THE PHANTOM OF JOY: EMOTION, AFFECT, AND THE PROBLEM OF PERSISTENCE IN MODERNIST LITERATURE

BY

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DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

My dissertation, "The Phantom of Joy: Emotion, Affect, and the Problem of Persistence in Modernist Literature," investigates the potential of positive affects for physical and aesthetic persistence. I expose textual traces of joy within literary modernism and offer a perspective on affective modernism that challenges the accepted structure of feeling. I consider how modernist writers (W.B. Yeats, May Sinclair, James Joyce, Mina Loy) endeavor to produce a realignment of self and body that is expansive and joyful, though always in relation to intense negative affect. Bodies and feelings are highly contested and gendered domains, and in theorizing joy I foreground the importance of the corporeal, emotional, and affective in the act of thinking about writing, reading, and meaning making, thereby contributing to the rethinking of modernism as more complex and embodied than is currently assumed. My work considers the precarity of life, especially for women and writers who challenge social and sexual norms. Literary engagement with joy and joyful objects intrudes into the consciousness of both character and reader, demanding new attention to be paid - to people, to words, to things - and this refocusing can lead to a fresh perspective that offers the potentiality to persist.

This dissertation challenges the dominant paradigm that characterizes modernism as unemotional, impersonal, and intellectual, and argues that analyzing and theorizing joy reveals modernism's critical modes as inadequate to a complete understanding of modernist aesthetics. Modernist scholarship has typically defined the mood of the modernist movement as anxious, suspicious, and detached. In contrast my dissertation offers a different mode and mood of engagement in order to analyze modernist literature. I contribute an alternative ecology of modernist knowing, namely, to know *feelingly*. I offer an analysis that uses close reading and close attention to "have eyes to see" positive affect and emotion. I posit that experiencing moments of joy, no matter how brief and contingent, can help us sustain intersubjective relationships, and that in experiencing moments of joy, subjects are able to reaffirm an energetic commitment to life. Each writer I discuss, namely W.B. Yeats, May Sinclair, James Joyce, and Mina Loy, cultivate episodes of joy that places them in a different relation to those feelings and objects that impinge upon them. Positive affects form a necessary part of life's experience, a will-toward-life that offers an attachment

to life. This is important because without attachment there is inaction and apathy, both personal and social. Moments of joy can be both a personal and political tool for continuance in the world. We must care, and have moments of intensity, in order to continue to engage with the unjust situations in which we find ourselves.

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DEDICATION

For my Dad, Ian Truran,

who nurtured my love of reading with his own

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

"What good to us is a long life if it is difficult and barren of joys, and if it is so full of misery that we can only welcome death as a deliverer?"
Sigmund Freud, "Civilization and Its Discontents" (1930)

"May Joy go solace-winged /To flutter whom she may concern"
Mina Loy (1917)

"I cannot see that art is anything less than a way of making joys perpetual."
Rebecca West (1928)

On the 18th April 1939, Virginia Woolf began to sketch her memoirs at the prompting of her sister, Nessa. At the age of fifty-seven Woolf thinks back to her first memory, "the most important of all my memories"; the base, she claims, upon which her entire life has stood.[1] She is a small child; she recalls the rhythmic susurration of the sea, "waves breaking, one, two, one, two," the quality of the light "behind a yellow blind," and the textural sound of scraping as the wind moves the blind, "draw[ing] its little acorn across the floor" (*MB* 64). As she recalls these sensations, the past becomes present within her body. She does not merely *think* of the feeling associated with the memory; rather her bodymind[2] is activated and she *feels* the emotion: "the feeling which is even at this very moment very strong in me" (*MB* 65). The past becomes an overlay upon the present, and the present a means to experience the past.[3] In contrast to the prototypical modernist character, the base-memory of Woolf's life is the "feeling of purest ecstasy I can conceive" (*MB* 65), feelings she re-experiences in recollection. She calls these feelings "moments of being" (*MB* 73). Unexpectedly for the general emotional tenor of modernism, Woolf reports that her most essential bedrock of feeling was joyous and that the recollection of it becomes a force to write, a means to produce art. These intensely felt "moments of being" continue throughout her life. They arrive as "sudden shocks" and, like Joycean epiphanies, they "will become a revelation of some order; it is a token of some real thing behind

[1] Woolf, Virginia. "A Sketch of the Past." *Moments of Being: A Collection of Autobiographical Writing*, edited by Jeanne Schulkind, second Edition, Harcourt, Inc, 1985. Hereafter referred to in-text as *MB*.
[2] Bodymind, or body-mind, is a term used to denote the relationship between body and mind as a unit, rather than a duality. This term is used broadly in body psychotherapy, somatic psychology, alternative medicine, and non-Western healing traditions. Bodymind has also been taken up recently in disability studies to articulate and complicate the intertwinement of mind and body, ability and disability. See Schalk, Sami. *Bodyminds Reimagined: (Dis)ability, Race, and Gender in Black Women's Speculative Fiction*, Duke University Press, 2018; Price, Margaret. "The Bodymind Problem and the Possibilities of Pain." *Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy,* 30, 1, 2015, pp. 268-284.
[3] Woolf is explicit about how both the past and present are changed in and through the experiencer: "The present moment is enriched by the past but the past is also enriched by the present" (14). She considers writing her memoirs contrasting the past and present Virginia, as the individual also changes so each iteration of the present-past is contingent, "I now, I then, come out in contrast. And further, this past is much affected by the present moment. What I write today I should not write in a year's time" (75).

appearances" (*MB* 72). Differing from Joyce however, Woolf articulates the centrality of emotion and interpersonal relation to the revelatory. Feeling is indispensable for a literary encounter: "so I go on to suppose that the shock-receiving capacity is what makes me a writer," because the shock is "at once in my case followed by the desire to explain it… and I make it real by putting it into words. It is only by putting it into words that I make it whole" (*MB* 72). Woolf makes the "ecstasy as I cannot describe" real to herself and to her reader by putting it into words. She seeks to express something that is beyond words, but that needs to be communicated through them. She must capture for readers: "the buzz, the croon, the smell, all seemed to press voluptuously against some membrane; not to burst it; but to hum round one such a complete rapture of pleasure that I stopped, smelt; looked" (*MB* 66).[4] Senses overloaded, touched, moved; attention arrested in a rapture of feeling that exceeds language (or the typical language of everyday speech), despite the everydayness of the experience – this is what a modernist writer, she claims, must wrestle with and write.

Her reflection articulates the slipperiness of putting feeling into words, the difficulty of not merely communicating the shell of feeling but offering the very essence of it. To report feeling is insufficient; readers must also feel its reverberations, hear its echo, taste its lingering flavor, and experience this despite language's inability to recreate that feeling-experience in totality. Failure to communicate the multidimensionality of the emotional experience through language is almost inevitable, but the motivation to try nonetheless remains strong. Communicating emotion to readers is fundamental to Woolf's understanding of herself as a writer. Woolf's reflections allow me to illustrate a number of claims that may prove surprising to scholars of modernism, and that I will examine over the course of this dissertation. These claims include: that emotion is at the center of modernism, that senses and bodies are integral to the experience of feeling, that what constitutes a body and feeling must be conceived much more broadly than the human corpus, that the individual is constituted and reconstituted via its *relations* to people, environments, impressions, and objects, and that the formal artistic experiments of modernism contribute to bringing emotions into being. Even more surprising perhaps, is the claim that intense, transformative, dynamic, positive emotion is central to modernism.

My dissertation challenges the dominant paradigm that characterizes modernism as predominantly unemotional, impersonal, and intellectual. It troubles the notion that Modernism is a movement that "relentlessly privileges intellect over emotion and aggressively enforces strong and

[4] Woolf describes her experience through her failure to describe it: "but again I cannot describe that rapture. It was rapture rather than ecstasy" (*MB* 66).

authoritative versions of the self."[5] Analyzing and theorizing joy reveals modernism's critical modes as inadequate to a complete understanding of modernist aesthetics. Modernist scholarship has typically defined the mood of the modernist movement as anxious, suspicious, and detached. In response to this accepted paradigm, I wish to provoke joy - meaning to *invite*, to *call forth*, and to *arouse*. I theorize positive affect in order to *invite* scholars to consider how joy contributes to modernist aesthetic production, and I argue that positive affect produces what I call "life-orientated" literature. My analysis c*alls forth* the joy that has haunted modernist aesthetics: an affective phantom that can contribute to an alternative vision of the modernist affective landscape. By focusing on the provocation of joy in modernist literature I hope *to arouse* interest in enlarging the scope of theorizable affects that can be explored in affect theory. By examining life-orientated affects in the modernist moment, my project responds to Michael Snediker's own delightful provocation to "imagine affirmation as an act far more radical than negation."[6] I expose textual traces of joy within literary modernism and offer a perspective on affective modernism that challenges the accepted structure of feeling.

This project offers a more nuanced account of literary modernism. I take up Eve Sedgwick's challenge, set forth in her seminal essay on paranoid and reparative reading, to conceptualize alternative hermeneutic forms. [7] She seeks to offer an alternative to dualistic thinking and reified critical approaches, because such conformity "creates a positive feedback loop, it becomes self-reinforcing as opposed to self-fulfilling" (*TF* 12). Thus, what had previously been a radical system of analysis becomes a normative, oppressive, reified mode of reading becoming the very oppressive system that it sought to interrupt in the first place. She explains the importance of creating alternative critical approaches *besides* the ones already in use: "*Beside* comprises a wide range of desiring, identifying, representing, repelling, paralleling, differentiating, rivaling, leaning, twisting, mimicking, withdrawing, aggressing, warping, and other relations" (*TF* 8 italics original). There is not one mode, or mood, through which to engage art, or to partake in the art of activism. She emphasizes the "queer possibility" of bodies and actions, that being in the world is not only oppressive or painful, but can also be loving, playing, healing, or joyful (*TF* 147). Jane Bennett's work on the re-enchantment of everyday life also emphasizes the importance of different moods. To conceive of modernity as "disenchanted i.e. a place of dearth and alienation" is to "discourage

[5] Cuda, Anthony. *The Passions of Modernism: Eliot, Yeats, Woolf, and Mann*. University of South Carolina Press, 2010.
[6] Snediker goes on to say, "Queer Optimism…wants to think about feeling good, to make disparate aspects of feeling good thinkable." Snediker, Michael. D. *Queer Optimism. Lyric Personhood and Other Felicitous Persuasions.* University of Minnesota Press, 2009, p. 3.
[7] Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. *Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity.* Duke University Press, 2003, hereafter referred to in text as *TF*.

affective attachment to that world."[8] In *Vibrant Matter* Jane Bennett claims, I think rightly, that, "if a set of moral principles is actually to be lived out, the right mood or landscape of affect has to be in place."[9] She goes on to say that "ethical political action on the part of humans seems to require not only a vigilant critique of existing institutions but also positive, even utopic, alternatives" (Bennett 2010, xv).

My dissertation offers a different mode and mood of engagement in order to analyze modernist literature. I contribute an alternative ecology of modernist knowing, namely, to know *feelingly*. I offer an analysis that uses close reading and close attention to "have eyes to see" positive affect, and also to place feeling "beside" these other modes of reading.[10] In revealing the phantoms of positive feeling that haunt modernist literature, I not only argue that joy is an affect worthy of attention, I also suggest that paying attention to moments of joy could be an invaluable part of creating the "right mood" to live on and persist in the battles of everyday living that are so powerfully -and experimentally – expressed in modernist literature.

To consider emotion and affect in Modernism is important, not merely because it has been occluded from the scholarly conversation, though it has been; it is productive because it offers a way of paying attention to scales of meaning and matter that are overlooked in discourse analysis. Often talk of "the body" does not include states that are other than reasonable or conscious, and yet the work under discussion repeatedly strives to capture that which is beyond language in different forms. For example, Joyce, I argue, deepens into the body across his *oeuvre*: from the physical imperative of passion that suffuses mind and body in *Portrait*, to the "blood and ouns" and emotions of *Ulysses*, then moving further into exploring the unconscious, pre-linguistic, and affective shifts in *Finnegans Wake*. In addition, the devaluation in literature of intense emotion as "sentimental" is often coded language for feminine and is as aspect of gender bias.[11] I discuss this in relation to modernism's relationship to emotionalism, below, and most directly in the chapters focusing on May Sinclair and Mina Loy. Through the examination of these writers' work, I challenge the idea that emotion is necessarily sentimental or that reason is unemotional.

In the first section of chapter one I will outline the parameters of my project. I articulate the paradigmatic view of modernism and modernist emotion. I then discuss key concepts such as persistence, haunting, and joy. I end this section with a brief summary of the chapters that follow. In

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[8] Bennett, Jane. *The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics.* Princeton University Press, 2001, p.3.
[9] Bennett, Jane. *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things*. Duke University Press, 2010, p.xii.
[10] In addition, there is no guarantee that an angry mood leads to better or more engaged activism. As Sedgwick points out, "to have an unmystified, angry view of large and genuinely systemic oppressions does not intrinsically or necessarily enjoin that person to any specific train of epistemological or narrative consequences" (*TF* 124).
[11] See Clark, Suzanne. *Sentimental Modernism: Women Writers and the Revolution of the Word*. Indiana University Press, 1991.

section two, I introduce the field of affect theory and trace the major genealogies that have emerged. I then offer a glossary of vocabulary terms that I will use throughout the project. In particular, I focus on describing the work of Benedict Spinoza whose "philosophy of joy," as laid out in his *Ethics*, forms the basis for my project. In section three, to offer further context, I offer a brief overview of modernist theories of emotion that were contemporaneous to the writers I discuss, including Charles Darwin, William James, and Sigmund Freud.

The Moods of Modernity

It is commonplace to characterize modernism as marked by a series of shocks that create anxiety, depression, or numbness. The Great War (1914 – 1918), class upheavals, increasing industrial mechanization, rapid social change, and radical developments in sciences all led to profound breaks with traditional ways of viewing and experiencing the world. These shocks were often perceived as painful, alienating and destructive to the individual, in addition to being antagonistic to artistic production. The Modernist period also offered unprecedented experiences in terms of excitement: radio, cinema, increased access to travel, mass market novels, and the rise of the literary "little magazines." Uncertainty about the status and constitution of the universe, humanity, the "subject," even individual consciousness was intensified by discoveries in the sciences, psychology, political theory, economics, philosophy, and an explosion of artistic upheavals. Melancholy, anxiety, and disillusionment are therefore often posited as the major affects in the modernist social imaginary. [12]

The German sociologist George Simmel is exemplary in his concerns about modernity's impact on the individual, and he drew direct connections between modernity and the lack of social and emotional wellbeing. Simmel diagnosed the malady of modern living as constant over-stimulation leading to a protective withdrawal of interest and feeling: "[t]he psychological foundation, upon which the metropolitan individuality is erected, is the intensification of emotional life due to the swift and continuous shift of external and internal stimuli."[13] Those living in urban centers adapt to these constant shocks of differences and the new rhythms of the city and, quite rationally, retreat in order to protect themselves (Simmel 52). Thus, the metropolitan person "is

[12] See Flatley, Jonathan. *Affective Mapping: Melancholia and the Politics of Modernism.* Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard University Press, 2008; Love, Heather. *Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History.* Harvard University Press, 2007; Crangle, Sara. *Prosaic Desires: Modernist Knowledge, Boredom, Laughter, and Anticipation*, Edinburgh University Press, 2010; Pease, Allison. *Modernism, Feminism, and the Culture of Boredom*, Cambridge University Press, 2012.
[13]Simmel, Georg. "The Metropolis and Mental Life" (1903). *Modernism: An Anthology of Sources and Documents*, edited by Kolocontroni, Vassiliki et al, The University of Chicago Press, 1998, p. 52.

moved to a sphere of mental activity which is least sensitive, and which is furthest removed from the depths of the personality" (Simmel 53).[14] This anticipates T. S. Eliot's words in "The Waste Land":

> Unreal City
> Under the brown fog of a winter dawn,
> A crowd flowed over London Bridge, so many,
> I had not thought death had undone so many.
>
> (l. 60-65)

Urbanized figures who are emotionally dead go about their grey lives under a brown, toxic fog. The walking-dead that flow into King William Street at the center of the "unreal city" - the financial heart of the City of London - represent those ground down by monotony and money. Hyper-rationalization and emotional detachment thus become a self-protective survival mechanism. Given this context, if emotions are considered at all within modernism, they are uniformly negative. Scholars of modernism have explored emotions such as melancholia (Flatley 2008), shame and "backwardness" (Love 2008), and boredom (Crangle 2010, Pease 2012).[15] In conversation with these scholars, I seek to shift the accepted notion of modernism as unemotional, but more than that, I seek to trace the hints of defiant positive affect that haunt literary modernism.

Yet, to speak of joy in Modernism is to run the risk of being characterized, as Yeats was by Auden, as "silly."[16] In fact, Auden's revision of his poem "September 1, 1939," offers a typical example of literary modernism's attitude regarding positive emotion. Auden's poem "September 1, 1939," responds to the outbreak of WWII, and speaks of feeling "uncertain and afraid" as the "clever hopes expire / Of a low dishonest decade" (l. 3-5). Auden acknowledges that, just like everyone else, he is "defenceless under the night," and is composed of "Eros and of dust" (l.106-107). Uncharacteristically, Auden expresses the belief that despite despair there is hope in the form of intimate connection and emotion: "Beleaguered by the same / Negation and despair," he might "Show an affirming flame," concluding that "We must love one another or die" (l. 108-110, 99).[17] However, Auden famously recanted this moment of relational optimism by changing the line about

[14] Unlike Simmel, who nostalgically juxtaposes a small-town's intimate connections against the indifference of the city, May Sinclair's novels depict the minute geographic, intellectual, and emotional limitations of the country which results in the claustrophobic, repressed and wasted lives of the women who live there.
[15] See Flatley, Jonathan. *Affective Mapping: Melancholia and the Politics of Modernism.* Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard University Press. 2008; Love, Heather. *Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History.* Cambridge, Mass. & London, 2007; Crangle, Sara. *Prosaic Desires: Modernist Knowledge, Boredom, Laughter, and Anticipation*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010; Pease, Allison. *Modernism, Feminism, and the Culture of Boredom*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
[16] Auden, W.H. "In Memory of W.B.Yeats." *W.H. Auden: Selected Poems: New Edition*, Random House, 1979. l 36.
[17] Auden, W.H. "September 1, 1939," ibid.

love to: "We must love one another *and* die;" (my italics), before disowning the poem altogether. This emotional and poetic turnabout serves to illustrate positive feelings are often aligned with naivety or silliness and must ultimately be rejected. Scholars have tended to follow suit, as there is a suspicion of the "all-too-positive" elements of popular literature that could lead to jingoism, triumphalism, and self-congratulatory imperialist projects. [18] However, as I demonstrate, the erasure of emotion and positive feeling creates a palimpsest, a phantom of feeling that haunts modernism's pages. In Auden's elegy for Yeats, for example, Auden mourns the loss not only of a great poet, but one whose "unconstraining voice" sought to "persuade us to rejoice" (l.59-60). The loss is not only of Yeats's gift, but of a genius whose poetry sounds out defiantly in the darkness and move others to feel power and joy. Contrary to the claim that "poetry makes nothing happen" (l. 36), Yeats unconstrainedly advocated for the power of aesthetics and emotion to effect change in the world.

Reacting against the moral certainty and the melioristic myth of Victorian culture, artists at the turn of the twentieth century sought a means of reflecting and responding to a very different, and much darker, cultural reality. Victorianism, to the modernist intelligentsia, was tired and complacent. New modern energies had to be captured and communicated, reflecting the changing times, both the dark sense of alienation and the rare ecstatic possibilities in such a transformative age. The shock of social and cultural change, urban malaise, the cataclysmic impact of the Great War, all contributed to a deep suspicion of emotions that might be perceived as sentimental or Victorian. Modernist pessimism might be said to form part of the affective posturing that distinguished the avant-garde artist from the mainstream Edwardian writer, differentiating a D.H. Lawrence or an H. G. Wells from a P.G. Wodehouse. The anxiety and antagonism perceived in the music of Stravinsky or Mahler for example, or in the writing of T. S. Eliot or Wyndham Lewis, was controversial and yet clearly distinguished these artists from the Victorian optimistic faith in progress. Contrary to Simmel's fears about the metropolis, artists like T.S. Eliot, T.E. Hulme, Ezra Pound, Wyndham Lewis, and Mina Loy cultivated the detachment, impersonality and intellectualism that Simmel saw as morally dangerous.[19] Artists sought new ways to respond to, and reflect upon, life radically changed by modernization, such as the redrawing of geographical boundaries through imperialism and the nation-state, the undermining of ideas of Self via

[18] Mao, Douglas and Walkowitz, Rebecca L. *Bad Modernisms*. Duke University Press, 2006, p.3.
[19] Simmel considered the severed connection between mind and emotion as being at the root of why people become hard and disconnected: "our minds respond, with some definite feeling, to almost every impression emanating from another person. The unconsciousness, the transitoriness and the shift of these feelings seem to raise them only into indifference" (55).

psychoanalytic and psychosexual theories of personality, and the changing political status of women.

Aesthetic Modernism's Attitude to Emotion and Feeling

In her discussion of sentimentality, Suzanne Clark gets to the heart of the modernist distaste for "excessive emotion" when she says, "[l]ike other pejorative labels, that of sentimentality hides its gendered insult behind a mask of objective judgment."[20] Feminist theorist, Sara Ahmed, citing Spelman and Jagger, points out that scholars have shown that the subordination of emotions works to "subordinate the feminine and the body" (3).[21] Ahmed goes on to say that "emotions are associated with women, who are represented as 'closer' to nature, ruled by appetite, and less able to transcend the body through thought, will and judgement" (*CPE* 3). Many (male) literary Modernists accused other writers (often female) of being "sentimental" as a decisive condemnation of their non-modernist – and therefore passé and unworthy – modes of writing. The indictment of being "sentimental" could be levied for literary crimes such as focusing on domestic spaces, or "female" concerns such as children or relationships, or for writing in (lucrative) genres such as romances or *bildungsroman*, or for not being "sufficiently intellectual" (another code for emotional).[22] As Clark states, "the idea of the 'sentimental' was used by modernist critics to repudiate and for many years effectively silence a whole generation of women writers by linking emotionalism to women" (Clark 2007, 125).[23] Such criticism led to many women emulating their masculine modernist anti-emotional stance in order to produce more "modern" work.[24] These were criticisms that both May Sinclair and

[20] Clark, Suzanne. "Sentimental Modernism." *Gender in Modernism: New Geographies, Complex Intersections*, edited by Bonnie Kime Scott, University of Illinois Press, 2007, p.125.

[21] Ahmed, Sara. *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*. Routledge, 2004, 3. Hereafter referred to intext as *CPE*. See also Jaggar, A.M. "Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology." *Women, Knowledge, and Reality: Explorations in Feminist Philosophy*, edited by A. Garry and M. Pearsall, Routledge, 1989; Spelman. E.V. "Anger and Insubordination." *Women, Knowledge, and Reality: Explorations in Feminist Philosophy*, edited by A. Garry and M. Pearsall (eds). Routledge, 1989.

[22] Suzanne Clark responds to the accusation of anti-intellectualism levied at women writers by stating "as if revolutionary poetry could only be intellectual – or by suggesting that women's continuity with nineteenth-century conventions of narrative made them less than intellectually respectable" *Gender in Modernism*, p. 125.

[23] Emotionalism was also used to feminize, and thereby dismiss, other classes such as the working poor or other nations. In the first manifesto of *Blast* (1914), for example, France is blasted for the nation's "SENTIMENTAL GALLIC GUSH / SENSATIONALISM," claiming a "violent boredom with that feeble Europeanism, abasement of the miserable "intellectual" before anything coming from Paris," and dismissing it as "Cosmopolitan sentimentality." Lewis, Wyndham et al. Blast Manifesto I. *Blast*, 1, 1914, pp.13, 34.

[24] Not all women artists responded to the criticism of emotionality by attempting to reduce it to naught. Louise Bogan, for example in "The Heart and the Lyre," preferred to defend her use of emotion as part of the power of her work. She argues that the fear of, "some regression into typical romantic attitudes," has led to female writers avoiding all emotion. This, she suggests, "is not a wholly healthy impulse, for it negates too strongly a living and valuable side of women's character. In women, more than in men, the intensity of their emotions is the key to the treasures of their spirit," Bogan, Louise cited in *Gender in Modernism*, 153.

Mina Loy had to negotiate in their writing.[25] These two very different, but contemporaneous, writers and feminists wrote outside what might be traditionally considered "sentimental" genres, and neither sought the rhetorical expediency of sentiment, but both shared a concern with addressing the lived experiences of women in their writing, and so both were criticized for focusing on feeling and physicality.

Modernist aesthetics thus performed aesthetic emotions that were highly controlled, and this is reflected in numerous manifestos and poetic statements of the time. Poetic statements such as T.S. Eliot's "Tradition and the Individual Talent" (1919) or Ezra Pound's freeing us from "emotional slither" sought to distance art from emotion and make it cool and impersonal.[26] Emotions might be permitted as long as they were properly explained and thereby made reasonable.[27] Eliot's objection to *Hamlet,* for example, is that the emotion is excessive given the facts of the case. Hamlet's emotions are ridiculous at best and pathological at worst: "In the character Hamlet it is the buffoonery of an emotion which can find no outlet in action; in the dramatist it is the buffoonery of an emotion which he cannot express in art. The intense feeling, ecstatic or terrible, without an object or exceeding its object, is something which every person of sensibility has known; it is doubtless a study to pathologists."[28] Intense emotions for these modernists must be tightly controlled and made reasonable, closer to judgements, for them to be artistically valid.

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[25] There is an added irony to the criticism of Sinclair for writing popular novels for women, because she regularly used the money she earned from those "sentimental" novels to financially support anti-sentimental men such as Ezra Pound and T.S.Eliot and fund little magazines.

[26] T.S. Eliot in "Tradition and the Individual Talent" (1919) wrote, perhaps, the best-known modernist articulation against writing about, and from, emotion. Eliot famously concludes that: "Poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality. But, of course, only those who have personality and emotions know what it means to want to escape from these things." Eliot, T.S. "Tradition and the Individual Talent." *The Norton Anthology of Modern and Contemporary Poetry*. Vol 1. Third Edition, edited by Jahan Ramazani, Richard Ellmann, Robert O'Clair, W.W.Norton & Company, 2003, p. 946-947. Critics such as Maud Ellmann has interrogated and undermined Eliot's confident stance of impersonality, see Ellmann, Maud. *Impersonality: T.S.Eliot and Ezra Pound*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1987, 7. Pound, Ezra. "A Retrospect" *Pavannes and Divagations*. New Directions, 1918.

[27] A later repudiation of emotion came in the form of the "affective fallacy" of Wimsatt and Beardsley (1949). These later literary critics objected to evaluating a text, or attributing worth to it, based on the reader's emotional response. Wimsatt and Beardsley stated that it is a mistake to focus on the physiological response of the reader, which cannot be proven or denied, as it can lead the critic to lose sight of the poetry itself, displacing words with emotions. Stating that "the Affective Fallacy is a confusion between the poem and its results (what it is and what it does)…the outcome of either Fallacy, the Intentional or the Affective, is that the poem itself, as an object of specifically critical judgment, tends to disappear" (31). Wimsatt and Beardsley were attempting to not simply evaluate literature but also legitimize literary studies, demonstrating that it had "objective" methods of analysis. Despite its title, Wimsatt and Beardsley do not deny the possibility of aesthetic emotions within the text and within the reader, but they ultimately reject them as beyond the scope of literary criticism. Wimsatt, W.K. Jr and M.C. Beardsley. "The Affective Fallacy." *The Sewanee Review*, 57, 1, 1949, pp. 31-55.

[28] Eliot prescribed the manner that modernist emotion should be created in literature: "The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an 'objective correlative'; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that *particular* emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked. […] The artistic 'inevitability' lies in this complete adequacy of the external to the emotion; and this is precisely what is deficient in *Hamlet.* Hamlet (the man) is dominated by an emotion which is inexpressible, because it is in *excess* of the facts as they appear," Eliot, T.S. "Tradition and the Individual Talent."

What feelings are permitted, in what circumstances, and what emotions are considered excessive, reveal the construction of social mores regarding the "proper" performance of emotion. The Futurist's for example wrote about feelings stated in a manner of dramatic excess in their artistic manifestos. Feelings such as pride, frenzy, fervor, mania and lust.[29] Flinging "their challenge to the stars" they triumphantly state the death of the old and they are the birth of the new: "Our hearts feel no weariness, for they feed on fire, on hatred, and on speed!" (8). Their poetry will be filled with "courage, boldness and rebellion," their actions struggle, glory, speeding movement, destruction, war (4). Passionate and intensely masculine, the Futurists harnessed the frenetic energy of the machine, but roundly rejected love and soft "womanly" sentiments as "contemptible": "[i]t is this hatred for the tyranny of love that we have expressed with the laconic phrase: 'contempt for women.'"[30] The Futurist's performative emotional excess is permitted within their manifestoes; they separate them from the "fragile woman, obsessing and fatal, whose voice, heavy with destiny" is a "reservoir of love" (ibid). The "new" of aggressive, active, masculine passion replaces the "old" of romantic emotion associated with the feminine.

Though the Futurists are extreme in their stance, modernism more broadly was strongly anti-sentimental. As such emotion and affect form an important, but relatively unmapped, aspect of the sociocultural matrix from which aesthetic modernism emerged. Of the scant attention paid to affect in modernist studies, the focus has been almost exclusively on negative affects which more obviously resonate with the shock of modernization and crises at the turn of the century. Yet, as my dissertation will discuss, a number of the best known, bestselling, and best respected modernists did not embrace such pessimism in its entirety; they also explored the possibility of intense positive affects in their work. Each writer that I consider writes about - and seeks to create in the reader - intense positive feelings in juxtaposition to negative feelings. For each writer, intense episodes of joy illuminate emotional, intellectual, and circumstantial darkness. This results in an affective resilience, what might be called a persistent will-to-live. My understanding of joy as hyphenated – as connected in necessary tension and relation with negative emotions - permits me to acknowledge the dominant affective tone of the modernist period and yet also offer a supplement, or extension, of this affective

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The Norton Anthology of Modern and Contemporary Poetry. Vol 1. Third Edition, edited by Jahan Ramazani, Richard Ellmann, Robert O'Clair, W.W.Norton & Company, 2003, p.943.

[29] Marinetti, F.T. "The Foundation and Manifesto of Futurism" (1909). *100 Artists' Manifestos from the Futurists to the Stuckists*, edited by Alex Danchev, Penguin Books, 2011, p.2. All manifestoes, unless otherwise noted, are taken from this collection.

[30] Marinetti. F.T. "Contempt for Women." *Le Futurisme* (1911). *Futurism: An Anthology*, edited by Lawrence Rainey, Christine Poggi, and Laura Wittman, Yale University Press, 2009, p.86.

field in order to account for the joy that is also present within the work of many writers of that period.

Defining Joy

To feel joy is to be in a state of, or to take in, intense pleasure. It is to exult, to delight, to be in high spirits. The Oxford English Dictionary defines joy as "a vivid emotion of pleasure arising from a sense of well-being or satisfaction." Joy is linked to a satisfaction achieved and experienced rather than a desire deferred. This definition differentiates joy from its close neighbor of *jouissance;* the key difference is that joy is a pleasure attained, thus giving a state of fulfillment, rather than a continuously deferred longing and lack.[31] In his philology of joy, Adam Potkay outlines some situations that evoke joy: "joy is what we feel, and as self-reflective beings know we feel, in situations, real or imaginary, in which what was lost is found; what was missed restored; what constrained is lifted; what we desire arrives, or what arrives satisfies a desire we hadn't known we'd had." [32] My definition of joy incorporates these facets of joy but also proposes that joy is not merely a mental state, but also an affective state, and one that always registers upon the body, whether consciously reflected upon or not. Joy impacts our physical bodies and in a transformative instant, takes our breath away, leaving us different than before. Spinoza theorized that joy, along with its contrary sorrow, formed the *conatus* of life: the very will to live and persist that drives all humans. Silvan Tomkins in his study of affects counts joy amongst the fundamental, evolutionarily necessary affects, and the neurobiologist Antonio Damasio suggests that positive affect is the brain's way of mapping the wellbeing of the body (as homeostasis). Positive affects form a necessary part of life's experience, a will-toward-life that offers an attachment to life. This is important because without attachment there is inaction and apathy, both personal and social. Moments of joy can be both a personal and political tool for continuance in the world. We must care and have moments of intensity in order to continue to engage with the unjust situations in which we find ourselves.

Joy can be thought of in terms of degree, quality, cause/effect, as paradoxical or hyphenated. [33] Joy is modifiable in ways that happiness, with its overtones of virtuous morality, is

[31] Jacques Lacan developed the theory of *jouissance* in his seminars and produced a concept that would fundamentally change psychoanalysis. The secondary literature on *jouissance* is vast and beyond the scope of this project. To gain initial insight into Lacan's original ideas see Lacan, Jacques. *Formations of the Unconscious: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book V*, edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, translated by Russell Grigg, Polity Press, 2017, especially the "Desire and Jouissance" section; Lacan, Jacques. *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII*, edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, translated by Dennis Porter, Routledge, 1992.
[32] Potkay, Adam. *The Story of Joy: From the Bible to Late Romanticism,* Cambridge University Press, 2007, p vii.
[33] Some of this definition is taken from Potkay, he explains that joy can be thought of in terms of degree, quality, and cause/effect. He also points out that joys are modifiable in ways that happiness is not (2007, 2).

not.[34] Objects of joy – that which moves one to feel joy or to which one might attach our joy – operate at different scales. Joy's etymological roots in Middle English "*joye*" and Old French "*joie*" link the word to "jewel," suggesting its rarity. Certainly, the temporality of joy is episodic and ephemeral. One cannot be perpetually in a state of joy; to be so, as I will touch upon below, would mark us as manic or mentally ill. Joy, as it is depicted in Yeats, Sinclair, Joyce, and Loy, is episodic and interrupting. It fills one up and then dissipates. This can offer a period of satiation but often followed by a sense of loss, but joy changes the perspective of the feeler of joy. For the authors under discussion, joy either precipitates or results from inspiration. Inspiration signals a physical act of blowing into or onto (from the Latin *inspirare* "inspire, inflame, blow into"), which also carries the metaphorical connotation of transformative force.[35] As Yeats expressed throughout his poetry, joy robs us of our words and collapses time, it burns and fuels us, and joy can offer creative enticement – in the sense of to fill and to "prompt and induce." This energetic inspiration, I suggest, not only motivates artists to create works of art, but allows people more broadly to affectively attach to the world. Joy does not remain, but it often returns, and it can come from small and quotidian things as much as exceptional circumstances.

Joy is not the same as happiness. Whereas joy is a vivid bodymind state that is experienced in the present and is a satisfaction attained and immersive, happiness is more evaluative, "a mental disposition or ethical evaluation" (Potkay 2007, 2). Discussing the philosophical history of happiness, Potkay argues that "an ethical conception of happiness is intimately connected with communal and political evaluations."[36] Sara Ahmed in *The Promise of Happiness* links happiness and sociality; she theorizes that happiness reinforces normative values and that certain forms of happiness become synonymous with being good: "happiness is used to redescribe social norms as social goods" (Ahmed 2010, 2). Rather than assuming happiness is simply found in happy people, Ahmed asks what forms of personhood are made valuable by certain claims to happiness: "Attributions of happiness might be how social norms and ideals become affective, as if relative proximity to those norms and ideals creates happiness" (Ahmed 2010, 11). In other words,

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[34] Potkay differentiates between joy and happiness by claiming that "'joy' is a trickier thing to talk about than 'happiness'" because though both joy and happiness admit degree, "joy admits both degree *and*, in writing, a welter of adjectival qualifications" Potkay, Adam. "Narrative Possibilities of Happiness, Joy, and Unhappiness". *Nineteenth-Century Contexts*. Vol 33. 2, 201, p. 117-118. See also Ahmed, Sara. *The Promise of Happiness*. Duke University Press, 2010.

[35] The link between poetic inspiration and divinity has been long established, whether that be the invocation to the Muse or the direct touch of God, circa 1300 inspiration meant the "immediate influence of God or a god." Inspiration is linked to breath in the Old French *inspiracion* "inhaling, breathing in; inspiration" (13c.), and from Late Latin *inspirationem* (nominative *inspiratio*), "blow into, breathe upon," figuratively "breathing or infusion into the mind or soul." (Online Etymology Dictionary). Though literary modernism retained the exceptionalism and 'genius' established by the god-touched artist, modernists tended to reject, or mock, any religious overtones of inspiration

[36] Potkay, Adam. "Narrative Possibilities of Happiness, Joy, and Unhappiness". *Nineteenth-Century Contexts*. Vol 33. 2, 2011, p.116.

happiness is socially determined - tied up with virtue and so becomes linked to doing good, being good, and therefore leads to value judgement; joy can escape social control. As Laura Frost says of pleasure, "pleasure is integrally tied to bodily, sensual experience, while happiness is more abstract and metaphysical, correlated with truth, contemplation, and wisdom. …pleasure can easily become disruptive, antisocial, or excessive. Pleasure can get out of hand; happiness, never" (7-8). Joy, like intense pleasure, interrupts rather than restrains.

Modernist Joy- Hyphenated Joy

Each writer I explore cultivates an episode of joy to place themselves into a different relation with those feelings and objects that impinge upon them. Whether those objects be memories (in the case of Leopold Bloom), or abstract concepts (death in the case of Yeats's poetry), personal relationships (for May Sinclair's characters), or sexual and gender relations (Mina Loy). The poetics and politics of joy are an embodied politics. Modernist joy vivifies. For the reader of modernist literature, it illuminates. Modernist joy does not presuppose a disengagement from real life, because it is not a state in which one can rest so long as to become apathetic. Modernist joy is, instead, an interruption, a change in bodymind state bringing one into realignment with self and world. To experience joy is to feel and be changed, offering a time-space to feel differently and therefore opening the potentiality to act differently. For each of the writers the sometimes unexpected but intense episodes illuminate the rest of the darkness, but also intensify the will-to-live. Whilst the illumination draws attention to the possibility for intense pleasure in the lives of modernist characters, it also makes more intense the darkness, which is why I consider joy a hyphenated affect, one that embeds the body of the subject in the world but offers an affective means of relating to their worlds differently. What becomes clear is that intense affective episodes are crucial for the effort to continue with life, in order to persist. In the case of Yeats, he seeks to evoke joy as a prophylactic against aging and death. The modernist preference for looking things squarely in the eye – can, Ellen Willis points out, turn into habitual despair.[37] Existential despair can counteract the galvanizing effects of righteous rage, or moral movement, or even wanting to persist in the world. Joy, I suggest - and the writings of these modernist artists support – offers an affective reboot, a respite from despair in order engage with the world, to battle, to re-spite.

To signal the close relationship of joy to other, sometimes negative, passions and emotions (tragic joy in Yeats, or unendurable joy for Sinclair), or joy that is complicated or qualified (carnal joy in Loy), I propose the idea of modernist joy as an hyphenated-feeling. This suggests that joy is a state that places frictional things in close connection. The hyphen offers a conceptual and

[37] Willis, Ellen. *Sex, Hope, and Rock-n-Roll*. University of Minnesota Press, 1992, p.80.

typographical bridge and is a metaphor for the connectivity joy creates. Hyphenated-joy signals that modernist joy is always in relation and close proximity to other emotions, sometimes qualifying them, sometimes being qualified. So, in Yeats's poem "Tom O'Roughley" for example, Tom claims that "an aimless joy is a pure joy." In other of Yeats's poems joy is also "antique" ("The Song of the Happy Shepherd"), "abstract" ("I see Phantoms of Hatred"), "sexual" ("Whence Had they Come?") - each puts joy into connection with other things. Sedgwick articulates the promiscuity of affective attachments: "affects can be and are attached to things, people, ideas, sensations, relations, activities, ambitions, institutions, and any number of other things including other affects. Thus, one can be excited by anger, disgusted by shame, or surprised by joy" (*TF* 19). Affectivity is the constant sense of transience and "inbetween-ness" that relates each and every discernible experience of the world to another. It is what allows us to build a knowledge that can compose our encounters in the world into knowledge and language. Emphasizing the link of joy to other emotions is thereby a means of articulating the Spinozan concept of multiple knowledge forms emerging from a nexus of connections. My research points to joy in aesthetic modernism as the endeavor to produce a realignment of self and body that is expansive and joyful, but always in relation with intense negative affect. Hyphenated-joy is also a useful means of signaling a gap or interruption, where a lacuna can offer an opening of possibility, space for reorientation, or a time (a pause) for respite. We are never *not* affected and we are always transitioning from affective one state to another, as such the connecting hyphen signals the simultaneity of connection and gap.

Haunted by a Feeling – The Phantasm of Joy

Can one be haunted by a feeling – an affect? How might that feeling take possession and set up house within the flesh? Do we suspect that there might be an affective poltergeist because of the appearance of goosebumps, or a palpitating heart, or a churning stomach? Perhaps one has a sense as one walks into a room that something is not as it should be - a hunch, an instinct, a notion that something is not quite right. Even more strangely, can one be haunted by happiness, or spooked by joy? These kinds of questions find form in asking: how are affects felt within a text, how might a "dead" text from a non-living writer become enlivened through feeling and affect? Rejected, or repressed, in the wake of the immensity and immediacy of death in WWI and Freud's death-drive, might the life-orientated affect of joy haunt the modernist cultural imaginary? [38] In part I use the term "haunting" as a metaphor for a presence, a feeling, that is hidden in plain sight. Joy is an unlikely-

[38] Walter Benjamin was fascinated by phantasmagoria and wrote of the projection sheets in his arcades project. See Cohen, Margaret. "Walter Benjamin's Phantasmagoria." *New German Critique*, 48, 1989, pp. 87-107.

seeming affective motivation for the creation of modernist art.[39] Yet Yeats, for example, combined ghosts, recurring memories, imaginary phantasms, and a fierce, painful joy in his poem "The Tower." For him, this haunting was welcome, a bringing back to creative potency that which was "half dead at the top." It is also from Yeats that I take the idea of phantasm.[40]

Yeats claimed that in writing "there is always a phantasmagoria," by which he meant that the writer always creates imaginary forms and phantasms that gave substance to his visions.[41] Yeats, I argue, sought to create a phantasmagoria of feeling alongside his symbolic phantasmagoria in order to revivify the "slow dying of men's hearts."[42] For Yeats, to be a thing of imagination was not to negate the possibility of its reality nor doubt the possibility of physiological, psychological, and emotional impact. Symbols live and linger, resonating within the living art of true artists, as my analysis will show. Similarly, for Spinoza too, to imagine a thing is to give it both material existence and the power to affect one's wellbeing. This is why, he suggests, that the "The mind endeavours as much as possible to imagine those things which increase or assist the body's power of acting" (IIIP12).[43] It is important to imagine things that are good for us because, according to Spinoza and the parallelism of his system, if you imagine it, it also impacts the body – and vice versa. What Yeats sought to discover was what manner of aesthetic phantasmagoria might haunt the (Irish) bodies of the living and move them to a deeper and more empowered social organization. Deleuze too would ask a form of that question in his discussion of Spinoza, bringing Yeats's concerns to the contemporary moment, "but now it is a question of knowing whether relations (and which ones?) can compound directly to form a new, more "extensive" relation, or whether capacities can compound directly to constitute a more "intensive" capacity or power."[44]

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[39] However, according to T.S. Eliot perhaps haunting is a quintessential modernist technique. He wanted writers to be haunted by the classical past, and to acknowledge that words, even though they that seem like your own, have always been used by others before you - there is an etymology and cultural history of words, this was an issue for artists seeking to 'make it new'. See Eliot's "Tradition and the Individual Talent" (1919).

[40] At the turn of the 20th century ghosts, specters, phantasms and psychic phenomena were of great interest. The Society of Psychical Research (a society to which both Yeats and Sinclair belonged) and the School of Psychic Studies were established, and investigated both paranormal and psychic events. Not merely literary plot devices or stock imaginary figures, phantoms and specters were also powerful conceptual metaphors. May Sinclair deals explicitly with ghosts, haunting, and the affective transfer of things that have no materiality in this world but nonetheless have substance and impact. Phantasms take form through and within the bodies of those sensitive enough to notice and experience them. A phantasm, according to the OED is also "a counterfeit, a sham; an inferior or false copy or semblance" and Joyce's Shem the Penman self, is a "sham, and a very low sham" and also accused of being a counterfeiter. A counterfeiter of letters, of words, a creator of fictions that nonetheless have material and substantial realities in the world.

[41] Yeats, W.B. "Poetry and Tradition" in *The Cutting of the Agate* (1907). *Essays and Introductions*. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1961), p.509.

[42] Yeats, W.B. "The Symbolism of Poetry." *Essays and Introductions*. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1961, p.162-3.

[43] Spinoza, Benedict. *Ethics*, translated by W.H White, Wordsworth Editions Limited, 2001.

[44] Deleuze, Gilles. "Ethology: Spinoza and Us." *Incorporations* 6. J. Crary and S. Kwinter (eds). Zone Books, 1994, p.628.

The work of Avery Gordon in *Ghostly Matters* on the "haunting" of social violence on everyday life offers another sense of haunting that the "phantasm" of my title gestures to.[45]Each of the writers that make up this dissertation touches upon a form of precarity, yet each writer is not a part of an oppressed or minoritarian group as Gordon's specters are. What joy might look like in the works of the writers of Harlem Renaissance, or Anglo-Indian writers for example, is something I would like to explore in future projects. The writers I discuss, Joyce, Sinclair, and Loy, were financially insecure and faced poverty throughout their lives, which surfaces in their work.[46] Sinclair and Loy, as women, had the added constraint of limited options for earning money and both had a family to support. Sinclair's prolific writing was a means of feeding herself and her mother, and Loy relied on small family stipends and numerous entrepreneurial ventures to which she was ill-suited, including designing and selling lampshades in Paris. So, whilst this dissertation does not offer a sociological analysis of social violence, these chapters reveal the haunting of oppressions in Gordon's sense - and for Sinclair literal ghosts and spectral manifestations – and the entanglement of joy in that haunting.

Another of the ways in which I see my project and Avery Gordon's connect is in a commitment to the narration of "complex personhood." Gordon, as a sociologist, advocates for considering people in all their contradictions: "Complex personhood means that the stories people tell about themselves, about their troubles, about their social worlds, and about their society's problems are entangled and weave between what is immediately available as a story and what their imaginations are reaching toward" (4). Representation of complex personhood is central to the experiments in form for Modernism, and so Modernist aesthetic objects offer particularly rich objects for the analysis of the "messiness" of life.[47] Artist's sought strategies for creative and personal persistence and they demanded strategies of readerly persistence from their readers. To ignore or be blind to the strategies of persistence is to miss a layer of complexity. Further, the affective and emotional respite that intense positive affect offers is a generally overlooked strategy. As Gordon states, "even those who live in the most dire circumstances possess a complex and oftentimes contradictory humanity and subjectivity that is never adequately glimpsed by viewing them as victims or, on the other hand, as superhuman agents" (4). Hyphenated joy offers a "and/both"

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[45] Gordon, Avery. *Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination*. Second Edition. University of Minnesota Press, 1997.

[46] Yeats might have what we would call the most "privilege" today – as an Irish protestant with sponsorship from the Lady Gregory, he was not on the poverty line but the difficulty he engaged with, as my chapter explores, is one that all of us will face – the possibility of psychic death as well as the inevitability of physical death.

[47] By "mess" I gesture to the tangle "stuff" that includes energies, meanings, objects, and emotions that make up lives. See Manalansan, IV, Martin. "The 'Stuff' of Archives: Mess, Migration, and Queer Lives." *Radical History Review*, 120, 2014, pp. 94-107.

nuance to the modernist structure of feeling, one that can indicate how positive feelings might keep us stuck sometimes, but also offer new energetic frames of reference and potentialities for persistence. I also share with Gordon the belief that subconscious or unconscious things can manifest themselves within the body and consciousness of the experiencer, and that these experiences can solidify into a feeling that there is "something-to-be-done." As Gordon explains: "haunting is a frightening experience" but, unlike trauma, "is distinctive for producing a something-to-be-done. […] when something else, something different from before, seems like it must be done. It is this sociopolitical-psychological state to which haunting referred" (xvi). Haunting feelings, frightening or joyous, refuses to support the status-quo, and the shift opens up the possibility for something to be done differently.

The Problem of Persistence

To persist in the world, one must want to continue to live in it. Part of the challenge of persistence is to find ways to continue to live in a world, nation, society, town, home, and body, when these same things make it difficult to continue. This is always a matter of life and death, even if life is healthy or the death seemingly far off – to persist is to abide. The problem of persistence might also be framed in terms of the quality of life, an attempt to thrive rather than simply exist. Many of May Sinclair's female characters, for example, are struggling to be intellectually and emotionally alive in a gendered hierarchy that insists that women should be "good" daughters, wives and mothers; always subordinate to the emotional needs of others, the women that Sinclair portrays experience a form of living death. Stephen Dedalus also struggles to persist through the degrading decline of his family's fortunes as they slip into poverty. He and his family strive to physically persist, often going hungry, but Stephen also attempts to remain creatively and intellectually alive in his culturally impoverished environment. To persist is, at some level, to choose life over death. In fact, joy's transformative experience is an intensification, an inherence and an adherence to life in all its complexity – rather than an escape from it, as joyfulness is often claimed to be. The root of the word persistence comes from Middle French (1540s) *persistance* and Latin *persistentem,* both gesturing to something "lasting, enduring, permanent." To writers such as Yeats and Joyce, who self-consciously wished to produce writing that would endure beyond their lifetimes, joy in content and form was a means by which to achieve this posthumous resonance. My chapter on Yeats, for example, explores his confrontation with his physical decline and the problem of making "monuments of unaging intellect" ("Sailing to Byzantium"). Joyce similarly wished to create texts that transcended across time and transmuted "the daily bread of experience into the radiant body of everliving life." Yet, more than write for posterity, one thing that all four writers share is a drive to

infuse writing with a vitality, a vividness, that exudes life and therefore, from a Spinozan point of view, joy. To persist is not necessarily joyful; there is no promise of pleasure with persistence, only potential. There may be no choice but to remain in difficult or even violent circumstances but, this dissertation argues, that these writers found joy as one of the affective means by which to persist and shift perspective in order to actively create the means by which to thrive.

Chapter Summary

Chapter one: the remainder of this chapter offers the theoretical framework and historical context for my analysis of joy in the work of W.B. Yeats, May Sinclair, James Joyce, and Mina Loy. Joy has a history, and in this chapter, I offer a description of the trajectory of joy in philosophy and literature. I also take stock of the contemporaneous modern theories of emotion, for example in the work of Sigmund Freud and William James. In setting the scene for my defiant and deviant joyful emotion, I discuss "typical" modernist feeling via literary modernism's self-identification as impersonal, objective, and unemotional, associated with writers such as T.S. Eliot and Ezra Pound. I also offer a literature review of the current scholarship on modernism and affect, with its focus on negative emotions and affects, including Heather Love and Jonathan Flatley. My philosophical alliance in this project is rooted in Spinoza's *Ethics*, but also draws on contemporary scholarship from affects studies, and I therefore define key terms and theoretical influences drawn from Spinoza and affect theory in this chapter. The subsequent chapters offer close literary analyses of each writer's representation of, use of, and formal manifestation of different instances of intense positive affect.

Chapter two, entitled "Aging, Death & Joy in the Late Poetry of W.B. Yeats," explores the antinomies of joy, and conceives of joy as a paradoxical passion that is both passive and active, both death-facing yet also life-orientated. Yeats, who is the foundational figure of my analysis, repeatedly seeks to triumph over existential despair by enacting a vacillation between antagonistic affects in his poetry. Joy, for Yeats, is connected to two main concerns: first, the nature of poetic inspiration and how to sustain a poetic life; second, how to persist in spite of the inevitable "absurdity" ("The Tower" l.1) of aging and death. Joy gives one heart and staves off fear, which enables one to live more fully *with* death not to imaginatively escape it. In performing these affective postures, Yeats moves himself through different forms of joy that permit him to persist personally and poetically.[48]

My third and fifth chapters deal with female writers who were successful in their lifetimes but have subsequently, and undeservedly, received little scholarly attention. Both May Sinclair and

[48] Yeats, W.B. "Byzantium" (1928). *The Collected Poems of W.B. Yeats*, 2nd edition, edited by Richard J. Finneran, Scribner, 1989.

Mina Loy were well known in their lifetimes, and contributed to the feminist zeitgeist. My inclusion discussion of these women writers serves, in part, as a recovery project to counterbalance a masculinized account of literary modernism. My third chapter focuses on May Sinclair and is entitled "Calling Your Soul Your Own: The Development of a (Dis)Passionate Self in May Sinclair's Psychological Fiction." Writing against Victorian convention, Sinclair carefully depicts the emotional labor of women as detrimental to intellectual, spiritual, and artistic development. My chapter traces Sinclair's unique creation of intellectual women of "genius" who are both constrained by, and seek to defy, social conventions of emotional labor, through experiencing exhilarating emotion beyond the normative objects of prescribed "feminine" desire. For Sinclair it is the responsibility of each individual to strive for a greater and wider perception of the self, in order to access a greater joy, and then to use the affective motivation of joy to pave the way for others to experience those moments too. Joy and passion are dangerous feelings but they are necessary in order for a women to "call your soul your own."

Shifting from the radically disembodied, philosophically Idealist, passions in May Sinclair's work, I pivot to James Joyce's deeply corporeal canon. Chapter three is called "The Capacity and Capaciousness of Joy in James Joyce." Joyce's engagement with joy changes across his three major texts (*A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, *Ulysses*, and *Finnegans Wake*), but in each text he deepens into the corporeality of his characters and texts. As the focus across Joyce's work changes from passion, to emotion, to affect, the body of the text demands different orientations from the reader. In *Ulysses*, for example, Joyce presents a joyful confrontation with the quotidian, fallible, *sensational* body that evokes a responsive physiological shift in the reader – disgust, laughter, confusion, for instance. In *Finnegans Wake,* however, the reader's sensorium is activated as she must draw on each of her senses, on feelings, on intuition; she must think associatively and expansively, encompassing encyclopedic epistemologies to form a hard-earned relationship with the text. An affective assemblage is formed between the corpus of the text and reader in *Finnegans Wake* that emphasizes the joy of encyclopaedic capacity which draws the reader into co-creating those potentialities. Ultimately, across his writing, the aim of Joyce's joyful art is to increase the capacity of the reader and the capaciousness of what we consider Life.

My fifth and final chapter focuses on Mina Loy and the queer joy of her avant-garde poetry and radical feminism. This chapter is entitled "'Little lusts and lucidities': Queer Expressions and Joy in Mina Loy." In her candid approach to sex, her non-normative performance of gender, her often critical stance to heteronormativity, I argue that it is therefore productive to consider Loy as a queer Modernist. For Loy, freeing sex of the cloak of sentimentality also meant freeing lines from punctuation and typographical spacing, and her poetry offers an oblique perspective on modernist

affect and joy. Engaging with Loy allows me to consider the counter-intuitive example of a quintessential form of modernist aesthetics, and how a refusal of joy is still a relation to joy. This chapter explores the paradoxical nature of Loy's conception of female selfhood, one that refigures avant-garde feeling through cerebral, psychic, and affective connection, which results in a strangely lunar form of joy.

Section II

In section two I introduce the field of affect theory and trace the major genealogies that have emerged. I then offer a glossary of vocabulary terms that I will use throughout the project. In particular, I focus on describing the work of Benedict Spinoza, whose "philosophy of joy" forms the basis for my project.

Affect Theory's Emergence and Definitions

Affect theory is an approach to thinking about things in the world that focuses on prelinguistic or nonlinguistic forces, also known as affects. Affects motivate us, move us, are part of us and our being in the world, however they are not conscious, and not individual, though they may be registered within a single body (though not contained by one). Affects are forces of modification; to be affected is to be changed or moved in some way by the impact of an encounter with something, whether a subject, an object, an idea, or an emotion. Seigworth and Gregg in the *The Affect Theory Reader* define affect as "the name we give to those forces – visceral forces beneath, alongside, or generally *other than* conscious knowing."[49] These visceral and vital forces are registered upon and within a body and "can serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought and extension" (*ATR* 1). Yet bodies are not simply defined by blood and ouns, to borrow a phrase from Buck Mulligan, but rather extend into the world and the world into body, one impinging on the other. These affective forces flow and circulate within, between, and around bodies, extending an individual beyond its corporeal frame and into what affect theorists call "worldings" (*ATR* 11). Affect is relational; it is the complex connection and continuous process of becoming otherwise which is co-created between a body and the world. Paying attention to affect is paying attention to "a palimpsest of force-encounters traversing the ebbs and swells of intensities that pass between 'bodies'" (*ATR* 2).

As Seigworth and Gregg note in the *Affect Theory Reader*, there is "no single unwavering line that might unfurl toward or around affect and its singularities, let alone its theories" (*ATR* 5). Part of

[49] Seigworth, Gregory J. & Melissa Gregg (Eds.) "An Inventory of Shimmers" *The Affect Theory Reader*. Duke University Press, 2010, p.1. Hereafter referred to in-text as *ATR*.

the promise of affect theory is in the multiple, transdisciplinary interactions that consider intersections of affect-body-world. There are myriad applications and accounts of affect, offering what Seigworth and Gregg call "affective bloom-spaces" and that occur in the "ongoingness of process" – or to paraphrase Spinoza, "no one yet knows what affect can do" (*ATR* 9). The lack of disciplinary orthodoxies is generally considered beneficial; however, the concept of affect has "gradually accrued a sweeping assortment of philosophical/ psychological/ physiological underpinnings, critical vocabularies, and ontological pathways" that are used towards many ends, which they cluster into eight different but related sets of concerns (*ATR* 5).[50] Seigworth and Gregg describe the beginning of these critical pathways as emerging from two watershed publications in 1995 – namely Eve Sedgwick and Adam Frank's "Shame in the Cybernetic Fold" and Brian Massumi's "The Autonomy of Affect." [51] These two publications stage an ongoing debate in affect theory regarding affect's intentionality and materiality. A short discussion of this debate follows to outline the theoretical allegiances of this project.

Donovan Schaefer offers a more recent discussion of the ongoing divergence between Deleuze/Massumi and Sedgwick/Tomkins.[52] The Deleuze/Massumi position considers affects as "molecular forces" that are always in flux, or what Massumi calls "fluidifying" (Schaefer 40, 41).[53] Schaefer offers the metaphor of a sandcastle to represent the "soft structures" that are created by Deleuzian affect: "always subject to erosion and mutation" (40). According to Massumi, affect is never perceived directly and ceases to be affective once it is sensed or made conscious.[54] Massumi "sees affect as that which is ontologically incompatible with the structuring grid of personal

[50] See *ATR* 6-9 for the description of the eight broad categories.
[51] Kosofsky Sedgwick, Eve and Adam Frank (eds). *Shame and Its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader*. Duke University Press, 1995. Another oft cited origin story for the affective turn is Brian Massumi's "Autonomy of Affect" paper that was also published in 1995, see Massumi, Brian. "The Autonomy of Affect" *Cultural Critique*, 31, 1995, pp. 83 – 109.
[52] I draw broadly on chapter two of Donovan Schaefer's *Religious Affects* to characterize this theoretical divergence. Schaefer, Donovan O. *Religious Affects: Animality, Evolution, and Power*. Duke University Press, 2015.
[53] Schaefer labels this strand of affect theory Deleuzian/Spinozistic, and Deleuze and Massumi do take much from Spinoza. I wonder though whether Spinoza must exclusively be aligned to that strain. Certainly, as Deleuze claims and Schaefer points out, Deleuze took the notion of flux from "the plasticity and endless reshaping of [Spinoza's concept of] substance through the reformation of its infinite attributes" (Schaefer 41). However, in my reading of Spinoza, God or Nature is not bound by anything and is therefore able to produce infinite attributes and the mode of substance that we call human bodies are characterized by dynamism and stasis (we are always affected and affecting). Yet the material univere is also highly deterministic and bound according to Spinoza; bodies cannot do as they will nor reconfigure at will, they are subject to passions and inadequate ideas, illness and decay. Spinoza states, for example, that affects can only be changed by the occurrence of another, stronger affect – this is hardly the disembodied line of flight of Deleuze's bodies without organs. Moreover, in chapter four of Spinoza's *Ethics*, he creates a taxonomy of affect and emotion, mapping the interrelation of the passions that humans are subject to, this has interesting parallels to Tomkins' list of feelings in *Affect Image Consciousness*. My ponderings offer interesting and beneficial future research possibilities and are deserving of greater discussion than I am able to afford them here. This is simply to note that I am not quite ready to give up Spinoza *tout court* to the Deleuzian 'side,' and to explain why I offer a different name to this genealogy than Schaefer.
[54] Affects are non-personal, pre-linguistic, intensities or forces, whereas emotions are – according to Massumi – conscious, identifiable, and can be expressed in language, and as such are fundamentally different from affect.

experience" (Schaefer 26). The key claim to this position is that affect proceeds " '*directly* from the body –and indeed *between bodies* – without the interference or limitations of consciousness, or representation': a prepersonal, unstructured, mobile contact zone" (Callard cited in Schaefer 41).[55] The utility of seeing affect as a shifting realm of "becoming" is in its possibility for infinite variation. Complex assemblages are not pre-determined by cultural, historical, or political forces, and therefore structures and worlds might be changed. Change, however, is conceptualized on a molecular, "virtual," or ontological level because "Deleuzian affect theory is not interested in the agency of individuated subjects" (Schaefer 44).

The Tomkins/Sedgwick approach on the other hand, does consider the experiential scale of affective impact. This tradition draws on biology, psychology (Tomkins), and materialist feminism. It focuses on "variation and transformation" but also "sustained attachments – the firm shapes of experience that emerge out of embodied histories" (Schaefer 40). In other words, certain things are fixed; for Tomkins, for example, drawing on Darwin (see below), there are basic emotions that are common to all bodies. These emotions can produce almost endless variation but are not without material objects and causes. Schaefer summarizes the position thus: "in the architecture of feeling" there is "a dynamic between structure and flow, between form and flux, between stability and change, between global and local" (42). This strand finds support in neuroscience from the likes of Damasio, LeDoux, and Panksepp.[56]

My own interests lead me towards the Tomkins/Sedgwick-Frank strain of affect theory. Their theorization offers a material concreteness and yet also great nuance in terms of affective and emotional possibility. Tomkins, Sedgwick and Frank recognize the animality of bodies, what Schaefer calls "the reefs that subsist below the level of rational control, linguistic sedimentation, of affective flux but nonetheless shape our encounters" (Schaefer 45). Sedgwick and Frank, drawing on Tomkins, "posit a noninfinite system that is nonetheless multiple, a plurality that is not reducible to an oscillation between binary poles" (Schaefer 44). Moreover, the modernist texts that I discuss offer both individuated experiences of joy and experiences that are intimate with the non-human but they

[55]See Papoulias, Constantina and Felicity Callard. "Biology's Gift: Interrogating the Turn to Affect." *Body and Society* 16, 1, 2010, pp. 29-56.

[56] See Damasio, A.R. *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain*. Harcourt Books, 2003; Damasio A. R. *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*. G.P. Putnam, 1994; Damasio, A.R. *The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness*. Harcourt Books, 1999; LeDoux, Joseph. *The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life*. Simon & Schuster, 1996. Panksepp writes that although there is "a certain amount of output flexibility" of most brain operating systems, there are also "domains of inflexibility" especially in emotions (cited in Schaefer 42). See also Panksepp, Jaak. *Archaeology of Mind: Neuroevolutionary Origins of Human Emotions*. W.W. Norton & Company, 2012; Panksepp, Jaak et al. "The Philosophical Implications of Affective Neuroscience." *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 19 3-4, 2012, pp.6-48. Panksepp, Jaak. *Affective Neuroscence: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions. Oxford University Press*, 1998.

tend not to focus on the molecular. In the case of Yeats, for example, the attention is inward and self-reflective, focusing on his own experiences of joy and his attempts to foster this in others through his poetry. For May Sinclair's women, the experience of joy is solitary and often kept secret; in the cases of Joyce and Loy joy is evoked through an intimate experience with another person (either in person or in memory). The individual is affected or moved, and joy is experienced within and upon the individual's body and in relation. Hence this branch of affect theory accounts for lived experiences in a way the Deleuze/Massumi branch does not. For me, there is always an orientation towards or away, a level of intentionality, an "aboutness" that is incompatible with Deleuzian amorphous forces. What I do take from the Deleuzian strain of affect is a more capacious sense of the possible assemblages of relation: of bodies, worlds, relations that flow and cohere beyond the barrier of the skin that make a fiction of the sovereign subject. I also take the idea that affective relations are immanent rather than transcendent. Affects and feelings do circulate outside of the human body, beings are affected by and can affect others and the environment in which they live. For example, Sinclair's Gwenda in *The Three Sisters* communicates non-verbally with her environment; her senses and emotions are called by the landscape and she enters into communication with it, her extra-human relations becoming a force of joy within her otherwise bleak world.

To be clear, emotions are not privileged in some way that places them above or beyond social construction. As Anna Wierzbicka writes, "emotions reflect and pass on values, preoccupations, and frames of society within which they have evolved" (cited in Potkay 2007, vii). The work of feminist affect theorists such as Sara Ahmed and Laurent Berlant also underline the influence of the social world on our emotions. Writing on how one is taught to be a subject, or a certain form of political citizen, through the "pedagogy of emotion" Berlant states that, "Aesthetics is one of the few places we learn to recognize our emotions as trained and not natural. Fear is natural, but the objects that make you afraid emerge historically. You get entrained by the world."[57] Sara Ahmed, in "Affective Economies," states that "emotions are not simply "within" or "without" but that they create the very effect of the surfaces or boundaries of bodies and worlds."[58] She is therefore interested in the way "emotions *involve* subjects and objects, but without residing positively

[57] Seitz, David K. and Lauren Berlant. "On Citizenship and Optimism." Society and Space. Available at http://societyandspace.org/2013/03/22/on-citizenship-and-optimism/ 22nd March 2013. Accessed 2nd November 2016. Both Berlant and Ahmed are prolific in their writing about affect, see the following for their key texts: Ahmed, Sara. *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*. Routledge, 2004, and *The Promise of Happiness*. Duke University Press, 2010; Berlant, Lauren. *Cruel Optimism*. Duke University Press, 2011; affect and race. Other queer, feminist, affect theorists that write on the intersections of the social, political, cultural and affective include but are not limited to, Cvektovich, Ann. *Depression: A Public Feeling*. Duke University Press, 2012.

[58] Ahmed, Sara. "Affective Economies". *Social Text*, 22 (4) 2004, p. 117.

within them," imaging instead the slippage of emotion between bodies and world, some emotions gathering, or "sticking" on certain bodies (120). Emotions, Ahmed states in *Cultural Politics of Emotion*, are mediated not private:

> Emotions are what move us, and how we are moved involves interpretations of sensations and feelings not only in the sense that we interpret what we feel, but also in that what we feel might be dependent on past interpretations that are not necessarily made by us, but that come before us. Focusing on emotions as mediated rather than immediate reminds us that knowledge cannot be separated from the bodily world of feeling and sensation; knowledge is bound up with what makes us sweat, shudder, tremble, all those feelings that are crucially felt on the bodily surface, the skin surface where we touch and are touched by the world.[59]

This is not a Deleuzian miasma of molecular "becomings" but rather an expression of the impact and construction of self and world. It is this sense of circulation, influence, and interpretation that I wish to evoke when I discuss affect moving through and beyond individual bodies.

Spinozan Affects – Joy, Sadness, Desire[60]

There is a rich and varied history of emotions in philosophy that is of such enormous scope that it is beyond the possibility for discussion here. Two philosophers stand out in their consideration of joy, Spinoza and Nietzsche. In the "Birth of Tragedy" Nietzsche does not merely accept the inevitability of destruction but affirms it, and in doing so finds reason to affirm existence. In chapter two I draw upon Nietzsche's concept of tragic joy in my discussion of W.B. Yeats. However, it is Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza (1632-1677) that I draw from the most, and as he is less familiar, I shall offer a brief discussion of his life and work as it pertains most closely to my project. [61]

Benedict Spinoza was born in the Netherlands at a time of immense religious, political, and philosophical change and upheaval.[62] For Spinoza philosophy was a way of life and his *Ethics* offers a unique, and at the time of its writing a heretical, form of wide-ranging political-religious-

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[59] Ahmed, Sara. *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*. Routledge, 2004, p. 171.

[60] Spinoza's philosophy is notoriously difficult, and many of his terms and meanings continue to be interpreted and debated in philosophy. The two philosophers that have influenced my reading of Spinoza the most are Steven Nadler and Gilles Deleuze. See Nadler, Steven. *Spinoza's Ethics: An Introduction*. Cambridge University Press, 2006; Deleuze, Gilles. *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, translated by Robert Hurley, City Light Books, 1988; Deleuze, G. "Ethology: Spinoza and Us." *Incorporations*, 6, edited by J. Crary and S. Kwinter, Zone Books. (1994). See also Massumi, Brian. *Parables of the Virtual Movement, Affect, Sensation*. Duke Univ. Press, 2002; Lord, Beth. *Spinoza's Ethics*. Edinburgh University Press, 2010.

[61] Special thanks to Professor Samantha Frost for her many discussions of Spinoza.

[62] For a short and accessible summary of Spinoza's life and works see Scruton, Roger. *Spinoza: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press, 2002. For a longer discussion of his life and his place in 17th century philosophy, see Nadler, Steven. *Spinoza: A Life*. Second Edition. Cambridge University Press, 2018.

metaphysical-moral philosophy. The goal of life, according to Spinoza's system, is to strive for happiness, but one can only be happy with a complete and true understanding of the cause of things that affect you, and that you affect. The *Ethics* is presented through the geometric method which attempts to apply the certainty of mathematics to questions of the nature of God and Man and how to be happy in a deterministic world. Knowledge is the ultimate good and power. Knowledge of Nature or God (one and the same for Spinoza) is the ultimate form of knowledge because it is to know something permanent rather than transitory. The *Ethics* is divided into five parts, though my interest is primarily focused on parts three and four that discuss affect and its impact. Yet each part builds upon the last: part one establishes the form of "God or Nature" as a single, eternal substance; part two turns to the nature of the human and Thought/Mind and Extension/Body; part three posits the origin and nature of affects; part four explores the concept of good and evil and the "bondage" of the affects; part five discusses the possibilities of freedom in a deterministic universe and the role of virtue and knowledge as part of moral philosophy. It is Spinoza's conception of affect and his focus on joy and sadness as primary affects that I will focus on here as most salient to my project.

Spinoza's concept of joy and perseverance, explained within his psychological theory in his *Ethics*, is a touchstone for my project.[63] According to Spinoza (IIIP11s), there are three primary affects from which all others are derived: joy (which all good feeling is a variant of, and which increases our power to act); sadness (which all bad feeling is a variant of, and which decreases our power to act); and desire ("desire is the power of striving itself whose transitions constitute the affects" (Nadler 203).[64] Joy is the feeling of having one's power, or *conatus* (striving to persevere), increased though interaction with another thing; whereas sadness is the passion one experiences signaling a transition that decreases one's *conatus*.[65] Affects can enhance or deplete; moving humans to a greater or lesser perfection, where "perfection" is understood to be an increase or decrease in the

[63] Actions have a special meaning in Spinoza's philosophy. Affects are active or passive: if they are passive, they are passions, and if they are active, they are actions. To be passive in mind or body, (to be passive in one is to be passive in both) means to be influenced and caused to change by something outside of oneself; illness for example, changes the bodymind (my term not Spinoza's) negatively and decreases its power, which produces the affect of sadness. Good nutrition or a quality education, on the other hand, changes the bodymind for the better and increases its power, and so produces joy. Therefore passions, including joy, are always passive because they are created from an external cause impacting the being (though joy is more active and offers more power than sadness). To be active is to not be affected by anything beyond oneself. Though, because we are finite, this cannot happen in a complete way, as we are always impacted by something - our bodies are always subject to decay for example. Happiness comes, for Spinoza, from developing character via a virtuous life, which is achieved through leading a life of moderation, reason, and knowledge (knowledge is the ultimate good). By minimizing passions and maximizing knowledge of adequate causes through reason, one is actively increasing one's power to persevere.

[64] The main sources of negativity spring from hatred and guilt; hatred, for instance, is sorrow plus an idea of the external cause, and thus hatred is turned towards another, whereas bad conscience is sorrow plus an idea of an internal cause, and thus hatred is turned inwards – either way these affects diminish life.

[65] *Conatus*, Latin for striving, tendency, endeavour, is the power of acting (*potentia agenda*) or "force of existing (*vis existendi*)" (Spinoza cited in Nadler, 195). Spinoza calls it "the actual essence" of everything (IIIP 57d).

power to affect and be affected.[66] Affects are the changes in the capacity of bodyminds - the transitions from one state to another, rather than the end product, which is an emotion (IIIP11s). When a body encounters another body, or an idea another idea – sometimes the two combine into a more powerful whole that will produce joy, or one discomposes the other, which produces sadness. A passion for Spinoza is always passive, as the body is at the mercy of external forces. To say that affect is relational, from a Spinozan point of view, means it becomes part of the compositional matrix. As Deleuze explains, if there is an encounter with something that the mode thinks is good for it, then it "enters into composition with it" and therefore the power is increased as the "good" thing is added and so joy is felt.[67] According to Kenneth Surin, "Only a new kind of life, capable of sustaining experimentation and a new appetite for living, can overcome these negative and reactive passions." [68] The artistic strivings of the modernists in my dissertation might therefore be said to articulate the enhancement and depletion of a modernist life. Expressing this life through sustained aesthetic experimentation, articulating appetites that have been born from modernity (like machine-human hybridity), and the emergence of new knowledges, thus moves modernist artists to what Spinoza would call joy, meaning the power of to persist in life.

According to Spinoza, life strives to persevere, "[e]ach thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being" (IIIP6).[69] No individual can purposely choose to diminish her power, to work against his own good: "There is in all things – bodies and minds – a kind of existential inertia by which they resist any attempts to destroy them or change them for the worse" (Nadler 195). [70] The *conatus* of a being can only be diminished by external causes and inadequate

[66]Nadler suggests that for Spinoza, perfection is "an ontological term to be understood simply as reality, or as the power to persevere in existence" (215). It is therefore not a value judgement to say something is more, or less, perfect.

[67] Deleuze, Gilles. *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*. Robert Hurley (trans). City Light Books, 1988, p.50. "So long as our feelings or affects spring from the external encounter with other modes of existence, they are explained by the nature of the affecting body and by the necessarily inadequate idea of that body" (50). Such affects are passions, since we are not their adequate cause.

[68] Surin, Kenneth. "Spinoza, Baruch." *The Deleuze Dictionary*. Academic Dictionaries and Encylcopedias. http://deleuze.enacademic.com/163/Spinoza%2C_Baruch Accessed 25th May 2018.

[69] I use the broad term "life" here to denote that, in Spinoza's philosophy all living things are made from the same material and subject to the same determined and necessary causes – humans are not exceptional. All life strives to persevere in its being and all life affects and is affected whatever form it takes.

[70] Spinoza's claims to a universal impulse for self-preservation has drawn criticism from philosophers. Nadler cites Jonathan Bennett as Spinoza's strongest critic on this point, see Bennett, Jonathan. *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*. Hackett Publishing, 1984, pp. 231-46, cited in Nadler, 196. Spinoza's claims to a fundamental drive to self-preservation also sits awkwardly with Freud's theorization of the death drive, which Freud considers a drive towards chaos and destruction. One interesting point of connection between Spinoza and Freud's conflicting drives can be observed when Spinoza answers questions about the death and decay of the body and acts of suicide by stating that: "all decay and destructive impulse must come from outside the thing itself" (Nadler 197). Death and suicide is not a drive from inside the being but rather results from inadequate ideas and passions that originate from outside of the being. Without external influences the being would seek to persist and act to increase its wellbeing. Freud suggests in "Civilization and Its Discontent" that there is an intensifying hatred for civilization since it demands an ever-greater toll upon the natural sexual and aggressive impulses, especially the demand to "Love ones neighbour as thyself," and this takes a great toll. Where Freud and Spinoza connect is in their claims that external events and interactions deplete people. In short, there are significant differences and

understandings of them, such as passions, which are passive affects. Human beings cannot help but be affected by external objects, but the greater the extent to which humans can understand how they are affected, the greater our power/perfection will be. Though there are three fundamental affects there are innumerable varieties of emotion that stem from them: "Of joy, sadness and desire, and consequently of every affect which either like vacillation of mind, is compounded of these, or, like love, hatred, hope, and fear, is derived from them, there are just as many kinds as there are kinds of objects by which we are affected" (IIIP56). Indeed, the same object will affect different people in different ways, and possibly the same person at different times, in different ways.

I take several important things from Spinoza that I adapt for use within my own project: that joy is integrally bound up with human capacity to persist; that the identification and recognition of joy is integrally linked to the power to affect and be affected; that to understand our emotions and affective relations it is necessary to increase power and persist. I also agree that we are never not affected or in an affective state, regardless of whether or not we know it; that an affect cannot be changed except by a stronger affect; and that to persist is fundamental to life, particularly human life, in spite of the inevitability of suffering. There are a number of points from which I depart from Spinoza's position: for example, I give greater credence than Spinoza to the epistemological power of the imagination and art, and posit that the transport of an aesthetic joy (or the joy evoked by literature) is a means of increasing *conatus*, and since an " affect cannot be changed or diminished except by a stronger affect," then to be moved by pleasure and joy endows readers (or literary characters) with a stronger means of persisting.[71] I do not take Spinoza's philosophy wholesale, many aspects of Spinoza's philosophy, nor am I offering a Spinozan reading of these texts; yet my project seems in the spirit of Spinoza – an outside force impacts the ideas of Spinoza, and – I would argue – produces an increased capacity to think Modernist aesthetics adequately.

Definition of Terms

Joy, as I define it, is an emotion, a feeling, an affect, a passion, and a force. As such, differentiating each term is useful for to understand the discussions in each chapter.

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incompatibility in thinking between Spinozan philosophy and Freudian psychoanalytic approach to affects, however one point on which they do agree is that external forces, especially from civilization, impinge upon and deplete people.

[71] Beth Lord clarifies Spinoza's notion of imagination in saying that it is the "first kind of knowledge" that is linked to experience and so is "the source of empirical knowledge, but also of falsity and error." She goes on to say that "experiencing, remembering, anticipating, inferring, dreaming and hallucinating are all varieties of imagining" *Spinoza's Ethics*. Edinburgh University Press, 2010, p. 162. For a more generous and generative discussion of Spinoza's concept of imagination, see James, Susan, Genevieve Lloyd and Moria Gatens (interview). "The Power of Spinoza: Feminist Conjunctions." *Hypatia*, 15, 2, 2000, pp. 40-58.

Sensation, Feeling, Emotion

The literary modernist sensorium is especially lively and communicative, making apparent to the reader much that would normally go unperceived. Sensation is the process of understanding our environment through the senses and is the first stage in our making sense of the world. Perception is the process of interpreting what we receive through the senses, though we perceive very little of the total amount of stimuli we receive. My discussion of embodied reading in the Joyce chapter pays attention to the sensations of Bloom's body, those perceived by Bloom, and others that are not but are registered in the text. Feelings are closely related to the perception of sensations; as Teresa Brennan states, "feelings are sensations that have found a match in words."[72] I would add that feelings are focused on the flesh, rather than an intellectual thought or judgement, which shades into an emotion. A fluttering in your stomach might be translated as hunger (a drive rather than an affect), but equally it might be the feeling of anxiety or excitement nonetheless the flesh communicates. Emotions are closely linked to feeling, the words often used interchangeably, but in distinction emotions have an element of judgement incorporated with them. Flatley draws a useful distinction between affect and emotion: "where *emotion* suggest something that happens inside and tends towards outward expression, *affect* indicates something relational and transformative. One *has* emotions; one is affected *by* people or things" (12). He differentiates them from affects by suggesting that emotions are the "result of the inevitable interaction of affects with thoughts, ideas, beliefs, habits, instincts, and affects" – if affects are not reducible, "emotions are" and in their increased complexity vary from person to person (16). Part of the work that the writers in my dissertation do is to create fresh associations to words and symbols in order to create a new form of modernist aesthetics, and a new form of emotion.

Passion and Mood

One root of the meaning of passion is *passio (Latin)* meaning "to suffer," which is also linked to "patient," signifying the "patience" necessary when suffering at the mercy of passions.[73] Anthony Cuda in *The Passions of Modernism* emphasizes the suffering and passivity contained within the concept of passion, and argues that for all modernism's strident stances, it also craved the experience of passivity. However, to think of passion as a verb is to recall that one can be excited or imbued with passion, to be impelled by passion to act or to speak. The political philosopher Thomas Hobbes considered passion a necessary complement to spurring action, and that "both action and passion

[72] Brennan, Teresa. *The Transmission of Affect,* Cornell University Press, 2004, p. 19.
[73] Cuda, Anthony. *The Passions of Modernism: Eliot, Yeats, Woolf, and Mann*, University of South Carolina Press, 2010.

are necessary elements of something happening."[74] Certainly, passion goes beyond the conscious control of the individual, and to this extent one is passive, but I would also add that the person subject to the fit of passion is aware of the intense emotion and strongly moved by it. Though this active meaning is now rare, to hyphenate these two aspects of passion is to create a productive tension that is especially fruitful in considering the antinomies of Yeats.

Finally, for my understanding of mood, I mainly follow Flatley, whose work on affective mapping focuses on mood. He draws from Heidegger's concept of *Stimmung* – mood or attunement. As Flatley points out, for Heidegger, one's mood is "one's primary way of being in the world, 'the 'presupposition' for, and 'medium' of thinking and acting'" (5). Ontologically prior to thinking and volition, *Stimmung* is the way one becomes interested in, attached to, in relation with things and other beings in the world, thus we are "never not in a mood" (Flatley 5). Flatley goes on to suggest that moods are in the world and are not originated within or contained by an individual subject: "[m]oods are like weather, we are in them, they are not within us. (23). By this definition, mood is near synonymous to affect in how it operates and what it does. I add one element from Teresa Brennan's notion of atmospheres to supplement this affective-mood state, I maintain – like Brennan – that atmospheres and moods can be (though are not always) sensed and transmitted. Brennan makes the point that you might enter a room and sense the prevailing mood, this in turn will affect your being, either changing the mood and/or changing you. Like Heidegger, Brennan says you bring your own mood with you to a collective atmosphere and so some of your experience will be an act of interpretation, but moods are still sensed and often known.

Though I have attempted to offer a brief and clear glossary of key terms for the subsequent discussions, it is important to note that these elements interact, affect, and simultaneously not necessarily sequentially occur. One is always affected and affecting whether one is feeling it or feeling many things at once.

Scholars of Modernist Feeling

Modernist scholars have generally emphasized the emotions identified by the artists themselves, i.e. anxiety, hysteria, melancholy. Understandably, given the overwhelming self-

[74] Many thanks to Prof. Samantha Frost who pointed out this connection to Hobbes and from whom the quote is taken. She also points out that for Hobbes passion is the necessary complement of action: "one thing acts (exhibiting action) and one thing is acted upon (exhibiting passion). Which means that passion is not merely "passive" but instead is akin to "receptivity to being affected" or "ability or capacity to be affected." This twofold sense of the causes of something happening make one thing the agent and the other thing the patient. Somewhere along the way, we lost the sense that an agent needs a patient; that the passion of the patient is an integral part of the total cause" (personal correspondence, 2019). See Frost, Samantha. *Lessons from a Materialist Thinker: Hobbesian Reflections on Ethics and Politics*. Stanford University Press, 2008.

proclaimed need of Modernists to avoid "emotional slither" and, T.S. Eliot's claims to impersonality with its associated turn from emotion, critics have preferred to focus on the irony and emotional detachment of Modernist artists.[75] This results in the conception of Modernism as unemotional (certainly anti-emotional) and intellectual. As Julie Taylor points out, "the traditional view of modernist aesthetics" is as "cold, hard, and cerebral."[76] She goes on to suggest that tracing a cool emotional tone and a detached aesthetic experience, as consistent throughout modernist aesthetics, has been central in establishing modernism as "a movement". Perhaps the need for clear disciplinary boundaries explains, in part, critics' reluctance to consider alternative individual emotions, and other structures of emotions. Though critics have been slow to engage with the feelings of modernity, some scholars such as Heather Love, Jonathan Flatley, and Julie Taylor have actively engaged with affect theory and argued for a "foundational link between affect and the structure of modernism itself," meaning that modernism, for these scholars, is "an affective orientation towards history."[77] There has been scholarship that is related to affect, especially focusing on the bodies of modernism, ranging from a newly inclusive focus on disabled bodies, or the ongoing discussions of prosthetic and mechanistic modernism, to single-sense studies that complicate and enrich the modernist sensorium.[78] My work converses with the queer and feminist focus of Heather Love, Michael Flatley and Michael Snediker, the work on passions of Anthony Cuda, and the affect focus of Julie Taylor's recent collected essays. [79]I will briefly touch on the current field of modernism and affect before articulating modernism's own sense of its emotional and affective terms.

Heather Love's *Feeling Backwards* finds the backwardness in the 20th century as an allegory of queer historical experience, and constitutive of the modernist experience itself. She posits that "[t]he idea of modernity – with its suggestions of progress, rationality, and technological advance – is intimately bound up with backwardness" (5). By focusing on moments of failed sociality, of loss,

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[75] The scholarship is too extensive to cite here. A key text on impersonality that remains an important work is Ellmann, Maud. *Impersonality: T.S.Eliot and Ezra Pound*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1987.

[76] Taylor, Julie (ed). "Introduction." *Modernism and Affect*. Edinburgh University Press, 2015, p. 2.

[77] Ibid, p.1-2.

[78]Linett, Maren Tova. *Bodies of Modernism: Physical Disability in Transatlantic Modernist Literature*. University of Michigan Press, 2017. For more on prosthetic and machinic bodies in modernism, see Armstrong, Tim. *Modernism, Technology, & the Body: A Cultural Study*. Cambridge University Press, 1998.Yoshiki, Tajiri. *Samuel Beckett and the Prosthetic Body: The Organs and Senses of Modernism*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. For modernist senses see: Danius, Sara. *The Senses of Modernism: Technology, Perception, and Aesthetics*. Cornell University Press, 2002. Abbie Garrington's *Haptic Modernism: Touch and the Tactile in Modernist Writing*. Edinburgh University Press, 2013 Jay, Martin. *Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought*. University of California Press, 1993.

[79] Justus Nieland's book on public feeling asks, "how did modernism understand the demands placed on emotional life by the new, and increasingly mass-mediated, forms of early- twentieth-century public life?" (2) Nieland, Justus. *Feeling Modern: The Eccentricities of Public Life*. Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008. There has been some excellent work that focus on single emotions such as Pease, Allison. *Modernism, Feminism, and the Culture of Boredom*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012; Crangle, Sara. *Prosaic Desires: Modernist Knowledge, Boredom, Laughter, and Anticipation*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010.

and of negative feelings such as melancholy, shame, regret, and loneliness, Love argues that "bad feelings have been central to the history of queer experience and queer feeling" (26). It is necessary to acknowledge them (look backwards) in order to see the continuities between the past and present. Acknowledging bad feelings and "embracing loss and risking abjection" is necessary, she argues, in order to not diminish historical and present realities for queer people: "backwardness has the status of a lived reality in gay and lesbian life" (Love 30, 7).

On the surface it might appear that our projects take opposite approaches to similar objects of study, and that my study perpetuates the enforced "politics of optimism" which "diminishes the suffering of queer historical subjects" (Love 29). However, my project does not dictate that the feeling of joy is a remedy for all ills, personal and political. Nor do the characters and writers that I engage with regard joy as sufficient, or even dominant in their lives and works, but rather, *necessary* to it. Like Love, I make an intellectual experiment in tracing feelings that have been rejected as "useless" and distasteful to the current literary-critical climate. Methodologically I too look backward in order to find feelings hidden in plain sight. I also engage with psychic phenomena and with psychoanalysis only sporadically, and I seek an alternative to the critical commonplace of ideology critique following from Eve Sedgwick's call for new reading practices. The feelings I focus on objects of analysis might differ, but my project owes much to Love's methodology, and extends, her modernist objects.

Jonathan Flatley uses affect to explore the mood of melancholia, positing, after Heidegger, that "not all melancholias are depressing."[80] He suggests instead that melancholia offers the possibility of knowing and engaging with the world in unexpected ways, thus challenging the commonplace that it is unproductive. In *Affective Mapping*, Flatley considers the possibilities in non- or anti-depressive melancholias. He develops a technique he calls "affective mapping" as a means of tracing the "historicity of one's affective experience" (4). This technique, he argues, can make a political problem that was once invisible or opaque, and certainly depressing, be "transformed into one that is interesting, that solicits and rewards once's attention" (4). Key to this affective mapping is to show the relationship between the individual and historical forces, but most importantly to demonstrate the collective nature of the mood. It demonstrates how "one's situation is experienced collectively by a community, a heretofore unarticulated community of melancholics" (4). One changes melancholia from depressive to productive by changing one's "mood" in the mode of Heidegger's *Stimmung*, meaning mood or attunement (5). Flatly suggests that melancholy might not

[80] Flatley, Jonathan. *Affective Mapping: Melancholia and the Politics of Modernism,* Harvard University Press, 2008, p.1.

simply be something that one is passively subject to, "like bad weather," but instead "melancholizing is something one *does*" (2). Like Flatley, I argue for the unexpected advantage of an affective mood that has been characterized a hindrance to personal and political productivity.

Cuda's thesis challenges both the dominant characterization of modernism as unemotional, or emotional only insofar as "modern art is a compensatory response to threatening and chaotic external stimuli" (179). Rather, Cuda argues, "the tensions surrounding the role of passion and emotional expression, in terms of both psychology and artistic creation were crucial to modernism's own self-definition" (17). Yeats, Eliot, Woolf, Mann, among others, "deeply valued the destabilizations of passion and the intensities of affect and were frequently suspicious of the illusions of a "stabilized," autonomous self" (6). In fact, Cuda claims that "that many of the well-known hallmarks of literary modernism – its experimental forms, its radical poetic theories, and its innovative ideas about emotions and personality – arise in part from an urgent desire among modern writers to meaningfully encounter powerlessness, to both know and feel what it means to be *the moved* instead of *the mover*" (5). Cuda's method is to trace what he characterizes as a "passion scene" which he defines as a trope or scenario which recurs, almost compulsively, across the writer's *oeuvre*. Unlike a symbol or an image, which is atemporal, the passion scene is contextual and subject to change throughout a career. What is consistent is the emotional intensity and importance with which this passion scene recurs. Like Cuda I am interested in Yeats's passionate poetic stances and consider passion as integral to his poetry. However, unlike Cuda, I find that passion can also be active, and Cuda overlooks the deep ambivalence in Yeats's feelings about passivity. Though he desperately desired and sought the divine revelation of Truth via a passionate overcoming, he also deeply feared it, preferring instead to take up active positions as poetic.

In the ten years since *Feeling Backward* was published bad feelings have been extensively theorized: cruel optimism, boredom, paranoia, depression, anxiety, and many more "ugly" feelings.[81] In the contemporary theoretical moment, feeling backwards and feeling bad, disconnected and with failed relations and understanding *is* the norm – despite Sedgwick's call to critically think "otherwise".[82] Like Love, I do not argue for the political efficacy of any one, single, particular feeling in this project, but for the importance of the feelings in general, especially in understanding the emotional and aesthetic topography of the modernist period. To focus on joy is also not to say

[81] See Berlant, Lauren. *Cruel Optimism.* Duke University Press, 2011; Ngai, Sianne. *Ugly Feelings*. Harvard University Press, 2005; see previous references to boredom for Crangle 2010, and Pease 2012.
[82] Kosofsky Sedgwick, Eve. *Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity.* Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2003.

this is the best, or even dominant modernist emotion, but it is to contribute to the scholarship, discussed above, with a new exploration of the moods and affective modes of modernity.

Section III

In this section, to offer further context, I provide a discussion of modernist theories of emotion that were contemporaneous to the writers I examine.

Contemporaneous Theories of Emotion and Affect

As Mark S. Micale in *The Mind of Modernism* points out, there is a dense web of connections between aesthetic and psychological modernisms. Marked by a "turn inward" "the aesthetic and psychological domains" were linked by "a common probing of sexuality, subjectivity, and self-identity."[83] During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, "artists, philosophers, and scientists probed beneath the surface reality of reason in order to uncover deeper irrational or nonrational levels of human experience and cognition. Both the arts and the sciences studied the unconscious, subconscious, and subliminal levels of mental life" (Micale 2). As Gabrielle McIntire points out, "it was no longer possible … to maintain the nineteenth-century metanarrative that reason could triumph over both irrationality and desire through discipline, correct moral guidance, and will."[84] Reason and rationality remained, of course, important and central but it was increasingly accepted that unconscious and irrational drives – especially sexual drives – were "a determining factor in behavior and psychic development" (132).[85] Nearly all modernist literature is to some extent concerned with framing and exploring the new configurations of the modern mind (McIntire, 140). The three most influential theories that engage with emotions were offered by Charles Darwin, William James, and Sigmund Freud. Though each sought to understand different elements of

[83] Micale, Mark S. (ed). *The Mind of Modernism: Medicine, Psychology, and the Cultural Arts in Europe and America, 1880 -1940*. Stanford University Press, 2004.

[84] McIntire, Gabrielle. "Psychology and Sexuality." *A Companion to Modernist Poetry*, edited by David E. Chinitz and Gail McDonald, John Wiley & Sons, 2014, p. 132

[85] McIntire points out that over the course of the early 20th century, "sexualities were also being systematically theorized, medicalized, and categorized for the first time." Sexologists such as Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis: With Especial Reference to Contrary Sexual Instinct: A Medico-Legal Study (1886, trans 1892); Havelock Ellis's multi-volume Studies in the Psychology of Sex (1897-1928) - only becoming legally available in England in 1935, 1901 in US; Iwan Bloch, Auguste Forel, Theodore Hendrik van de Velde were being used by sex reformers such as Stella Browne, Edward Carpenter, and societies such as British Society for the Study of Sex Psychology emerged (133). See also Wolfe, Jesse. *Bloomsbury, Modernism, and the Reinvention of Intimacy*. Cambridge University Press, 2011; Stevens, Hugh and Caroline Howlett (eds). *Modernist Sexualities*. Manchester University Press, 2000.

emotional life for different goals, each provides an important backdrop against which the writers I discuss are writing.

Charles Darwin - The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872)

Darwin published the first edition of *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* in 1872.[86] In this seminal work of early psychology, Darwin argues for the evolutionary basis of emotion, suggesting emotions evolved because they were useful for survival. All humans, and some animals, he claimed, communicate emotions through a particular set of inherited facial expressions.[87] He makes the case for a set of primary emotions – anger, fear, surprise, disgust, joy and sadness – and corresponding bodily expressions that are innate, and occur across social, cultural, and species differences.[88] He sought to refute creationism and the support his evolutionary theory through his consideration of emotion: "his intention was to show how the expression of emotions in man were analogous to those in animals, supporting his theory that man and animals were derived from a common ancestor."[89] It is, according to Darwin, evolutionarily advantageous to be able to discern this "language of emotions" in others via facial configuration, as a face that communicates anger also suggests attack.[90]

Darwin considers joy a primary evolutionary emotion that is recognizable across time, cultures, and even species. He associates its expression with exuberant physical movements – clapping, dancing, stamping – but primarily with laughter: "[l]aughter seems to be the expression of mere joy or happiness" (195). The physical expression of joy Darwin closely associates with laughter, tears, loud vocalizations (though not screaming which he associates with grief), and trembling. Joy, like anger, is the first among exciting emotions that leads (even more than anger) "to energetic movements" (84). Often, he suggests, these actions are purposeless, simply resulting from the "excited state of the sensorium" (80), especially in anticipation of a pleasure to come. Joy, he claims, "quickens the circulation, and this stimulates the brain, which again reacts on the whole

[86] Darwin, Charles. *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals: Definitive Edition*. (1872). Third Edition. Oxford University Press, 1988. Hereafter referred to in text as *Expression*.
[87] Some researchers, such as Gregory Bateson the major communication theorist, argue that facial expressions are communicative signals only and are not signs of internal physiological changes as they might be if they were emotions. Paul Ekman, however, suggests that emotions are both expressions of an internal state *and* a form of communication; see Ekman's 'Afterword' *Expression*, p. 365.
[88] Paul Ekman, based on research into facial expression, posits six basic emotions: happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, and disgust.
[89] Black, John. "Darwin in the World of Emotions." *Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine*, 95, 2002, p.312.
[90] Paul Ekman points out that before the publication of *Expression* "the face was of interest primarily to those who claimed they could read personality or intelligence from the facial features," but that "Darwin ignored the features and focused on the visible but temporary changes in appearance" Ekman, Paul. "Darwin's Contributions to our Understanding of Emotional Expression." *Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society B*, 364, 2009, p. 3449.

body" (80). Thus Darwin defines joy as stimulating and dynamic, and associated with exuberance and excitation.

Darwin's chosen examples of the expression of joyful emotion plays into a social and cultural bias regarding the types of people that experience joy, namely children, "savages," and the mentally ill. Though Darwin's theory demonstrates that joy, along with high spirits and love (which he clusters together) as experienced by all humans, his illustrations and examples rely on categories that implicitly align intense positive emotion to lower cognitive and moral abilities. Darwin draws on the reports and information offered in correspondence from doctors working with people with mental disability, because he finds "their emotions are more fixed and exaggerated" (Black 313). In his discussion of patients suffering from "*general paralysis of the insane,*" Darwin states that "in this malady there is almost invariably optimism – delusions as to wealth, rank, grandeur – insane joyousness, benevolence, and profusion, while its very earliest physical symptom is trembling at the corners of the mouth and at the corner of the eyes" (Darwin, italics original 204). The facial expression accompanying this joyousness is one of a "pleased and benevolent expression" that Darwin characterizes as "feeble benevolence" (Darwin, 205). Implicit in this description and subject sample is the suggestion that joy, especially intense or "excessive" joy is associated with "weak" mindedness or childishness. Darwin differentiates between joy and high spirits or cheerfulness. Unlike the "excessiveness" or childishness of joy, high spirits are characterized by men with bright eyes, erect carriage, head upright, and eyes wide, "the brain, being stimulated by the increased flow of blood, reacts on the mental powers; lively ideas pass still more rapidly through the mind, and the affections are warmed" (Darwin, 210). Though Darwin's writing retains a tone of curious objectivity, the examples provided suggest intense emotions, though universally expressed, are something that should be controlled or put away so as not to be childish or silly.

Silvan Tomkins –Darwin and Contemporary Affect Theory

I take a brief detour to contemporary affect theory in order to point to Darwin's continued influence on the field. Silvan S. Tomkins was a psychologist whose work focused on developing "a more comprehensive understanding of the biological and evolutionary roots of human motivation in order to establish a more accurate picture of personality."[91] Tomkins' dense multi-volume work entitled *Affect Imagery Consciousness* explores human emotion and motivation to create what is known

[91] Kelly, Vernon C. "A Primer of Affect Psychology." The Tomkins Institute. http://www.tomkins.org/what-tomkins-said/what-others-said-about-tomkins/vernon-kelly-a-primer-of-affect-psychology/ Accessed 13th October, 2013, p. 1.

as affect psychology.[92] Tomkins uses the term affect rather than emotion to denote a biological event, a kind of pre-conscious reflex, that is always felt but not always consciously known as an emotion. Drawing on Darwin's work on expression – particularly facial expression - Tomkins suggests that affects are hard-wired "affect programs" and are both universal and innate. Tomkins posited that nine basic affects (fear-terror, anger-rage, distress-anguish, disgust/dissmell [negative], interest-excitement, shame-humiliation, enjoyment-joy [positive], and surprise-startle [neutral]) were fundamental to human emotional responses and motivation. Though trained as a psychoanalyst, Tomkins disagreed with Freud's notion that the drive system was the greatest motivational force, positing instead the affect system: "[i]n our view, the primary motivational system is the affective system, and the biological drives have motivational impact only when amplified by the affective system" (6), see below for more discussion of Freud. [93] His work, especially with babies and infants, convinced him that reason was not the precursor for emotion, and that cognitive theories that place consciousness and appraisal as a prerequisite to feeling were incorrect. Pre-rational and pre-conscious affects, he posited, are the precursors to emotion and the power system for cognition: "Reason without affect would be impotent, affect without reason would be blind" (Tomkins cited in *TF* 37).

Following Darwin, Tomkins studied the faces of adults and children and found that each affect had an associated facial expression. Unlike Darwin, who characterized joy's expression as laughter and excessive bodily movement, Tomkins suggested the essential expression of enjoyment-joy was a smile and that laughter was a "more primitive and earlier response of the enjoyment affect" (*AICI*, 370). In his discussion of joy, Tomkins posits that joy is a social affect that bonds people together: "we are arguing that the smile in response to the human face makes possible all those varieties of human communion which are independent of eating and touching the other" (*AICI*, 407). Interpersonal interaction is a primary stimulus for enjoyment-joy that produces the smiling response, but "anything which can capture the interest of a human being can also produce the smile of joy" (*AICI*, 408); even a memory, if sufficiently intense, can release joy. Tomkins also suggests the primary function of joy is to offer mitigation for negative affects, not to end them, but rather to increase the tolerance of them, "one of the most important functions of the positive affect of joy is as a competitor and reducer of a wide spectrum of negatively motivating conditions, whether they be

[92] Tomkins, Silvan. *Affect Imagery Consciousness.* Vol 1: The Positive Affects. Springer, 1962; *Affect Imagery Consciousness.* Vol II: The Negative Affects. Springer, 1963; *Affect Imagery Consciousness.* Vol III: The Negative Affects: Anger and Fear. Springer, 1991; *Affect Imagery Consciousness.* Vol IV: Cognition: Duplication and Transformation of Information. Springer, 1992.
[93] Tomkins, Silvan. *Affect Imagery Consciousness.* Vol I: The Positive Affects. Springer, 1962, p.6. Hereafter referred to in text as *AICI*.

drive discomforts, pain stimulation, or fear, or shame or distress" (*AICI*, 478). As mentioned previously, joy promotes courage and persistence in facing the inevitable difficulties of living.

William James – The James-Lange Theory of Emotions[94]

Another early theory of personality and emotional development that has been taken up by affect theory, and perhaps the best known in its own time was the psychological theories of William James. What came to be known as the James-Lange's physiological theory of emotion was the dominant theory of emotion at the *fin-de-siècle* and early 20th century.[95] Their model posited that emotions occur as a result of physiological responses to external stimuli and that emotions are dependent on how you interpret these physical symptoms (perception of an event –physiological reaction --emotion). Contrary to the generally accepted sequence of understanding emotion ("the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression"), James states, "my thesis on the contrary is that *the bodily changes follow directly from the* PERCEPTION *of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur* IS *the emotion*."[96] In other words, you are frightened because your heart races and you sweat, not that you are frightened and so your heart races.

William James, drawing on Darwin's ideas on emotion, suggests that humans are hard-wired to feel a certain way in certain situations; for example, we would fear a charging elephant even if we didn't know what an elephant was, or "no woman can see a handsome little naked baby without delight" (*Emotion,* 14). People will react, he claims, in predetermined ways, and by extension feel in certain ways regardless of their rationality. In a lovely turn of phrase James

[94] American psychologist William James (1842-1910) and Danish physiologist Carl Lange (1834-1900) independently proposed the same theory of emotion at approximately the same time. Their two theories were later combined into what is now known as the James-Lange Theory of Emotion.

[95] A near contemporaneous refutation of the James-Lange theory was the Cannon-Bard theory of emotion, which emphasized the role of the brain in producing emotions and posited that physiological and emotional stimuli occur *simultaneously* and *independently*, neither one resulting from the other. Walter Bradford Cannon (1871-1945) first proposed this theory in 1927 and continued his research with his student, Philip Bard (1898-1977) into the 1930s. They argued that emotions cause our physiological reactions, pointing out that people can have the same physiological reactions with different corresponding emotions, so a racing heart and sweating could be the result of seeing a snake or because you were exercising. In addition, they suggested that emotions occur far too quickly to be produced from physical states. For more on the Cannon-Bard Theory see: Cannon, Walter B. "The James-Lange Theory of Emotions: A Critical Examination and an Alternative Theory." *The American Journal of Psychology*, 39,1-4, 1927, pp.106-124. For a more recent theory that emphasizes cognitive factors in emotion production, and that combines elements of the James-Lange and Cannon-Bard theory, see Schachter-Singer or the two-factor theory (1962). Like James-Lange, this model states that physiological arousal occurs first, but then the individual must *cognitively interpret* arousal and look to the environment to contextualize the arousal; this contextualizing will result in the experiencing of one emotion as opposed to another. For more on this theory, see The Psychology Notes HQ. May 20, 2017. https://www.psychologynoteshq.com/theoriesofemotion Accessed 24th January 2019.

[96] James, William. "What is an Emotion?" Lange, Carl Georg & William James. *The Emotions: Volume I*. Williams & Wilkins Company, 1922, p. 13, emphasis original. This essay will hereafter be referred to in text as *Emotion*.

elaborates by saying "particularly conformed pieces of the world's furniture will fatally call forth most particular mental and bodily reactions, in advance of, and often in direct opposition to, the verdict of our deliberate reason concerning them" (*Emotion,* 14). In "What is an Emotion?" William James speculates that emotions are "ordinary sensorial brain processes" variously combined to create the variety and idiosyncrasy of individual emotional makeup (*Emotion,*12). Exploring his theories in detail in his 1884 essay from *Mind*, James focuses on what he calls the "coarser emotions," those emotions that have "distinct bodily expression" (*Emotion,*12) which must be differentiated from the "subtler emotions" linked to intellectual pleasure and aesthetic appreciation. Waves of "bodily disturbance" posited James are what arouse "standard emotions" (*Emotion,*13) such as surprise, fear, anger, rapture. Intellectual delight on the other hand, "depends upon processes in the ideational centers exclusively" (*Emotion,*12). Though widely discredited now, due to the work of neuroscientists and experimental physiologists who conducted experiments that showed even paralyzed people were able to experience emotion, or that stimulation to the same site in the brain does not necessarily produce the same emotion, some aspects of the James-Lange theory find some support. Studies show that the area of the brain associated with processing sensory information becomes active during emotional responses, for example, or that those more attuned to their body's physical signals experienced increased anxiety.[97]

James's theory has interesting implications for literature, not only because May Sinclair used James' term to describe Dorothy Richardson's development of the quintessential modernist form "stream of consciousness." James expresses the impossibility of catching, through introspective analysis, this transitive flight of thought that leads us from one conclusion to another, which "is in fact like seizing a spinning top to catch its motion" (*Psychology,* 28). It is precisely this transitive flight that modernist writers of the stream of consciousness form attempted to capture in language. James refers to the "rhythm of language" that illustrates the pulsings of consciousness, or the feeling of attention and non-attention, the feeling of gaps resulting from "*contrasts in the quality*" of the stream of thought rather than breaks.[98] Consciousness is like "a bird's life," James suggests, "it seems to be an alternation of flights and perchings," but these natural metaphors give way to expressions of consciousness in language: "where every thought is expressed in a sentence, and every sentence closed by a period. The resting-places are usually occupied by sensorial imaginations of some sort, … the places of flight are filled with thoughts of relations, static or dynamic" (*Psychology,* 27).

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[97] "James-Lange Theory of Emotion" The Psychology Notes HQ, 21st December 2012. https://www.psychologynoteshq.com/jameslangetheoryofemotion/ Accessed 24th January 2019.
[98] James, William. *Psychology: The Briefer Course* (1892). Dover Publications Inc, 2001, p26, italics original. Hereafter referred to in text as *Psychology*.

Written language as well as speech makes tangible this bird-like movement of thought: "there is not a conjunction, or preposition, and hardly an adverbial phrase, syntactic form, or inflection of voice, in human speech, that does not express some shading or other of relation which we at some moment actually feel to exist between the larger objects of our thought" (*Psychology,* 29 italics original). James recognizes the ability of language to communicate emotion not only in its content, but also via tone, mood, and vocal inflection, all of which might suggest the power of literature to express and evoke emotion.

Sigmund Freud – Psychoanalysis

Sigmund Freud's general psychological theory came to dominate 20th-century thinking about the topology of the mind and the motivation of individuals. Seeking to explain, on a scientific basis, the structure of the psyche, mental illness, and the possibilities for psychical well-being. Freud's drive theory had enormous explanatory power and exerted, and continues to exert, its power on the clinical and cultural imagination today (even if it impacts the scientific landscape less). Whilst psychoanalysis does not form a significant theoretical frame for my project, it does cast an important light upon the writers I discuss and the historical moment in which the literature was produced. Some Freudian concepts are important to my discussion of modernist emotion and affect, namely the unconscious, repression, and sublimation, among others. May Sinclair, for instance, draws broadly on early psychoanalytic ideas, especially issues of repressed sexual instincts and sublimation. The unconscious and dreams are, of course, central to an understanding of *Finnegans Wake*, and sexuality as the main motivating force for human behavior is central to Loy's queer feminism. So, whilst I do not use psychoanalysis as a methodological framework, it necessarily forms an important intellectual backdrop to any engagement with modernist emotion.

Unlike Darwin and James, Freud's objective was not to demonstrate the universality of emotions *per se*, but rather the universal structure of the psyche that included emotions. Like Darwin, Freud looked to observable behavior for signs of emotional tone; but like James he relied heavily on introspection and inferences from conscious ideas. Freud lamented, "[i]t is not easy to deal scientifically with feelings. One can attempt to describe their physiological signs. Where this is not possible … nothing remains but to fall back on the ideational content which is most readily associated with the feeling."[99] Like James and Darwin, Freud used mixed methods to consider feelings - introspection and self-analysis; clinical observations and case studies; and in his later work

[99] Freud, Sigmund. "Civilization and Its Discontents" (1930). *The Freud Reader*, edited by Peter Gay, W.W. Norton & Company, 1989, p. 723. Hereafter referred to intext as *CD*.

speculation from broader societal observation. Whilst Freud's work may appear in each chapter, as it pertains to the specific author, here I will touch upon three important ideas from Freud's later work that pertain to my discussion of emotion and joy: first, a less discussed aspect of Freud, psychoanalysis and happinesss; second, the death drive, and finally Freudian feelings.

The Pleasure Principle and Beyond - Happiness in Late Freud

Let us return, momentarily, to the problem of persistence to consider it from a Freudian perspective. In "Civilization and Its Discontents" (1929) Freud ruminates upon what the behavior of men reveals about "their purpose and object of their lives," and concludes "[t]he answer to this can hardly be in doubt. They strive after happiness; they want to become happy and to remain so."[100] The aim of each human is to achieve a modicum of happiness, either through the active satisfaction of instincts or the avoidance of pain, "[the striving] aims, on the one hand, at eliminating pain and discomfort, on the other, at the experience of intense pleasures" (*CD* 2013, 15). The difficulty with such a desire, prompted by the primary drive, the pleasure principle, is that "its programme is at loggerheads with the whole world," and that despite desire and striving, "[t]here is no possibility at all of its been carried through; all the regulations of the universe run counter to it."[101] Since sexual drives, the primary source of the pleasure principle's fulfilment, cannot be satisfied because of personal and societal restrictions [the reality principle and civilization], and the means to suffer are many, then no wonder, Freud muses, men's claims to happiness have become modified. People count themselves fortunate and happy enough if they escape active suffering: "a man thinks himself happy merely to have escaped unhappiness or to have survived his suffering" (*CD* 729-30). This pessimism is born of its historical moment and the devastating, destructive forces unleashed by humanity in the First World War, in addition to the increasing threat of Hitler in 1929 when this essay was completed. Despite bitter reality and the inevitability of suffering, Freud clearly articulates the necessity of persistence: "The programme of becoming happy, which the pleasure principle imposes on us, cannot be fulfilled; yet we must not — indeed, we cannot — give up our efforts to bring it nearer to fulfilment by some means or other" (*CD* 733).[102]

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[100] Freud, Sigmund. *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930). Watchmaker Publishing, 2013, p. 15. Hereafter referred to intext as *CD* 2013.

[101] Freud, Sigmund. "Civilization and Its Discontents" (1930). *The Freud Reader,* edited by Peter Gay, W.W. Norton & Company, 1989, p. 729. Hereafter referred to intext as *CD1*. Happiness is only possible, according to Freud, via an intense buildup of force which is released quickly (akin to an orgasm), whereas unhappiness is much easier to experience. There are three principal means by which suffering occurs: the decline of the body; the external world "which may rage against us with overwhelming and merciless forces of destruction"; and impact of our relationships with others (*CD1* 729).

[102] Freud emphasizes the individual nature of happiness and consolation: "There is no golden rule which applies to everyone: every man must find out for himself in what particular fashion he can be saved. All kinds of different factors will operate to direct his choice. It is a question of how much real satisfaction he can expect to get from the external world, how

Interestingly, for this discussion, Freud does not describe how it feels to persist, or what feelings might aid in persistence, as I will explore later, but he does list some of the means by which individuals can experience modified happiness. Freud suggests that in order to avoid unpleasure, people use strategies of deflection, substitution, and intoxication, "Life, as we find it, is too hard for us; it brings us too many pains, disappointments and impossible tasks. In order to bear it we cannot dispense with palliative measures" (*CD* 2013, 14). One means of avoiding suffering, Freud suggests, is to not feel at all – whether through sensations and emotions, claiming that "[i]n the last analysis, all suffering is nothing else than sensation; it only exists in so far as we feel it, and we only feel it in consequence of certain ways in which our organism is regulated" (*CD* 734). Ascetism is one of the ways that people try and achieve the non-emotional stasis of affective independence: "This type of defence against suffering is no longer brought to bear on the sensory apparatus; it seeks to master the internal sources of our needs. The extreme form of this is brought about by killing off the instincts, as is prescribed by the worldly wisdom of the East and practised by Yoga." Yet if one succeeds in killing off instincts "he has sacrificed his life" (*CD* 731). The desire for the quietening of passions finds a parallel in the aesthetic modernist desire for impersonality, and to be free from the "emotional slither" that softens poetry and saturates it with the transient feelings of the poet.

Importantly, art and beauty offer vital means of what Freud calls "compensation," even though they too are doomed to fail: "[t]his aesthetic attitude to the goal of life offers little protection against the threat of suffering, but it can compensate for a great deal. The joy experienced in the contemplation of beauty for Sinclair's characters, for example, is part of what attaches them to life. According to Freud the enjoyment of beauty has a peculiar, mildly intoxicating quality of feeling, and it is vital to life: "Beauty has no obvious use; nor is there any clear cultural necessity for it, yet civilization could not do without it" (*CD* 2013, 22). Art and intellectual work, he suggests, are indispensable substitutive satisfactions to the thwarted genital satisfaction of the instincts: "[t]he substitutive satisfactions, as offered by art, are illusions in contrast with reality, but they are none the less psychically effective, thanks to the role which phantasy has assumed in mental life." (*CD* 734). Nevertheless, the mild narcosis induced by art can do no more than bring about a transient withdrawal from the pressure of vital needs, Freud claims, and it is not strong enough to make us forget real misery. I take up the notion of compensation and sublimation in the Sinclair chapter, and also suggest that joy, with its accompanying emotional and affective shifts, is not a means to "forget

far he is led to make himself independent of it, and, finally, how much strength he feels he has for altering the world to suit his wishes. In this, his psychical constitution will play a decisive part, irrespectively of the external circumstances" (*CD* 734).

real misery" or balance the libidinal economy, but offers an energetic and emotional means of perceiving life differently.

Death Drive and Life-Orientated Writing

Though not changing his assertion that men desired happiness, Freud did revisit the pleasure principle in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) and *The Ego and the Id* (1923), resulting in his speculation about a complementary death drive. In "Civilization and Its Discontents" (1929) Freud, famously, argues for the instinctual basis of aggression and the requirement for civilization to control it in the interests of a "civil" society:

> The existence of this inclination to aggression, which we can detect in ourselves and justly assume to be present in others, is the factor which disturbs our relations with our neighbour and which forces civilization into such a high expenditure of energy. In consequence of this primary mutual hostility of human beings, civilized society is perpetually threatened with disintegration (*CD* 2013 53).

The pessimism of the work is oft noted and attributed to WWI with the mass, anonymized killing of millions, in addition to the "free aggressiveness" that his therapeutic work revealed, both of which demanded some other explanation than the drive for pleasure. Freud argued that the urge for self-destruction, in part to resolve tensions visited upon the self from external forces, is an urge to return to chaos, and the oneness of an earlier state. The death drive also explained the "compulsion to repeat," an impulse to revisit and reexperience traumatic and painful experiences and memories. The death drive opposes the tendency toward survival, propagation, sex, and other creative, life-producing drives. Without denying the possibility of the death-drive's existence, this impulse stands in productive tension to what I have called the life-orientation of the writing I discuss. In the case of Yeats, for instance, it is the very impingement of death that moves him to joy and an emphasis on life in his writing. As discussed previously, one is alive to both joy and misery in the act of persistence, and in the authors I discuss each articulates the challenges to life differently, but each also writes with a drive (to borrow a Freudian term) towards live rather than death. In a Spinozan sense, this itself is joy. Spinoza's life-focused notion stands in contrast to the death-drive of Freud. Deleuze articulates Spinoza's vision in this way, "[i]n a world consumed by the negative, he has enough confidence in life, in the power of life, to challenge death, the murderous appetite of men, the rules of good and evil, of the just and the unjust. Enough confidence in life to denounce all the phantoms of the negative" (13). To consider the instances of joy, broadly conceived, demands

attention to affect's capacity to describe and disrupt personhood, and reveals the potentiality to be re-orientated towards life.

Freudian Feelings

Emotions played a role in the lives and treatment of individuals in psychoanalysis but are generally treated as symptomatic, and a means to the end of bringing unconscious material to conscious notice. The primary psychoanalytic emotion might be considered anxiety, so that emotions become something to suffer through and find relief from. Anxiety is the dominant emotional note of psychoanalysis; if an idea or affect resides in the unconscious then "it always has the character of anxiety, the substitute for all 'repressed' affects."[103] Key to repression, according to Freud, is not the destruction of ideas, instincts, desires, and memories, but rather the process of preventing them coming to consciousness. "We know," Freud asserts, "that to suppress the development of affect is the true aim of repression and that its work does not terminate if this aim is not achieved" (Unconscious, 121). Affect is not broadly discussed in Freud's work, only as the diversion of powerful forces (and their return) which produces anxiety; hence the single emotional note of psychoanalysis is the dissonance of anxiety.[104] Despite Freud's pleasure principle, psychoanalysis is ill-equipped for the study of more pleasurable emotions. As Barbara Ehrenreich points out: "in the psychological language of needs and drives, people do not freely and affirmatively search for pleasure; rather they are "driven" by cravings that resemble pain."[105] This undifferentiated drive offers, to me, insufficient nuance to explain lived experiences and the possible production of aesthetic products. My work then, is less an argument for or against psychoanalysis, but more a refinement of what modernist emotions can be considered. In engaging with the affective levels of literature, it permits an attention to the ever-shifting relational assemblages that are created, what Mary Zournazi calls "the experience and dimensions of living" and considers the "different pulls, constraints and freedoms that move us forward and propel us into life." The specificity and textural

[103] Even if affective development proceeds directly from the unconscious to the conscious, and has not been associated with repressed material, Freud suggests it will take on the emotional tone of anxiety. Affects, he claims, are never truly made unconscious but rather "the ideational presentation had undergone repression" (120). Freud is not clear by what he means by affect, but it seems to mean a force or energy associated with the libidinal economy, as he seems to equate (or at least link very closely) instinctual impulses and affects. Just as instincts cannot be repressed, rather only the ideas that become associated with or express the instinct can be repressed, so too affects. Freud, Sigmund. "The Unconscious." *General Psychological Theory: Papers on Metapsychology*. Simon & Schuster, 1991, p.122.

[104] Interestingly, anxiety becomes less damaging and more useful in Freud's discussion of war neuroses and traumatic shock; Freud suggests that is it not anxiety – which he defines as "a particular state of expecting the danger and preparing for it, even though it may be an unknown one" – but rather *fright* that impacts the mind most forcefully. The combination of surprise, cathectic unpreparedness, and fear for one's life that is combined in fright causes a traumatic breach in the system. Therefore the default mode of anxiety of the typical neurotic which *prepares* them for future, if unknown, dangers and thus does not cause such an irreparable breach as fright. Freud, Sigmund. "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (1920). *The Freud Reader*. Peter Gay (ed). W.W. Norton & Company, 1989, p.598.

[105] Ehrenreich, Barbara. *Dancing in the Streets: A History of Collective Joy*. Henry Holt and Company, 2006, p.13.

details that emerge during the analysis of affect and emotion are necessary in order to offer a more complete understanding of modernism. Indeed, rethinking the critical status quo is in itself a quintessentially modernist project, and offers a valuable enrichment of modernist scholarship.

John B. Watson - Behaviorism

Behaviorism does not form a focus for this project, in part because emotions and affect did not fall under the remit of objective and observable objects, and thus is outside of the purview of behaviorism. I also do not engage behaviorism because one of the key tenets of my project is to complicate, enrich, and more closely pay attention to the depths and rhythms of the body – of the text and the bodies within the text, and this necessitates looking beyond behavior. Moreover, affect – especially if we consider the evolutionary basis of some emotions – is not manipulatable by classical conditioning. It does merit it a brief mention here as behaviorism was part of the cultural imaginary, shaping attitudes and orientations towards emotions at the turn of the 20th century – including literary approaches. Moreover, in Behaviorism's challenge to the appropriate subject of psychological study and its methods, it contrasts with the other approaches previously discussed. Rather than the stream of consciousness or interior monologue of Joyce and Sinclair who are discussed here, behaviorism writers such as Wyndham Lewis, Samuel Beckett and, John Attridge suggests, Henry James explored "a representation of mental life that does not privilege introspection, self-presence and interiority" but rather behavior.[106] It is not that behaviorists deny the existence of emotions but that both the topic and the methods by which they were studied (introspection) should not be of interest to psychology as it claims the status of natural science.

In what is commonly referred to as the "Behaviorist Manifesto", "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It" (1913), J.B. Watson defined behaviorism as "a purely objective experimental branch of natural science."[107] Concerned with only that which is directly observable, namely behavior, Watson states: "[i]ts theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness" (Watson, 248). The behaviorist movement in psychology sought to be more "scientific" and that psychologists should not make inferences on things that were not directly observable, "thinking, planning, and feeling were all banned from scientific study" (Ekman, intro Darwin xxx). Unlike Darwin, Watson rejected the idea that inheritance played any part in explaining social behavior:

[106] See Attridge, John. "Mind, Body and Embarrassment in Henry James's The Awkward Age." *Modernism and Affect*, edited by Julie Taylor, Edinburgh University Press, 2015, p. 22.
[107] Watson, John B. "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It" (1913). *Psychological Review*, 101, 2, 1994, pp. 248-253.

"our genes played no role in any of the differences in talent, ability or personality" (Ekman in *Expressions*, 368). Learning and manipulating behavior was of central importance to Behaviorism, exemplified in Watson's "Little Albert" experiment.[108] Make changes to the environment, manners of teaching, ways of child rearing and it is possible, according to Behaviorist tenants, to change the state and fate of men and women. The popularity of Watson's theory, evolutionary psychologist Paul Ekman argues, was because it resonated with the "democratic Zeitgeist – the hope that all men could be equal if their environments were equally benevolent" (Ekman xxxiv). Behaviorism is necessarily reductive, in that behaviorism does not take into account biology including genetics (Darwin) or hormones, the power of the unconscious (Freud), or emotions and affects as motivators and influential on behavior. Nonetheless, in its demands for psychological theories to be supported by empirical data Behaviorism has had, and continues to have, a major influence upon and hand in shaping psychology today.

To conclude this introductory chapter, literary engagement with joy and joyful objects intrudes into the consciousness of both character and reader, demanding new attention to be paid - to people, to words, to things, and this refocusing can lead to a fresh perspective that offers the potentiality to persist. Given the current sociopolitical climate, which is rife with fear, anxiety, and sadness (not unlike the sociocultural atmosphere of the early 20th century), it seems vital to conceive of multiple critical and affective survival strategies. The shift of perspective I explore in my dissertation potentially offers one such strategy: life-orientated affectivity through the cultivation and recognition of moments of joy. Joy interrupts our usual perceptions and attention, which puts us in a different relation to ourselves, offering a means of making us self-coincident. I posit that experiencing moments of joy, no matter how brief and contingent, can help us sustain intersubjective relationships, and that in experiencing moments of joy, subjects are able to reaffirm an energetic commitment to life, to be life-orientated once more.

[108] Watson and Rayner (1920) conditioned an infant into being afraid of a white rat using classical conditioning methods. For more on Watson's Little Albert experiment and behaviorism in general see McLeod, Saul. "Behaviorist Approach," 5th Feb 2017. *Simply Psychology*, https://www.simplypsychology.org/behaviorism.html Accessed 29th January 2019.

CHAPTER TWO

"Making and Mastering"
Joy as Poetic Persistence in W. B. Yeats's Late Poetry

"For the nobleness of the arts is in the mingling of contraries, the extremity of sorrow, the extremity of joy" W. B. Yeats (1907)

"All things fall apart and are built again / And those that build them again are gay" W. B. Yeats (1938)

"The arts are the bridal chambers of joy" W. B. Yeats (1939)

From *The Tower* (1928) onwards, Yeats articulates with increasing urgency the problem of living with dying.[109] Drawing inspiration from his visceral being, he gives voice to his intense fears that his sexual impotency signifies a corresponding creative impotency. Dogged by increasing ill-health, Yeats's physical decline was counterbalanced by the intensity with which he affirmed life, and his affective postures – especially those of joy – were integral to this transformation. Yeatsian joy is a means to perform a kind of affective alchemy, the transmutation of baser, affective materials into more active, productive ones. Intense sorrow, according to Yeats, brings submission; it is a true passion, meaning that it signals passivity and suffering. Yeats states that, " [because] there is submission in pure sorrow, we should sorrow alone over what is greater than ourselves nor too soon admit that greatness."[110] A great poet, Yeats suggests, takes in pure sorrow and transforms it into pure joy – weaving both into the gold of poetic language, both for his own sake and to demonstrate the power of imagination to offer transformative possibilities to readers. As Seamus Heaney says of Yeats's poetry: "it shows how the willful and unabashed play of human imagination constantly promotes the possibilities of human civilization, and it fortifies the spirit against debilitating assaults from inside itself and from outside as well."[111] This transformative alchemy Yeats asserts, is for poets alone: "joy because it must always be making and mastering, remains in the hands and tongue of the artists but with his eyes he enters upon a submissive, sorrowful contemplation of the great "irremediable things" (*PT* 254). Joy for Yeats is a passion necessary for this contemplation of

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[109] All Yeats poems, unless otherwise noted, are taken from *The Collected Poems of W.B. Yeats*, edited by Richard J. Finneran, 2nd edition, Scribner, 1989.

[110] Yeats, W.B. "Poetry and Tradition" in *The Cutting of the Agate* (1907). *Essays and Introductions*. Macmillan Publishing Company, 1961, p. 252. "Poetry and Tradition" is hereafter referred to in-text as *PT* and *Essays and Introductions* is referred to in-text as *EI*. Yeats distinguishes between active and passive suffering, linking passive suffering in poetry to raw personal feelings that have not been transformed and intensified through language into art. Active suffering transforms the personal into poetic language and shifts it towards a mythic or historic scale. Though a poet draws on his personal life, "there is always a phantasmagoria" (*EI*, 509).

[111] Heaney, Seamus. "Joy or Night: Last Things in the Poetry of W B Yeats and Philip Larkin." Lecture delivered at University College of Swansea, 18 January 1993. Handwritten manuscript ms 49,493/183, p. 22. National Library of Ireland. 17 June 2016. I subsequently found a version of this essay published in Heaney, Seamus. *The Redress of Poetry: Oxford Lectures*. Faber and Faber, 1995, pp.146-163.

"irremediable things," an emotional node in the experience of living-with-dying. By formulating a notion of Yeatsian joy, juxtaposed but inextricably linked, to the tragedy of aging and death, we not only gain a deeper understanding of Yeats's later poetry, but it is possible to develop a more nuanced account of modernist emotions.[112]

Yeats recognizes that there are things in life that are worthy of sorrow; the broader historical context of "living with dying" is, of course, the violence of war. Yeats lived and wrote through WWI, the Irish Civil War, and the build up to WWII. He gave language to violent devastation in his lament "All changed, changed utterly: /A terrible beauty is born."[113] In one of Yeats's few poems that refer directly to war, "An Irish Airman foresees his Death" (1919), a young pilot impassively recounts his inevitable death: "I know that I shall meet my fate /Somewhere among the clouds above" (l.1-2). He is not moved by patriotism, idealism, or revenge: "Those that I fight I do not hate, / Those that I guard I do not love" (l.3-4). Instead, what motivates him is a Yeatsian moment of joy: "A lonely impulse of delight / Drove to this tumult in the clouds" (l. 11-12). A memorial to Robert Gregory, Lady Gregory's son, this poem illustrates Yeats's position that, though art may be rooted in the personal and the tragic, by artistic alchemy death is made lasting through the transformation of aesthetic joy.[114] In "A General Introduction For My Work" (1937), written very close to the end of his life, Yeats wrote that "a poet writes always of his personal life, in his finest work out of its tragedy, whatever it be, remorse, lost love, or mere loneliness; he never speaks directly as to someone at the breakfast table, there is always a phantasmagoria" (*EI*, 509). Emotions and experience are drawn upon as fuel for poetry, and the experience of writing and reading poetry moves the person again. Part of the responsibility of the poet is to take raw emotions and make them something worthy of lasting in art. Yeats reflects: "I have heard Lady Gregory say, … 'Tragedy must be a joy to the man who dies.' Nor is it any different with lyrics, songs, narrative poems; neither scholars nor the populace have sung or read anything generation after generation because of its pain" (*EI* 523). Joy is the "aboriginal ice" that makes the tales of sorrow persist in the hearts and minds of the many.[115] For Yeats, to move oneself to joy is the only means by which to find strength

[112]Pethica suggests that Yeats, in his final volume of poetry, was attempting to not only "interpret his impending death" but to also stage "a carefully managed dramatic narrative which might condition critical responses after his death." Pethica James. "Introduction." *Last Poems*, *Manuscript Materials*, edited by James Pethica, Cornell University Press, 1997, p. xxiii. Yeats is thereby choosing to be remembered as laughing into the face of death, a wild wicked old man, rather than an absurd "sixty-year-old smiling man" who is tied to the dog's tail of age.

[113]"Easter, 1916" l.15-16.

[114] Yeats wrote a more formal elegy "In Memory of Major Robert Gregory" (1918) which is placed before "An Irish Airman foresees his Death" (1919). The difference in tone, intensity, and emotion between the two poems is an example of Yeats's transformation of tragedy to something powerful and defiant via tragic joy.

[115] It moves beyond the particular and personal to the scale of the heroic and epic: "The maid of honour whose tragedy they sing must be lifted out of history with timeless pattern, she is one of the four Maries, the rhythm is old and familiar, imagination must dance, must be carried beyond feeling into the aboriginal ice" (*EI* 522).

enough to truly live, not merely exist: "For only when we are gay over a thing, and can play with it, do we show ourselves its master, and have minds clear enough for strength" (*EI* 252).[116] The impulse to look at tragedy directly, with an unblinking eagle-eye and thereby become its master through play, leads Yeats to claim that the heroic mood that forms "the true poetic movement of our time" is "bitter and gay."[117]

Joy, I argue, has been integral to Yeats's poetry from his early work. The themes of death, loss, and suffering are present from Yeats's earliest poetry; however, I focus on Yeats's poetry from *The Tower* (1928) onwards until his posthumously published *Last Poems* (1939). [118] I do this partly for expediency, partly because the later poems are his most modern, but largely because I want to consider the impact of the lived experiences of aging in relation to what I consider the life-orientated affect of joy, and how these interact in Yeats's poetry. By analyzing Yeats's late poetry, it is possible to identify multiple forms of joy and multiple routes to experiencing it. Initially I set up the problem of aging and dying through an analysis of the poem "The Tower." I then consider Yeats's poem "Vacillation" as it contains each form of joy that I have identified. Though tragic joy has received the most critical attention, I identify other forms that have not attracted critical notice. I call these forms of joy *divine*, *sensual, aimless*, and finally *harmonic* joy. *Divine joy* is primarily the way of the soul and intellect, *sensual joy* is the way of the body and heart, *aimless joy* is the union of the natural and supernatural, and *harmonic joy* is the (rare) union of all aspects of sensate and spiritual experience, intensified to circulate around one event, i.e. art.[119] For Yeats, to only experience parts of life is insufficient for producing a great art or a great life. By limiting oneself to one aspect of any experience is to limit life and art; rather one must vacillate, doubt, struggle, suffer *all* possible joys and sorrows in order to live fully and create well.

"The Tower" – Living with Dying

In his collection *The Tower* (1928), W.B. Yeats explores what he calls "death-in-life and life-in-death" ("Byzantium" l.16). The volume was published when Yeats was sixty-three, and it makes clear the connection between physical and poetic virility, the decline of one precipitating the decline of the other. Bitter and rage-filled, the title poem of the volume opens with a rhetorical question that

[116] Yeats explores the problem of making and mastering the self and soul, and the joys and sorrows of doing so in poems such as "Vacillation," "Dialogue of Self and Soul," "Blood and Moon," "Man and the Echo."
[117] Yeats in a letter to Dorothy Wellesley (June 6th 1936), cited in Forster, R. F. *W. B. Yeats: A Life. II. The Arch-Poet*. Oxford UP, 2003, p. 553.
[118] Tracing how joy changes and develops would be a fascinating extension to this chapter that I would like to undertake in the future.
[119] The term *sensate* is a useful one as its root has broad meaning. The Late Latin *sensatus* means to be "gifted with sense," and derives from *sensus* "perception, feeling, undertaking, meaning," and it can also mean to have the power of sensation, to be sensitive, and to be sentient. All these connotations are useful in thinking of Yeats's capacious notion of experience.

draws the reader into the frustration and indignation with which the aging speaker laments his dilemma:

> What shall I do with this absurdity –
> O heart, O troubled heart – this caricature,
> Decrepit age that has been tied to me
> As to a dog's tail?
>
> (l. 1-4).

The breathing pattern at the start of the first stanza and the space introduced by the long dashes, aids in transmitting the affective tone of the poem. The "O's" slow the reading down, and force gasps of air, giving the sense of pain and the breathlessness of old age. This is especially poignant as Yeats was recovering from a respiratory illness after bleeding from the lungs whilst composing material for *The Tower*. The speaker apostrophizes his own heart, looking for wisdom from the traditional locus of emotion. Yet the heart is also a fleshy, physical organ, one that fuels the life of the "dying animal." The debased likeness of the caricature is emphasized by the exasperation articulated in the plosive "p" of decre***p***it. And the spi***tt***ing rage of the repeated 't' sounds. Yeats leaves an uncharacteristic space as he moves to the next line, a kind of caesura to offer a beat of mental space so that he can introduce the counterpart of aging - an intensely fertile imagination and acutely vibrant senses:

> Never had I more
> Excited, passionate, fantastical
> Imagination, nor an ear and eye
> That more expected the impossible
>
> (l.5-8).

The enjambment offers a pause to understand "never had I more" as both the richness of his current life, but also emphasizes the cost of declining physicality. It also allows the next line to emphasize the contrary benefits of aging through the pounding pace of "excited, passionate, fantastical." Part of the absurdity is that the aging man has never been more imaginatively potent even as he declines physically. By repeating the "I" sound in this second half of the stanza, he is asserting his existence and individuality by singing his own song against the inevitability of the common experience of death. Sibilant with passion, "fant***as***tical and impo***ss***ible," he brandishes his intensely fertile imagination against the discordant metal-kettle decrepitude of old age. *Absurdus*, the Latin root of the word "absurd" means "out of tune; foolish" - so how, the aging speaker asks, can the poet sing from the soul when the absurdity of decrepit age makes him "out of tune" and ridiculous? The end of the stanza reinforces the tunelessness and indignities of aging by likening it to being derided by "A sort of ba***tt***ered ke***tt***le at the heel," which is discordant, frightening, and incongruous.

As if to prove his imaginative potency, the speaker commands his forces – imaginative and ghostly – to both bear witness to his lamentation and to answer his question. The speaker on the battlements of his tower, calls forth "images and memories" (l.22) of those long-dead, or those taken from his imagination, "For I would ask a question of them all" (l. 24):

> Did all old men and women, rich and poor,
> Who trod upon these rocks or passed this door,
> Whether in public or in secret rage
> As I do now against old age?
> (l.97-100).

The question shifts the scale from the personal to the general case, making the rage and fear that troubles the heart a characteristic of life. *An* answer is given in the silent stare of those the poet-speaker has imaginatively called forth: "But I have found an answer in those eyes / That are impatient to be gone" (l.101-102). Their answer is unvoiced; only their gaze is interpretable, and its meaning left undecided, only "impatient" hints at the mood of the gathered phantasms. They are impatient, perhaps, with a question that has an obvious answer: yes, indeed, old-age is rage-inducing because death is unavoidable – but if inevitable, might it be unpitiable? The silent communication of those "out of nature" ("Sailing to Byzantium" l. 25) suggests that such corporeal concerns are no longer theirs. Yeats's consideration of aging and death creates an aesthetic posture that describes old age as pernicious but, in its raging defiance, not pitiable. There is even joy in such a stance, in the possibility of art emerging from such "irremediable things." I will explore Yeats's confrontation with aging and death further though a close analysis of his poem "Vacillation" (1932). The poem opens with the question "what is joy?" and explores the different forms of joy that Yeats uses in order to "play" with his existential dread.

"Vacillation" – The Movement of Hyphenated Joy

The poem "Vacillation" offers a (non-exhaustive) template of the possible joys and barriers to joy that can found in Yeats's poetry. The poem offers pairings of force, of expansion and restriction, as the soul moves through the extremities of life: the expansion of divine or soul's joy (stanza II), oscillating to the constriction of worldly status and material gain (stanza III); a revelatory joy from quotidian pleasures (stanza IV) shifting to the remorse and regret of daily life (stanza V); the acceptance of the inevitable rise and fall of civilizations that also contains tragic joy (stanza VI); the tension between sexual and spiritual experiences (stanza VII) resolved through the spiritual-sensual experience of art (stanza VIII). Soul's joy, tragic joy, aimless joy, sexual joy, and hearts' joy are all posited as possible, yet partial joys, that might be used to transform the rage and sorrow of aging into the joy of life; ultimately creating the "unaging monuments of intellect." I will

go on to explore each category more fully below, but ultimately conclude – as Yeats does – that each of these joys are partial and incomplete. The poem imaginatively inhabits each of these positions and moves back-and-forth between possibilities, as each living being must. The poem comes to the conclusion that that life fully experienced is joy.

Briefly, it is useful to outline Yeats's philosophical position taken from *A Vision* as it informs the poetry under discussion. Yeats's theory of life is fundamentally a conflict between two polarities or *tinctures,* of *primary* and *antithetical* forces, or "extremities." All life is a process, or continual movement, between these two opposing forces, that he called *gyres*. Yeats's system is based upon the movement of these forces, represented as double cones or *gyres* (see fig.1): "All physical reality, the universe as a whole, every solar system, every atom, is a double cone."[120] Each cone is moving from the greatest possible expansion to the smallest contraction (see fig. 2). It is also "a spiral expressing the two forces or essences in space and time."[121] All of terrestrial life, all of history, all of the cosmos is based upon the tension of the opposite states according to Yeats. If, for example, the *antithetical* gyre is at maximum expansion, then the *primary* would be at the maximum contraction; all life and experience is propelled by the movement back and forth between opposites: "living one another's lives, dying one another's deaths" (*AVB* 50). The opposing gyres must always be thought of together. They are always in relation and are interdependent. Considered at the scale of the human consciousness, Yeats calls the gyre objective and subjective, on the universal scale of God: solar and lunar. As Yeats put it in *AVB,* "The whole system is founded upon the belief that the ultimate reality is one, represented as the Sphere, falls in human consciousness…into a series of antimonies" (137). The most fundamental antinomy is between the One (God) and the Many (humanity). Yet, as Neil Mann in the introduction to *W.B. Yeats A Vision: Explications and Contexts* points out, Yeats is most interested in the forces pulling in either direction "towards the One and *towards* the Many: the unifying and the dispersing, the centripetal and the centrifugal, the homogenizing and the differentiating, the objectifying and the subjectifying" (5). Yeats found the contradiction, tension, and paradox inherent in the system personally and poetically generative. As Yeats summarizes, "The antithetical tincture is emotional and aesthetic whereas the primary tincture is reasonable and

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[120] Yeats, W.B. *A Vision: The Revised 1937* Edition. Margaret Mills Harper and Catherine E. Paul. *The Collected Works of W.B.Yeats Vol XIV*. Scribner, 2015, 51. Hereafter referred to in-text as *AVB*.
Yeats discusses the intersecting cones as Discord and Concord increasing or diminishing as first one then the other gains dominance. He uses one of his favorite phrases ("Dying each other's life, living each other's death") to characterize this on a human level (*AVB* 50). One cone representing subjectivity and other other objectivity, and all the associated characteristics of each, can be thought of as intersecting states, "struggling one against the other" (*AVB* 52).
[121] Mann, Neil. "'Everywhere That Antinomy of the One and the Many': The Foundations of A Vision". *W.B.Yeats's A Vision: Explications and Contexts*. Mann, Neil, Matthew Gibson, Claire V. Nally (eds). Clemson University Press, 2012, 5.

moral" (*AVB* 54). These are the "extremities" through which "Man runs his course" as Yeats writes in the opening line of "Vacillation" (l.1-2).

The speaker in "Vacillation" attempts to answer the question 'what is joy' across eight stanzas by experiencing multiple things that purportedly bring joy. "Vacillation," is a complex, esoteric poem in eight movements, which had been drafted under the title "Wisdom." Yeats links the movement back-and-forth between extremities to both wisdom and joy.[122] To ask, "what is joy?" is also to ask what is the point of life? As Helen Vendler states, it is to ask whether "life, in its forced choices and their tragic results, has any space in its system for joy."[123]In the first section of "Vacillation," the speaker puzzles over the extremities between which "man runs his course," and asks how joy is possible when everything ends in death:

Between extremities
Man runs his course;
A brand, or flaming breath,
Comes to destroy
All those antinomies
Of day and night;
The body calls it death,
The heart remorse
But if this be right
What is joy?
(l.1-10)

Yeats then compares the conflicting antinomies inherent within existence to the paradoxical "Tree of Life," a tree which, impossibly "Is half all glittering flame and half all green" (l.12). [124] One role of

[122] *Words for Music Perhaps and Other Poems*), Manuscript Materials, ed. Clark, David R. Cornell University Press, 1995, 75. In the 1933 version of "Vacillation" each section are labelled with simple roman numerals giving away nothing as to the content or meaning of the poem. In the previous version published by Cuala Press in 1932 Yeats gave each stanza a title, see appendix 1 for details.

[123] Ibid, p. 154.

[124] It is in his essay "The Celtic Element in Literature" that Yeats describes the *Mabinogion* passage of the 'burning tree' (Essays and Introductions 176). The image of the tree half aflame and half green from root to tip is an image taken from the from the twelfth century Welsh Romance, the *Mabinogion*, from an episode focusing on Peredur the Son of Evrawc. The tree is a small part of quest tale focusing on the adventures of Peredur, a Cuchulain-like figure, who refuses repeated offers of wealth and women in order to attain fame and honour in battle. The episode features an idea that appealed to Yeats: resurrection through womanly love. Coming to the Palace of the Sons of the King of the Tortures, he discovers that the men of the palace are killed each day by an Addanc. On returning as corpses to the Palace, their sisters anoint them with warm water and precious balsam, and they live once more. Peredur desires to go with them to battle the Addanc, but they refuse him saying "If thou shouldst be slain there, thou hast none to bring thee back to life again" (29). It is clear then that the repeated cycle of death-in-daily battle, and the life-giving touch of the female counterparts in the dark, finds resonance with Yeats's notions of life-giving male/female union and *petit mort,* articulated in poems like "Solomon and the Witch" or the Crazy Jane sequence. Peredur follows the men secretly, but he is intercepted by a beautiful, magical woman who foretells that he will die in his quest. She offers to aid him by giving him a stone that will hide him from the Addanc, on the condition that "thou wouldst pledge me thy faith to love me above all women," thus united with his own female counterpart who rescues him from death, he goes to kill the monster. The tree is signpost on his way to find the Addanc: "he saw a tall tree by the side of the river, one half of which was in flames from the root to the top, and the other half was

the tree is to signal the connection and tension between spiritual and worldly concerns, but also to signal the half human, half divine nature of humanity. As "brand, or flaming breath" clears away all antinomies "the body calls it death, the heart remorse". The heart's death can be a living-death, a heart that is haunted by regrets and self-accusations rather than sins. The "half and half," of the tree in section two, which consumes what it renews refers to the perpetual cycle of birth and rebirth. This is reinforced by the allusion to Attis, the Phygnian God of vegetation, who is castrated and sacrificed, in order to be reborn in the Spring. The speaker states: "he that Attis' image hangs between / That staring fury and the lush leaf" (l. 16-17). These lines can be read in two ways. The poet could be the "***he*** that Attis's image hangs between / That staring fury and the lush leaf." "He" is the man that is pinning the mask of Attis to the tree. He is confronting his Daemon, the face of the human contemplating the face of the divine. Alternatively, the "*he* that Attis's image *hangs between*/ That staring fury and the lush leaf."[125] Like Attis, the poet is always torn between competing forces; in this case he is caught between "Abounding foliage moistened with dew," (we are meant to hear the echo of sexual desire and consummation here, of earthly joy), and the furious, unblinking stare of the intellect; of divine joy, both are ways to fuel creativity. Yet the poet is forced to choose between "Perfection of the life or of the work" ("The Choice" l.2), and so the poet must look out of the mask of the castrated divinity in order to be born again to song. Like Attis-Dionysus, whose sacrifice is an ecstatic, bloody, sensual experience that offers a union of the mortal and the divine, the poet is caught between the two joys. Thus, the first joy introduced, an impossible perfect joy, must come from the union of two opposites, symbolized by the tree "half all glittering flame and half all green" (l.12).

In stanza three, the speaker considers the antinomy of divine joy with worldly joys. The speaker suggests that there is necessity and pleasure in accumulating wealth and status, counselling to "get all the gold and silver that you can" because whilst "all women dote upon an idle man" (l.23), (such as the man who writes poetry), still "children need a rich estate" (l. 19, 23, 24). And so once again our Attis-like poet is hung between extremities because "No man has ever lived that had enough / Of children's gratitude or woman's love" (l. 25-26). Yet Yeats indicates his distaste for these pleasures calling them "Lethean foliage" (l.27), meaning they cause one to be tangled in

green and in full leaf" (29). *Mabinogian*. Transcribed from the 1849 edition text by David Price, translated by Lady Charlotte Guest.

[125] Yeats states in *Per Amica Silentia Lunae*: "I think all happiness depends on the energy to assume the mask of some other life, on a re-birth as something not one's self, […] If we cannot imagine ourselves as different from what we are, and try to assume that second self, we cannot impose a discipline upon ourselves though we may accept one from others. Active virtue, as distinguished from the passive acceptance of a code, is therefore theatrical, consciously dramatic, the wearing of a mask."[125]"

worldliness and transient pleasure, forgetting real joy. [126]The speaker remains within the everyday world in stanza four, but it is transformed by an affective revelation of joy. Yeats offers a first-person account of the extremity of joy, inspired by a real incident from his life. In section four, Yeats experimented with labeling the stanza variously "Joy" and "aimless joy,"[127] when the speaker is overcome with unexpected joy:

> My body of a sudden blazed;
> And twenty minutes more or less
> It seemed, so great my happiness,
> That I was blessed and could bless.
> (l.35-44).

Joy masters him and offers an energetic and emotional exuberance. It is without intention and it does not seek any reciprocity. The affect simply overspills the self and permits an affectionate engagement with others.

After the blessed feeling passes, the speaker articulates the emotional difficulty of being so involved in the world: "responsibility so weigh me down" (l. 50). Responsibility is not only the prosaic pressures of feeding a family, but the emotional difficulties of being human, expanding perhaps on the remorse which inflicts the death of the heart:

> Things said or done long years ago,
> Or things I did not do or say
> But thought that I might say or do,
> Weigh me down, and not a day
> But something is recalled,
> My conscience or my vanity appalled.
> (l. 51-56).

This stanza, originally titled "remorse" and later "conscience" articulates the pain that we create for ourselves that keep us from the joy of life.[128] Yeats also subtly undermines any notion of conventional morality by confusing conscience with vanity. There is no divine faculty adjudicating sin and guilt, but rather pain from self-deceit and ego. Being in the

[126] Stanza five was originally titled "remorse" and later "conscience" articulates the pain that we create for ourselves that keep us from the joy of beauty.
[127]Yeats, W.B. *Words for Music Perhaps and Other Poems*, Manuscript Materials, ed. Clark, David R. Cornell University Press, 1995, 77. All references of draft materials for "Vacillation" are taken from this volume.
[128] Yeats, W.B. *Words for Music Perhaps and Other Poems*: *Manuscript Materials*, ed. Clark, David R. Cornell University Press, 1995, 77.

world means pain and regret is inevitable, and this element of the human condition is scaled up to the level of civilizations in the next stanza.

Yeats strikes a Nietzschean note of *amor fati* in stanza six, as the great leaders and conquerors of fallen civilizations, of "Babylon or Nineveh" (l. 64) cry "'Let all things pass away'" (l. 66). Unlike the speaker of stanza five who feels the repeated bite of remorse, the leaders attempt to embrace the inevitable decline of their civilizations.[129] Moving in scale from ancient civilization to all men, the stanza then moves back to the personal embracing of the inevitable passing of life:

> From man's blood-sodden heart are sprung
> Those branches of the night and day
> Where the gaudy moon is hung.
> What's the meaning of all song?
> 'Let all things pass away.'
>
> (l. 66-70).

As in the opening stanza, day and night symbolize life and death, and the overly ornamental, highly ornate "gaudy moon" is hung (mirroring the mask of Attis) between life and death. Seeking joy is a noble pursuit, even as one is caught between life and death. We see this in the choice of "gaudy," associated with the *antithetical* and emotional moon, *gaudia*, or joy, in the Latin root of the word, or *gaio* of Greek meaning rejoice, which is a noble pursuit (gaudy also links to *guaire*, Middle Irish for noble). The question shifts from '"What is joy?" in the opening stanza, to a related question, "What's the meaning of all song?" Stanza seven seeks to answer both questions.

Originally entitled "Dialogue of Soul and Heart," stanza seven offers the choice between divine joy and sensual joy:

> The Soul. Seek out reality, leave things that seem.
> The Heart. What, be a singer born and lack a theme?
> The Soul. Isaiah's coal, what more can man desire?
> The Heart. Struck dumb in the simplicity of fire!
> The Soul. Look on that fire, salvation walks within.
> The Heart. What theme had Homer but original sin?
>
> (l.72-76) [130]

[129] The imperious command of "Let all things pass away" might also be understood to be a desperate attempt at control, i.e. the delusion of individual will against the cycle of history.
[130]Yeats, W.B. *The Winding Stair* (1929), Manuscript Materials. ed. Clark, David R. Cornell University Press, 1995, 81. All references of draft materials for "A Dialogue of Self and Soul" are taken from this volume.

The heart is filled with passion and longing; it is an organ that registers sensual and physical desire. Soul offers a mystical purging with "Isaiah's coal."[131] The purifying fire of divine revelation and atonement, where "salvation walks within" (l.76). The soul counsels the heart to "Seek out reality, leave things that seem" (l.72). This hints at a Platonic position, of glimpsing via vision, the reality-behind-the- illusion of earthly concerns. Yet Heart replies "What, be a singer born and lack a theme?" This clearly affirms the body, suggesting inspiration comes also from the earthly and the personal as well as the divine. The poet prefers to sing and be understood, to live mortally and imperfectly like Homer: "What theme had Homer but original sin?" This recalls another dialogue poem earlier in *A Winding Stair,* "A Dialogue of Self and Soul," the Attis-like poet ultimately chooses to remain within the cycle of life, death, and re-birth concluding: "I am content to live it all again" (l.57).

The final stanza dramatizes the results of the conversation by summoning the Catholic scholar Friedrich von Hügel, whose treatise *The Mystical Element of Religion* had argued the Christian vision as the vision of artists.[132] Though their thinking on spirituality connected in many ways, Von Hügel's devotion to organized Catholic religion was too restrictive for Yeats's notion of spirituality [133]. As Untereker points out "Christianity fascinated Yeats. Accepting all its miracles, he found only its rejection of the personal ultimately distasteful. For if he were to reject the personal, he would, Yeats felt, be rejecting the way of the artist, the only way open to him" (220).[134] Like Von Hügel, Yeats was able to accept the possibility of a personal and direct relationship to the divine through mystical experience. Yeats embraces a non-Christian spirituality that emphasizes art, sex, love, and divinity, concluding that, "Homer is my example and his unchristened heart" (l. 87). Yeats acknowledges that his heart would find some rest from the passionate work of life, if he focused on eternal and disembodied things, rather than the passions of love and hate. Instead, once more, he elects the sweetness of life symbolized in "the lion and the honeycomb" (l. 88-89). He will work, bee-

[131] This is taken from Isiah 6:7 "With it he touched my mouth and said, 'See, this has touched your lips; your guilt is taken away and your sin atoned for.' And he said, "Go, and say to this people: 'Keep on hearing, but do not understand; keep on seeing, but do not perceive.' Make the heart of this people dull, and their ears heavy, and blind their eyes; lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their hearts, and turn and be healed."

[132] Untereker, John. *A Reader's Guide to William Butler Yeats*. Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1959, 223.

[133] See "Baron Friedrich von Hügel." *YourDictionary*, n.d. Web. 29 May 2017. Von Hügel's lasting contribution comes from his notion of the *historical/institutional element,* the *intellectual/speculative element,* and the *mystical/experiential element* of religion.

[134] Yeats explains the tension of Heart and Soul in a letter to Olivia Shakespear: "I feel that this is the choice of the saint (St.Theresa's ecstasy, Ghandhi's smiling face): comedy; and the heroic choice: Tragedy (Dante, Don Quixote). Live Tragically but be not deceived…Yet I accept all the miracles, Why should not the old embalmers come back as ghosts and bestow upon the saint all the case once bestowed upon [Pharaoh] Rameses? …I shall be a sinful man until the end, and think upon my deathbed of all the [sexless] nights I wasted in my youth" (cited in Albright, 727).

like, in the chambers of the heart, to create the sweetness of poetry.[135]

The poem "Vacillation" offers Yeats's philosophical and poetic thinking in the microcosm of one poem. In attempting to answer for himself the questions: *what is the point of life given the inevitability of death*, and *can joy be real if sorrow exists*? Yeats establishes a poetics of joy. He performs emotional "masks" that permit him different ways to be moved through joy and so to write of joy; this moves him from the submission of sorrow into the action of an alternative orientation to the world.

Dealing with Death Through Joy

Like Spinoza, Yeats seeks an emotional transformation by seeking a more adequate understanding of that which would cause him to sorrow, i.e. his aging and inevitable death. For Yeats, to intensely experience the antinomies of life is to live fully and actively. Unlike Spinoza Yeats does not always master his emotions by reason alone, but rather by fully experiencing all feelings and channeling them into art: "I am philosophical, not scientific, which means that observed facts do not mean much until I can make them part of my experience" ("Private Thoughts 1939" *E*, 430). Active joys are those which are self-affective, internal, or offer "an internal agreement of our essence, other essences, and the essence of God…then the affects that arise from it are themselves actions."[136] Thus, they increase our power or perfection - which Spinoza calls *blessedness* – is an experience that Yeats also links to joy. Any joy brings with it an increase in power and perfection. As Deleuze says of Spinoza's *Ethics,* "The *Ethics* is necessarily an ethics of joy: only joy is worthwhile, joy remains, bringing us near to action, and to the bliss of action."[137] Yeats's notion of emotional transformation appears to propose something akin to Spinoza's idea that affects can only be moved by more intense affects. There must be a more forceful emotion created via an altered perspective in order to displace a prior one. So sorrow can be moved to joy and hate to love; but the motion is recursive - shifting back and forth like the dialogical form Yeats uses to express it.

Divine Joy – The Development of the Soul

One of the ways that Yeats cultivates joy in the face of dying is to theorize life-after-death and place bodily death in the perspective of an afterlife. In Yeats's system, reincarnation offers a

[135] Daniel Albright cites Judges 14:14 as the scriptural reference, pointing to the moment when Samson took a honeycomb from the carcass of a lion, telling the Philistines that 'Out of the eater came forth meat, and out of the strong came forth sweetness' (727).
[136] Spinoza, Benedict. *Ethics.* Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, 2001, 28.
[137] Deleuze, Gilles. *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*. Trans. Robert Hurley. City of Light Books, 1988, 51.)

repetition of lives and therefore no permanent ending. Despite his *Vision*, Yeats was conflicted about the abstract comfort of reincarnation; it seemed cold comfort at the close of one's current earthly existence. Though the ultimate goal of the wheel of rebirth is to transcend the sensual world and attain the joy of Nirvana – the aging poet-philosopher found this both fascinating and unappealing. Yeats, in an interview in 1933, confessed: "I am trying to write about the state of my soul, for it is right for an old man to make his soul."[138] "To make your soul" is an Irish phrase meaning to prepare for death, and as Yeats-the-man faced the prospect of preparing his soul for the judgement of the afterlife; Yeats-the-poet contemplated how to sing-from-your-soul in order to produce art that would be immortal. Yeats, as Daniel Albright points out "was haunted for much of life by the conflict between man's organic nature and man's possibility of abstracting himself into an image, a work of art"[139]. In order to attain immortality, man or poet, he must focus on his soul as the medium of the divine.

The difficulty in "making your soul" for the mortal poet, is that the flesh interferes in soul cleansing, and Yeats explores this issue in "Sailing to Byzantium" (1927). The speaker realizes that since he is in the autumn of his life this excludes him from the sexual unions of those in the full bloom of summer, so he turns his mind to the possibility of a divine union instead:

> That is no country for old men. The young
> In one another's arms, birds in the trees,
> —Those dying generations—at their song,
> The salmon-falls, the mackerel-crowded seas,
> Fish, flesh, or fowl, commend all summer long
> Whatever is begotten, born, and dies.
> Caught in that sensual music all neglect
> Monuments of unageing intellect.
>
> (l.1-8)

The appeal of abundant life is seductively set against the cold, if unageing, intellect. This stanza's musicality betrays the difficulty that the speaker experiences as he attempts to contemplate, and create, 'higher' things. The consonance of the sibilant '*s*' sounds is entwined throughout the first stanza. Just as the young are locked in "one another'***s*** arm***s***" so bird***s***, tree***s***, ***s***ong, ***s***almon, ***s***ea***s***, and ***s***ummer, all sound their ***s***en***s***ual mu***s***ic. Soft 'f' sounds from "***f***ish, ***f***lesh, or ***f***owl" offer a restful,

[138] Yeats, W.B. cited in Jeffares, A. Norman. *A Commentary on The Collected Poems of W.B. Yeats*. Stanford University Press, 1968, 253.

[139] *The Poems*. ed. Daniel Albright. J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1990, 545. The poem "The Dolls" for example, juxtapose the organic human life that "bawls", that is imperfect and fleshy, with the purposeful creation of the dolls; implicitly aligning the creation of god with that of the artist, as Yeats suggested poets are necessary to show him how to create, to "Bring the soul of man to God, / Make him fill the cradles right" ("Under Ben Bulben" l. 40-41).

breeze of breath across the different types of life, hinting at a harmony between them. The connection between them is reduced to a three-word synopsis of life - each are "begotten, born, and dies." The plosive 'b' birthing them and rushing them headlong into the solid 'd' of "dies," a dissonant half-rhyme that ends with a full-stop. We hear the homophone of "foul" in "fowl," hinting at the future of bodily corruption that will inevitably follow on from the "sensual music" of "those dying generations".

Here Yeats reiterates the pathos of aging but also offers a possible solution; the promise of the soul's joy rests on the "unless." But first the speaker is moved to self-pity juxtaposed against the beautiful abundance is the physicality of the "aged man" whose "mortal dress" is pitiably tattered:

> An aged man is but a paltry thing,
> A tattered coat upon a stick, unless
> Soul clap its hands and sing, and louder sing
> For every tatter in its mortal dress,
>
> (l.9-12).

Paltry is rubbish, refuse, and is cognate with Middle Low German and East Frisian *palte* which associates it with "rag," hence being a tattered coat.[140] The aged man must discover his own song, drawn from things that will not decay, in this case art and his soul (l.12). In order to distance himself from such concerns, both rejected by and rejecting the land of sensuality, he goes to Byzantium, an epitome of art and life: "I have sailed the seas and come / To the holy city of Byzantium" (l. 15-16).[141] However, there is no guarantee of such immortality, the "unless" evokes possibility but also contingency, one must work for immortality. In contrast to the fertile pleasures of flesh and fauna of the first stanza, the rest of the poem emphasizes divine joy – the possible pleasure gained from attending to the soul:

> O sages standing in God's holy fire
> As in the gold mosaic of a wall,
> Come from the holy fire, perne in a gyre,
> And be the singing-masters of my soul.
> Consume my heart away; sick with desire
> And fastened to a dying animal
> It knows not what it is; and gather me
> Into the artifice of eternity.

[140] The image of an old man as scarecrow is repeated in the same volume in "Among School Children" (1927). Yeats imagines himself as "Old clothes upon old sticks to scare a bird" (l.48), and recalling himself to his visit of school children he reminds himself "Better to smile on all those that smile, and show / There is a comfortable kind of old scarecrow" (l. 31-32).

[141] Yeats held Byzantium in high regard due to the closeness of art and life, and thereby the potential for *harmonic joy*: "I think that in early Byzantium, and maybe never before or since in recorded history, religious, aesthetic and practical life were one, and the architect and the artificers … spoke to the multitude and the few alike" (*AVA* 158-59).

(l. 17- 24).

The emphasis shifts from mortality to divinity - "God's holy fire" - fire being the element that represents the unchanging Divine world.[142] This holy fire sculpts the soul by fanning the flames of divine joy. In a letter to Olivia Shakespear written on 27th October 1927, Yeats calls this holy fire "ecstasy" (cited in Jeffares 256). The speaker invokes the sages to "be the singing-masters of my soul" and to gather him "into the artifice of eternity." Ecstasy, unlike joy, suggests a *putting out of place* (Latin *extasis*), a form of insanity or bewilderment. The late Greek etymological meaning (*ἔκστασις*) suggests why ecstasy is maddening – "withdrawal of the soul from the body, mystic or prophetic trance" – it involves the removal of the soul from the body, i.e. death. To reach Nirvana, souls must be ascetic in life so they will escape from the cycle of life and death. The ascetic soul is fashioned into tougher, more pure material, by attempting to purge the fleshy body and emotional heart. But the trick is, there is no escape from the desiring heart, for while the creating of art may be divinely inspired, the body is a necessary vehicle for its soul-making:

> Soul clap its hands and sing, and louder sing
> For every tatter in its mortal dress,
> Nor is there singing school but studying
> Monuments of its own magnificence
>
> (l.11-14).

The referent of "its" seems to be the soul; meaning that the only school for the soul is the contemplation of divinely inspired art.[143] The earthly poet of course remains tied to the body. He must draw on his spiritual vision to recreate, or recapture, the divine fire in art.

Yeats faces the problem of the ascetic - a concern that May Sinclair also faces, as I will discuss in the next chapter- how does an embodied being slough off the desires and senses of the body in order to come closer to the divine? Yeats articulates this problem in "A Dialogue of Self and Soul," which details the tension between the needs of the soul and the needs of the body. Aspects of the poet-speaker's self debate their supremacy, "My Soul" opens the exchange and "My Self" responds, each argues their part:

> *My Soul.* I summon to the winding ancient stair;
> Set all your mind upon the steep ascent,
> Upon the broken, crumbling battlement,
> Upon the breathless starlit air,

[142] See the summary of the Hermetic Kabbala and related elements, and their mapping onto the Neoplatonic division of reality in Genung, Michael. "Yeats's "Sailing to Byzantium" The "Esoteric" Four-Stanza Structure". *Orbis Litterarum* Vol. 65, issue 1, 2010, pp. 22-56.

[143] Not only meant in the metaphorical sense, for Yeats divine inspiration was quite direct and literal. Yeats was emphatic about his experiences of communing with the dead – souls much more intimate with the divine – through the mediumship of his wife, that culminated in *A Vision*. Yeats offered to give up and to concentrate on the channeled philosophy of his "instructors," but he was told that they had "come to give him metaphors for poetry."

Upon the star that marks the hidden pole;
Fix every wandering thought upon
That quarter where all thought is done:
Who can distinguish darkness from the soul?
(l. 1-8)

Soul gives instruction as to how to achieve that liberation of the soul from the confines of the body - focus and discipline the mind: "Fix every wandering thought upon / That quarter where all thought is done" (l. 6-7), to think only of "ancestral night" (l. 20). The answer is implied in the question, "Who can distinguish darkness from the soul?" (l. 8); no one can, or at least not the individual whose soul is speaking cannot make this distinction. To ponder darkness is to think only on the soul itself, and not let the imagination: "remember things that are / Emblematical of love and war" – meaning desire and bodily existence – and rather think of elevated, heavenly things. His Soul argues his body is beyond use, so his imagination should turn away from such concerns: "*My Soul.* Why should the imagination of a man / Long past his prime remember things that are Emblematical of love and war?" This is necessary, his Soul suggests, so it can escape the "crime" of "death and birth (l.17-19, 24).

The back and forth between self and soul is not really a dialogue; they do not listen to one another. Each is compelled by its own concerns, one apart from the other. The self contemplates the emblems of love and war which is represenred by "Sato's ancient blade" and the flowered embroidery which is wrapped around the sword. Though the embroidery is "tattered" (like the aged man), it is also vivid ("Heart's purple") and still able to "protect" and "adorn" (l. 27, 10,16).[144] "My Self" closes the conversation in the third movement, and is given four stanzas to articulate its defiance: "*My Self.* A living man is blind and drinks his drop / What matter if the ditches are impure? / What matter if I live it all once more?" (l. 41-43). Yeats chooses life: "I am content to live it all again" (l. 57). He recognizes that partial knowledge is the lot of an incarnate existence and asks, *why not be content with life itself*?[145] The speaker's bravura of "Measure the lot; forgive myself the lot" is affirmative and joyous. The body casts out remorse, electing to live a mortal life. To live is to embrace the body, to drink life down in all its impurity. The "frog-spawn" filled "blind man's ditch" (l. 59), the unidealized reality of the fecund ditch - which is life - may persist, but it is affectively transformed: it feels different.

[144] Yeats associated the sword and its covering with life, as he wrote to Olivia Shakespear in October 1927 "I make my Japanese sword and its silk covering my symbol of life" (cited in Jeffares 324).

[145] In Yeats's system, part of the point of life is to accumulate experience; part of the process of the afterlife is to sort through those experiences. It is only from the perspective of after-life that the soul can take in the whole of experience and see it in context. Wisdom, and the ability to forgive oneself and others, is therefore not available to the living. So, Yeats concludes in this poem, one might as well live without remorse because real forgiveness and wisdom is only possible after death.

In the final staza, body and soul need one another to transform into something greater than their parts. The casting out of remorse leaves room in the heart for joy:

> I am content to follow to its source
> Every event in action or in thought;
> Measure the lot; forgive myself the lot!
> When such as I cast out remorse
> So great a sweetness flows into the breast
> We must laugh and we must sing,
> We are blest by everything,
> Everything we look upon is blest.
>
> (l.64-71)

The sweetness flooding the breast transforms the "I" which casts out the remorse into "we" - "We must laugh and we must sing/ We are blest by everything," (l. 70-71). "We" the self suggests must come together and be transformed in the process. The world remains a fecund ditch, Yeats does not shy away from that reality. However, when the body strives to embrace life fully and cast out remorse to ensure the heart survives, then life gains meaning. The ditch, and every defiling, disfiguring, disgusting thing associated with it, blesses. The blind man can see; he is given his vision of life transfigured: "Everything we look upon is blest" (l.72). Joy unifies self and soul. In combining body, soul, and feeling, it is possible to look upon everything and have the power to bless. If everything we look upon is blessed, then even the "mirror of the malicious eye" (l.52) is no longer malicious; there is no need to take on the view of another because at the end of the poem, vision is granted.

Divine joy, if it necessitates the denial of the body, is not attractive to Yeats; not only is it impossible but it denies the divinity *of* the body.[146] However, the form of divine joy that does appeal to Yeats, and that he seeks to create, is the transformation of bodily life in the immortality of art. Experiencing joy, for Yeats, becomes a form of creative discipline akin to his artistic practice - an emotional practice that must be constructed with effort through art in order to counteract the indignities of bodily disintegration, and in order to create art. The process is recursive, for the temporality of joy is brief and, like his gyres, the movement of emotion is constant and sensorial, which leads to the next form of joy that I call *sensual joy*.

[146] I think there is some very interesting research to be done on the transmission of affect between the living and the dead, which I would like to follow up on in future research. Yeats's spirituality allows him connect with souls further along in the process of his cyclical system, via the Medium of his wife's automatic writing. His spirit guides, who had 'come to give him metaphors for poetry,' continue to have impact on the living, thus creating relationships between spirits and embodied beings, and embodied beings touching spirits.

Sensual Joy – the Body in Relation

In contrast to *Divine joy*, with the emphasis upon disembodied ascetic contemplation, Yeats explores its opposite through sensual joy, and in particular sexual joy, as a route to creativity and spirituality. As Yeats suggests in the short, sharp, rhyming quatrain as spikey as the spur of the title: sex fuels poetry as well as soul clapping. In "The Spur" Yeats writes:

> You think it horrible that lust and rage
> Should dance attendance upon my old age;
> They were not such a plague when I was young;
> What else have I to spur me into song?
> (l.1-4). [147]

This defiant song rings lustily against the pitiable lament of the tattered scarecrow discussed above. This is an example of Yeats's joyful posturing, a performative act through art that offers energy to the flagging heart. For, as discussed with regards to remorse, the death of the heart is a living death. In old age, lust and rage are powerful affective means to attain a passionate position from which to produce poetry. In "The Spur" we hear Yeats's powerful insistence on defiant physicality over disintegration that resonates throughout his late poetry.

The stance in "The Spur" is linked to Yeats's wandering Beggar-Poet persona, beginning with Red Hanrahan (1905) in his early work, and becoming "The Wild Wicked Old Man" in *New Poems* (1938). From the poem of the same title, the Begger-Poet claims: "A young man in the dark am I / But a wild old man in the light" (l. 37-38), signaling his sexual prowess and stamina combined with the wisdom of age. Rather than gamble on pleasures of an uncertain afterlife, the Begger-Poet advocates for taking pleasure whilst you can. He attempts to persuade a pious woman - whose "Hands are busy with His beads" (l. 25), and who loves "That old man in the skies" (l. 24) - to lie with him. He admits that he may not have the stamina of a young man, but that he can penetrate her more meaningfully through his words:

> I have what no young man can have
> Because he loves too much.
> Words I have that can pierce the heart,
> But what can he do but touch?
> (l. 14-17).

The "Wild Wicked Old Man" advocates for sexual pleasure and joy. He acknowledges that all "right taught" men know that the end of suffering can come from divine intervention: "'That some

[147] Daniel Albright comments that in the draft to the poem, Yeats capitalized Lust and Rage "personifying them as Muses of an old man" (793).

stream of lightening / From the old man in the skies / Can burn out that suffering" (l. 55-57), but he confesses that " a coarse old man am I, /I choose the second-best, /I forget it all awhile /Upon a woman's breast'"(l. 59-62). Though the respite is temporary, it is preferable to the fantastical-sounding Zeus-like lightning bolt from God. The Old Man posits that the penetration of words to move one emotionally is akin to, and more satisfying than, simple sexual union. It offers the words to move one emotionally and create the union of heart with heart, as well as body with body.[148] The intensification of *Eros* associated with the "mad" passion of the beggar, for Yeats, offers an alternative joyful union that is more immanent but no less holy than the woman's prayers. The linking of sexual desire in old age to wickedness gestures to a strong societal respectability, which would find such aged desire contemptable and disgraceful. The social censure of sexuality and age is intensified for women. So that the Wild Wicked Old Man's female counterpart, "Crazy Jane" is an even more radical figure.

The "Crazy Jane" sequence operates under an alternative sexual and spiritual economy than that of early twentieth-century Ireland.[149] The persona challenges the Irish Virgin Mary archetype as the ultimate role for women. Though the status and opportunities for women had greatly expanded, the "ideal" woman of Ireland at the turn of the twentieth-century was married, faithful, a mother, and moral, with sexual activity taking place exclusively within the confines of a church-sanctioned marriage.[150] By the twentieth-century the "triumph of respectability" for women of all classes was won (McLoughlin, 266). Jane is a character that espouses a fundamental interdependence between body, heart, and soul. Her direct speech and her ongoing love and desire for her lover, Journeyman Jack, even after his death, presents a defiant alternative to organized religion and associated respectability as espoused by the Bishop. Her status as poor, partnered but unmarried, seemingly non-reproductive, and in charge of her own sexual and spiritual destiny challenges the respectability politics of the early twentieth-century Ireland.

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[148] In "After Long Silence" from *The Winding Stair*, a poem allegedly about Olivia Shakespear according to George Yeats, Yeats states that the couple of the poem "descant and yet descant / Upon the supreme theme of Art and Song" (l.5-6). Descant is evocative of both singing and talking, and the friends talk at length companionably about a timeless topic of art and song. This is possible since they are too old to desire one another: "Bodily decrepitude is wisdom; young / We loved each other and were ignorant" (7-8).

[149] Yeats suggests that Shelley was a "good Platonist," and that Shelley was "of the opinion that the 'thoughts which are called real or external objects' differed but in regularity of occurrence from 'hallucinations, dreams and ideas of madmen'" (*PASL* 352).

[150] McLoughlin, Dympna "Women and Sexuality in Nineteenth Century Ireland" in *Irish Journal of Psychology* 15: 2-3: 1994: 266. For more information on Irish sexuality see also Inglis, Tom. "Origins and Legacies of Irish Prudery: Sexuality and Social Control in Modern Ireland." *Éire-Ireland*. Vol. 40, no. 3 &4, 2005, pp.9-37; Inglis, Tom. "Sexual Transgression and Scapegoats: A Case from Modern Ireland". *Sexualities*. Vol. 5, no. 1, 2002, pp 5-24. Ferriter, Diarmaid. Transformation of Ireland 1900-2000. Profile Books, 2005; Conrad, Kathryn. *Locked in the Family Cell: Gender, Sexuality, and Political Agency in Irish National Discourse.* University of Wisconsin Press, 2004.

Yeats satirizes the notion that Jane must be "crazy" because she is sexually active and unapologetic, a notion I will discuss further in my Mina Loy chapter. As an outsider, Jane has imaginative freedom that fosters a more creative, non-normative relationship to others – including God. She can love her man without needing the institutional validation of social constructions such as marriage, and she can love God without the church's mediation. In "Jane and the Bishop," for example, Jane takes power from the ancient magic of the land, offering curses upon the head of the Bishop who banned Jack years ago. The Bishop vilified Jane and Jack for living "like beast and beast" (l. 13), suggesting their love was not sanctified by the church. This undermined by the fact that we learn that "Jack had my virginity" and yet many years later, Jane buries her "dear Jack" (l. 22, 5), demonstrating the longevity of their relationship. Yeats hints at an older form of union beyond the control of the church, the "irregular union" as Dympna McLoughlin calls it, since it was a union that was recognized by neither church nor state. Beneath the notice of either institutions, the poor of nineteenth-century Ireland, paid a small sum to a "couple beggar" to say words over their "marriage." Thus united, their chances of survival improve, both for themselves and for any children they might have (McLoughlin, 270). Just as Jane had to turn to an older power to recognize her life with Jack, so she invokes an older power to recognize his death. She curses the church – represented by the Bishop – that will not bless Jack now he is dead:

> Bring me to the blasted oak
> That I, midnight upon the stroke,
> …
> May call down curses on his head
> Because of my dear Jack that's dead
> (l. 1-2, 4-5).

We learn that in fact it is Jack that bids her to the oak: "And there is shelter under it" (l. 26). The oak is thought in Celtic mythology to represent the connection between heaven and earth; and in Ogham it is symbolic of strength, stability, and the healing of the heart after a loss. Jack has taken his final journey into the night that is death, and the repeated refrain "(All find safety in the tomb)" means that Jack is beyond the control of the Bishop; Jane is not and so she must take shelter beyond the Church's control through recourse to an older power, which she is in control of.

We are clearly meant to side with Jane, not only because she is the only speaker throughout the poem, but because the body of the Bishop and Jack are compared, and like the "birch-tree," Jack stands tall and erect. Once again, according to Ogham which is the language of trees, the birch is useful, protective, and associated with passion and fertility. By comparison, the Bishop is a hunchback, which the poem "The Saint and the Hunchback," makes clear is symbolic of self-

suppression. Jane's unconventional relationship is associated with life and passion, even though (or perhaps because) it is outside of the control of the church.

In the most well-known of the Crazy Jane poems, "Crazy Jane Talks with the Bishop," Jane finally confronts her enemy, and they argue their position on theology and sensuality.[151] The Bishop suggests that Jane should look beyond the mire of blood and veins, the fleshy vehicle of life. The Bishop counsels her to consider the next life: "Live in a heavenly mansion," and reject her desiring body: "Not in some foul sty" (l. 5-6). Just as the Bishop equated her non-church union as bestial, he now sees her as morally degenerate and so living in a foul sty. As the Bishop specifically points out, her breasts are "flat and fallen," and her veins bloodless and "dry"; he is thinking of her bodily disintegration as mirroring the stagnancy of her soul. This echoes Jane's equating his wrinkled skin and hunchback as a reflection of his repressed desires and his desiccated soul-state in "Crazy Jane and the Bishop." As her body is no longer attractive or reproductively useful, he argues, she should therefore repent her earthly concerns and consider the state of her soul. The irony is that the human divinity, Jesus, of whom the Bishop is meant to be an institutional representative, was born in a sty-like structure, and yet is still divine, and this irony is completely lost on the Bishop.

Jane has learnt her truth "in bodily lowliness" but neither the grave nor bed can deny it that it is true: "'Fair and foul are near of kin, And fair needs foul'" (l.7-8). Though she is low in status, her heart is proud and elevated; thus, she contains the low and the high. The last two lines of each stanza pair a high/low dichotomy: mansion/sty, lowliness/pride, whole/rent, demonstrating in the form that "fair needs foul." Yeats antinomies are ever in relation and need one another to progress. Jane's ability to embody both high and low, makes her a figure much closer to the whole. It is pointless to be overly proud of one's high status for:

> Love has pitched its mansion in
> The place of excrement;
> For nothing can be sole or whole
> That has not been rent
> (l. 15-18).

So, Jane, in her earthly wisdom concludes that love (both romantic and spiritual), like inspiration, must come from "the place of excrement" – the body and the refuse.

The soul cannot be made individual if it is not rent, meaning to be loaned from the wholeness of God, and also meaning to be ripped. We may also take "sole" to mean the sole of the

[151] In the final stanza of "Crazy Jane on God" Jane says that "I had wild Jack for a lover; / Though like a road / That men pass over / My body makes no moan / But sings on: ("All things remain in God" (l. 18-23). This suggests that the site of contention is Jane's body and the freedom that she claims, especially her sexual freedom.

foot, which is the part of the body in direct contact with the ground, the point of greatest lowliness. In addition, "sole" means alone or unmarried, and so Jane's unmarried status, and recent aloneness, implies that she is certainly sole. Yet her hole has also been rent, temporarily lent, to her lover; her body loaned for this life cycle before returning to God. Not only is Jane's powerful refutation of religion a ringing endorsement for an intimacy with the divine that is based on sexuality, something reinforced by a number of Yeats's poems, but as a reader her affirmative celebration and rebellion against the Bishop offers intense pleasure. There is also a link to joy by the allusion to Blake's "Jerusalem": "I will their places of joy and love, excrementious." In Blake's work, it is the specter of division and discord that seeks to baffle the world, but in Yeats's poem it is the constraints on sexuality enforced by the church that sow discord. Joy and love being excrementious might be a fact, but if one can embrace it, be "crazy" and unify those two opposites, then 'the place of excrement' can be creative and joyful. The sanity of Jane's 'craziness' as well as the Old Man's "wickedness" is associated with the joy of sex and their life-affirming defiance. Their instinctual and sensual knowledge is an embodied knowing that, Yeats asserts, is not in conflict with greater wisdom, but another aspect of it, beyond the confines of the rational mind.

Tragic Joy – Gay Rejoicing

The form of joy that has received the most critical attention is formulated as "tragic joy," and is associated with the figure of the Hero.[152] Jahan Ramazani, for example, has written persuasively regarding Yeats's use of tragic joy as a means of responding affirmatively to death and destruction.[153] Ramazani conceives of Yeats's tragic joy a confrontation with the sublime, and whilst the sublime may fit for tragic joy, it does not adequately explain the other forms of joy that I have identified. Tragic joy, Ramazani claims, "expresses as well as any other formulation in the history of criticism the emotive structure and ambivalence of the sublime, since the sublime involves the conversion of affects from defeat and terror to freedom and joy" (1989, 164). Ramazani identifies a generic-poetic genealogy that encompasses the Romantic tradition of appropriating dramatic tragedy into lyric poetry, turning the "tragic hero into the lyric poet" (1990, 82). Ramazani then links the tragic lyric poet to the "tragic spectator" of Nietzsche, which: "combines the Apollonian hero's impulse to overcome himself with the satyr chorus's Dionysian joy in destruction," thus casting the poet and speaker as both hero and tragic chorus (1990, 85). The lyrics of tragic joy are a "self-overcoming" via the assumption of a mask: "He crafts his joyful mask out of privileged moments

[152] For more on Yeats's notion of tragic joy, see Ramazani, R. Jahan. "Yeats: Tragic Joy and the Sublime" PMLA, Vol 104, no 2. 1989. Pp 163-177; Ramazani, R. Jahan. *Yeats and the Poetry of Death: Elegy, Self-Elegy, and the Sublime.* Yale University Press, 1990; Untereker, John. *A Reader's Guide to William Butler Yeats*. Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1959.
[153] Ramazani, R. Jahan. "Yeats: Tragic Joy and the Sublime" PMLA, Vol 104, no 2. 1989, p 168.

and imposes it on the mournful self" (1990, 98). Laughter, Ramazani points out, is a derisive attempt to defy death: "the laughing hero must identify with that which threatens to destroy him, the poet turns into pitiless, rough beast" (1990, 104).

While I agree with much of Ramazani's reading, it is only one of the joyful masks that Yeats assumes. Ramazani's focus on the sublime shows that tragic joy is a response to sorrows of overwhelming scale and awesome size. This is why Yeats engages tragic personas in the face of social and historical ills. For example, in "The Gyres," Yeats draws on his system to explain the violence and loss of the contemporary historical moment, drawing an analogy with the fall of Greek civilization - imagined as the death of Hector and the burning of Troy: "Hector is dead and there's a light in Troy" (l. 7). Yeats, in the context of WWI and the coming of WWII, saw the fall of civilization as imminent and that the time of heroes had passed. There is an inevitability to the cycle of history, a violent procedure that is both natural and unavoidable, signaled by the hysterical, prophetic cry that opens the poems: "The gyres! the gyres!" (l.1). Taken with the title, the third repetition of "the gyres" sounds like a cry of warning of imminent danger. The opening line attempts to draw attention to the end of things - thought, beauty and worth, all worn out - and when "ancient lineaments are blotted out. / Irrational streams of blood are staining earth" (l. 4-5). Both the reader and "Old Rocky Face" are called to "look forth" (l.1) to witness tragic destruction. As Ramazani points out, Yeats diminishes the scope of heroic reaction in limiting his heroes to spectatorship rather than action. Given the destruction at the historical scale, that the movement of Yeats's gyres predicts, what choice does one have:to be overcome or to resist. To find strength, one must "play" and find joy, hence – at this scale - Yeats claims that the heroic mood, which forms "the true poetic movement of our time" is "bitter and gay."[154]

One means by which Yeats attempts to shift the tone from tragedy to joy in "The Gyres" is by repetition. The phrase "What matter" is repeated four times, three times as a question in the middle octave. The repetition is insistent and builds a tone of panic, but also pushes the rhythm to an increasingly ecstatic pitch. The repetition with a slight difference emphasizes that the transformation of tragic joy is ongoing, as the repetition suggests these things matter very much:

> What matter though numb nightmare ride on top,
> And blood and mire the sensitive body stain?
> What matter? Heave no sigh, let no tear drop,
> A greater, a more gracious time has gone;
> For painted forms or boxes of make-up

[154]Yeats in letter to Dorothy Wellesley (June 6th 1936) cited in Forster, R. F. *W. B. Yeats: A Life. II. The Arch-Poet*. Oxford UP, 2003, p.553.

In ancient tombs I sighed, but not again;
What matter? Out of cavern comes a voice,
And all it knows is that one word 'Rejoice!'

(l.9-16).

The speaker asks, "What matter though numb nightmare ride on top / And blood and mire the sensitive body stain?" (l. 9-10). The question asks, "what does it matter if…" indicating an attempt at insouciant defiance in the face of destruction. This acknowledges the seduction of a fatalist stance, which would aid in diminishing the pain of bearing witness.

The poem asks, what does it matter if "numb nightmare," a dream that deadens mind, spirit, and feeling, is in control? This also suggests a lack of intelligence and an impotent imagination. The numbness is emphasized in the advice to "Heave no sigh, let no tear drop," (l. 10). The poet has done those things before: cried over paintings (a notion repeated in "The Municipal Gallery Revisited"), over women (see "Adam's Curse"), or a sighed, regretted, sorrowed over the theatre - "but not again." To make and master is to overcome sorrow through joy. The phrase "Rides on top" recalls the related, but antithetical, dream of "News for the Delphic Oracle," where the dead straddle dolphins as they find their way to the place between lives. The Shades of the dead pitch off burdens by reliving their death whilst "ecstatic waters laugh" (l.16). This vision is an Elysian-like dream of a hyper-sensual afterlife, whereas in "The Gyres" the dream is a nightmare. Another fatalistic possibility is raised: why bother if this destruction is recursive and determined by fate? Yet everything that Yeats holds as important in life is threatened with destruction, and the repetition is both a bashing down of hope and a building up of defiance.

This time physical violence, the "blood and mire the sensitive body stain" (l.10), visited upon bodies, is also wounding the spiritual body, the sensitive body being the spiritual counterpart of the "mire of blood and vein." Vicki Mahaffey suggests that in *Last Poems*, Yeats associates death more fully with violence: "Death as less erotic and seductive, more sexual and even violent, eventuating in a painful birth into the unknown."[155] "What matter" can also mean "what *can possibly* matter if these things occur," in other words asking "what is the point?"

What matter though numb nightmare ride on top,
And blood and mire the sensitive body stain?
What matter? Heave no sigh, let no tear drop,
A-greater, a more gracious time has gone;

[155] Mahaffey, Vicki. "Yeats and Bowen: Posthumous Poetics" *Yeats and Afterwords*. Ed. Marjorie Howes and Joseph Valente. University of Notre Dame, 2014, p. 255.

For painted forms or boxes of make-up
In ancient tombs I sighed, but not again;
What matter? Out of cavern comes a voice,
And all it knows is that one word 'Rejoice!'

(l.9-16)

It is tempting to give up and embrace a quietism to this onslaught; however, the final "What matter" answers 'why weep?', but also 'what is to be *done*'? This time there is a reply, from the cavern or mouth of Old Rocky Face, emphasizing the need for joy in the face of tragedy: "And all it knows is that one word "Rejoice!" (l. 16).[156] Joy is necessary for the energy to take an empowered stance against these overwhelming inevitabilities. It matters both that you live in order to rejoice, but also that rejoicing motivates you to live.

Yeats wrote to Dorothy Wellesley on 26 July 1935, to him "the supreme aim is an act of faith and reason to make one rejoice in the midst of tragedy" (cited in Jeffares 337). There is nothing to be done the poem suggests except look on and laugh: "We that look on but laugh in tragic joy" (l.8). Rhyming "Troy" with "tragic joy" indicates the inevitability of destruction in the poem due to the movement of the gyres, and the necessity to laugh at it, the bitter, cold, hollow laughter of "heroic discipline" that requires force and repetition in order to drive oneself to joy.[157] As Untereker suggests, Yeats in his later poetry drove himself into "postures of prophetic ecstasy" until he could "finally look on life's tragic scene with gay eyes" (Untereker, 157). By calling attention to the gyres, the poet attempts to drive his vision into a tragically joyful one. Old Rocky Face can rejoice because it has a larger perspective that is not measured in individual temporalities, but rather at the scale of gods and civilizations: "Those that Rocky Face holds dear" are immortal, like the *Sidhe*, and those Shades that start the cycles of the gyre once again. This hints at the difficulty of achieving such a joyful perspective in a time of violence. Yet the poet continues to struggle to gain the geological and cosmological perspective held by the magical mountain. Though the poet's aim is to achieve tragic joy in the face of great tragedy, it is not easily attained. Part of the process is to struggle again and again. The struggle itself becomes heroic – like Cuchulain fighting the waves.

[156] Though the identitiy of "Old Rocky Face" is debated, it seems to me at least one link it to Ben Bulben, support can be taken from the link with "The Man and the Echo". Where the sound of the echo is called "O rocky voice" to whom the speaker asks "O rocky voice / Shall we in that great night rejoice?" (l.39-40). The voice is identified at the opening of the poem as "a cleft that's christened Alt / Under broken stone I halt / At the bottom of a pit" (l.1-3) suggesting the cavern of "The Gyres". Alt is a rocky fissure on Ben Bulben which is said to be a gateway into the land of the *Sidhe*, or the otherworld.

[157] The laughter is figured as "gaiety" in Yeats's later poems. The root of gaiety comes from the Middle French, French *gaieté*, *gaîté* cheerfulness or mirth and so is linked to laughter.

Yeats's notion of the gaiety of tragic joy clearly resonates with Friedrich Nietzsche's work in the "Birth of Tragedy" (1871) and "The Gay Science" (1882); and joy at the turn of the twentieth-century is often associated with Nietzsche.[158] Like Nietzsche, Yeats seems to suggest that it is by embracing tragedy that one can move to joy and power. By 1902, Yeats had read Nietzsche and called him in a letter to Lady Gregory the "strong enchanter," stating that "I have not read anything with so much excitement since I got to love Morris' stories which have the same astringent joy."[159] Though Yeats had read some of Nietzsche's work in translation and found much in his works to reinforce and affirm his own conclusions, it would be inaccurate to say that Yeats took his system from Nietzsche.[160] There is certainly a close kinship between Yeats's notion of tragic joy and Nietzsche's concept of *amor fati.*[161] Yeats's philosophy that he lays out in *A Vision*, does contain a strain of determinism in the cycle of life-death-rebirth. Being born into a particular phase, the person can embrace the challenges dictated by birth, i.e. accept one's fate (be 'in phase'), or clash with his fate (be 'out of phase'). The recognition of fate and the necessity of embracing it joyfully is a point of connection for Nietzsche and Yeats.

Though Yeats shares similarities with Nietzsche, his system also has significant differences. Yeats's highest form of joy, for example, relies on a supernatural union with the divine that Nietzsche would reject. Yeats's system, and therefore his poetry, assumes a spark of the divine immanent in the human incarnation, evolving with experience and moving toward wisdom, with the ultimate goal of returning to the Godhead. Yeats's his whole system was based on the mystical commonplace that consciousness was expansive and active, rather than the reduction and devaluation of consciousness at the core of Nietzsche's philosophic intervention. Yeats conceives of a multilayered constitution of the human being that has a corollary (Mann 2). As Yeats puts it in *AVB:* "The whole system is founded on the belief that the ultimate reality, symbolized as the Sphere,

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[158] For more on the connections between Yeats and Nietzsche see: Bohlmann, Otto. *Yeats and Nietzsche an Exploration of Major Nietzschean Echoes in the Writings of William Butler Yeats*. Palgrave Macmillan, 1982. Valdez Moses, Michael. "The Rebirth of Tragedy: Yeats, Nietzsche, the Irish National Theatre and the Anti-Modern Cult of Cuchulain, Modernism/modernity, Volume 11, Number 3, September 2004; Heller, Eric. "Yeats and Nietzsche: Reflections on Aestheticism and a Poet's Marginal Notes". *The Importance of Nietszche*. University of Chicago Press, 1988.

[159] Yeats, W.B. letter to Lady Gregory (August 1902) cited in Ellmann, *The Identity of Yeats* (1964). Astringent means severe, austere, stern, and thus creates an oxymoronic form of joy that captures the Nietzschean mode of joy very well.

[160] According to O'Shea's *A Descriptive Catalogue of W.B.Yeats's Library* Yeats owned and lightly annotated one book pertaining to Nietzsche, namely Daniel Halévy's *The Life of Friedrich Nietzsche* (1911)[160]. R.F. Forster in his biography of Yeats (suggests that Yeats may have read Havelock Ellis's *Savoy* essays on Nietzsche wherein Ellis stressed Nietzsche's parallel's with Blake and that emphasized his attacks on morality, which Forster suggest, Yeats also takes up (159). Forster also notes that John Quinn sent Yeats *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* on 27 May 1902 and on 15 Nov 1902 sent Yeats *The Case of Wagner*, *Genealogy of Morals*, and poems (584) and comments that from 1902 to 1903 that Yeats read the German philosopher intensely for the first time (272).

[161] Yeats had other ideas in common with Nietzsche, for example: a notion of the tragic hero and Dionysian ecstasy versus solar or Apollonian nature, the rejection of restrictive and conventional morality, and an inclination for the aristocratic over the democratic.

falls into human consciousness…into a series of antinomies" (51). For Yeats reality is ultimately One and the individual soul descends into incarnate life to become one of Many. Or as Yeats put it in his notebooks: "Reality is a timeless and spaceless community of Spirits which perceive each other. Each Spirit is determined by and determines those it perceives, and each Spirit is unique" (Yeats cited in Mann 8). Thus, they are affected by each other. Emotion never remains purely individual and is rather interpersonal. Indeed, it is via a union with these more powerful others that there is a move from tragic joy to *aimless joy*.

Aimless Joy – the Union of the Natural and Supernatural

Aimless joy is a rare and particularly important form of joy for Yeats, because it is a moment of union with a greater reality, creating a revelation of joy, and thus offers a form of affective certainty as to the existence of the One.[162] This rare moment of what Yeats calls a blessing, is both a moment of respite and a refueling of the self because it is closest to a union with God. *Aimless joy*, as we know from "Vacillation," came upon the speaker in a moment of reverie; it mastered him and offers an energetic and emotional exuberance. It is without conscious reason and it does not seek any reciprocity. The affect simply overspills the self and permits an affectionate engagement with others.

Yeats also describes *aimless joy* in "Demon and Beast," but this time finds productive *disconnection*, finding respite from the internal battle of love and hate, through a moment of arrest afforded by *aimless joy*. He writes that:

> For certain minutes at the least
> That crafty demon and that loud beast
> That plague me day and night
> Ran out of sight
> Though I had long perned in the gyre,
> Between my hatred and desire.
> (l 1.4).

Only for brief moments are the demon of hatred and the beast of desire that torment the poet quieted. It is the human condition to be perning in the gyre, cycling between these two forces - one dominating and then reversing so the other gains dominance. The poem begins with the tormenting passions and ends in a fantasy of ascetic escape from such torment, like "exultant Anthony" (l.46). The transformation from contemplation of passion to the contemplation of monastic peace is enabled by "aimless joy":

[162] It is not a joyous revelation, as the revelation is not intellectual, rather the blessing is the affect, or feeling, of joy itself.

But soon a tear-drop started up,
For aimless joy had made me stop
Beside a little lake
(l.23-25).

The "sudden joy" as Yeats referred to it in an earlier draft, shifted the emotions of the speaker from what Yeats would refer to as "the common condition of our life" which is "hatred" (*PASL*, 365), to being joyful and filled with "sweetness" (l.39). The speaker states that his whole nature is roused, and so the "white gull" that is "[n]ow gyring down and perning there" can move him to joy. The soaring gull represents the soaring soul that does not escape from the gyres of Yeats's system, but is momentarily free within it. Yet we know this respite cannot last; desire creeps back in with "Yet have I no dearer thought / Thank that I may find out a way / To make it linger half a day" (l.40-43). *Aimless joy* is one of the higher forms of Yeatsian joy, because it is visited upon the moved person suddenly and in unexpected ways, and this respite brings with it sweetness or blessing.

To be aimless is to be without objective, goal or purpose. Those that believe that art for example, should always have an aim or utility, according to Yeats, do not accept that anything can be an end in itself. These people: "hate the things that have worth in themselves, for that worth may suddenly, as it were a fire, consume their Book of Life, where the world is represented by ciphers and symbols; and before all else, they fear irreverent joy and unserviceable sorrow" (*EI 251-2*). In the same passage from "Poetry & Tradition," Yeats points out that the greatest poets were those that understood that: "[a]ll the most valuable things are useless" and produce beautiful things "because Providence has filled them with recklessness" (*EI* 251). Aimless joy is not instrumentalized; it is the highest form of feeling and aesthetic production, powerful because it is "irreverent" and "unserviceable". (*PT* 252). Unlike Helen Vendler who suggests that Yeats's aimless joy is a form of "geriatric amnesia" that represents the "stupid happiness of blind body," rather it seems to me that aimless joy arrives via the body, is consciously registered, and enables the speaker to reintegrate into relationships with the world (158).

The momentary shift of consciousness from the individual to the distributed and impersonal force of *aimless joy* is like the shift from emotion to affect, from conscious motivation to unconscious movement. Yeats seems to find a kind of embodied attunement that accesses a greater joy; he becomes a conduit or medium for the transfer of positive affect. Its aimlessness, its lack of direction suggests an impersonal impingement on the body that shifts the trajectory of the individual, while remaining beyond conscious knowing, the body's blaze casting a glow, arresting the feeling of time, and dissolving the lines between psyche and soma. Yeats, the most controlled of poets, is a craftsman wishing to compose a poetic persona as well as exquisite poetry.

Yet there is also passivity apparent in the passion. Anthony Cuda argues that Yeats was fascinated by powerlessness, claiming it was paramount to Yeats's conception of the artist's vocation.[163] As Cuda asserts in *The Passions of Modernism* (2010), passion is an ambivalent, unacknowledged experience at the heart of modernist aesthetics. Defining passion as rooted in passivity and suffering, he traces what he considers "an urgent desire among modern writers to meaningfully encounter powerlessness" to experience the passivity at the root to passion, "to both know and feel what it means to be *the moved* instead of *the mover*" (5).[164] Self-fashioning and aesthetic creation are inextricably linked in Yeats; he intentionally adopts passionate postures in order to provoke an emotional intensity that fuels his writing. To recognize the impossibility of mastery is to emphasize the shifting and unstable subject of the individual self, an instability that Cuda claims is characteristic of modernism which: "deeply valued the destabilizations of passion and the intensities of affect and were frequently suspicious of the illusions of a "stabilized," autonomous self" (6). We might characterize this as the difference between the Medium and the Mystic. The Medium is a passive channel that diminishes personality, and who offers his body as a channel for the spirit. After a "terrifying" experience of spirit possession at a séance in his early years, Yeats refused to take the role of Medium again. Much has been written on the gender politics and co-authorship of *A Vision*, of Yeats's spouse who took on the role of Medium, and I will not rehearse it here. Suffice to say that Yeats preferred to not obliterate his personality, though he recognized, even idolized the Mediumship role. The Mystic on the other hand gathers knowledge, occult and experiential, and is the mouthpiece of the revelation, though not necessarily the medium of the material.

Cuda identifies an important distinction however, that despite attempts at self-mastery and self-willing by the artist, the intentional agent is not synonymous with the conscious self: "The artist writes; the text is written. And although these two actions occur simultaneously, they are not identical" (8), meaning that passionate inspiration "presents the artist with a vision of his or her own mind that is partial, half-darkened, and deeply ambivalent in its foreignness' (8). The poet, despite his ecstatic postures, does not have authoritative access to nor control over himself. Mastering is a process that "always" happens, a constant action. It is the vacillation at the heart of Yeats's notion of joy. Mastery is never completely achieved; it will always fail. Like Yeats's gyres, and like affect, mastery is dynamic, forever unfolding and transforming. It is the struggle, the vacillation and

[163] Cuda, Anthony. *The Passions of Modernism: Eliot, Yeats, Woolf, and Mann*. University of South Carolina Press, 2010, p.94.
[164] For more information on George Yeats's role as medium and contributor to *A Vision*, see Mills Harper, Margaret. "Nemo: George Yeats and Her Automatic Script" New Literary History. Vol 33, No.2, 2002; Saddlemeyer, Ann. Becoming George: The Life of Mrs. W. B. Yeats. Oxford UP, 2002; Maddox, Brenda. Yeats's Ghosts: The Secret Life of W. B. Yeats. Harper 1999.

knowing it, that is a necessary part of joy, and it is the wisdom brought through the heart that leads us to the final *harmonic joy*.

Harmonic Joy – Intersecting Experience

Harmonic joy is the bringing together of all joys within one life (though not necessarily all in one moment). It is the union and experience of all the things: the acceptance of the infinite soul (many) and the finite nature of the body (one), and the striving for self-knowing and self-realization while at the same time accepting its limitations. I use the term *harmonic joy* to gesture to, but also differentiate from, Unity of Being.[165] Yeats's notion of Unity of Being is only possible after death, and *harmonic joy* is experienced upon and within the incarnate body. To bring together multiple aspects of experience is to make a greater artistic composite, without making any claims to permanence. Harmony thereby allows for what we might think of as "composite blessedness," the purposeful bringing together of elements to create something linked but not fixed. Harmony as a metaphor also suggests the transience and dynamism of the affective and the emotional state with the intersection of senses. Suggesting harmony between the art and the artist, the composite nature of *harmonic joy* signals its integral nature of art for Yeats. To compose poetry is to strive to compose the self, meaning both to create a Self and gather emotions to form a presentation of a "complete" self. Finally, harmony makes a link to musicality and the lyric. [166] What Yeats sought was not song nor chant, but rather a kind of intoned rhythm. As Florence Farr explains, it is the sonic communication of "the belief in the power of words and the delight in the purity of sound" (*EI* 22).[167]

Harmonic joy is best exemplified by a brief return to the poem "Vacillation." The tree of the second stanza serves as an apt symbol of harmonic joy: "A tree there is that from its topmost bough / Is half all glittering flame and half all green" (l.11-18). The roots are grounded and the leaves reach

[165] Yeats used the term Unity of Being to refer to an ideal harmony between body, mind, and soul, which he set against the common condition of a fragmented, incoherent self. Yeats characterized Unity of Being in a draft of *AVB* as "Complete Harmony phisical [sic] body intellect and spiritual desire all may be imperfect but if harmony is perfect it is unity" (Mann 356-7). Perfection and completeness, what he calls "uncomposite blessedness" in "Michael Robartes and the Dancer" (1918, l. 45), is only really possible beyond incarnate life; for Yeats, the immanent soul is a fragment separated from the Whole One, therefore all knowledge and experience must necessarily be incomplete. Thus, for Yeats it is the artist that may come the closest to Unity of Being, for through their art they are able to create unaging beauty (as in "Sailing to Byzantium") and create 'complete' art.

[166] Though poetry is not akin to music for Yeats, in his early essay "Speaking to the Psaltery" (1907) Yeats emphasizes the importance of the performance of poetry to a certain rhythm that transforms the poetry into something ecstatic.

[167] Florence Farr, one of the only artists able to create the exact pattern of sonic resonance that communicated both the beauty of music and the feeling, writes "It is not until they have been forced to use their imaginations and express the inmost meaning of the words, not until their thought imposes itself upon all listeners and each word invokes a special mode of beauty, that the method rises once more from the dead and becomes a living art" (*EI* 22).

to the heavens. The tree is half living and half dying[168]; half natural and half supernatural, and so the tree offers an image of a rare event of harmony: of opposites held together within a greater whole. [169] The tree's growth signals the processual nature of becoming, ever-changing. Its magic, that is both utterly natural and yet also supernatural, is joyous. These lines follow immediately on from the question that began this chapter, "what is joy?" and this harmonic image answers the question symbolically.

Stanza IV moves from the symbolic to the personal experience of harmonic joy. Yeats offers a first-person account of the extremity of joy, inspired by a real incident from his life. During his fiftieth year the poet-speaker remembers:

> While on the shop and str***ee***t I gazed
> My body of a su***dd***en blazed;
> And twenty minutes more or le***ss***
> It s***ee***med, so great my ha***pp***ine***ss***,
> That I was ble***ss***ed and could ble***ss***.
>
> (l.40-44, italics mine)

Like the tree, the man is rooted to the spot and his body becomes ablaze with fire, a physiologically registered flush of affect. Here his body is necessary to register the affect that resonates through spirit and soma; this joy moves the poet-speaker to write, thus linking the experience to inspiration. Inspiration is from the Latin *inspirare:* "inspire, inflame, blow into,"a combination that means to breathe in spirit (from *in-* "in" + *spirare* "to breathe"). The emotion shifts the perspective of the speaker. His vision is expanded beyond the simple street, flushed by the fire of revelation, signaled by the rhyme of gazed/blazed. His external vision is doubled, marked in the stanza by the double letters nestled together on every line (and reminiscent of the "Double Vision of Michael Robartes"). Though we do not see his vision, the speaker communicates his changed perspective through the metaphor of time. Time is slowed, if not conquered, as the emotion is intensified. The speaker is afforded an experience that brings body, mind, soul, and imagination into conjunction. So powerful was his experience that he feels a balance between his own blessing and his ability to pass on his blessing to others, "I was blessed and could bless" (l.44).

[168] I use active verbs here advisedly; I would argue that the tree is caught in a constant process, living and dying – in dynamic action. The tree recalls another of Yeats's important symbols, the tower, "half dead at the top" and suggests a more final and complete cycle – dead rather than dying. Another cycle will come in Yeatsian mythology, but the tower is not an organic image and the process is near a close.

[169] Though the image of the tree can be read as an autumnal tree in the process of changing from green to red, therefore it links it to the natural cycle of the seasons, the Attis' image the resurrected God, it also reinforces the supernatural element of the poem.

An even greater harmonic joy is the poem itself. Yeats was the "solitary man" of the London coffee shop, and in his transformation of the experience, passes on affective texture of the experience to the reader. The poem itself contains every form of partial joy: divine, sensual, aimless and each opposite i.e. worldly accumulation, remorse, and ambition. The multiple strands held in one poem in its very composition presents the "composite blessedness" of *harmonic joy*. There is also a note of uncertainty, of wavering, in each of the poems that deals with joy, regardless of the emphatic declarations that may conclude the poem. This is an acknowledgement that the fragmented and doubt-filled individual will be moved by forces beyond his control at the same time as they battle to overcome them. So that the artist might become indecipherable from his art -"How can we know the dancer from the dance?"[170] At the end of "Vacillation" even those that differ might go with joy-fueled blessings: "So get you gone, Von Hügel, though with blessings on your head" (l.99).

The Wisdom of the Heart

Writing to Lady Pelham near the end of his life, Yeats concludes that:

> When I try to put all into a phrase I say, 'Man can embody truth but he cannot know it.' I must embody it in the completion of my life. The abstract is not life and everywhere draws out its contradictions. You can refute Hegel but not the Saint or the Song of Experience.

To live life, fully and intensely and from the multiple perspectives that his theory of the mask afforded him, is to 'embody truth'. For Yeats passion, not the intellect, is the necessary vehicle to wisdom: "I cannot discover truth by logic unless that logic serve passion, and only then if the logic be ready to cut its own throat, tear out its eyes" ("Pages from a Diary in 1930," *E* 301). Emphasizing the necessity for the unity of both body and mind, Yeats writes that knowledge must be intellectual, embodied, and affective. Gathering experience is the goal of life: "the core of Yeats's morality is completeness of experience: finding the soul's inner purpose and realizing this, exploring it as fully as possible" (Mann 12). No overarching morality will be adequate for this goal, as each soul's purpose is different depending on its place on the wheel, so notions of Christian morality are restrictive and do not suit Yeats's goals of complete experience. Hence, for Yeats, wisdom must also include foolishness. Wise old men, especially poets, should be willing to appear foolish, a foolishness born of thinking passionately through their bodies as well as their minds; so declares Yeats in "A Prayer for Old Age" (Parnell's Funeral and Other Poems). The prayer is "That I may seem, though I die old, / A foolish, passionate man" (l.11-12), for the fool is a better poet than the

[170] "Among School Children" l. 64

wise man, for poetry must be passionate. The heart, with its associations of feeling and the embodied "complexities of mire or blood" ("Byzantium" l. 8, 24), signals that wisdom becomes something felt and embodied, rather than intellectual or objectively known.

Joy for Yeats is a poetic performance. In his poem "The Apparitions," joy is necessary as a life-orientated affect as we move closer to death:

> When a man grows old his joy
> Grows more deep day after day,
> His empty heart is full at length
> But he has need of all that strength
> Because of the increasing Night
> That opens her mystery and fright
> (l. 17-22).

Death, here figured as night, begins to open before the old man, and joy is necessary as it gives heart and staves off fear. This enables one to live more fully *with* the phantasmic auguries of death. Yeats, with unblinking eye and his "old man's eagle mind" ("An Acre of Grass") was unflinching in his poetry that engaged with aging and death.[171] He repeatedly rehearsed his life, death, and afterlife. He struck pose after pose attempting to master fear. For, as Yeats repeatedly shows, it is not death that is the end but the closing of hearts in fear.

In Yeats's *Last Poems* (published posthumously but collated by Yeats shortly before his death) his final posture changed in tone. Rejecting the rage of tragic joy – literally deleting whole stanzas in that mood from "Ben Bulben" and "The Circus Animal's Desertion"; he also leaves behind *divine joy*, and *sensual joy*. Yeats instead embraces the wisdom of the heart by concluding that "Maybe at last being but a broken man / I must be satisfied with my heart" (l. 3.4)[172]. By 1937-38 there is less joy and more resignation in his poetry, as we will see. Yet the heart as emotional center becomes even more important to Yeats's compositional practice, which includes cannibalizing the heart to fuel poetry, making beauty out of whatever is left and is to hand, drawing life from the marrow and the bones. What seems central to aging and death for Yeats, then, is the joy of life, and the life of the heart, enumerating his old themes as a means of weaving together a collage of "masterful images" (l. 33) in order to create something new. Like the bricolage of "Old kettles, old bottles, and a broken can, /Old iron, old bones, old rags, that raving slut / Who keeps the till" (l.36 -38) To the mind of

[171] Wayne K. Chapman notes that Yeats annotation his edition of the *Poems of Spencer* with "common tradition in mediaeval natural history that the eagle strengthened its eyesight by gazing at the noonday sun" (cited in notes to *AVB*, 356).
[172] In the earliest extant draft of the poem, the poet ponders "Perhaps / I am too old?" to write poetry, since he has been suffering from writer's block for near six weeks *Last Poems*, Manuscript Materials. Ed. Pethica, James. Cornell University Press, 1997, 1. In a further draft he laments "Maybe at last, being but an aged man, / I must be satisfied with my life" ibid, 1.

the old broken poet, everything is old and broken, but also offers possibility of renewal. The "masterful images because complete / Grew in pure mind" but began in the scraps and detritus of a life, of a body, and from the heart. This bricolage is a form of composite blessing, a *harmonic joy*. Where an earlier Yeats had sought to transform the "refuse" or the "fecund ditch" into a phantasmagoria of symbols, here the poet reveals the process of poetry "I must lie down where all the ladders start / In the foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart" (39-40). After all, being satisfied with the heart has led to new creativity.

Joy is a performative stance to Yeats that is necessary to create art. Seamus Heaney captures this sense of the value of joy for poetry, which can be applied to Yeats's art: "the goal of life on earth, and of poetry as a vital factor in the achievement of that goal, is what Yeats called in another context the 'profane perfection of mankind.'"[173] In order to persist, and persist in writing poetry, "it is essential that the vision of reality which poetry constitutes should be transformative" (Heaney). For Yeats, the wisdom of the heart is the acceptance of all aspects of life, lived in celebration of the body, whatever its decrepitude. For Yeats the transformative potential of joy is what attaches one to life: to the body as it blazes, and the pleasure of connection in being able let go of hatred and bless others. Sexual joy brings sensual pleasure, spiritual union, and poetic inspiration. Divine joy permits the mystic to strive for certainty of the continuation of the soul after death, whereas aimless joy forgoes knowledge and instead embodies it. What is joy for Yeats? It is the affective, embodied, inspirational, and spiritual motivation to continue to "make and master," and thus persist personally and poetically in the world.

[173] Heaney, Seamus. "Joy or Night: Last Things in the Poetry of W B Yeats and Philip Larkin" Lecture Delivered at University College of Swansea, 18 January 1993.

CHAPTER THREE

"Calling Your Soul Your Own"
The Development of a (Dis)Passionate Self in May Sinclair's Psychological Fiction

"the Will-to-live, the Desire to have life, and to have it more abundantly …it grows into a consuming passion; it passes beyond physical bounds; and the Love of Life becomes the Love of God" May Sinclair (1917)

"on the whole philosophers have refused to see God as he is: the wild poetic genius of eternity" May Sinclair (1922)

"Women must destroy in themselves, the desire to be loved" Mina Loy (1914)

At the close of *Mary Olivier: A Life*, Mary permits herself a rare display of emotion, she "had found herself crying, incredibly crying; all the misery, all the fear, all the boredom of her life gathered together and discharging."[174] Despairing and desperate she cries out " 'If I could get out of it all"; as if in response, everything goes still and she is encompassed by "a sense of happiness and peace" (*MO* 432). This feeling is her "secret joy"; it does not feel like it is her own, rather it feels like "an immense, invisible, intangible being" whose life she suddenly comes into contact with (*MO* 432). She no longer needs to escape from her life, reassured that she can access "It" in dire need; "It" she thinks, is "the flash point of freedom" (*MO* 434). Flashes, episodes, visions, joys, all come to Mary and many of May Sinclair's other female characters, often in times of great suffering. This "ultimate passion" transmutes their misery, through intense joy, into peace or happiness and transforms their perspective from constraint into expansion. Sinclair repeatedly revisited the motif of individual development, constrained by structural oppression across her twenty-three novels and her short stories. Her female characters seek the intellectual and emotional awareness to gain a sense of their own minds, desires, and gifts – a sense of Truth - beyond the claustrophobic confines of familial, marital, maternal, and societal expectations. For Sinclair, a philosopher and Idealist Monist, the flash of an intangible being is a momentary connection with Reality. Like Yeats, Sinclair developed her own form of psycho-spirituality that centered around artistic "genius." She also explored the conundrum of body and soul through her work. Unlike Yeats, who celebrated sexual pleasure and the pleasures of the finite corporeal life alongside divine reality, Sinclair favored a cerebral and disinterested approach to attachment; one that often emphasized self-erasure, renunciation, and sacrifice. May Sinclair's position as novelist, philosopher, critic, psychoanalysis advocate, Spiritual Monist, and feminist offers a unique and important perspective on Modernism's

[174] Sinclair, May. *Mary Olivier: A Life*. New York Review Books, 2002, p.432. Hereafter referred to in-text as *MO*.

anxieties surrounding spirituality, subjectivity, and sexuality. I will consider the role and meaning of Sinclair's repeated deployment of joyful, passionate intensities in her psychological fiction, and in her exploration of female psychological development. Her work reveals a tension within literary modernism, that despite the desire for impersonality and disinterested attachment, emotions – especially positive emotion - are a paradoxical necessity for creative development. For Sinclair, emotions are both a form of constraint and a means to freedom, but ultimately, she demonstrates that joy is a necessity in order to "call your soul your own."

Sinclair was deeply concerned with what it meant to be human and, more specifically, a female thinker and writer at a historical-cultural moment when the conceptualization of 'the subject' and the role of women was in crisis. Sinclair published two philosophical texts: *A Defence of Idealism: Some Questions and Conclusions* (1917) and *New Idealism* (1922), and she also explored many of her philosophical questions in her literary work.[175] She was also deeply engaged with the "New Science" of psychoanalysis and her works combined her psychological and spiritual search for "Truth." As she states in *A Defence of Idealism*: "It looks as if the only things that stand firm in this universe are Ideas, Truth, Goodness, Beauty" (xii). May Sinclair's engagement with discourses of philosophy, psychoanalysis, and psychic research, enables us to trace the contours of an emerging modern psycho-spiritual sensibility at the turn of the 20th century. Sinclair identifies in her novels an emergent sensibility of the Modern Woman, that sought to resolve the tension between personal obligation and personal fulfilment, psychical development and physical intimacy, creating a self and escaping its confines. As Rebecca Bowler and Claire Drewery express, "In both Sinclair's fiction and non-fiction, modernist reconceptualization of subjectivity, consciousness and human identity center upon negotiations between public and private, the cerebral and the corporeal, and the spiritual and the profane."[176] Though faith in a traditional Judeo-Christian God was on the wane, and Sinclair herself rejected her mother's strict, pious, Christian upbringing, broader interest in metaphysics, mysticism, and spiritualism was at an all-time high.[177] Sinclair's idiosyncratic form of Spiritual Monism combines metaphysics, psychology, mysticism, feminism, and literature, and places

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[175] Sinclair, May. *A Defence of Idealism: Some Questions and Conclusions*. The Macmillan Company, 1917, hereafter referred in-text as *DoI*; *The New Idealism*. The Macmillan Company, 1922, hereafter referred in-text as *NI.* See also, May Sinclair, "The Ethical and Religious Import of Idealism," *The New World: A Quarterly Review of Religion. Ethics and Theology (1892 – 1900)* vol. 2, no. 8, 1893, hereafter referred in-text as "*ERI.*"

[176] Bowler, Rebecca and Claire Drewery (eds). "Introduction." *May Sinclair: Re-Thinking Bodies and Minds*. Edinburgh University Press, 2017, p.2.

[177] Wilson, Leigh. *Modernism and Magic: Experiments with Spiritualism, Theosophy, and the Occult*. Edinburgh University Press, 2015; Hobson, Suzanne. *Angels of Modernism: Religion, Culture, Aesthetics 1910-1960*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011; Lewis, Pericles. *Religious Experience and the Modernist Novel*. Cambridge University Press, 2010; Singh, Amardeep. *Literary Secularism: Religion and Modernity in Twentieth-Century Fiction*. Cambridge Scholars Press, 2006; Bell, Michael. "The Metaphysics of Modernism." *The Cambridge Companion to Modernism*. Edited by Michael Levenson. Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 9-32.

affective-emotional experiences of joy, bliss, and ecstasy as intrinsic to knowledge and persistence. Yet my reading of her her work also reveals the fraught nature of such ventures. For Sinclair (who claimed to have experienced these moments personally) and the characters who experience them, these moments provide energetic sustenance to persist within the constraints of mid-Victorian morality. However, these episodes are predicated on self-erasure and sacrifice, so there is an ironic tension at the heart of Sinclair's work – that to create an independent subjectivity, one must also risk its destruction.

It is in her psychological *bildungsromana* that Sinclair most pointedly explores how to reconcile embodied, emotional humanity which includes personal and social attachments, with the intellectual search for Truth and Reality. Through an analysis of Sinclair's psychological novels - *The Three Sisters* (1914), *Mary Olivier: A Life* (1919), *Life and Death of Harriett Frean* (1922), I will consider how Sinclair resolves the tension between personal obligation and personal fulfilment for woman at the turn of the 20th century.[178] I will introduce Sinclair's concerns regarding love and emotional attachment and their role in psychic development in my opening discussion of Sinclair's best-known novel, *Mary Olivier: A Life* by focusing on the relationship between Mary and her mother. Moving to a short discussion of Sinclair's idealism, feminism, and her ideas about sublimation, I will explore why, for her, intimacy becomes a problem to be resolved. I will also illustrate how Mary's early experiences of joy through nature and literature act as a means of ameliorating familial suppression. I will then turn to the *Life and Death of Harriett Frean* to show the consequences of failing to escape Oedipal ties and develop a sense of individuality. Through *The Three Sisters* I consider the role that sexuality and sublimation play in Sinclair's concept of self-development. Each sister represents a "type" of *fin-de-siècle* woman, identifiable by her approach to love, self-fulfillment, and sexuality. This introduces the problem of romantic attachment and spiritual detachment, integral to Sinclair and representing broader modern concerns regarding boundaries of self and other. To conclude, I return to *Mary Olivier* to discuss the controversial "happy ending" at the close of the novel. The radical uncoupling that Mary performs is usually read as an act of self-sabotaging repression, but I offer an alternative reading, and by drawing on Spinoza, consider the affective potentiality in the uncertain ending. Intense episodes of joy and ecstasy are important events in each these works, and I examine how they become a means of knowing and creating the Self in Sinclair's fiction and also how they make possible knowing and experiencing the divine in her work. Joy becomes the affective

[178] Sinclair, May. *The Three Sisters*. New York: The Dial Press, 1985, hereafter referred to in-text as *TS; Life and Death of Harriett Frean*. Virago, 1980, hereafter referred to in-text as *HF*.

means of creating a dis-passionate self, one that is "free" (within determined limits), and thus persists within and beyond toxic intimate and social relationships.

May Sinclair (1863-1946)[179]

Given Sinclair's relatively unknown status in the Modernist canon, I will begin with some brief biographical context. Mary Amelia St. Clair Sinclair, was born 24th August 1863 in Rock Ferry near Liverpool, into a relatively affluent family, though her father's ship business failed when she was seven and resulted (along with his alcoholism) in her parent's separation; thereafter May and her mother lived in extreme if genteel poverty. The only daughter and youngest child, 'May' was expected to spend her life caring for her strict, pious mother - which she did - supporting her mother and five brothers from her writing and translating work. Usually deeply protective of her personal life, going so far as to cut out parts of letters that might be found after her death, Sinclair did admit that her novel *Mary Olivier*: A *Life* (1919) was heavily autobiographical. Sinclair was a successful novelist and respected philosopher and intellectual. Sinclair never married, and it is speculated that she was a life-long celibate. In the late 1920's, due to declining health and being increasingly out of sync with the modern world, Sinclair became increasingly reclusive, lapsing into silence by 1929. She lived the rest of her long life in the company and care of her nurse and companion, Florence Bartrop, who nursed Sinclair through Parkinson's Disease and increasing dementia. May Sinclair died on 14th November 1946, at the age of 83, in relative obscurity; however, she left a large literary legacy that is finally beginning to find a new audience.

Despite her secluded end, in her hey-day May Sinclair was a celebrated and bestselling author. From the publication of her first novel *The Divine Fire* in 1904 (which sold over 200,000 copies in America alone) [180]May Sinclair became one of the most fêted and celebrated authors of her time, in both England and America. [181] Sinclair was not only a novelist and critic, but was also a philosopher, psychologist, biographer, literary critic, and essayist. She was a friend and advocate for

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[179] I am indebted to the following works for biographical details for this section and throughout: Raitt, Suzanne. *May Sinclair: A Modern Victorian*, Clarendon Press, 2000; Zegger, Hrisey, Dimitrakis. *May Sinclair*. Twayne Publishers, 1976; Boll, Theophilus. *Miss May Sinclair: Novelist. A Biographical and Critical Introduction*. Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1973.

[180] Bowler, Rebecca and Claire Drewery. "Introduction." *May Sinclair: Re-Thinking Bodies and Minds*. Edinburgh University Press, 2017, p1. Sinclair's later work was of varying quality and was not as well critically received. This was in part due to her suffering from decline due to Parkinson's Disease from the late 1920s, but also the changing times and temperament of the reading audience.

[181]Just a small sampling of the reception of Sinclair's first novel offers an impression of the impact it had: " *The Divine Fire* – it is colossal! I have read every line of it and re-read many lines of it. I take my hat off to you. I sit in the dust at your feet" – Jack London, private correspondence, 1905. "Few books have made such a profound impression as that book upon the American reader" The Lounger. *Critic* (November 1905). "Miss May Sinclair…is the most widely known woman artist in the country and America" Thomas Moult, *Voices*, Sept 1920. All quotes taken from Boll, Theophilus. *Miss May Sinclair: Novelist. A Biographical and Critical Introduction*. Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1973, p. 126.

many of Modernism's best-known writers: Ezra Pound, Richard Aldington, H.D., Charlotte Mew, Violet Hunt, Ford Madox Ford, and Rebecca West to name a few. She tirelessly promoted and supported a younger generation of writers by offering financial aid, creative support, and by writing encouraging reviews of their work. Sinclair was one of the first to recognize what she thought of as the genius of T.S. Eliot, writing a laudatory review of Eliot's "Prufrock: And Other Observations" in 1917.[182] Her critical writing is probably best remembered for her use of the phrase "stream of consciousness" to apply to Dorothy Richardson's *Pilgrimage*.[183] May Sinclair earned her living as a novelist and translator but at the heart of all her work was her thinking as a philosopher

She published two philosophical books and she was an elected member of the prestigious Aristotelian society. A monistic idealist, Sinclair argued for the development of a new idealism that could weather the New Realist storm, proposed by philosophers such as A.N. Whitehead. Sinclair was also one of the first to recognize the importance of the "new psychology" – psychoanalysis. She was a founding member of the Medico-Psychological Clinic of London (1913), the first facility to use psychoanalysis as a working therapy in England. In addition, she was a member of both the Society of Psychical Research and the Women Writer's Suffrage League. Sinclair was a writer who "repeatedly remade herself, testing the limits of acceptable content and then form, her writings represent, in a sense, a genealogy of literary modernism's development."[184] Despite her prodigious output, or perhaps because of it, May Sinclair's work has mostly been lost to scholarly and public view. Most of May Sinclair's work is currently out of print and scholarly interest has only relatively recently gathered momentum and begun to gain critical legitimacy. Sinclair was very successful in her lifetime and made lasting contributions to the literary and feminist zeitgeist, but has subsequently, and undeservedly, received little scholarly attention. As such, this chapter offers a reconsideration of Sinclair, bringing her work back into timely scholarly conversations.

To understand Sinclair's fiction, one must have a grasp on her philosophical writing which informed her novels. As Ellen White, in her history of women philosophers points out, Sinclair draws upon "ethical idealism, pantheism, mysticism, and psychoanalytic theory in a rejection of Victorian morality and in support of radical feminism."[185] Sinclair conceived that the mind is the

[182]Neff, Rebeccah Kinnamon. "New Mysticism in the Writings of May Sinclair and T.S.Eliot." *Twentieth Century Literature: A Scholarly and Critical Journal*, vol 26, issue 1, 1980, p. 84, hereafter referred to in-text as "Neff"
[183] Sinclair, May. "The Novels of Dorothy Richardson" *Egois*t 5, April 1918, pp.57-59. Reproduced in Scott, Bonnie Kime Scott, ed. *The Gender of Modernism: A Critical Anthology*, Indiana University Press, 1990. p. 478.
[184] Kunka, Andrew J. and Michele K. Troy (eds). "Introduction." *May Sinclair: Moving Towards the Modern*. Ashgate Publications, 2006, p. 5.
[185] White, Ellen White. *A History of Women Philosophers*: *Vol 4 1900-today*. de Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1995, p. 316.

point of contact with Reality, in that "the world arises in consciousness" (*DoI* 112).[186] Sinclair, in her first book of philosophy, *A Defence of Idealism*, defends her Idealistic Monism against multiple alternatives such as New Realism (Bertrand Russell), Pan-Psychism (Samuel Butler), Pragmatism (William James), and Vitalism (Bergson). She admits that the old Idealism must die and a New Idealism arise in its place. [187] Metaphysical certainty is impossible, Sinclair concedes, but the weight of evidence and metaphysical support errs on the side of certain things having a monistic reality that makes them permanent: "It looks as if the only things that stand firm in this universe are Ideas, Truth, Goodness, Beauty: there is not a 'fact' that bears their imprint and their image for long together; yet they, eternal and immutable remain" (*DoI* xii-xi). Sinclair concludes the monist "can only say that in the unity of his own consciousness the term spirit covers will and action and passion, as well as thought and sense. He finds that love and thought and will behave as energies, as motive powers, or even as causes within the unity of consciousness" (*DoI* 298). This means that the assumption of knowledge in this consciousness, and that of others, only makes sense if we assume "an absolute consciousness, as the ground of all its knowing" (*DoI* 298). The Absolute Self, Sinclair claims, wishing to know itself (and make itself known) must manifest itself in the material: it is the existence of finite selves that allow the Absolute to know itself (*DoI* 299). Sinclair concludes that her construction of the "New Idealism," which "leaves the door open to our vision of Goodness, Beauty, and Truth, eternal and real, surpassing all goods and beauties and truths we know; incorruptible; unassailable by evil" (*NI* 305), is the most likely conclusion for the structure of the universe and self.

***Mary Olivier* – The Problem of Family**

Sinclair's most formally innovative novel, *Mary Olivier: A Life*, is a semi-autobiographical *bildungsroman.* The novel charts the life of an intelligent child who traverses the claustrophobic and controlling conditions of a mid-Victorian daughter's life, seeking solace and intellectual sustenance through philosophy and poetry, and finally evolving her own form of "modernist consciousness" (Raitt 215). Written in a stream-of-consciousness style, the novel chart's Mary's life in five books of irregular length from infancy (two years) to middle age (forty-seven). The novel explores concerns such as boundaries of the self, duty and honor, heredity, consciousness and religious-spiritual ideas.

[186] Writing to her friend and psychic researcher Catherine Dawson Scott, 20 Mar 1920, Sinclair explains "everything has to come through some recorder, not even in life do we get direct contact with any object (or event), Sinclair cited in Raitt, p. 215. I will capitalize the term Reality when discussing Sinclair's idealist notion that Reality is God.

[187] Sinclair points out that we cannot know which philosophy is true, Realism or Idealism. Idealism she claims could live happily alongside Realism, but Realism restricts Idealism too greatly: "Reality is not one whit the worse because Idealism chooses to regard Spirit as its source. It is no more a dance of bloodless categories that it was before. Existence remains as full-blooded and gorgeously coloured, as variegated and multitudinous, as everlastingly exciting, mysterious and surprising whether you call it the manifestation of Spirit or a collection of ultimate realities" (*DoI* 309-310).

These ideas are explored within the confines of the family and Sinclair drew broadly on psychoanalytic concepts, especially sublimation and oedipal over-attachment focusing on the mother. Late in life, Mary is recognized for her poetry and 'discovered' by a man, the poet-philosopher that she had longed for her entire life, "his minds really was the enormous, perfect crystal she has imagined. […] She had looked into it and seen beautiful, clear things in it" (*MO* 391). Richard Nicholson offers Mary a form of escape and a route to happiness; he offers her the intimacy, the care, the intellectual and spiritual partnership that she has lacked, thus he comes to symbolizes the summation of all her desires – and fears. In an act of exquisite readerly torture, May Sinclair holds out this seeming perfection at the close of the novel but then does not allow her protagonist to take it. As Katha Pollitt, in her introduction to the 2002 reprint of *Mary Olivier,* rightly points out "it is hard to think of a renunciation less necessary than Mary's refusal to marry Nicholson" and it is "almost too much for a modern reader to bear."[188] In *Mary Olivier,* Sinclair dramatizes the coming to consciousness and emerging subjectivity of an intellectual who tries to escape the ties of convention at turn of the 20th century. The nets, to borrow a phrase from Joyce's *Portrait*, that Mary Olivier has to escape from are family and Oedipal.

The novel follows her from infancy to middle age, tracing her perpetual battle to develop and retain a sense of Self. Her mother, "Little Mamma" the "little dove'", is pious, cold and emotionally inaccessible to Mary. Little Mamma attempts to mold Mary into a proper little girl: submissive, domestic, and religious. A battle of wills is fought over activities appropriate to Victorian conceptions of femininity, such as sewing and religious observance, that become contested ground between Mary and her mother. Growing up, Mary's burgeoning personality and independence is considered dangerous and undesirable by her family. Her mother controls Mary by withholding from her desperately desired love and attention. Mary yearns for her mother's attention and approval, begging her mother to vocalize her love. Mary offers her own love first: "I love you. I ache with loving you," but her mother refuses to respond saying:

> "I want deeds, not words. If you love me you'll learn your lessons properly the night before, not just gabble them over hot from the pan." […] She sat there with a sort of triumph on her beautiful face, as if she were pleased with herself because she hadn't said it. And Mary would bring the long sheet that dragged on her wrist, and the needle that pricked her fingers, and sit at Mamma's knee and sew, making a thin trail of blood all along the hem (*MO* 81).

[188] Pollitt, Katha. "Introduction." *Mary Olivier: A Life*. New York Review Books, 2002, p. vii-xv, xii.

Mary learns that pain and violence that comes from emotional attachment. She is too young to withstand her mother's cruelty and so behaves as she is expected to. Little Mamma's love is entirely dependent upon Mary's gender-appropriate behavior, on her being good: "her [Mamma's] face left off disapproving and reproaching and behaved like it did on Christmas Days and birthdays. She smiled now as she sat still and sewed, as she watched you sitting still and sewing" (*MO* 298). Mary asks her: "Why do you look at me so kindly when I'm sewing?" Her mother replies: "Because I like to see you behaving like a little girl, instead of tearing about and trying to do what boys do" (*MO* 81). Little Mamma reinforces gender norms by modeling gender-appropriate behavior through the manipulation of emotions, in controlling Mary's happiness she schools her as to what society expects. As Sara Ahmed explains: "happiness is used to redescribe social norms as social goods."[189] Her mother also objects to her developing a sense of self with independent desires. Mary expresses her intense desire for her brother's kitten, Sarah, her mother is horrified and invokes the greater desire of God-the-father in order to contain Mary's sense of self within properly feminine confines. Mary complains, "But *I* want Sarah," and her mother responds, "And that's selfish and self-willed…God hates selfishness and self-will. God is grieved every time Mary is self-willed and selfish. He wants her to give up her will" (*MO* 18, italics original). Mary's sense of herself, the "I", is as offensive to her mother as the "want." Little wonder that from a young age Mary begins to associate emotions with pain and desire with shame. Mary learns to keep her inner life and imaginative rebellion secret and unspoken.

Though Mary's behavior is outwardly obedient, it is her inner life that causes conflict between herself and her mother. Throughout the novel Mary's desires – to go to school, to teach herself Greek, to play tennis, to not be confirmed into the church – are vilified and resisted by her family. In some cases, Mary prevails, but there is always a price to pay. When, for example, at fourteen she wants to use her brother's discarded books to learn Greek, her mother tries to prevent her saying, "'It's just silly vanity'" (*MO* 148). Her mother's censure and refusal move Mary affectively and brings to body-consciousness something that her conscious mind refuses to face – anger: "Mary's heart made a queer and startling movement, as if it turned over and dashed itself against her ribs. There was a sudden swelling and aching in her throat" (*MO* 149). She accuses her mother of being afraid and stubbornly asks for the books. In fact, she wants to learn Greek because of a feeling, she "knew the sound patterns were beautiful, and that was all she knew. Beauty" (*MO* 151). She cannot tell her mother of her aesthetic-affective instinct because her mother would try to destroy it: "Beauty could be hurt and frightened away from you," so it must be protected (*MO* 151).

[189] Ahmed, Sara. *The Promise of Happiness*. Duke University Press, 2010, p.2.

Her mother capitulates, but punishes Mary for her small act of self-assertion, "'There—take Mark's books. Take everything. Go your own way. You always have done; you always will. Some day you'll be sorry for it'" (*MO* 151). Mary is immediately wounded and cowed by her mother's anger, "She was sorry for it now, miserable, utterly beaten. Her new self seemed to her a devil that possessed her. She hated it. She hated the books. She hated everything that separated her and made her different from her mother and from Mark" (*MO* 151). Such acts of self-actualization are necessary, psychologically, for independent development but Mary's mother wishes to keep her daughter young and pliable. Mary, as the only daughter, is expected to remain at home, unmarried, in order to look after her mother. As she grows up, she ensures her own emotional and spiritual survival by developing coping mechanisms that nourish her intellectual wellbeing, but she must still fight for them: "'Ever since I began to grow up I felt that was something about Mamma that would kill me if I let it. I've had to fight for every single thing I've ever wanted. It's awful fighting her, when's she's so sweet and gentle. But it's either that or go under'" (*MO* 287). Sinclair's novel does not offer the fantasy of an emotionally independent modern heroine ready-born, rather she depicts the difficulties and dangers stemming from the claustrophobic constraints of familial, emotional, and social ties on women, and especially for women of genius.

In selecting Greek as the subject of contention, Sinclair implicitly offers a critique of the limitations of women's education. Mary's pleasure in atypical interests beyond the expected pursuits of women, is an important means by which she cultivates a Self, retains her autonomy, and has a sense of participation in her own life. In fact, choosing alternative objects of interest can become an act of personal and political resistance. Sara Ahmed suggests that those who are unhappy with prescribed notions of happiness "disturb the fantasy that happiness can only be found in certain places" (2010, 62). Mary is happy in the wrong way, or she experiences the right kind of happiness towards the wrong thing. Mary realizes her joy is considered a sin: "happiness that was no good to Mamma, no good to anybody but you, secret and selfish; that was your happiness. It was deadly sin" (*MO* 168). Such acts of self-interest or self-building imagine an alternative moral economy based on alternative objects of happiness.[190] Each form of happiness, like Spinoza's *conatus*, offers Mary a means of persisting in emotionally and intellectually barren circumstances.

Literature becomes a means of experiencing defiant joy leading to self-discovery. In childhood, the *Encyclopedia Britannica* is the only source of knowledge not controlled by her parents.

[190] See Truran, Wendy. "Feminism, Freedom, and the Hierarchy of Happiness in the Psychological Novels of May Sinclair." *May Sinclair: Re-Thinking Bodies and Minds*. Edited by Rebecca Bowler and Claire Drewery. Edinburgh University Press, 2017, pp. 79-97. This published article was written concurrently with the first draft of this chapter. The article is not reproduced here and differs from the discussion in this chapter, however, there may be some duplicated phrasings and examples.

She is the first to "rr-rr-rimp" the pages open, she treasures "the volumes that contained the forbidden knowledge of the universe," and what she learns "thrilled her with a secret joy" (*MO* 118). Mary uses the Encyclopedia to gain language for things she has already intuited. Mary learns about Pantheism for example, "whatever else God might be, he was not what they said, something separate and outside things" (*MO* 116). Mary's direct experience of God and Beauty, discussed below, leads her to understand "[that] the universe going on inside God, as your thoughts go on inside you; the universe, so close to God that nothing could be closer. The meaning got plainer and plainer" (*MO* 116). She finds her way to Spinoza, "[t]here is not substance but God, nor can any other be conceived" (*MO* 116). This acquisition of less mediated knowledge (than information from her mother) is an intellectual awakening for Mary, offering evidence for the God she had experienced in flashes of joyful revelation: "The God of Baruch Spinoza was the God you had wanted, the only sort of God you cared to think about" (*MO* 117). Mary's discovery of spiritual truth within literature, rather than scripture, gestures to the increasingly fraught relationships with organized religion at this cultural moment. Mary's turn-to-literature, as a secular source of spiritual guidance, reflects the more general Modernist resistance (in science, social and political theory, as well as literature) to religious orthodoxies. Mary begins to read poetry - Longfellow, Byron, Shelley - which she connects to Spinoza and pantheism. Just as Yeats would assert, poetry is the language for divinity; the poets and artists that Mary reads become her teachers and spiritual leaders, and they leave their mark on the poet she will become. Yet, it is Mary's direct, joyful, revelatory experiences of beauty – which she finds captured by Shelley in his poetry – that begins her education as an artist and poet.

When she is seven, Mary has sudden affective episodes of joy that transform her perspective through an acute experience of beauty. Her transformation comes in "brilliant, clear flashes" of joy, that form part of the secret, "selfish" happiness that her mother considers sinful (*MO* 434). Her experience is embodied and emotional, and it is attached to material objects such as the environment, nature, and the light around her Essex home. Her vision is intensified, colors are saturated, and her sense of life is illuminated as if seeing the landscape for the first time: "The queer white light everywhere, like water thin and clear. Wide fields, flat and still, like water, flooded with thin, clear light; grey earth, shot delicately with green blades, shimmering. […] The high trees, the small scattered cottages, the two taverns, the one tall house that the look of standing up in water" (*MO* 57). Whiteness, light, and water are closely linked suggesting a connection between purity, clearness, and fluidity. Water, the element most closely connected with emotion, offers Mary a visual rebirth; she perceives the world differently: "She saw the queer white light for the first time and drew in her breath with a sharp check. She knew that the fields were beautiful" (*MO* 57). Beauty

affects her, happiness floods her body: "Suddenly, without any reason, she was so happy that she could hardly bear it" (*MO* 58). Her feelings mirror the vision: "Her happiness was sharp and still like the white light" (*MO* 58). The experience produces an affective transformation that is linked to the beauty. She becomes porous, visions of beauty flow in and her feelings of happiness flow out, it is a kind of transcendence. Mary is unable to control her joyful experience, it visits her without warning: "Here was the sudden, secret happiness you felt when you were by yourself and the fields looked beautiful. It was always coming now, with a sort of rush and flash, when you least expected it" (*MO* 88). Her "secret happiness" is associated with the fields, beyond the enclosure of her mother and religious instruction, it comes often but unpredictably: "It had happened so often that she received it now with a shock of recognition; and when it was over, she wanted it to happen again. She would go back and back to the places where it had come, looking for it, thinking that any minute it might happen again. But it never came twice to the same place in the same way" (*MO* 109). Her body and emotions are mediators of her experience of a power greater than herself, Beauty, which she later links to a revelation of Reality behind everyday appearances - a vision of God: "the sudden, secret happiness that more than anything was like God" (*MO* 168). Rather than the wrathful, cruel, and remote God of her mother's religion, Mary develops a sense of god-in-beauty and beauty-in-god, concluding that the divine is expansive, immanent, emotional, and embodied. Though isolated from family and society because of her metaphysical and mystical beliefs, Mary is placed in an intimate relationship with nature. Mary's collision with Beauty, her sudden vision of it, produces an *affective access to the absolute* which expands the horizons of her world. Sinclair's exploration of the challenges of attempting to gain freedom from emotional, familial, religious, social, and genetic inheritances are captured in the motif of light and darkness, secret and perfect joy.

Sinclair uses the motif of light and darkness which represents materiality and spirituality, body and mind, sexuality and chastity and connects her expanded view of these concepts back to literature. The light which is associated with God is also associated with writing. Mary finds the same affective experience of Beauty contained in Shelley's poetry: "All her secret happiness was there. Shelley knew about the queerness of the sharp white light, and the sudden stillness, when the grey of the fields turn to violet: the clear, hard stillness that covers the excited throb-throbbing of the light" (*MO* 152). Sinclair attempts to capture this same light and direct contact with reality within her descriptive prose of the reality. For Sinclair, and her fictional counterpart Mary, it is via beauty - and writing beautiful poetry - that one might gain access to Reality. Rather than wait on revelation, beautiful writing can offer access to a joyful experience of the divine: "Poetry is the rhythmic

expression of an intense personal emotion produced by direct contact with reality."[191] Mary, as she matures, begins to write poetry. She makes her isolation beneficial, by using her solitary life to create poetic manifestations her secret light. Mary's love of words and ideas populates her barren existence: "They don't understand you can really love words – beautiful sounds. And thoughts. Love them awfully, as if they were alive. As if they were people" (*MO* 157). Immersed in poetry and in contemplation of the absolute, Mary – as nascent poet-philosopher - is as emotionally fulfilled as she has ever been.

Mary's discovery of joy in creativity and her use of it to escape her constraints recalls Stephen Dedalus's flight in *A Portrait of an Artist as a Young Man.* As Stephen articulates: "When the soul of a man is born in this country there are nets flung at it to hold it back from flight. You talk to me of nationality, language, religion. I shall try to fly by those nets" (*Portrait* 148). These nets involve relationships: to family, to religion, to nation - all of which restrict intellectual and emotional development. The nets of Stephen and Mary are linked, related to domestic arrangements, romantic relationships, Judeo-Christian religion, and artistic expression, but they differ by several orders of magnitude. Mary's drama of resistance plays out on a smaller stage, but is all the more intimate and intense for that; her struggle highlights the increased difficulties for women to negotiate an escape of those nets. Both Mary Olivier and Stephen Dedalus claim that solitude is necessary for artistic freedom. Stephen states: "I do not fear to be alone or to be spurned for another or to leave whatever I have to leave" (*Portrait* 181). Stephen anticipates being alone because of rejection by the fraternity of artists and thinkers he hopes to be respected by; Mary however must fight to be an individual at all. The affective labor which women are expected to undertake does not allow her time to be alone and this arrests her artistic development, this is reflected in the time scale of both texts, portrait of an artist as a *young man*, compared to Mary Olivier's *A Life.*[192]

Detachment

Mary's childhood vision of the fields and her subsequent experiences of joy are important moments in her understanding of her 'real' self; however, joy could be viewed as an ambivalent good for an idealist. It signifies the shift to greater knowledge and power, but it is also an embodied

[191] Sinclair, May. "The Poems of F.S. Flint." *The English Review*, vol. 32, 1921, p.13.
[192] The increased pressures of affective labor for women artists is suggested by the time taken to escape the "nets" that hold them back. *Portrait* ends in Stephen's escape to Paris as a young man; *Mary Olivier* ends with Mary's freedom happening in her 50's, suggesting a life-long battle for independence. The comparison is not exactly parallel however, as Mary in middle-age is a published and celebrated author, whereas Stephen – as we discover in *Ulysses* – has yet to write anything. Nonetheless, it is worth noting, the length of time considered worthy of a *künstlerroman*, is considerably shorter for a male artist than a female.

passion that denies the dissociation of spirit from the body. Joy is important because it is a manifestation of the Will-to-Live, the term Sinclair used interchangeably with libido. Joy also moves one to a greater perfection and a greater empowerment and action. Clearly drawing on Spinoza's concept of active joys and his concept of the passions in her depictions of the suffering caused by attachment, Mary strives to cultivate a detachment from her embodiment. Sinclair's representation of affect is ambivalent, affects attach her to the vagaries of the body - leave her at the mercy of emotional manipulation - but also give the capacity for experiencing joy that is vital for the development and perpetuation of the self. To feel is to be alive, to be human, but also to be potentially limited by passions. This, Sinclair suggests, is especially true for women, who have previously been denigrated as the emotional sex, incapable of rational thought, hysterical or mad when they display intense emotion. Sinclair thus imagines a radical form of detachment that divests one of the materiality of the body and affects.

Sinclair uses joy to indicate a transformative experience that is moving the protagonist from a lesser to a greater perfection, either in terms of physical maturity or in terms of psychic development, as when Mary Olivier experiences her secret and perfect happiness. Joy's etymological roots in Middle English "*joye*," from the 12th century signified "a feeling of pleasure or delight," and Old French "*joie*" links the word to "jewel" suggesting its rarity and also its value. Paradoxically, joy is an experience of intense pleasure but must not separate from pain. The Latin word *laetitia* is defined as excessive joy which leads us closer to ecstasy and rapture. To be ecstatic, from the Greek *ekstasis*, is to be put 'out of the place,' in the classical sense, *ecstasis* had an association of insanity or bewilderment, to 'drive out of wits;' but in the late Greek the meaning shifts to "withdrawal of the soul from the body, mystic or prophetic trance." The rapture of the ecstatic moment stupefies the body whilst the soul contemplates divine things. Yet there is a dilemma in wishing to experience bliss and the need to control passion or, to put it another way, emotions are dangerous because they move us. As the definitions of rapture and ecstasy suggest, they can move us outside of ourselves. Affect is sticky, caring clings, attachment ties us to others, and this means we are never truly free. Mary Olivier thinks that to be spiritually free is to necessitate emotional freedom, to not care. Speaking of her mother she tells her brother: "My body'll stay here and take care of her all her life, but my *self* will have got away" (*MO* 290). She insists she must fight not only her mother's demands, but also her own emotions, "the bit of me that claws on to her and can't get away"; she must fight the part of her that is attached to everyone she loves: "it's got bits of them sticking to it" (*MO* 290). To be free from caring is to be free to be a "real" self. Mary takes this fantasy detachment to extremes, becoming dissociated in order to access her "secret joy" and be "certain" about Reality,

though dissociation is a state that Sinclair associates both with mysticism and neuroses, and I will touch on these points further at the close of the chapter.

Harriet Frean – A Failure of Self

In *Mary Olivier* Sinclair focuses on Mary's striving to create and maintain the boundaries of a self in order to grow beyond the confines of maternal, religious, and conventional expectations. In *Life and Death of Harriett Frean* (1922), Sinclair creates an imagistic, terse tale of a woman who fails to transcend her upbringing. Harriett is a perfect daughter, an example of the Victorian ideal woman, and through her short book Sinclair shows the dire consequences of this ideal. Deborah Gorham's study of the feminine ideal in Victorian England defines her as follows: "The ideal woman was willing to be dependent on men and submissive to them, and she would have a preference for a life restricted to the confines of the home. She would be innocent, pure, gentle and self-sacrificing. Possessing no ambitious strivings, she would be free of any trace of anger or hostility. More emotional than man, she was also more capable of self-renunciation." [193] Daughters had a special place in the manifestation of this ideal because not only was "the parental role suffused with intense emotional significance" but also that "daughters could offer the family a particular sort of tenderness and spirituality," but only if the daughter accepted her place as her mother's asexual double (Gorham 5). Unlike many of Sinclair's other protagonists, Harriett is adored and protected by her parents, to the point of excess. As a good oedipal subject, Harriet identifies strongly with her mother, imagining her future she thinks of herself as a wife and mother: "She would be like Mamma, and her little girl would be like herself. She couldn't think of it any other way" (*HF* 11). Like Mary Olivier, Harriett is called upon to "behave beautifully" at all times, but unlike Mary she follows her parents' strictures and gains pleasure from it: "Being good was being beautiful like Mamma. She wanted to be like her mother" (*HF* 11). To "behave beautifully" becomes the highest aspiration that Harriett can think of. Angus Burrell, writing a review of Sinclair's *Arnold Waterlow: A Life* in 1925, suggests that Sinclair's specialty is the diagnosis of the sickness of the soul which comes from "over attachment to the mother," and the inability to separate from a mother and be "born again." He writes, "she [Sinclair] is a naturalist of souls. Her specialty lies in diagnosis of this soul sickness, in offering elaborate documentation of its fatality, or in suggesting complete or partial cures."[194] Harriett Frean documents the fatality.

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[193] Gorham, Deborah. *The Victorian Girl and the Feminine Ideal*. Indiana University Press, 1982, p. 4-5.

[194] Burrell, Angus. "A Specialist in Souls" Review of *Arnold Waterlow: A Life*. *The Nation* Vol 119. No 3098, p 548 July 22, 1925. Burrell goes on to comment on Sinclair's exploration of the absolute in her novels: "The people in this book have the touch of reality upon them. In a sense, and it helps to make them more real, they have the touch of unreality. For what we ordinarily call reality is not the only reality to May Sinclair; her people do not become wholly real until, as an affirmation

In *Life and Death of Harriett Frean*, Sinclair shows a life that is wasted because Harriett is crushed under the weight of the responsibility of behaving beautifully. Unlike Mary Olivier who strives to develop a sense of self, which means she is marked by society as disobedient, Harriett Frean has only one moment of disobedience, which results in her giving up her will completely thereafter. Harriett has no inner life, instead she remains cosseted in the family triad, never forced to grow up. The family dynamic is comforting and a closed system, "And the three friends, Connie and Sarah and Lizzie, came and went. She loved them; and yet when they were there they broke something, something secret and precious between her and her father and mother, and when they were gone she felt the stir, the happy movement of coming together again, drawing in close, close, after the break. We only want each other" (*HF* 49). Drawing on Jung, Sinclair posits that it is "man's childish passion for them [parents] that are the backward forces that retard his development as an individual" (*DoI* 144). In order to reach maturity, conflict with the mother is necessary: "[t]hat conflict begins in childhood and is waged most fiercely on the threshold of adolescence. It must be fought to a finish, and the child must win it or remain for ever immature" (*DoI* 144). Harriett attempts and fails to enact that conflict.

A decisive event in Harriett's development is when, at the age of ten, Harriett strays beyond the prescribed boundaries of her safe family walls. She enjoys her transgression; she gathers red campion flowers – red denoting physical and sexual maturity – as she walks down the forbidden Blacks Lane: "[b]ecause I wanted to know what it would feel like" (*HF* 21). Her curiosity to know and to feel, to experience for herself, leads her to slip through the constraints of the Victorian household. Her desire to stray beyond prescribed boundaries is clearly part of growing up. Harriett imagines herself like her mother, "she swung her hips and made her skirts fly out. That was her grown-up crinoline, swing-swinging as she went" (*HF* 17). Sinclair's imagery moves from the lush colors of nature – the white froth of cow-parsley and the red tops of the campion - to "waste ground covered with old boots and rusted and crumpled things," and a "dirty little brown house" (*HF* 18). The house is inhabited by a man that Harriett feels scared of: "[h]e was the frightening thing, when he saw her he stepped back and crouched behind the palings, ready to jump out" (*HF* 18-19). The figure represents the real-world dangers that women can experience, that keeping women in the private sphere supposedly protects them from, but also that leaves them completely unprepared to confront. Harriett's play comes crashing against the menace of adult sexuality, but also but also gestures to social and economic difference. Harriett's parents wish her to forget the world that might contain difference,

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and extension of this dimensional world, they experience a contact with a world of more mystical consciousness" (548). *Arnold Waterlow: A Life* is considered to be a reconsideration of *Mary Olivier: A Life*, except through the frame of a male protagonist.

but this includes the difference of her own desires and intellectual independence. Instead, her mother takes her regularly to see the red campion, "so that it was always the red campion she remembered" - a safe screen hiding the masculine sexuality and poverty she had momentarily trespassed upon (*HF* 24).

Like Mary, Harriet's natural curiosity and need for emotional variety to alleviate the boredom of her life is crushed under the weight of the threat of her mother's unhappiness. The reason Harriett is given for not returning to Blacks Lane alone is opaque and emotional: "Because it makes you mother unhappy. That's enough why" (*HF* 22). The threat of parental unhappiness is used as a means of tying Harriett to the values of the family. To place the responsibility of her mother's happiness in Harriett's hands, is also to place the burden of affective labor upon her shoulders. Sinclair, forward in her thinking, recognizes that happiness as a disciplinary technique. Harriett experiences her parent's disappointment as a great punishment: "She would always have to do what they wanted; the unhappiness of not doing it was more than she could bear. […] Their unhappiness was the punishment. It hurt more than anything" (*HF* 23).[195] Harriett father hopes she will self-regulate: "We don't forbid, because we trust you to do what we wish. To behave beautifully" (*HF* 23). Harriett inherits prescribed forms of happiness, her happiness and her desires are no longer her own. To wish to protect a child from experiences that they are emotionally, psychologically, and physically unprepared for is understandable, but the Freans are not preparing Harriett for the world; rather they are teaching her to repress her natural curiosity and desires and replacing them with the empty beauty of good behavior. Harriett reproduces her parent's values and rules of conduct without question, demonstrating the fact that "women are also implicated in supporting the structures that apparently restrict them."[196] Harriett's development is arrested due to her affective and emotional inheritance. In her lack of self-knowledge and her inability to exert her own will, she cannot function as an adult, and is unable to access the higher realms of beauty or happiness.

To remain attached to another's construction of your self is to risk regression. When Harriett's mother dies, Harriett is also lost. She lived her life through the prism of her family and now she does not know how to continue: "Through her absorption in her mother, some large, essential part of herself had gone" (*HF* 110). Lacking emotional and intellectual independence, Harriett refuses to look squarely at reality and so her unconscious motivations manifests affectively:

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[195] The manipulation of daughter's emotional responses by parents is emphasized across all three novels. Gwenda in *The Three Sisters* acknowledges that her father's anger and cruelty draw forth her will, "but she was defenseless against his pathos, and he knew it. […] Pity was a dangerous solvent in which her will sank and was melted away" (*TS* 337). Mary Olivier is also cowed by her mother's unhappiness: "Tears. She was beaten" (*MO* 198).

[196] Hirschmann, Nancy J. "Toward a Feminist Theory of Freedom." *Political Theory,* vol 24, no. 1, 1996, p.56.

"She had no clear illumination, only a mournful acquiescence in her own futility, an almost physical sense of shrinkage" (*HF* 148). Harriett's psychic and somatic edifice which she built her sense of self upon, her sense of her "beautiful and honourable self" crumbles around her (*HF* 149). This is her tragedy; because she did not cultivate an understanding of her Self, or find anything that she could claim as her own, her world is subject to emotional and seismic shifts. Harriett's upbringing, and her failure to move beyond it, means she does not have the skills to rebuild her own psychological edifice after the loss of her parents. Harriett feels that she is irrecoverable, so she regresses into childhood in order to "retrace the footsteps of her lost self" (*HF* 110). She replaces her mother with her maid, Maggie, in whom she finds the sensual and affective pleasures of infancy: "She loved the comfort and protection of Maggie – she found shelter in Maggie as she had found it in her mother" (*HF* 163). Harriett becomes "ecstatic under Maggie's flickering fingers as they plaited her thin wisps of hair" (*HF* 164). Instead of growing up, Harriet grows back into the past.

Beautiful behaviour is a corruption for Sinclair, an abasement of the divine potential of both Beauty and Will. Sinclair claims that one way an individual can serve the Absolute is to be unique - to add to the collective unconscious. To simply repeat the previous generations work is to waste your life; to surrender your intellectual and emotional freedom is to regress. In *A Defence of Idealism*, Sinclair states that it is part of each person's duty to add something to the collective consciousness of the race: "by the one fact that …I lifted my head above the generations and added another living being, another desire, another will, another experience to the sum of human experiences, … I prove the superiority of my sublimation" (*DoI* 35). Harriett's failure, according to Sinclair, is a failure to add anything to the sum of human experience or knowledge. To "simply refuse to grow up and persist in being a child," or to go back to the dead generations" is, according to Sinclair is to be degenerate: "to be degenerate is to fail to add the priceless gift of individuality to the achievement of the race." (*DoI* 35). The close of *Harriett Frean* is unique within Sinclair's psychological fiction. It does close an affective episode of joy and revelation, as Sinclair's psychological fiction does, but rather than a vision of a higher reality, it is a regressive delusion. Harriet experiences "sudden ecstatic wonder and recognition" but her final word is "Mamma…" – misrecognizing her friend as her mother (*HF* 184). Harriett has become degenerate by Sinclair's standards, and it is clear that society has actively contributed to this degeneration. Conventions that would hold women to vacuous standard of "beautiful behaviour" without an expectation of any valuable contribution to society create such degeneracy in Sinclair's view.

Philosophy and Form

Writing on the poems of F.S. Flint, Sinclair emphasized the importance for modernist writers to depict the reality of inner states: "it is in rendering psychological states, in presenting unaltered an unabridged the truth of ordinary reality, the modern poet most shows his modernity; in sticking, that is to say, close to consciousness" (Flint 16). Sinclair felt that her psycho-spiritual philosophy could be utilized in modern artistic form. In an interview entitled "The Future of the Novel" in 1921, she endorsed the single-consciousness method of novel writing created by James Joyce and Dorothy Richardson, concluding that: "I think that the analytic psychological novel is becoming a thing of the past; that the synthetic psychological novel is taking its place."[197] This means moving away from a novel that didactically traces and explains the motivations and emotions of characters and generalizes from them (analytic), to a method that presents character as a complex multiplicity of elements which must be taken together to form a greater whole (synthetic). This results in a whole shift that readers must participate in, so that readers are co-creating rather than passively receiving. This meant that Sinclair valued single consciousness narratives with their implied influences and motivations, that conflict and coalesce in ways that readers must sort through themselves, and that we consider Modern. This is especially the case in her most formally innovative novel, *Mary Olivier*. The importance of the focus of one internal consciousness for Sinclair was "direct presentment of the subject," and that it is important that "the modern novelist should not dissect; he should not probe; he should not write about the emotions and the thought of his characters. The words he uses must be the thoughts – be the emotions" (Future 89). Influenced by her affinity with Imagism and Idealism, Sinclair felt that form and substance should be indistinguishable.

Sinclair sought, in her work, to give form to Reality behind the façade of the everyday, what she called making direct contact with reality: "the naked presentation of a thing, with nothing, not so much as a temperament or a mood between you and it."[198] This technique is something that Sinclair identifies in both H.D.'s and T.S. Eliot's poetry. Both Eliot and Sinclair were interested in philosophical idealism and Sinclair claimed that part of his genius was that "he knows what he is after. Reality, stripped naked of all rhetoric, of all ornament, of all confusing and obscuring association."[199] Writing a review of "Prufrock: And Other Observations" she lauds Eliot's dangerous and disturbing masterpiece, but concedes it is difficult because, "He does not see anything between

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[197] Starr, Meredith and May Sinclair. *The Future of the Novel: Famous Authors and Their Methods: A Series of Interviews with Renowned Authors*. Small, Maynard & Company, 1921, pp. 87-89.

[198] Sinclair, May. "The Poems of 'H.D.'" *Fortnightly Review,* 121, March 1927, pp. 329-340. *The Gender of Modernism: A Critical Anthology*. Edited by Reproduced in Bonnie Kime Scott. Indiana University Press, 1990, p. 454.

[199] "Prufrock: And Other Observations" A Criticism. *Little Review*, vol. 4, no. 8, December 1917, pp. 8-14. *The Gender of Modernism: A Critical Anthology*. Edited by Reproduced in Bonnie Kime Scott. Indiana University Press, 1990, p. 451

him and reality, and he makes straight for the reality he sees; he cuts all his corners and his curves; and this directness of method is startling and upsetting to comfortable, respectable people" (449). Sinclair also tried to see nothing between herself and reality, both in content and form, and make directly for it in her novels, which sometimes meant "startling and upsetting comfortable, respectable people."[200] Like Joyce, Sinclair sought to develop a stream of consciousness technique that captured a vibrant sense of the development of an individual – especially an artist – in the context of familial, religious, social, and psychological constraints.

Sinclair considered a revelation of Reality could be experienced in "every finding of a new truth, every creation of a new beauty; every victory of goodness, every flash of spiritual insight and thrill of spiritual passion is, while it lasts, a communion, here and now, with God" (*NI* 314). God for Sinclair is linked to the imagination. Artistic souls are able to access the Absolute through their higher levels of sublimation. I will talk about sublimation in more detail below, but for now, the greater the levels of sublimation towards a more spiritual goal (Truth, Goodness, Beauty) the higher the level of consciousness.[201] Sinclair states:

> No reasoning allows or accounts for these moments. But lovers and poets and painters and musicians and mystics and heroes know them: moments when eternal Beauty is seized travelling through time; moments when things that we have seen all our lives without truly seeing them…change to us in an instant of time, and show the secret and imperishable life they harbor; moments when the human creature we have known all our life without truly knowing it, reveals its incredible godhead; moments of danger that are moments of sure and perfect happiness, because then the adorable Reality gives itself to our very sight and touch (*DoI* 339).

God becomes loveable, accessible, and knowable – especially to lovers and artists. All know God affectively and their means of perceiving the world are changed because of their recognition of their oneness with God. Diane Gillespie explains further: "Reality is neither the temporal world nor a denial of it. A fresh perception of the external world," and notes that, "Sinclair closely associates aesthetic innovation with the metaphysical position she calls the "new idealism."[202] For Sinclair God is a poet: "Philosophers have refused to see God as he is: the wild poetic genius of eternity" (*NI* 304). After all, she goes on to say, "the universe is not a set of equations. It has all the appearance of

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[200] Reviews of *Mary Olivier* often focused on the difficulty of the technique (single consciousness form), for example: "All through *Mary Oliver* one has the feeling that one is expect to admire the skill of the mid-wife – it is not the baby which is considered, but the craft producing the baby…Technique has become the end of art. Apart from its technical interest *Mary Olivier* is a dull book." *The New Statesman*, Oct 11 1919, p. 44.

[201] Sinclair draws a distinction between personality and the permanent self: "our sense of individuality is one thing and the existence of the self is another" (DoI 68).

[202] Gillespie, Diana. "May Sinclair." *The Gender of Modernism: A Critical Anthology*. Edited by Reproduced in Bonnie Kime Scott. Indiana University Press, 1990, p. 438.

a romantic adventure" (*NI* 304). This romantic adventure becomes associated with a kind of mystical sensuality, God as lover. Sinclair's protagonists exchange earthly sensuality for a spiritual one. Heightened moments of passion permit a deeper feeling of the real, but for Sinclair these mystical unions come through self-control and suffering rather than hedonism.

Sublimation

Sinclair defined sublimation as: "the striving of the Libido towards manifestation in higher and higher forms," and claimed that, "all religion, all art, all literature, all science are sublimations in various stages of perfection. Civilisation is one vast system of sublimations."[203] Her interest in metaphysics and consciousness led her to psychoanalysis, and she read extensively in the new psychology. She was a founding member of the Medico-Psychological Clinic which introduced the work of Janet, Freud and Jung to England (1913).[204] As White points out, "Her interests in idealism led her to an interest in psychoanalysis as a tool for developing self-consciousness" (White 135). Sinclair constructed a version of sublimation to suit her own ends, claiming that sublimation could consciously be directed: "[t]he whole evolution of man as a moral and social being has been lifting of the libido out of the Unconscious into the Conscious and its direction by intelligence" (*SS* 120).[205] Sinclair thought that the notion of sublimation was the most useful contribution that psychoanalysis made. The "the secret of individuality," she thought, "lies in the sublimation to consciousness of the unconscious Will-to-live" (*DoI* 5). Sinclair often referred to the libido as a more generalized Will-to-Live, an indestructible Life-Force that fueled all action and thought. Its source, she agreed, was the unconscious: "We know now, and we cannot escape from the knowledge, that in all these [myths and religions] the one eternal and universal element is in the sexual libido" and that "all have their source and hiding-place in the Unconscious" (*SS* 118).[206] Rather than define the unconscious as the dark underbelly of the mind, a vast repository of dirty secrets, Sinclair thought that the libido could be a life-force that brought the individual closer to God: "New Psychology means that man's libido has many of the attributes of God. It is eternal, indestructible, pure in its essence, infinite in its

[203] Sinclair, May. "Symbolism and Sublimation." *The Medical Press*, 1916, p.119, hereafter referred to in-text as "SS." In *A Defence of Idealism* Sinclair calls all sublimation "a turning and passing of desire from a less worthy or less fitting object to fix it on one more worthy and more fitting" (7). Neff also suggests that "although Sinclair acknowledged that of the 'four great forms of Sublimation – Religion, Art, Science and Concrete Activity,' religion offers the greatest possibility of spiritual progress, she contented herself with second-best, Art" (107).

[204] Zegger, 22. Sinclair also joined the Society for Psychical Research in 1914. The interest of the society was the whole of human consciousness and as such the society also took an interest in mysticism and the paranormal. Zegger records that it was members of SPR that first introduced the work of Janet, Freud and Jung to England through the Medico-Psychological Clinic.

[205] Sinclair argues, "[that] for the happy normal individual, desire is never repressed; it is either directed and controlled, or it wanders of its own accord into the paths of sublimation" (*DoI* 7).

[206] Sinclair draws a clear distinction between repression and sublimation in her *Defence of Idealism*: "It would be truer to say that wherever there is repression there is no sublimation, and wherever there is sublimation there is no repression" (7).

manifestations, of which the sexual impulse is only one" (*DoI* 144). The psychoanalysts Sinclair read postulated a strong correlation between the sexual urge and the yearning for mystical union. Following their lead in assuming that the unconscious is the seat of the libido, Neff suggests, "she formulated a psychic kinship between the mystic, the artist, and the lover" since all three are "inspired from the same source" (85). Thus, Sinclair's writing had to include the dark unconscious, sexual motivation, and idealize the personality that had the greatest power of sublimation. It is in the higher realms of sublimation that Sinclair's highest form of happiness rests, particularly in intellectual pursuits and creativity. Mary Olivier's ability to "sublimate all her restless energy into the writing of poetry," for example, saves her from succumbing to the monotony of life in Morfe with her mother (Raitt 216).[207] The use of sublimation is what enables Mary Olivier to evolve towards episodes of joyous detachment.

Sinclair makes a clear connection between sublimation and joy in her pamphlet feminism:

> Whoever has known and can remember certain moments of heightened vision and sensation, when things seen – common things – trees in a field – a stretch of sky – became transfigured and took on I know not what divine radiance and beauty, whoever has known the exaltation, the exquisite and unspeakable joy, the sheer ecstasy and the ultimate peace that accompany such vision, however fleeting, whoever, I say, knows and remembers, will remain unmoved while the physiologist points out … that they are part of the pageant of sexual passion, the psychological side of the great decorative illusion by which the Life-Force lures us to its end.[208]

Here Sinclair seeks to reassure women that to have sexual desires is not deviant but a natural and joyful part of life. For Sinclair, however, this "pageant of sexual passion" is best channeled into creative endeavor, whether artistic or maternal.

Feminism and Celibacy

Sinclair firmly believed that women should be able to shape their own lives whether emotionally, sexually, or economically. Sinclair's feminism was highly pragmatic and focused on the ability to work in two important senses. Firstly, on a woman's ability to earn money. Sinclair was part of the Women's Freedom League in 1908 and was particularly concerned with the right to work for married as well as single women, and when she marched as a suffragette in 1910 it was as a worker with the Women Writers (Boll 89). Sinclair writes in her essay "A Defence of Men" that economic independence for women is a step to emotional and sexual equality leading to the

[207] Raitt also suggests that sublimation allows Mary to escape "the tightening net of heredity" (231).
[208] Sinclair, May. *Feminism*. The Women Writer's Suffrage League, 1912, pp.31-32, hereafter referred to in-text as *Fem*

betterment of men: "[w]hen the average woman can afford to choose her mate well, or abstain from mating, let her demand inexorably a finer quality in man, and man must ultimately develop it. Nature herself will see to that."[209] Sinclair also wrote a pamphlet entitled "Feminism," published by the Women Writer's Suffrage League (1912), which defended women from attacks accusing them of being over (or under-) sexed. Sinclair wrote the pamphlet in response to Sir Almroth Wright's letter, "Suffrage Fallacies," published in *The Times* (28 March 1912). A renowned physician of immunology, Wright claimed that all suffragettes were suffering from "hysteria, neurosis, and degeneracy," brought on by sexual frustration, or what he called "physiological emergencies" (Almroth cited in *Fem* 7). As Sinclair put it, " [he finds] at the bottom of the Suffrage movement there is nothing, then, but Bitterness, sexual bitterness of the Frustrated, breaking out in the violence of the Militants; intellectual bitterness of the Unrecognized. But first and foremost sexual bitterness" (*Fem* 17). As Wright "sees in woman only a bundle of physiological emergencies" (*Fem* 28), he assumes an element of mental disorder for all women who are unmarried and not defined by their "proper" reproductive function, yet as Sinclair points out, a large proportion of suffragettes were both married and mothers, and those who were not (like Sinclair) were for the large part intelligent and articulate women who wanted to contribute to society. Sinclair concludes that resistance to women's enfranchisement "is after all, as much a commercial as a sexual fear and hatred" (*Fem* 36). Sinclair concedes that sexual libido, what she calls "Life-Force" is indestructible and is the motivation of much of both men and women's drive; however, she sarcastically states "He argues as if there were no such thing in the world as self-control" (*Fem* 8-9).

Self-control and sublimation were important ideas for Sinclair. If, as she believed, libido and creativity stemmed from the same force, it was necessary for women artists to harness this force in order to accomplish great things. Meaning, she concluded in many of her novels, that women with genius should be celibate. A large part of Sinclair's advocacy of celibacy was due to her belief that the emotional and psychic labor of intimate relationships, especially motherhood, was detrimental to women's abilities to produce art. At best "genius was a stronger force than love," and love was in fact "irrelevant to women's creative talent" (Raitt 121). At worst, Raitt asserts, "Sinclair believed that sexual intimacy could actually hinder women in their pursuit of artistic excellence" (120). As Sinclair articulates in her novel *The Creators*, emotional and sexual detachment is necessary to produce great work. As Nina Lempriere, a great poet in her own right, says to the genius novelist Jane Holland, "' if any woman is to do anything stupendous, it means virginity.'"[210] Whereas the

[209] Sinclair, May. "A Defence of Men." *English Review*,11, July 1912, p.566.
[210] Sinclair, May. *The Creators: A Comedy*. The Century Co, 1910, p.106. Also see Battersby, Christine. *Gender and Genius: Towards a Feminine Aesthetics*. Indiana University Press, 1989, for further discussion of women and the notion of genius.

choice to be celibate might be politically fraught today, especially if one claims it as a sexual identity rather than a temporary state; for Sinclair, the practice of celibacy was a default practice, presumed if one was unmarried, as Sinclair was. Benjamin Kahan in his book *Celibacies* addresses the difficulty of thinking of celibacy as anything other than a problem, or a period of waiting for the next sexual experience.[211] Rather than lack, Kahan argues for defining celibacy as "a nongenital sexuality" (12), and that it should be differentiated from chastity: "chastity and virginity are moral categories, denoting a relation between the will and the flesh; they are not categories of sexuality" (Arnold Davidson cited in Kahan 11). Moreover, Kahan points out that suffragettes used celibacy as a tool in the fight for equality and as a means of gaining and retaining independence. As Kahan asserts, "leaders of the suffrage movement took vows of celibacy," suggesting "the deep connections between celibacy and the culture of reform" (15).[212] I find Kahan's assertion of celibacy as a sexuality useful because it cannot be reduced to a lack of sex, or "waiting to have sex," but instead offers the possibility of making sensual, and even pleasurable, choices in relation to non-sex. In addition, Kahan's discussion therefore enriches the reasons why women might choose to enjoy a "nongenital sexuality," rather than reduce them repressed spinsters or prudes.

Sinclair repeatedly explores the issue of sexual fulfillment compared with creative or spiritual fulfillment in her novels. Sinclair's engagement with the female body, sexuality, and feminism also offers a useful counterpoint to Mina Loy's approach as I discuss in chapter five. Both writers share a preoccupation with the necessity and dangers of intimate relationships, maternity, and sex. Both writers also advocate for a seismic shift of consciousness in order to achieve radical social change for women, which they see as embroiled with sex. Both Sinclair and Loy cultivate an approach that emphasizes a female-focused psychosexuality that seeks forms of freedom from societal norms and expectations. Yet their orientation to the body and sex is diametrically opposite, whereas Loy embraces and expresses sexual pleasure and shared sexual bliss as a route to a higher consciousness, Sinclair advocates for a radical disembodiment and an erotic intimacy with the non-human in order to avoid the compulsion of the libido, resulting in what Suzanne Raitt calls "a poetics of celibacy" (Raitt 109).[213] This context of celibate genius makes the deferments and hesitations of Sinclair's

[211] Kahan, Benjamin. *Celibacies: American Modernism & Sexual Life*. Duke University Press, 2013.
[212] Kahan also points out important economic reasons as to why women of Sinclair's generation might not marry: "This culture of celibacy is tied to reform because marriage legally and economically disenfranchises women. To put this differently, while middle- and upper-class women's legal and economic independence is contingent upon their being unmarried" (14).
[213] Fay Pickrem reframes Raitt's "poetics of celibacy" as a libidinal panic rather than a conscious choice, stating: "I read this recurring trope less as a conscious disinterested choice essential to creative genius than as the unconscious dictates of libidinal panic and a foundational discomfort with corporeal desire." I, on the other hand, consider it both a conscious choice - an attempt to sustain creative genius - *and* a discomfort with corporeal desire. Pickrem, Faye. "Disembodying

female protagonists less surprising. What becomes more surprising is the frequency which Sinclair deals with sexual desire and intercourse directly and without typical mid-Victorian moral judgement. In her psychological novels, for example, women are sometimes hysterical, but this is portrayed in a way that places blame on the systemic repression of sexual instincts rather than the fact that one has sexual instinct. As I will now explore in *The Three Sisters* for Sinclair, despite her belief in celibacy, her knowledge of psychoanalysis brought her to the conclusion that "ordinary people sexual frustration could be as corrosive as over-indulgence" (Raitt 110).[214]

The Three Sisters

In *The Three Sisters* (1914), Sinclair focuses on love, sexual desire, and the dangers of its repression. Each sister comes to represent a means of coping with unconscious sexual motivations as well as the psychological and emotional pressures of family, and these personality "types" are repeated across Sinclair's *oeuvre*.[215] As such, I will consider each sister as representative of a facet of Sinclair's approach to sex, sublimation, and the striving for personal freedom. *The Three Sisters* follows the fortunes of the Carteret family over the course of nine years, as they arrive and settle into a small remote village in North Yorkshire. Their father James Carteret, a small-minded provincial vicar, moves the family out of embarrassment after his youngest daughter, Alice, allowed her feelings for a young man to be known publicly. Vicar Carteret dictates the rhythm of his daughters' lives, constraining their choices and physical freedom; he is a symbol of patriarchal power and the stultifying control of orthodox religion. He considers himself a father filled with "wisdom and patience," when he is in fact a petty tyrant who oppresses his daughters, in part, because he is an "enforced, reluctant celibate" (*TS* 136). The sisters are Mary, the eldest, Gwendolyn (Gwenda), and the youngest Alice (Ally). The plot of the novel is driven by each sister's attraction to and pursuit of the one eligible bachelor in the village, Dr. Steven Rowcliffe. How each sister acknowledges and acts upon her attraction to him is a case study in psycho-sexual motivation and sublimation. Stephen and Gwenda fall in love, though it remains unspoken, but Gwenda leaves to allow Ally her opportunity to attract Stephen. In the short time Gwenda is away Stephen, believing she doesn't care for him, is seduced by Mary and marries her. On Gwenda's return, their love is rekindled but never spoken of as Gwenda refuses to betray Mary, just as she refused to betray Ally. A large portion of the novel is

Desire: Ontological Fantasy, Libidinal Anxiety and the Erotics of Renunciation in May Sinclair." *May Sinclair: Re-Thinking Bodies and Minds*. Bowler, Rebecca and Claire Drewery (eds). Edinburgh University Press, 2017, p.130.

[214] Sinclair considers the dangers of sexual abstinence more fully in *The Helpmate* (1907).

[215] Sinclair was fascinated by character "types." and wrote a book review for Jung's *Psychological Types,* see "Psychological Types." *The English Review*, 36, May 1923, pp.436-9.

taken up in exploring the misery inflicted on Gwenda, Stephen, and Mary as a consequence of mismatched partnerships. Sinclair offers an intense and claustrophobic study of the minutia and tedium of everyday life, and the damage that family dynamics – as microcosms of larger systemic suppressions – can inflict on individuals. She uses the family circle as a means by which to interrogate relationships between parents and children, women and men, and the conscious and unconscious thoughts that motivate and move us. Sinclair explores the benefits and dangers of giving in to passion, but also the dangers of sexual repression, she states: "you cannot attempt the destruction of the indestructible without some sinister result" (*SS* 120).

Constrained, by their father, by the remoteness of the village, and by the scrutiny of the town's inhabitants to the point of catatonic boredom, the sister's youthful desires are forced to find alternative outlets each according to their own personality type. Each sister reveals her essential character as they daydream of Rowcliffe. Mary is the "womanly woman" who is "sweet and good," and who "had found out long ago that silence was her strength. […]. Impossible to tell what she was thinking" (*TS* 74). Outwardly submissive, Mary is the Vicar's favorite daughter because performs womanly subservience. Gwenda, the middle sister, is a prototypical New Woman: independent, intelligent, and physically active young woman. She is sensible, forthright, and she refuses to be bullied by her father. And finally Ally, the youngest, a neurasthenic Romantic in the vein of Catherine Earnshaw of *Wuthering Heights*, who is passionate and intense, and whose body registers her desperate need for love and sexual fulfillment. Their father represents the stultifying and deadening power of patriarchal society and organized religion, the symbol of which are the 10'o clock family prayers: "He gloried in them as an expression of his power. They were a form of coercion which it seemed he could apply quite successfully to his womenkind" (*TS* 133). As they await their father's controlling power each sister channels her boredom into fantasies of Dr. Rowcliffe that reveal their psychological make-up and how each personality might respond under distress.

The extent to which each sister is aware of her unconscious feelings is key to Sinclair's valuation of them, as this indicates how far they are able to sublimate their libido (and so revealing the power of their mind). Mary thinks in terms of her gender performance, how she will act the part of a social "angel" and thereby be noticed and appreciated; she represents the quintessential Victorian woman. Her outward actions do not betray her inner motives, namely to catch her man: "'Wednesday is his day. On Wednesday I will go into the village and see all my sick people. Then I shall see him. And he will see me. He will see that I am kind and sweet and womanly.' She thought, 'That is the sort of woman that a man wants.' But she did not know what she was thinking" (*TS* 10).

Mary represents the Victorian ideal of the "Angel in the House": sweet, subservient, and seemingly selfless. Yet her true motivations are masked from her conscious awareness so that she can retain her self-regard as the Victorian angel without acknowledging her real desires. Gwenda, in contrast, thinks: "'I will go out on to the moor again. I don't care if I *am* late for Prayers. He will see me when he drives back and he will wonder who is that wild, strong girl who walks by herself on the moor at night and isn't afraid.' She thought (for she knew what she was thinking), 'I shall do nothing of the sort. I don't care whether he sees me or not. I don't care if I never see him again. I don't care'" (*TS* 10). Importantly Gwenda is aware of her desires, though she tries to deny them; she knows she wants to be seen by Rowcliffe and be appreciated for her strength, her healthy physicality, her bravery, and her mystery. These are all characteristics that forecast the change from New Woman to Modern Woman. In being self-aware, Gwenda is able to modify her behavior and not act purely from impulse. Finally Ally thinks about Steven, and her plan is active though self-destructive. She has learned that to act on her desires results in negative consequences – like her family being moved from town to the country – so to satisfy her needs, she must repress her impulses. She thinks " 'I will make myself ill. So ill that they'll *have* to send for him. I shall see him that way'" (*TS* 11). Ally can acknowledge her desires and find a means of pursuing them, but she is unable to break-out from the constraints of social norms. The means by which she is able to actualize her desire are inadequate and dangerous, but Sinclair makes clear that Ally's need to be loved is natural and not to be condemned. The narrator doesn't comment on whether Alice is fully conscious of her thoughts, but we can assume so as she must take definite action to actualize her plan. Jean Radford in her introduction to the novel suggests that each sister responds to the pressures of their circumstance in the way that she is able "Alice in neurotic illness, Gwenda in sublimation, and Mary by manipulating reality to achieve her own ends."[216]

Sinclair clearly ranks the sisters and their personalities in terms of the destruction to themselves and others. Gwenda is the prototype of Sinclair's later, more modern, heroines, and forerunner for Mary Olivier. Gwenda, like all of Sinclair's most lauded protagonists are women that are "physically robust and self-sustaining, morally pure and committed to intellectual, creative and spiritual goals, they are frequently aligned with the huntress Artemis" (Pickrem 125). They are also loyal and try to act with honor and consideration for others, yet this means that they perform acts of (often unnecessary) self-sacrifice or self-renunciation. Ally represents another type in Sinclair's fiction – the happy wife and mother – these women are happy, sane, nurturing, and are important within the pantheon of women in Sinclair's works. Reserved for special ire is the Mary figure –

[216] Radford, Jean. "Introduction." May Sinclair. *The Three Sisters*. The Dial Press, 1985, p.ix.

representative of outmoded Victorian virtue, the Victorian ideal of the "Angel in the House."[217] Such "angels" have been "trained to repression," and act "in supine adoration of the male" in which women adored men "as a god on his own hearth, and when he left it he couldn't rid himself of the superstition on his divinity."[218] Sinclair blames patriarchal society who construct and perpetuate the ideal, rather than individual women that follow it, but she still demands more and better of her modern sisters: "it is largely due to the debilitating, the disastrous influence of the Early and Mid-Victorian woman. Her willful ignorance, her sentimentalism, her sex-servility, amounted to positive vice, and could only be productive of viciousness in the unhappy males exposed to it" (*DM* 558). As Mina Loy will state in outrageous style and typography, in her "Feminist Manifesto," such women are left no choice but to become parasites upon men. Sinclair critiques the system that limits women's opportunities economically, emotionally, and sexually, and demonstrates (as Loy does) that the means of securing this marital "happy ending" forces women to lie and manipulate in order to attain it. Mary is this parasitic Angel, unable to face unpleasantness, either her own or in others. Her refusal to face reality means she masks the knowledge of her betrayal of both her sisters by taking Steven for herself. Sinclair portrays Mary's actions as villainous in its willful ignorance, she neither faces her sexual desires (as Ally does) nor sublimates them (as Gwenda does). Mary's manipulation of circumstances, and ultimate choice to marry Steven despite him being in love with Gwenda, leads her – according to Sinclair's assessment - to a degrading self-abnegation as well as the betrayal of others.[219]

Shocking though Sinclair's sexual frankness was to her audience, Sinclair advocates strongly for Ally who satisfies her thwarted libido directly, rather than by postures of goodness. First by attempting to attract Stephen, and then by taking a lover in Jim Greatorex. Ally has strong sexual instincts and her will-to-live protects her sanity by finding ways to express itself. Ally sublimates her passion for Steven into music and she signals her desires are communicated as she plays "Chopin's Grande Polonaise." She plays with her temperament "febrile and frustrate, seeking its outlet in exultant and violent sound" tearing at the instrument like "some fierce and hungry thing" (*TS* 13). In silent protest, "[s]he flung out her music through the open window into the night as a signal and

[217] In addition to May Sinclair's own, Mary's name recalls Mary, mother of God, and Mary Magdalen. It also evokes Mary Wollstonecraft, who in her *Vindication of the Rights of Women* (1792), warned of the dangers of keeping women artificially weak, as it "produces a propensity to tyrannize, and give birth to cunning, the natural opponent of strength" (Norton 174). This is a point that Sinclair underscores in her depiction of Mary Carteret.
[218] Sinclair, May. "A Defence of Men" *English Review*, 11, July 1912, 562.
[219] For Sinclair, these actions constitute a regression and a lessening of reality: "Every mean thought, every selfish passion, every sacrifice of a wider to a narrower good, is an *actual limitation of his personality*. In this deeper sense sin is unreal, for personality, self – consciousness, we found to be the source and ground of reality." "The Ethical and Religious Import of Idealism." *The New World: A Quarterly Review of Religion. Ethics and Theology (1892 – 1900)*, Dec 1893 p.702.

an appeal"; to let the Polonaise "loose thus was Alice's defiance of the house and her revenge" (*TS* 15).[220] Through the joy, and intolerable splendor of the music played with her body and passion, Alice demands that her desires be heard and allows herself to feel them. Sinclair also explores the consequences of repressing sexuality without sublimation. Dr. Rowcliffe diagnoses Ally with hysteria, yet he makes unhappiness a symptom and being happy the cure: "I don't say she's going to die. But – in the state that she's in – she might get anything and die if something isn't done to make her happy." Rowcliffe clarifies his definition of happiness: "I mean of course – to get her married" (*TS* 180). Rowcliffe's diagnosis implies that Alice's illness stems from the violent repression of her sexual impulses: "You see, she isn't ill because she's been starving herself. She's been starving herself because she's ill. The trouble is not that she starves herself – but that she has been starved" (*TS* 180). Rowcliffe condemns the cramped conditions of Ally's emotional and physical life, controlled by her Father, rather than Ally herself: "What I tried to impress on him is that she *will* go out of her mind if she's kept shut up in that old Vicarage much longer. And that she'd be all right—perfectly all right—if she was married. As far as I can make out he seems to be doing his best to prevent it. Well—in her case—that's simply criminal" (*TS* 181). Rowcliffe lays the blame for Ally's illness at the feet of the Vicar Carteret, for refusing Ally the outlet of society, of interest, of stimulation, of the company of others, and ultimately sexual satisfaction through marriage.[221] Sinclair makes clear that love and libido are natural impulses, as Gwenda and Rowcliffe agree: "there's nothing wrong with Ally, she's as good as gold" (*TS* 77).

Ally has an affair with Jim Greatorex, who hears and responds to her musical appeal, and becomes pregnant with his child. Their initial union is facilitated through art – he sings as she plays the piano – and they are joined in the joy of music. Their relationship is founded upon a shared ecstasy: "[i]t was essentially the same ecstasy; only, on Alice's face it was more luminous, more conscious, and at the same time more abandoned" (*TS* 227).[222] Sinclair suggests that it is the repression of Ally's natural sexual energy, by her father and her internalized status as a middle-class woman, that is to blame for her illness and her securing of her own cure which results in pregnancy out of wedlock: "[s]he had yielded to his fascination partly through weakness, partly through

[220] Gwenda sees Ally as a victim, and fears to become like her: " Gwenda reveals her compassion but also her own personal fear when she thinks of Ally: "She looked on little Ally as the victim of a malign and tragic tendency, the fragile vehicle of an alien and overpowering impulse, Little Ally was doomed. It wasn't her fault if she was made like that" (*TS* 58). Gwenda's strength is her mind and her ability to face reality straight on: "She dreaded the secret gates, the dreamy labyrinths, the poisonous air of the Paradise of Fools" (*TS* 146).

[221] The Vicar Carteret is an "enforced, reluctant celibate" who attempts to deceive people into thinking he is an ascetic, but his "red mouth revealed its profound and secret sensuality," hence this unconscious revenge in keeping his daughters from marriage and therefore emotional and sexual satisfaction (*TS* 136).

[222] The ecstasy that Alice experiences takes her outside of herself, including her social circle. The narrator notes "Ally's social self had grown rigid in the traditions of her class, and she was aware of the unsuitability of her intimacy with Jim Greatorex; but disaster had numbed her once poignant sense of it (*TS* 250).

defiance, partly in sheer, healthy self-assertion of her suffering will and her frustrated sense"(*TS* 250). For Ally, the wisdom of her body saves her from a state of extended hysteria and madness. Greatorex and Ally marry and have children, creating a reality of shared intimacy and love. Ally is cured of her hysteria and morbid fears through marriage and motherhood, "In the fine sanity of happiness she showed herself as good as gold." (*TS* 367). Like Loy, Sinclair asserts the healthy necessity of motherhood for some women, if not all. As Raitt suggests Sinclair makes clear that "celibacy is not a uniformly good thing, especially for women who aren't geniuses" (142).

Gwenda is one of Sinclair's women with genius - intelligent, independent, strong, and whose mind and will are her own. The Sinclairian genius is a figure that struggle, suffers, and sublimates her libidinal energies for her values and thereby, according to Sinclair's philosophy, becomes a spiritually superior being because of her struggle. Rowcliffe compares her to the virgin huntress, Artemis: "She flashed by like a huntress, like Artemis, carrying the young moon on her forehead. From the turn of her head and even the falling of her feet he felt an unconsciousness of his existence" (*TS* 40). Gwenda is associated with the moon on the moor that she loves. The obvious connection is that Gwenda is a virgin and inaccessible as the goddess, but to Gwenda the moon is also a symbol of beauty and freedom. She watches the moon and rhapsodizes upon the vision, "Something's calling her across the sky, but the mist holds her…She's fighting the wind. And she goes – she goes!" (*TS* 159). As Gwenda's gaze is heavenward she fails to see the gaze of the earthly lover. Because Gwenda's energy is guided towards the celestial bodies rather than sexual bodies, Steven is resentful: "She shared the earth's silence and the throbbing passion of the earth as the orbed moon swung free. And in her absorption, her estranging ecstasy, Rowcliffe at last found something inimical." (*TS* 157). Gwenda's happiness is not dependent on him, or anyone else, but comes from within: "Gwenda's joy was pure and profound and sufficient to itself. He gathered that it had been with her before he came and that it would remain with her after he had gone" (*TS* 158). Part of the importance of this passage is that it evokes the symbol of the moon in Jungian terms. Sinclair quotes Jung in suggesting that symbols have the purpose of redirecting the libido towards higher ends: "their purpose is to lead the useless, regressive, incestuous libido over the bridges of symbolism into rational activity, and through that transform the obscure compulsion of the libido working up from the unconscious into social communion and higher moral endeavor (Jung cited in *SS* 120). Thus, readers are invited to follow the moon's heavenly movement rather than an earthly union.

It is once again to joy, this time a shared joy, that the characters turn to persist through the misery of life. Despite being married to Mary, Steven is really in love with Gwenda and Gwenda loves him, though both try to repress their feelings. They walk together and it is these snatched

moments Gwenda draws on to sustain herself through the "immensity of her tragedy" (*TS* 307). Their chaste but emotionally intense meetings belong to another reality "they belonged to another scale of feeling and another order of reality" (*TS* 306). In these moments Gwenda lives with a greater intensity, "through this intensity she drew the strength to go on, to endure the unendurable with joy" (*TS* 307). In a Spinozoan sense, Gwenda has an increased capacity for action (survival) due to joy contributing to her *conatus*. As they walk one evening, they have a communal experience of this lived intensity through a shared vision of the Reality behind a flowering thorn tree: "they stood enchanted in a great stillness and clearness and a piercing beauty" (*TS* 321). Both see the mystic vision and experience "the subtle and mysterious joy" of the thorn in bloom, which offers a "passion [that] was as distant and as pure as ecstasy" (*TS* 321). For Gwenda it is enough to have shared this mysterious vision which creates a kind of mystical marriage, sanctified by the Reality behind the tree.[223] But Steven is moved to desire, the "pure" passion moving him to physical, sexual passion. For Sinclair this is no surprise as women have "a profounder feeling, a finer moral splendor, a superior sex virtue" and "that in matters of sex feeling and of sex morality man (let us admit it at once) is different from and inferior to woman."[224] Pickrem points out that Gwenda longs for Steven, but under the rubric of sublimation, "their communion must be without touch: a meeting of minds and spirits, not hearts and bodies. The thorn trees become the cathected object through which their souls can come together in disembodied consummation …Libidinal pleasure is not foreclosed, but sexual arousal is to be delivered via Gwenda's idealist stance into transcendental penetration" (129). As Sydney Kaplan suggests, the life of the mind and spirit is often preferable to Sinclair's female protagonists as opposed to the traditional roles of lover/wife/mother: "that old life and its conflicts were primarily related to sex: sexual role, sexual desire, and sexual conditioning. 'Reality' must be a going beyond sex" (71).

Sinclair suggests that Gwenda is a superior figure to her sisters in part because she is able to sublimate her desires rather than be ruled entirely by them. We are told that Gwenda's thwarted love for Rowcliffe is directed into reading, walking, and thinking: "her woman's passion, forced inward, sustained her with an inward peace, an inward exaltation. And in this peace, this exaltation, it

[223] The Hawthorn was also the wood of the May Day tree, celebrating the return of spring and is associated with the return of spring which mirrors the sexual union of male and female. Jane Gifford in *The Wisdom of Trees* states: "The beautiful white flowers give cause for celebration of nature's capacity for renewed life and love, and for the wonders of lovemaking, conception, and childbirth" symbolizing the return of spring and the fruitful male-female unity (n.p.).

[224] Sinclair, May. "A Defence of Men" *English Review*,11, July 1912, p. 559. Sinclair believes that because of women's reproductive function "that consecration of woman's womanhood to suffering, that fore-ordained sacrifice of her flesh, that perpetual payment in blood and tears" means that due to nature's choice of women as "the sex that pays" this means they are morally superior in matters of sex. She goes on to say that "Spirituality, so difficult for [man] to come by, has been positively thrust upon woman. Born of her sacrificial destiny, it has been expected of her, nourished in her, guarded by all the sanctions of her life. She has had time for it, all the time of all the ages" (560).

became one with her passion for the place" (*TS* 339). Part of the subtle but biting critique of the book is that Gwenda, despite refusing marriage as means of escaping her family situation, is still forced into the role of caregiver for her father. Women are trapped by their affective labor: "she, who was born for the wild open air and for youth and strength and freedom, would be shut up in that house and tied to that half-paralyzed, half-imbecile old man forever. It was damnable" (*TS* 307). Yet Gwenda also chooses to sacrifice herself in this way, her intellect and vitality is enslaved by her passion; this time a passion of pity: "She suffered from the incessant drain on her pity; …Pity was a dangerous solvent in which her will sank and was melted away" (*TS* 337). For Sinclair, like Spinoza, to be rationally aware of your motivations, to understand the causes, to choose things that increase your ability to act is an important form of mental and spiritual freedom, even when other forms of freedom fail. Gwenda finds in her relationship with Steven and in her relationship with nature, the power and freedom to resist the demands placed upon her by within the domestic sphere, for "she shook off the slave-woman who held her down, [and] her inner life moved with the large rhythm of the seasons and was soaked in the dyes of the visible world; and the visible world, passing into her inner life, took on its radiance and intensity. Everything that happened and that was great and significant in its happening, happened there*"* (*TS* 339). Led by necessity, Gwenda develops an inner life that keeps her sane and healthy and which compensates, somewhat, for the responsibilities that she cannot escape[225] Sinclair's heroines are, most often, childless intellectuals that obtain higher levels of consciousness and thereby challenge the Christian idealization of motherhood.

The Joy of Detachment

To close I will return to Mary Olivier's final, and most intense experiences of joy, and discuss her final actions that enable her to achieve emotional and affective freedom. Mary Olivier pursues a dissociated joy that consciously uncouples her from all intimacy and desire. For Mary, to have a body which registers affects is to be vulnerable. To have affects is also to be affected - to be moved or changed as well as acted on, influenced or moved. So, to be truly free, especially in her cramped and constrained relationship with her mother in Morfe, she seeks to escape into the blackness which is a union of pure Mind and Will. Sinclair depicts Mary's union with the darkness as a slipping beyond the nets of the body, into the pure consciousness of union with the absolute. She experiences this as a form of awakening, an epistemological revelation. Mary's revelation moves

[225] Like Mary Olivier, she finally turns to philosophy to quiet her heart, mind, and body, "lured on the quest of Ultimate Reality, and found that there was nothing like Thought to keep you from thinking. She took to metaphysics as you take to dram-drinking. She must have strong, heavy stuff that drugged her brain. And when she found that she could trust her intellect she set it deliberately to fight her passion". Yet "After seven years her heart still beat at Steven's coming."

her from grief and pain into peace. She meditates upon her desire to not feel until darkness envelops her and hushes her bodily sensations and her desire. Sinclair describes it as a kind of spiritual poetry: "there was a sort of rhythm in the blackness that caught you and took you into its peace. When the thing stopped you could almost hear the click" (*MO* 300). Mary interprets this as a quality inherent to the blackness itself rather than a feeling located in herself, precipitated by her emotional shift, "it took you into *its* peace" (*MO* 300). It is significant that Mary wishes to give up her desire - she wants to not want. She prays not for guidance or a change of external circumstances, but rather an escape from her own emotional state. The detachment from emotion, especially desire, brings joy: "She had an exquisite security and clarity and joy" (*MO* 300). Mary does this twice: first, to give up her desire for her one trip away from her mother so that she can remain and look after her sick brother; second, to give up the man she loves so that she can look after her sick mother. It is this latter renunciation that can be particularly challenging for a contemporary reader to accept. To work so hard to cultivate and protect your Self, only to give it up to a union with blackness, no matter how joyful, seems counterproductive. This can seem troubling to modern readers, a self-sacrifice whose outcome keeps Mary bound to the constraints of her life. Yet, Sinclair, via Mary, argues that there is something greater and more lasting than romantic love – mystical union with Reality.

Paradoxically, passion is both the thing one must let go of and the thing that provides evidence for the existence of God. Mary uses her feeling of "perfect happiness" after giving up Richard, her lover, as evidence for the correctness of the decision. The joy serves as affective evidence for the existence of something greater than her desires: "giving Richard up and still being happy. That was something you couldn't possibly have done yourself…all at once, making that incredible, supernatural happiness and peace out of nothing at all" (*MO* 435). She speaks to Richard of her Willing in order to stop wanting him: "it makes you absolutely happy…It's how you know…That's there's something there. That it's absolutely real" (*MO* 422). Giving up Richard becomes part of the circular logic that justifies giving up Richard. Raitt points out that Sinclair herself was suspicious of this model of knowledge: "Sinclair did not like the idea that religion might rest on feeling. Unused to trusting her own intuitions, suspicious of the sorrow which had been so large a part of her emotional life, Sinclair wanted to see evidence of, rather than to merely feel, the existence of God" (61). Metaphysical uncertainty, for Sinclair, is a necessary condition of living. Mary, at the close of the novel, stands and "shivers between certainty and uncertainty" (*MO* 437). Mary says that the oneness with the Absolute tested her experience, her "ultimate passion," and she felt the "adventure" of doubt (*MO* 437). Sinclair writes that the grace of god is "the miracle of perfect happiness, with all its queerness, its divine certainty and uncertainty" (*MO* 434). Uncertainty is a

necessary part of belief for Sinclair. Logical probability and experiences with the Absolute can never make one certain. At the very moment that Mary is most certain, most Perfectly Happy, readers are cast into the most doubt about the veracity of Mary as a reliable narrator. As readers we can never be certain of the veracity of Mary's experiences, we can only search for our truth by reading attentively and by deciding based on the evidence before us. Sinclair places us in the same position of Mary. Like Mary, we are on our own.

As the novel closes Sinclair performs the final intimate untangling of the novel – between Mary and the reader. As the book ends, Mary's words, "They had all gone and yet she was happy" (*MO* 436), applies to her family, lover, friends, and as we run out of pages – to readers. Sinclair performs this disconnection by being less intimate with readers. We are offered fewer and fewer details from Mary's mind and larger gaps of time are introduced. For example, at the start of the final section Mary has travelled for a year, that "ecstasy of space" is dismissed in one sentence. Readers are being closed out, as Richard was. There are more instances of the second person "you" and third person "she," reminding readers that there is a narrator who is controlling access to the mind and memories of the protagonist. The difference in readerly intimacy can be illustrated by looking at Mary's first experience of her "secret joy" as a child, contrasted to her "perfect happiness" as an adult. Mary's secret joy is Imagistic, colorful, rich, and specific: "The queer white light everywhere, like water thin and clear. Wide fields, flat and still, like water, flooded with thin, clear light; grey earth, shot delicately with green blades, shimmering" (*MO* 57). The experience is rich and multisensorial. In comparison, the philosophical and cerebral description of Mary's final ecstatic vision is sparse and abstract: "She saw that the beauty of the tree was its real life, and that its real life was in her real self and that her real self was God" (*MO* 430). As Mary's mind becomes more abstract, less sensorial, so the form reflects Mary's changing consciousness. The language, and Mary, is less bogged down in detail and embodiment of life – Mary has more control of her mind. The consequence of this control and jettisoning of sensory detail, is that readers are set adrift without the anchoring of Mary's consciousness.[226]

Mary Olivier doesn't have a happy ending, in part because it doesn't end; rather it stops, right in the middle of things - *perfici in medio*. Sinclair's refusal of a traditional 'happy ending' forces readers' to confront how their own desires for fictional norms of happiness that perpetuate gender stereotypes, and that non-normative scripts of happiness engender affective resistance from

[226] The text is set up so that if you give the rapture at the end the benefit of the doubt, then you will credit her detachment; because you will believe that peace comes from this caring without wanting. If you do not believe Mary's report that you can be detached and happy, you will be irritated with the text and therefore be alienated from identification. Either way, Sinclair manipulates a readerly detachment.

readers.[227] Sinclair's ending reveals the stark social reality of women's existence at the turn of the 20th century. Sinclair demonstrates in her psychological novels that being free and married might be impossible for women, given their position in society. However, she proposes the possibility of affective and mental freedom if one cultivates intelligence and a strong will. Sinclair shows that happiness can be a constraint on women; but that those women who are happy differently have the possibility to resist emotional oppression and survive the cramped conditions of their daily lives. Sinclair offers an unworldly perfect happiness as a possibility of completion of female development given the constraints women are under.[228] Whilst this solution might appear to maintain the status quo, Sinclair's portrayals of her protagonists' "real" lives demonstrates the extremity that it is necessary in order to be free and happy. Mary, like Stephen at the end of *Portrait*, believes she has concluded something, which is reinforced by the conclusion of the novel. However, it is clear for the reader that Mary's development is not finished.[229] Despite Mary's own sense of a concluding affirmation in her experience of joyous Reality: "If it never came again I should remember," the ending is not closed (*MO* 437). In the final pages Mary's life isn't over, she is not dead. The close offers a potential for another becoming, another oscillation of questioning and discovery. Like Mary, readers are left "shivering between certainty and uncertainty." May Sinclair extends the reader a challenge to create the ending to our satisfaction from the perspective on reality that we have. How readers react to Mary's self-reported "perfect happiness" reveals what readers value. Perfect Happiness might be insufficient, but Sinclair suggests it might also be necessary. Sinclair's rich depiction of women's emotional reality, including their relation to happiness, is one of the multiple reasons Sinclair's work, so long ignored, has earned a place at the center of the emerging affective history of literary Modernism.

[227] Despite the pedagogic element to the 'letting go' of Richard in order to claim a more 'Real' relationship to the Absolute, the irony is that readers might find it very hard to 'let go' of Mary's sensual, physical, detailed world and take the cerebral happiness in response. May Sinclair has devoted her novel to creating a vibrant and emotional character who we are invested in, and Mary's desire to not 'want' does not necessarily reflect a similar lack of 'want' in the reader. Yet I suggest this is Sinclair's parting modernist-idealist gesture – to demand the reader 'let go.'

[228] By calling her feeling "perfect" Sinclair is alluding to the idea that it contains more action, more *conatus*, and is also more real: "By reality and perfect I understand the same thing" (Spinoza, Baruch. "Nature and Origin of the Mind." *Ethics*, definition 6, 46 2D6)

[229] I appreciate Christine Battersby's point regarding the close of the novel, she describes the end of the novel as "an open-ended conclusion – one that raises as a possibility the dangers of perverting Spinozism into a philosophy of renunciation, as opposed to a philosophy of affirmation" (2002 119).

CHAPTER FOUR

The Capacity and Capaciousness of Joy in James Joyce

"That's joyful I can feel. Never have written it. Why? My joy is other joy. But both are joys. Yes, joy it must be." Leopold Bloom, *Ulysses*

"He was no saturnine artificer contriving devices. But one of life's celebrants, in bad circumstances cracking good jokes, foisting upon ennuis and miseries his comic vision." Richard Ellmann

In his Paris Notebook of 1903, in preparation for writing what would become *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, Joyce writes explicitly of the connection between aesthetics and emotion, comedy and joy: "An improper art aims at exciting the feeling of desire but the feeling which is proper to comic art is the feeling of joy." [230] Joy, unlike desire, is 'proper' to art, because it offers completion rather than lack; it is static rather than kinetic (or cathartic). Comedy gives us something, leaves us replete, and so it elicits joy. According to Joyce, "desire, therefore, can only be excited in us by a comedy (a work of comic art) which is not sufficient in itself inasmuch as it urges us to seek something beyond itself; but a comedy (a work of comic art) which does not urge us to seek anything beyond itself excites in us the feeling of joy" (*CW* 144). In the assertion that joy offers an energetic and emotional resource, Joyce is akin to Yeats; however, the means of exploring and experiencing joy are very different. Yeats selects peak experiences that carry the greatest intensity, offering symbols and images that will carry emotional power to the reader. Joyce, on the other hand, immerses the reader in the details and detritus of everyday life, overwhelming the senses with accumulative and associative significance. The joy is also in the joke. The joke is in the 'Dublin' - or doubling, the multiple plays of meaning - in the capaciousness of the text. Joyce argues for the superiority of comedy over tragedy on the grounds that "comedy makes for joy and tragedy for sorrow, and that the sense of deprivation is imperfect, and therefore, [Joyce] implies inferior to the sense of possession" (Ellmann in *CW* 142). Comedy and joy give; tragedy and sorrow take away. The joy is not merely in the pleasure or laughter. It is to be found in the ungraspable enormity of the texts Joyce produced, the unflinching corporeality of the bodies he represents, the multi-directional meanings that never settle, and the multiplicity and complexity of relationships – between the characters, between words, words and bodies, bodies and meanings. Ultimately, across his writing, Joyce's art is to engage with life, and it is in the forcefulness with which Joyce writes life that we might discover joy. In one sense, then, in choosing to write comedies, Joyce is choosing joy as his

[230] Joyce, James. *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. John Paul Riquelme (ed). New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007. Hereafter referred to in-text as *P*. Mason, Ellsworth and Richard Ellmann. "Introduction to 'Aesthetics.'" *James Joyce: The Critical Writings*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1959, p. 142. Hereafter referred to in-text as *CW*.

object, and joy in Joyce, as I will demonstrate, is intimately connected to life in the Spinozan sense of increasing capacity and perseverance.

Passion, emotion, and affect are all integral to Joyce's comic vision though they have been explored little in Joycean scholarship. These states offer an important means of thinking about the construction and destruction of the sovereign subject, in particular the artist-subject and the modernist artwork. There is a progression across Joyce's work, a dynamic shift from the *passions* of young Stephen Dedalus, to the richer and more embodied *emotions* of Bloom, to the shifting forces of *affect* and fluxing subjectivity of *Finnegans Wake*. As the focus across Joyce's work changes from passion, to emotion, to affect, so there is a corresponding disintegration of subjectivity. There is a movement from the *Künstlerroman* where a young man is striving for self-mastery and is attempting to construct himself as a self-contained sovereign subject in *Portrait*, that shifts to the multiple perspectives and many forms of self-hood in *Ulysses* - the form revealing the forces that impress upon the bodies and minds of seeming-individuals. Joyce's notion of joy changes across the three texts and demands different orientations from the reader, ending in an affective assemblage in *Finnegans Wake* that emphasizes the joy of encyclopaedic capacity that draws the reader into co-creating those potentialities.

Terminology: Passion, Emotion, Affect

At its most basic, this chapter demonstrates the importance of feeling in Joyce's work. I differentiate between passions, emotions, and affects, though all three occur within each of the texts, because each text places greater emphasis on one over the others. In *Portrait*, Joyce emphasizes passions, or their lack, to indicate the youthful, uncontrolled body and desires of a young, emerging artist attempting to harness his energies for creative ends. In *Ulysses* the emphasis is on emotion and feeling. *Ulysses* is, in part, an exploration of relationships between aspects of self, between couples, between friends, and between more abstracted notions of city, country, religion, duty, death and so on. There is also an emphasis on the body: how does flesh fare in these conditions and what is the relationship between flesh and world? I do touch on affect in the *Ulysses* section in order to consider the way that affect is a force that constitutes relationships and moves bodies (through emotion) into motion. Finally, I consider the affectivity of the language in and the experience of reading *Finnegans Wake* and offer some thoughts on how readers might approach the novel affectively. It is useful, then, to offer a brief (if incomplete) definition of these terms.

Broadly speaking a passion is an intense emotion which Adam Potkay suggests has a cognitive component that distinguishes it from sensations or moods.[231] A passion overthrows reason and registers strongly within the body. Though the person subject to the 'fit' of passion is aware of the intense emotion, she may not have the presence of mind to articulate it until it has passed. Anthony Cuda in *The Passions of Modernism* emphasizes the suffering and passivity integral to passions. [232] The etymology of *passio (Latin)* means "to suffer" and is also linked to "patient," signifying the "patience" necessary when suffering at the mercy of passions. Certainly, passion goes beyond the conscious control of the individual and, to this extent, one is passive, but I would also suggest that passion can feel both overwhelming *and* empowering; we might think of a 'towering passion' that moves us to action.

Jonathan Flatley makes a useful distinction between affect and emotion: "Where *emotion* suggests something that happens inside and tends towards outward expression, *affect* indicates something relational and transformative. One *has* emotions; one is affected *by* people or things."[233] We might think of emotion as a form of feeling that has found its way into consciousness, is recognized, and thus can be expressed in words. Affects on the other hand, are forces of modification. To be affected is to be changed or moved in some way by the impact of an encounter with something, whether a subject, an object, an idea, or an emotion. Gregg and Seigworth, in *The Affect Theory Reader*, define affect as "the name we give to those forces – visceral forces beneath, alongside, or generally *other than* conscious knowing."[234] These visceral and vital forces are registered upon and within a body, and "can serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought and extension" (*ATR* 1). Affect is relational; it is the complex connection and continuous process of becoming otherwise, which is co-created between a body and the world. Yet bodies are not simply defined by blood and ouns, to borrow a phrase from Buck Mulligan, but rather an extension of body into world and world into body, a reciprocal becoming. It is important to note, as Teresa Brennan does, that affects "are social in origin but biological and physical in effect."[235] One of the ongoing issues in affect studies is one with which Joyce was intimately familiar: how to not simply *represent* the body in language but how to *embody* language?

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[231] Potkay, Adam. *The Story of Joy: From the Bible to Late Romanticism.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
[232] Cuda, Anthony. *The Passions of Modernism: Eliot, Yeats, Woolf, and Mann*. University of South Carolina Press, 2010.
[233] Flatley *Jonathan. Affective Mapping: Melancholia and the Politics of Modernism.* Harvard University Press, 2008, p. 12.
[234] Gregg, Melissa & Gregory J. Seigworth (Eds.) "An Inventory of Shimmers" *The Affect Theory Reader*. Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2010, p. 1. Hereafter referred to in-text as *ATR*.
[235] Brennan, Teresa. *The Transmission of Affect*. Cornell University Press, 2004, p.3.

Comedy and Joy

Joy, according to a young Joyce, is the 'proper' feeling evoked by good comedy, and yet comedy does not always feel joyful, and modernist comedy in particular can produce pain before pleasure. In a letter to Joyce regarding *Ulysses*, his brother Stanislaus articulates the difference between comedy and reading pleasure: "There is many a laugh, but hardly one happy impression."[236] In part Stanislaus is correct; happiness is not explicit in *Ulysses* or Joyce's other work. Few find happiness in the objects that society dictates will bring happiness: marriage, job, money, status; but there is joy in Joyce, though it performs a different function from happiness. In fact, joy and its sisters, bliss, rapture, and ecstasy, are all to be found across Joyce's work as a form of pointilliste-style emotional highlight, a highlight that often prefigures darker disappointments and thereby increases the intensity of the emotional 'fall,' but also a commitment to reawaken. Pleasure in Joyce, as Laura Frost explains, is often an 'unpleasurable' experience. In Frost's conception, unpleasure is not the opposite of pleasure but its modification. She draws on Freud's notion of unlust in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle,* which is characterized by "gratification attained through tension, obstacles, delay, convolution, and pain, as opposed to accessible, direct satisfaction." [237] 'Difficult' modernist pleasure, Frost argues, is often positioned in direct contrast to "passive and corporeal pleasures" evoked by emerging mass entertainment such as the cinema (19). She states, "the hallmarks of modernism – including fragmentation, disjunction, and irony – are strategies that demand interpretive work from the reader" (Frost 20). This means that "modernist writers ask their readers not just to tolerate but also to embrace discomfort, confusion, and hard cognitive labor," and I would add, hard emotional labor (Frost 6). To enjoy Joyce, one must work for it. I discuss the more emotionally and affective inflected reading labor that is necessary in order to move towards joy in the *Finnegans Wake* section of this chapter. As I will argue throughout the chapter, part of the work of reading Joyce, of accessing the pleasure – often via comedic moments – is not cerebral but corporeal, demanding attention to the physical as well as intellectual aspects of both the characters and reader. So that high and low art, and high and low comedy are entangled and are made less, not more, distinct.

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[236] Letter from Stanislaus Joyce to James Joyce, dated August 7th 1924, cited in Ellmann, Richard. *James Joyce*. 2nd Edition. Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 578. Referred to in text as Ellmann throughout.

[237] Frost, Laura. *The Problem with Pleasure: Modernism and Its Discontents.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2013, 6-7. Joyce makes multiple kinds of demands upon the reader. In *Ulysses,* for example, he challenges the reader with themes such as sexual desires, including masturbation and adultery, or bodily functions such as defecation or menstruation; intellectual demands in 'Proteus'; formal demands in 'Oxen of the Sun' with the tour de force across the development of English literature; imaginative demands in 'Circe'. As Frost argues, this marks Joyce as a quintessential modernist and indicates the pedagogic impulse behind the difficulty of the text.

Joyce creates comedy from everyday life and utilizes commodious forms of pleasure – high and low – that in turn evoke a broad range of responses from the reader. Joycean comedy is just as likely to feel awkward, embarrassing, disgusting (during Bloom's bowel movements in "Calypso" for instance); or petty, guilty, mean (in the sharp observations of the Bar Fly in "Cyclops"); or frustrating and bewildering (in the banter of "Oxen of the Sun" or reading *Finnegans Wake*). This emotional variety contributes to Joyce's texts cultivating an encyclopaedic capacity in the reader, which I will discuss in more detail later in the chapter. In a recent special issue of *Critical Inquiry*, Lauren Berlant and Sianne Ngai consider the impact and affects of comedy today. They speculate, that part of the enduring power of comedy is its exploration and transgression of boundaries, making it highly capacious and labile: "Perhaps, in addition to its swarming effect or external action on other genres, there is something internal to comedy—maybe its capacity to hold together a greater variety of manifestly clashing or ambiguous affects— that makes its boundaries so uniquely ambiguous."[238] The shifting status of what is funny (or not funny) depends on cultural context, social mores, and one's own positionality. Yet comedy can be dangerous because, as Berlant and Ngai point out, the funny often trips over the unfunny or can look identical to it (234). Through Joyce's shifting narratorial position, the 'us' and 'them' can change depending on the chapter. For example, at the beginning of "Cyclops" the sharp banter of the Good Old Boys at Barney Kiernan's is witty, fast-paced, colloquial. Readers can find themselves amused and attracted by the raconteurial display and positioned as appreciative auditors to the "says I" Bar Fly. This laughter-reaction can clash with feelings brought into being by belatedly recognizing the anti-Semitic comments that are laced throughout:

> Circumcised? says Joe.
>
> Ay, says I. A bit of the top. […] Ay, says I. How the mighty have fallen! […] Jesus, I had to laugh at the little jewy getting his shirt out. *He drinks me my teas. He eats me my sugars. Because he no pay me my moneys?*
>
> (*U* 12. 19-20,24,30-33, italics original)

The anti-Semitism and Irish nationalism escalate as the chapter progresses, and as such it is easier to judge who or what is acceptable. But this earlier comedic exchange blurs the boundaries between funny and unfunny, thus disrupting clear definitions of comedy and also forcing readers to reflect on their relation and responsibility in the reproduction of what they wish to consider acceptable.[239] Or

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[238] Berlant, Lauren and Sianne Ngai. "Comedy has Issues" *Critical Inquiry* 43, 4, 2017, pp. 238.

[239] This kind of uncomfortable recognition and implication also occurs in "Ithaca" when Stephen sings the anti-Semitic song "Sir Hugh, or the Jew's Daughter" to Bloom, especially if the reader has closely identified with Stephen. Berlant and Ngai point out that the both aesthetic judgments and comedy "recall us to what is shared [and not shared] in our everyday practices" (223).

as Berlant and Ngai explain, as comedy always crosses lines, " it helps us figure out what lines we desire or can bear" (235). This co-implication and intimacy between text and reader is what Joyce calls in *Finnegans Wake*, having "two thinks at a time" (503.7).

Joyce's comedy is intimately entangled with competing feelings, fraught with sometimes guilty pleasures; for example, readers are placed in positions of voyeur as Bloom masturbates in "Nausicca," and are subject to his pleasurable submission in "Circe." This contrasts with Henri Bergson's suggestion in his essay *Laughter: A Definition of the Comic* that the "*absence of feeling*" is fundamental to laughter. [240] Comedy, he claims, could not produce its effects unless it were received by a calm soul: "Indifference is its natural environment, for laughter has no greater foe than emotion" (4, italics in original). One must be a disinterested spectator to find the farce of life funny, whereas being deeply invested in and sympathetic to life makes laughter impossible. This seems to be borne out in the figure of Leopold Bloom, who is endearing, loveable, frustrating, deeply curious about the world, and sympathetic and sincere; but he himself is not funny – perhaps, because he is not cruel. It is through Joyce's ironic distance that we often laugh *at* Bloom, rarely with him. Yet, as the example above suggests, to laugh at Bloom might be to align oneself with the drinkers of Barney Kiernan's bar, so that ironic distance is interrogated for its intimacy to cruelty and hate. Bergson also suggests that laughter must always have an echo, it is always "the laughter of a group" real or imaginary (6). Joyce uses laughter to make visible these lines of power and pleasure. Whilst Joyce's notion of the emotional stasis of joy chimes with Bergson's distant laughter, Joyce's rare comic aesthetic was to hold in tension a deep engagement with life alongside an amused detachment. Joyce's texts introduce multiple perspectives, focalizing different bodies and their fleshy experiences, shifting narrators, and telescoping between distant perspectives and extreme close-ups. Joyce's readers are never afforded the privilege of being the amused, distant unemotional Bergsonian spectator. In Joyce's comedies the emotion, so detrimental to comedy according to Bergson, must be negotiated alongside the irony. Pleasure and un-, laughter and joy, cruelty and compassion are all part of Joyce's comedic aesthetic. The joy is in the joke, the joke and the joy can be found in cultivating the capacity of capaciousness and the comedic confusion of feeling.

[240] Bergson, Henri. *Laughter: An Essay on the Comic*. Trans. C. Brereton & F. Rothwell. Macmillan and Co, 1913, p. 2.

Aesthetic Feelings

The artist, Joyce famously wrote in *Portrait*, "like the God of the creation, remains within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his fingernails" (*P* 252). Impersonality and the cultivation of indifference was central to Stephen's articulation of the ideal artist's position, but what is often overlooked is that emotion also becomes a means of verification for the successful artwork. As discussed in the introduction with reference to T.S. Eliot, impersonality, in fact, does not equate to unemotional or cold dispassion. Stephen begins his aesthetic philosophy with his own set of privileged 'proper' aesthetic emotions, the ultimate being dramatic emotion. Dramatic emotion is close to the tragic emotion of Aristotle, one that is arresting – static.[241] Stasis thus suggests an arresting of emotion, that art can create a momentary cessation of the constant current of emotion. This implicitly suggests the ability to control or have willpower over emotions, suggesting a hierarchy of mind or will over the body. For Stephen, proper art evokes proper emotion which results in a capturing of attention: "The mind is arrested and raised above desire and loathing" (*P* 180). Improper art, on the other hand, which Stephen calls "pornographical" or "didactic" (*P* 180), can excite a purely physical response such as desire. The effect of proper art is affective and registers upon the mind-body of the viewer, and is accompanied by certain emotions (joy, terror, pity) if the artwork is successful. Joyce depicts both Stephen's desire for this form of aesthetic elevation, but also shows Stephen's failure to achieve it, as his art is too passionate.

Stephen's attachment to the concept of stasis suggests an anxiety, reflected in the wider cultural consciousness, a worry about being moved without conscious volition. Georg Simmel summarized this anxiety in "The Metropolis and Mental Life," (1903): "The deepest problems of modern life derive from the claim of the individual to preserve the autonomy and individuality of his existence in the face of overwhelming social forces, of historical heritage, of external culture, and of the technique of life."[242] To be unmoved, unemotional, static is linked to the need to be free from all constraints including emotional labor. The anxiety of being ruled over, even by emotions, is acute for Stephen and raises anxieties about the autonomy of the individual, especially the 'artist.' Joyce

[241] In many conceptions of emotion, to be static might mean it ceases to be an emotion. Philosophers of emotion as diverse as Spinoza and William James conceive of emotions and affects as the energetic movement from one state to another. Movement, not stasis, is fundamental to emotions. So, to crave stasis might also be to crave the end of emotions.
[242] Simmel, Georg. "The Metropolis and Mental Life" (1903) *Modernism: An Anthology of Sources and Documents*, edited by Kolocontroni, Vassiliki et al, The University of Chicago Press, 1998, p. 51.

differentiates between active desire, which causes unrest and emotion, from joy, which registers within the body and mind differently:

> Desire, as I have said, is the feeling which urges us to go to something, but joy is the feeling which the possession of some good excites in us. Desire, the feeling which an improper art seeks to excite in the way of comedy, differs it will be seen, from joy. For desire urges us from rest that we may possess something, but joy holds us in rest so long as we possess something (*CW* 144).

Desire, as Lacan would later theorize, always implies lack. Joy, as I use it, on the other hand is not simply *jouissance*, but rather a different state and category of feeling. As Joyce suggests, one is arrested by joy: paused, at rest, momentarily replete.[243] This form of joy is a pleasure achieved, a desire sated, and so joy is linked to pleasure, not desire in Joyce. Rather than escape into a more pleasant emotion, or flounder in overwhelming passion, or luxuriate in emotional depths – Stephen's ideal art stalls, stops, or arrests. It demands the reader's undivided attention. In that state the artwork is elevated above the physical, beyond the temporal, into the eternal – even if the feeling is experienced only temporarily.

Joyce's sketching of an aesthetic theory and Stephen's articulation of one in *Portrait* are positions taken against important contemporaneous explorations of self and mind.[244] Questions about perception, experience, and self, in addition to the 'proper' evidence were debated by philosophers, emerging psychologists, and artists. Joyce claims that intellectual and perceptual arrest is necessary in order to see beauty, and that joy enables beauty to be properly seen: "for beauty is a quality of something seen but terror and pity and joy are states of mind" (*CW* 145). Joyce takes an unusual stance insisting that beauty is not merely in the eye of the beholder, but is a property of the artwork, and thereby he refuses solipsism, or the primacy of the impression of the experiencing artist/critic over the artwork. In differentiating between beauty that is a quality to be seen and joy as a state of mind that both results from and aids in the seeing, Joyce implies that it is the *relations between* the art and subject that create the 'proper' work and feel of art. As Judith Ryan points out, Joyce insists that bodies are real and integral to a sense of self (148). I would add that to make or

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[243] Joyce removes any reference to comic perfection in *Portrait*; instead he elaborates his theory of tragedy and pity (which he associates with joy in invoking the same 'proper' feeling). Tragedy can be comic and therefore joyful according to Joyce: "All art which excites in us the feeling of joy is so far comic and according as this feeling of joy is excited by whatever is substantial or accidental [general or fortuitous, in other m/s] in human fortunes the art is to be judged more or less excellent: and even tragic art may be said to participate in the nature of comic art so far as the possession of a work of tragic art (a tragedy) excites in us the feeling of joy" (*CW* 144). What is clear is Joyce preferred the comic medium to the tragic throughout his career.

[244] My discussion here has been informed by Judith Ryan's work on the co-constituting emergence of psychology – particularly empiricism and experimental psychology – and modernist literature. My conclusions are different, but her work has helped me conceptualize the historical and cultural context. For more information see Ryan, Judith. *The Vanishing Subject: Early Psychology and Literary Modernism*. University of Chicago Press, 1991.

experience art, body and world must interact, and affective forces circulate for embodied art to be created.

Passions and Escaping Them in *Portrait*

The anxiety of being moved and changed by external forces, as articulated by Simmel, also carries with it the sense of being displaced, of being 'put or kept in motion; changed from one position, state, etc., to another.' Joyce's characters are often kept in physical motion as they work through their emotions; physical transitions are indicative of emotional processing. In particular, an adolescent Stephen uses walking not only as a mobile space to find the privacy in a crowded house to think through his ideas and theories, but also to feel through his turbulent emotions.[245] As a dependent of Simon Dedalus, Stephen is literally moved from place to place, displaced across Dublin and into increasing levels of poverty. His wanderings can help process his feelings and order his thinking: "his sensitive nature was still smarting under the lashes of an undivided and squalid way of life. His soul was still disquieted and cast down by the dull phenomenon of Dublin" (*P* 68-69). Walking aids in moving his emotions, so that in movement he is able to achieve a greater equilibrium, to come closer to emotional stasis.

Joyce explores modernist anxiety regarding the porosity of the self and world through Stephen's passions and especially his sense of smell. An illustration of this is Stephen's emotional outburst after his school play after learning he will not see the object of his desire, Emma Clery. His emotional excess drives him to physical excess and he "began to walk at breakneck speed down the hill. He hardly knew where he was walking" (*P* 75). Stephen is moved to action:

> Pride and hope and desire like crushed herbs in his heart sent up vapours of maddening incense before the eyes of his mind. He strode down the hill amid the tumult of sudden-risen vapours of wounded pride and fallen hope and baffled desire. They streamed upwards before his anguished eyes in dense and maddening fumes and passed away above him till at last the air was clear and cold again (*P* 75).

Reported in the third-person, the narration serves to give the impression of Stephen being beside himself, being overcome and inarticulate with passion. His feelings are expressed via olfactory metaphors - "crushed herbs" and "incense" - but also the faintly sinister (and feminized) image of "vapours" that madden him. Stephen attempts to take possession of himself by cataloguing personal

[245] This links Stephen with the peripatetic philosophers, the first and most important amongst them being Aristotle. Followers of Aristotle would gather at the Lyceum, just outside of Athens to walk in the gymnasium and discuss points of philosophy. For more details see: Furley, David John. "Peripatetic school." Oxford Classical Dictionary. March 07, 2016. Oxford University Press. http://oxfordre.com/classics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199381135.001.0001/acrefore-9780199381135-e-4870 Accessed 14 Dec 2018.

sensations and external realities, particularly smells: "That is horse piss and rotted straw" he thinks; "It is a good odour to breathe. It will calm my heart" (*P* 76).[246] He "breathed slowly the rank heavy air" and he is able to acknowledge "my heart is quite calm now. I will go back" (*P* 75,76). The point of view also shifts to first-person, indicating his sense of self-possession. Yet the taking in of the smells of the city whilst walking through it, dispossessing himself from his passions, betrays the porosity of his being. Smells, and affective forces, circulate around and within his body-in-motion, taking in the sights, sounds, smells, of the city he is *moved* to calm.

Teresa Brennan's work on the *Transmission of Affect* is useful in making sense of Stephen's environmental catharsis. Read affectively, rather than as that of a rational man gaining control of his temporarily disordered mind by will alone, Stephen's journey illustrates the co-constituting nature of the relationship of subject and environment. Brennan's work challenges the assumption that emotions and feelings are contained, and that the individual is the originator and keeper of affects. Rather, she suggests that we are porous, that people are changed by the affects that circulate between themselves and others, and within and around the environment: "the atmosphere or environment literally gets into individuals" (1). Smell, she suggests, is a sense that particularly transmits affects, and is critical in communicating responses and "effecting changes in another's hormonal (hence affective) composition" (10). Stephen's passion is one example of Joyce's understanding of a sympathetic relationship between an individual and the environment. This becomes radically intensified in the *Wake*, as the subject becomes one with its environment, radically extending the notion of the human. As Brennan points out, affect and its transmission "does not sit well with an emphasis on individualism, on sight, on cognition" (18) as "it troubles the subject/object distinction, as well as raising questions of free will, agency, passivity, consciousness and unconsciousness" (21).

As the previous Simmel quote suggests, the fantasy of an impermeable, self-contained, self-directed individual becomes hard to maintain against the impact of modernity. Mark S. Micale in *The Mind of Modernism* points out that during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, "artists, philosophers, and scientists probed beneath the surface reality of reason in order to uncover deeper irrational or nonrational levels of human experience and cognition. Both the arts and the sciences studied the unconscious, subconscious, and subliminal levels of mental life."[247] The fear of irrationality and the darkness at the heart of humanity challenges Enlightenment ideals that hold onto reason, individualism, and the perfectability of humankind. To be affected is to always be in a

[246] Spinoza's discussion of the passions suggests that only a stronger feeling can move one from a present passion, so Stephen instinctively takes in more powerful scents in order to shift his emotional-olfactory reactions to Emma. Dublin moves him to a greater passion than Emma.
[247] Micale, Mark S. (ed). *The Mind of Modernism: Medicine, Psychology, and the Cultural Arts in Europe and America, 1880 -1940*. Stanford University Press, 2004, p.2.

dynamic state of change, to always be in relation. Despite intellectually attempting to fly structures of social oppression, Stephen is always in relation to them and thereby affected. In response to these constraints, Joyce – like many modernists - elevates a dispassionate nature to something desirable, even inherent in the nature of genius. As Stephen, now famously, states: "When the soul of a man is born in this country there are nets flung at it to hold it back from flight. You talk to me of nationality, language, religion. I shall try to fly by those nets" (*P* 177).

Stephen reflects on the fact that though he has read about passions, he is unable to recognize his own experiences as those romanticized in books: "All the description of fierce love and hatred which he had met in books has seemed to him therefore unreal" (*P* 72). Stephen notices, wonders at, and eventually celebrates the fact that he cannot sustain passion, whether religious, amorous, or vindictive. Stephen repeatedly states in *Portrait* that "some power" moves him beyond emotion, "some power was divesting him of that sudden woven anger as easily as a fruit is divested of her soft ripe peel" (*P* 72). Paradoxically the shedding of the fruit's skin means not only that the fruit is exposed and vulnerable, but also that it could be divesting itself of something unnecessary in order to get to its core. Rather than a passionate revelation, Stephen discovers an emptiness. It leads to an indifference that unclouds the mind:

> A brief anger had often invested him but he had always felt himself passing out of it as if his very body were being divested with ease of some outer skin or peel. He had felt a subtle, dark, and murmurous presence penetrate his being and fire him with brief iniquitous lust: it, too, had slipped beyond his grasp leaving his mind lucid and indifferent. This, it seemed, was the only love and that the only hate his soul would harbor (*P* 130).

There is recognition of the abnormality of Stephen's inability to be moved for long by any intense feeling. Temperamentally, Stephen seems unwilling or unable to live in relationship to others, and it is his inability to connect that ultimately undoes his spiritual fervor: "To merge his life in the common tide of other lives was harder for him than any fasting or prayer and it was his constant failure to do this to his own satisfaction which caused in his soul at last a sensation of spiritual dryness together with a growth of doubts and scruples" (*P* 132). His investment in his emotional and intellectual separation from others is, in part, pragmatic – his family is devolving into squalor due to his father's drinking. Equally there is also a pride at his unique 'power' which then permits him the clarity and distance to stay unmoved, which Stephen later claims helps to mark him out as an artist.

Profane Joy

Though unable to sustain passion, Stephen does experience episodes of joy, most often figured as the joy of relief in the release of sexual passion. After he has been tormented by desires,

which are at odds with society's taboo on sexual practices and speech, Stephen feels the joy of sexual release.[248] Knowing he is committing a deadly sin, but at the same time feeling the rightness of his actions, he feels both terror and joy as he has his first sexual experience with a prostitute, "Her round arms held him firmly to her and he, seeing her face lifted to him in serious calm and feeling the warm calm rise and fall of her breast, all but burst into hysterical weeping. Tears of joy and relief shone in his delighted eyes and his lips parted though they would not speak" (*P* 88). The feeling of release is physical and emotional. His weeping is a physiological manifestation of the movement of affect that is experienced as a joyful emotion. Some of the joy of the experience stems from his outsider status, marked for eternal damnation as a Luciferian rebel, as this lends piquancy to the pleasure: "A cold lucid indifference reigned in his soul. At his first violent sin, he had felt a wave of vitality pass out of him and had feared to find his body or his soul maimed by the excess" (*P* 90). The literal encounter with another's body becomes a violent spiritual encounter, which moves Stephen into a form of indifferent freedom. The effect of the shift returns as affect, registered as a "dark peace" nestled in his body. Stephen feels different; he has been moved and modified (*P* 90).

Joyce measures the pleasures of the secular life against the immense power and intense feelings brought into experience by religion. For Stephen, religion cultivates power over the mind and curtails freedom by evoking shame. By comparison it is the sensuous, sinful world that offers joy. At sixteen Stephen's newfound "dark peace" is disturbed by the rhetorical and emotional might of the Catholic church, illustrated in the 'retreat' episode. Whereas his body became a vehicle for the intensification of positive emotion, or the feeling of dark freedom, by comparison at the retreat his body becomes a vehicle of shame: "Shame rose from his smitten heart and flooded his whole being" (*P* 101). Passion, emotion, sensation, affect all coalesce to impinge upon Stephen's body, internalizing judgements against his lust: "Was that boyish love? Was that chivalry? Was that poetry?" (*P* 101). During confession he feels a hell-like flame: "He could still escape from the shame. O what shame! […] His face was burning with shame" (*P* 124). The affective, somatic response to shame means he is moved to a piety that is momentarily as intense as his previous perversity. The relief from shame makes way for a kind of bliss; or the release from shame is akin to the sexual release. Yet this religious manipulation of emotions is one of the nets that the older Stephen is trying

[248] It seems like the external restrictions from home, church, school, peers are so great that Stephen starts to cannibalize himself - feeding off his feelings – and that they only become real if they are inside him and not connected to the outside. Stephen becomes so solipsistic that the shared external world becomes to feel less real to him: "His very brain was sick and powerless. He could scarcely interpret the letters of the signboards of the shops. By his monstrous way of life he seemed to have put himself beyond the limits of reality. Nothing moved him or spoke to him from the real world unless he heard in it an echo of the infuriated cries within him" (*P* 81). This feeling destroys any sense of emotion for him: "Nothing stirred within his soul but a cold and cruel and loveless lust. His childhood was dead or lost and with it his soul capable of simple joys and he was drifting amid life like the barren shell of the moon" (*P* 84).

to fly from. The attachment to the church becomes a cruelly optimistic relationship; to use Lauren Berlant's concept: "a relation of cruel optimism exists when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing."[249] The cruel optimism is clear; first Stephen is terrified by the church through its powerful moral constructs, then the church offers escape from that terror through intervention. This is just one illustration of how the social entrains the emotional.

However, an intersubjective relation of comradery and friendship (rather than hierarchy) leads Stephen to discover a secular joy accessible to all, what Stephen calls a "profane joy." Stephen's commitment to the religious life, which had been sustained by his religious fervor, is tested when the director of Belvedere asks whether he has felt the calling and tempts him with "the power of the priest of God" (*P* 138). The offer momentarily sparks Stephen's pride and quickens his heart; yet an olfactory memory – a smell from his childhood in Clongowes - triggers dis-ease: "at once from every part of his being unrest began to irradiate. A feverish quickening of his pulses followed and a din of meaningless words drove his reasoned thoughts hither and thither confusedly" (*P* 140). Considering a vocation as a priest, he experiences an affective rebellion, "the chill and order of the life repelled him" (*P* 141), instead he is warmed back to secular life by joy. Hearing singing, seeing friends with linked arms touch, feeling the sun upon him - it is the sensible, vegetable, chaotic that wins over his soul. In a rare show of feeling and good humor precipitated by the flush of joy, Stephen smiles and is amused by everyday life: "He smiled to think that it was this disorder, the misrule and confusion of his father's house and the stagnation of vegetable life, which was to win the day in his soul" (*P* 142).

Stephen's reengagement with 'vegetable' life leads him to experience ecstasy: "His heart trembled in an ecstasy of fear and his soul was in flight. His soul was soaring in an air beyond the world and the body he knew was purified in a breath and delivered of incertitude and made radiant and commingled with the element of the spirit. An ecstasy of flight made radiant his eyes and wild his breath and tremulous and wild and radiant his windswept limbs" (*P* 148). It is ecstasy, a state of being beside oneself or out of place, an out-of-body-feeling emotional state, that enables Stephen to fly beyond the emotional nets that have ensnared him, if momentarily. He remains constrained in important and pragmatic ways, yet his brief emotional freedom moves him to a new perspective. This leads to a rare act of affirmation, which will be echoed by Molly Bloom at the end of *Ulysses;* Stephen cries "Yes! Yes! Yes! He would create proudly out of the freedom and power of his soul, as the great artificer whose name he bore, a living thing, new and soaring and beautiful, impalpable,

[249] Berlant, Lauren. *Cruel Optimism.* Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011, p 1.

imperishable." (*P* 149). His soul becomes the living thing which he has created, but also from which he will draw his future creations – art will be living – both vegetable and eternally aesthetic.

As Stephen is inspired by the image of another young, wild figure – the bird girl – she becomes an emblem of the art he seeks to create: corporeal but beautiful. Stephen's soul cries out "Heavenly God!" in an "outburst of profane joy" (*P* 172). The narration shifts focus from Stephen's usual self-consciousness to a sense of immediacy: "He was alone and young and willful and wild-hearted, alone amid a waste of wild air and brackish waters and the sea-harvest of shells and tangle and veiled grey sunlight and gayclad lightclad figures of children and girls and voices childish and girlish in the air" (*P* 150). This connection is registered upon his body: "his cheeks were aflame, his body aglow; his limbs were trembling" (*P* 150). This affect shifts his perception of life:

> Her image had passed into his soul for ever and no word had broken the holy silence of his ecstasy. Her eyes had called him and his soul had leaped at the call. To live, to err, to fall, to triumph, to recreate life out of life! A wild angel had appeared to him, the angel of mortal youth and beauty, an envoy from the fair courts of life, to throw open before him in an instant of ecstasy the gates of all the ways of error and glory. On and on and on and on! (*P* 150).

The intensity of feeling is reflected in the poetry of the language. The pounding rhythm of "To live, to err, to fall, to triumph, to recreate life out of life!" reflects the pounding of Stephen's heart, and the repetition of "On and on and on and on!" draws the reader onward and upward, to feel the soaring of Stephen's hopes. So intense is his feeling that there follows a need for stasis (the result of the 'proper' emotion, joy) that is this time figured as sleep, "swooning into some new world" (*P* 151). When he awakens, a gentle joy follows the violent rapture, "Evening had fallen when he woke and the sand and arid grasses of his bed glowed no longer. He rose slowly and, recalling the rapture of his sleep, sighed at its joy" (*P* 151). Such experiences cannot last, Dedalus's son must fall back to earth, yet Stephen's descent is softened by recollected joy. In the next chapter Icarus has fallen, and we return to watery tea made from the dregs of repeatedly used leaves, and a list of pawned items. This is the daily reality that isn't transformed magically by the burning and glowing certainty of his world. His heart is "already bitten by an ache of loathing and bitterness" (*P* 153) yet he lets go of this by smells of the morning (sensory) and memories of women (bird girl) and in Hauptmann's plays (aesthetic) so that he creates for himself "a mood of quiet joy" (*P* 153). Intense life is felt still; joy can still be recalled to aid in continued existence.

***Ulysses*[250]**

Moving from *Portrait* to *Ulysses* offers a shift from the youthful passions of Stephen Dedalus and his ambivalence to emotion, connection, and corporeal thinking. Though there is much to say regarding Stephen's ongoing emotional development in *Ulysses*, this section will focus on the emotional landscape and embodiment of Leopold Bloom. Joyce's focus on pleasures and problems of embodiment challenges the critical commonplace of cerebral modernist art, and moves towards a model of mind-body interaction that might now be consider new materialist: a model that posits a materialist, thinking body, that incorporates "a wider remit of incorporeal sense making."[251] Joyce's focus on the minutiae of the body via Bloom's sensitivity and attunement to his sensations, feelings, and emotions - as well as his (sometimes willful) repression of them - reveals an affective approach to corporeality, one that necessitates a body, but is not limited to it. Therefore, my focus in the *Ulysses* section of this chapter will be on Joyce's representation of bodies, how those bodies offer somatic markers for emotion, and how Joyce offers a corporeal means of thinking that is material and joyful.

The visceral and vital forces of affect are registered upon and within a body but, unlike emotion which is 'felt,' these forces are not consciously registered, though they always affect us and "can serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought and extension" (*ATR* 1). As Atkinson and Duffy, in their discussion of affect and modern dance, point out, "The concept of affect in contemporary theory marks a return to the body as a site for the interplay of thought and feeling, and its importance derives from its refusal to reduce the body to the status of a container for either the mind or, by implication, the emotions."[252] Thus the tracing of affect through affected bodies can trouble established epistemological categories. Affect is both a "state of relation" and "the passage of forces and intensities" (*ATR* 1). With the energetic crossings and interactions there are constant encounters, so that a body is never not in a state of affect, and in turn affecting the world. These moved/moving bodies, and the language Joyce deploys to create them, I argue, are orientated towards life – the business of everyday living and also, psychologically speaking, life-orientated rather than death-driven.

According to Spinoza, no individual can purposely choose to diminish her power, to work against her own good; this he calls *conatus*: "There is in all things – bodies and minds – a kind of existential inertia by which they resist any attempts to destroy them or change them for the

[250] Joyce, James. *Ulysses*, Gabler, Hans Walter (ed.) Random House Inc., 1986. Hereafter referred to in text as '*U*' and chapter numbers and line references given.
[251] Sampson, Tony. "Neuroaffect." Capacious Affect Inquiry / Making Space Conference, August 2018, Lancaster PA.
[252] Atkinson Paul and Michelle Duffy. "The Amplification of Affect: Tension, Intensity and Form in Modern Dance." *Modernism and Affect*. Taylor, Julie ed. Edinburgh University Press, 2015, p. 94.

worse."[253] It is part of the mode of our being, a necessary part of our nature that we experience passions. Passions are affective transitions that alert us to a change in being, a shift in our *conatus*.[254] There are three primary affects from which all others are derived: joy (all good feeling is a variant of joy, and which increases our power to act), sadness (all bad feeling is a variant of it, and which decreases our power to act), and desire (the striving itself, the movement of which constitutes affects). To persist, to continue to exist and to strive for more knowledge, or freedom, is to experience joy. Meaning the capacity to think, feel, or act more completely. The idea that bodies and minds existentially resist any attempt to destroy them is at odds with Freud's idea of the "death drive" articulated in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle.* [255] Freud stated that "the aim of all life is death" and theorized that in addition to our instinct for pleasure there is a 'death instinct.' The death instinct or drive is a natural desire to "re-establish a state of things that was disturbed by the emergence of life," to return to the state before life interrupted it.[256] Spinoza does not deny that self-destructive tendencies occur but claims that these are the effects of outside influences. Thus, the key difference is that for Freud the drive to destruction comes from within, whereas Spinoza posits a form of porosity, the outside getting within.[257]

As I will examine further with regard to warmth and somatic markers below, Joyce repeatedly portrays the 'outside' environment getting 'in' to the body of his protagonists. Both the environment and individual affect and are affected. To offer a brief example, in "Wandering Rocks," Stephen is affected by his meeting with his young sister Dilly. Stephen is moved by her impoverished look, especially her intellectual hunger and desire to escape her life. Though she is hungry, she buys a French primer for a penny (money that she had to beg and cajole from her father). This is tragic, but in a Spinozan sense her increase in knowledge and her desire for a better life means an increase in her *contatus* (one that mirrors Stephen's own intellectual hunger in *Portrait*). This doesn't mean she feels joy but rather that, despite her circumstances, she is striving to live. Stephen's *conatus* is

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[253] Nadler, Steven. *Spinoza's Ethics: An Introduction*. Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.195.
[254] Spinoza clearly points out that these feeling affects are not an intellectual comparison of before and after, "When I say a greater or lesser force of existing than before, I do not understand that the mind compares its body's present constitution to a past constitution" but rather "something which really involves more or less of reality than before" (III, gen.def.). Spinoza, Benedict. *Ethics.* Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, 2001.
[255] The literature that discusses Freud and Joyce is immense, though this connection is not something I will pursue further. To offer only a few citations see the following: Ellmann, Maud. *The Nets of Modernism: Henry James, Virginia Woolf, James Joyce, and Sigmund Freud*. Cambridge University Press, 2010; Thurston, Luke. *James Joyce and the Problem of Psychoanalysis*. Cambridge University Press, 2004. Froula, Christine, *Modernism's Body: Sex, Culture, and Joyce*. Columbia University Press, 1996. Brivic, Sheldon R., *Joyce Between Freud and Jung*. Kennikat Press, 1980.
[256] Freud, Sigmund, "Ego and the Id" *The Freud Reader*, (ed) Peter Gay. W.W. Norton & Company Inc, 1989, p.709. Manifestations of the death-drive can be seen in Stephen's self-centered actions, his depression, and his self-destructive behaviors, all of which could be considered an inward-facing manifestation of the aggressive drive. Bloom consciously and unconsciously returns to the thought of Molly's adultery, bringing himself great pain, but also a sado-masochistic pleasure.
[257] To clarify, for Spinoza mode and attribute are of the same substance, all is one (God, Nature, Man, Materiality), so the designation of outside/inside is a useful, though slightly misleading, simplification.

momentarily diminished, however, as he is filled with guilt: "She is drowning. Agenbite. Save her. Agenbite. All against us. She will drown me with her, eyes and hair. Lank coils of seaweed hair around me, my heart, my soul. Salt green death" (*U* 10. 874-880). The destructive wandering rocks are an apt metaphor for Spinoza's notion of *affectio,* the impact of external things on the self; the impact of different lives one upon another. In his determination to keep from being swallowed by the family's needs, Stephen's joy (his capacity to act) is increased. As readers, we might like Stephen less, but Joyce forces us to face harsh realities and reflect upon the choices that Stephen has with a father who drinks his children's food-money away, on the city that makes it hard to be working poor, and on a society that makes it impossible for the poor, and especially poor women, to gain an education. In distinction to Freud, the striving to live does not necessarily feel pleasurable or produce pleasure, but Joyce demonstrates the will-to life is honorable and instinctual. This, Spinoza, would call joy.

Pleasures of the Body

In contrast to the cerebral, sad Stephen Dedalus in the first chapters of Ulysses, the appetitive introduction to Mr. Leopold Bloom is already arresting: "Mr Leopold Bloom ate with relish the inner organs of beasts and fowls. He liked thick giblet soup, nutty gizzards, a stuffed roast heart, liverslices fried with crustcrumbs, fried hencods' roes. Most of all he liked grilled mutton kidneys which gave to his palate a fine tang of faintly scented urine" (*U* 4. 1-5). We know he has a hearty appetite, "ate with relish" in contrast to the very thin and often hungry Stephen and that Bloom has unusual tastes, delighting in offal which "gave to his palate a fine tang of faintly scented urine." Even in the first line, Bloom is physical, abundant, and has the capacity to find pleasure in things that others would reject.[258] Bloom emerges as a strong personality and highly emotional. His qualities include his care for others, his curiosity, his carefulness, his compassion, his constant plans that will come to nothing, his capacity to be interested in everything and disgusted by nothing (except cruelty). We also see his passivity and self-willed blindness to difficult aspects of his life, such as Molly's nascent affair, which Laura Frost calls his "moods of compulsive avoidance and guilt" (5). To ensure Bloom does not tip into sentimentality, Joyce develops a joyfully repulsive scene of Bloom in the loo.

One of the joyful things about Joyce is the immensity and intensity of the corporeal life he represents, and the capacity he demands from the reader to pay attention to it. In his immersive

[258] The opening line is intriguing and predisposes us to like him, and on a stylistic level. After the difficulty of "Proteus", readers might be relieved to return to what seems like the normality and ease of narrative. The openness and familiarity is warm and welcoming after the complexity and sharp humor of the Telemachiad.

exploration of the details and detritus of everyday life, his curiosity engaged with things beyond common notice, Joyce offers a joyful engagement with the materiality of the world. The surprisingly accurate and detailed depiction of Bloom's experience builds (embarrassing, sensational) comedy. Bloom sits "asquat on the cuckstool" (*U* 4. 500), the Shakespearean 'high' language invoked to make Bloom's activity even more farcical. The vulnerability of Bloom in the jakes, enjoying his "just right" defecation (*U* 4. 510) is surprising, still, to readers - literally, the protagonist is caught with his trousers down. [259] However, Joyce incorporates a self-parody as Bloom selects his reading material: "Something new and easy" to mirror the anticipated pleasure of a good stool, delaying the gratification, "Quietly he read, restraining himself, the first column and, yielding but resisting, began the second" (*U* 4. 506). Bloom's interior monologue combines a commentary on his bowel movement and his judgement of the quality of the story he's reading: "It did not move or touch him but it was something quick and neat" (*U* 4. 509-10). There is nothing for the reader to be moved by - either in bowel or emotion - the writing doesn't make an impact, a powerful contrast to the unfolding, fibrous experience of reading *Ulysses.* Certainly, there is a level of base comedy in the stool scene, but also a direct, honest, lack of shame that celebrates the joy of the body. These unsavory details are part of Joyce's aesthetic, a comedic art that moves the reader to confront the heart and guts of life. As Stephen explains to his mother in a discarded scene from *Portrait*, "Art is not an escape from life. It's just the very opposite. Art, on the contrary, is the very central expression of life. An artist is not a fellow who dangles a mechanical heaven before the public. The priest does that. The artist affirms out of the fulness [sic] of his own life, he creates."[260] Art should not offer an idealized, nor ideal life, rather it should seek to "express life" in all its fullness.

Fleshy Warmth – Comfort and Joy

Bloom's fleshiness extends to a sensitivity to his environment that offers an example of the transmission of affect and the porosity of self. In contrast to Stephen's in *Portrait*, Bloom's porosity is visceral and fleshy, tangible. Enjoying his walk in "Calypso," cat-like, he takes in sleepy succor from the environment: "His eyelids sank quietly often as he walked in happy warmth" (*U* 4. 81). Joyce makes the warmth tangible and immanently vital, alive with feeling – it is the warmth that is happy, solid enough to walk in like a field or fog. The weather changes as he walks: "A cloud began to cover the sun slowly, wholly. Grey. Far" and the energetic touch upon Bloom's body, creating a

[259] Of course, delight is not a uniform nor necessary reaction to this scene. The scene evokes all sorts of emotional responses: disgust, shock, which leads to anger or indignation, even a refusal to continue to read on. But the language with which Joyce treats the moment clearly communicates the fact that Bloom finds enjoyment in the moment and challenges the reader to consider whether they too can sit "calm above [their] own rising smell" (*U* 4. 13-14)
[260] Joyce, James. *Stephen Hero*. New York: New Directions 1969, p. 86.

change in Bloom's mind and mood (*U* 4.218). There is an interaction between the individual and the environment which challenges the notion of self-containment, it is the outside coming in. As "Grey horror seared his flesh" (*U* 4.230) evoking mental images of a lack of life and fecundity. His imagination moves from the exoticism of the Dead Sea, to being a sea that is dead – without life: "barren land, bare waste. Vulcanic lake, the dead sea: no fish, weedless, sunk deep in the earth" (*U* 4. 218-219). This environmental and physiological alignment changes both Bloom's body and the environment, or at least Bloom's perception of the environment. It becomes hostile and uninviting and he hurries home to escape it. The dreary greyness, lacking color and light, synaesthetically becomes hot "searing," burning with its chill, so this sensation becomes what Tony Sampson calls "a *capture of affect* in consciousness" (n.p.). [261] Registered on the body, the affective shifts change his mind, transforming the exotic, fertile fantasy of Agendath Netaim on the Red Sea, into the dead sea "the grey sunken cunt of the world" (*U* 4.227-28), so that "cold oils slid along his veins, chilling his blood: age crusting him with a salt cloak" (*U* 4.231-2). The images Bloom has been musing upon, – olives, sun, sea – manifest psychosomatically through their embodiment in metaphor. Olives transform into cold oils that chill, and the sea cloaks and crusts him in salt – preserving dead meat rather than supporting living flesh. The mind-body offers a feedback loop that denies a dualism, but rather suggests a shared materiality – imagination also at one with flesh. As I will develop more fully later in the chapter, especially in connection to *Finnegans Wake*, Joyce articulates the tension between the desire to be a self-contained subject and the impossibility of it.

Bloom draws on his memories to counter his negative thoughts. He imagines simple, life-giving things to counter-balance the invasion of desolation: "To smell the gentle smoke of tea, fume of the pan, sizzling butter. Be near her ample bedwarmed flesh. Yes, yes" (*U* 4.237-39). Having been forced to confront death, and the anticipation of another confrontation with it at Paddy Dignam's funeral, Bloom asserts life: "Well, I am here now. Yes, I am here now." (*U* 4.231-32). The inevitability of death and the assertion of life will be a theme returned to again and again throughout *Ulysses*, especially via the body: through thoughts of Rudy, through Bloom's recognition of his fading sexual vitality, through his lack of physical fitness. In this case, as with many others, he distracts his attention from painful things by calling upon his senses to combat his physical discomfort: smell, smell-sight, sound, taste, touch, all warm him back to life. He returns to a site, in memory, that has previously brought him comfort and seeks to recreate those pleasures. The body of Bloom in "Calypso" introduces a notion of joy through the comfort of enfleshment. Comfort for Bloom comes

[261]For a more biologically rigorous discussion of the interaction between the individual and the social, cultural, and natural environment see Frost, Samantha. *Biocultural Creatures*. Duke University Press, 2016.

from bodily functions, emotional connection, and fleshy warmth, especially warm, female flesh that he associates with Molly.

As previously discussed, Brennan emphasizes the primacy of smell and pheromonal exchange in entrainment, and smell is an important sense for Joyce throughout his texts, as the smell of tea and butter exemplifies.[262] However, I consider touch, and the thermodynamic transfer between skins, i.e. warmth, as an important mode of affective transmission. Warm, living flesh is the moly against the creeping inevitability of death, and bed an island where skin inevitably (if inadvertently) touches. Warmth suffuses, stirs, and is shared by and between humans and non-humans. Body and bed have conjoined to produce a warmth, a shared experience that extends the subject beyond the self and co-creates a state with a non-human entity. It is the phantom impression of Boylan's body in his bed that Bloom will have to exorcise in "Ithaca" – an affective trace – in order to reclaim the warmth and comfort of his bed-body assemblage.

As Bloom hurries back in "Calypso" to serve his still-abed wife her warm/warming tea, warmth itself comes to life. The environment becomes agentic, vital: "Quick warm sunlight came running from Berkeley road, swiftly, in slim sandals, along the brightening footpath" (*U* 4.240). The sunlight is running, spirited, female and the forces of light and warmth touch Bloom and bring a young girl to his mind: "Runs, she runs to meet me, a girl with gold hair on the wind" (*U* 4.240–242). Milly, or an imagined lover (or both), the warming sun warms the flagging erotic energy of Bloom back to life.[263] Synaesthetically experienced, warmth activates all the senses and Joyce renders a kind of simultaneous sensory intensification that is suffused with other sensations: "He heard then a warm heavy sigh, softer" (the sigh is warm). Also, "the warmth of her couched body rose on the air, mingling with the fragrance of the tea she poured" (warmth is touched and smelt) (*U* 4. 58, 306-7). Ironically, like a pharmakon, the flesh of Molly that has, in part, caused the anticipatory pain of adultery is also the flesh that will comfort and alleviate that pain.

The motif of Molly's flesh offering a sense of home and comfort recurs throughout the day. In "Hades," for example, Bloom imagines the immensity of death as the loss of a bedfellow: "One must go first: alone, under the ground: and lie no more in her warm bed" (*U* 6.554-55). Bloom muses, an Odysseus returning from the underworld, as he leaves the cemetery:

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[262] Two recent papers have taken up Brennan's idea of the transmission of affect and smell: Fogarty, Ann. " 'The Odour of Ashpits and Old Weeds and Offal': The Transmission of Affects In Dubliners" *James Joyce: The Recirculation of Realism*. Rome, Italy: Edizioni Q, 2014. 21-39; Frost, Laura. "James Joyce and the Scent of Modernity" in *The Problem with Pleasure: Modernism and Its Discontents.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2013. Sara Danius in *The Senses of Modernism* on the other hand, emphasizes the primacy of sight and secondarily sound, for modernism: Danius, Sara. *The Senses of Modernism: Technology, Perception, and Aesthetics*. Cornell University Press, 2002.

[263] At approximately the same time, the agentic sunshine connects the same sensation across geographical distance and is perceived by Stephen: "Warm sunshine merrying over the sea" (U 1. 306). The cloud and darkening mood also connect the two characters, but Stephen remains melancholy rather than resistant.

> Back to the world again. Enough of this place. Brings you a bit nearer every time. … I do not like that other world she wrote. No more do I. Plenty to see and hear and feel yet. Feel live warm beings near you. Let them sleep in their maggoty beds. They are not going to get me this innings. Warm beds: warm fullblooded life
>
> (*U* 6. 995-96, 1002-05)

To be alive is to be warm, to be in relation and to think through the body fully ("plenty to see and hear and feel yet"). Because he is committed to living "fullblooded" in an intensity of sexual and emotional fervor, the thought of other 'warm beings' "warms the cockles of his heart" (*U*. 6. 787). There are many ways to be warmed into life: hearts can be warmed by kind words or praise; ears can burn when one is spoken about; faces flush with passion, with rage, envy, indignation: "She felt the warm flush, a danger signal always with Gerty MacDowell, surging and flaming into her cheeks" (*U* 13. 365-67). Eyes can prickle in an effort to hold back hot tears; brains are said to burn or steam with intellectual effort; bodies sweat, engorge, pulse. Each instance of feeling transmits across and through bodies. It can be felt and seen by others. Bodies are always affected and affecting.

Senses and Soma

The primary sense shifts from smell to touch, as warmth is a modality of touch. To touch is always to be touched in return, and to touch is to feel – both haptically and emotionally. The surface of the skin becomes a conduit, a point of touch, of contact between worlds. As Sara Ahmed explains, "the skin connects as well as contains" (Ahmed 54). As my discussion shows, warmth radiates beyond the individual 'contained' subject. Ahmed, in *Queer Phenomenology*, goes on to say, "the locations of sensation on the skin surface show that the sensation is not 'in' the object or the body but instead takes shape as an effect of their encounter," so that phenomenology shows "how objects and others have already left their impressions on the skin surface" (Ahmed 54). Unlike the visual system whose primary organ is the eye, we feel with our entire bodies: "we touch using our skin, muscles, joints, and we can touch using nearly every surface along the whole body."[264] Touch also offers a non-verbal mode of communication and means of knowing the world. As Mark Paterson explains:

[264] Fulkerson, Matthew, "Touch", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/touch [accessed 30th November 2018], n.p. There is a plethora of touch-specific language that captures different elements of how touch is registered, for example, 'cutaneous' refers to a brush upon the skin, or 'haptic,' as touch understood through the somatic senses. Touch is also registered through movement and awareness of this movement (kinaesthesis), and through an awareness of bodily position (proprioception).

> touch articulates a complex world, a world of movement and exploration, of non-verbal social communication. It is a carnal world, with its pleasures of feeling and being felt, of tasting and touching the textures of flesh and food. And equally it is a profound world of philosophical verification, of the communication of presence and empathy with others, of the co-implication of body, flesh and world.[265]

Whether warmth is heard in a tone of voice, as when Bloom "Dth! Dth's" in compassion over Mina Purefoy's difficult birth (*U* 8. 88), or smelt and felt as when Molly's bodily warmth mixes with tea-steam, or energetically felt as when Bloom sits in a warm spot recently vacated by a pair of women's buttocks and thighs, the feeling is transferred and the recipient is transformed, as Bloom might say, warmed into life. To touch and be touched means that you are open to the world and responsive to it.

Joyce weaves body, emotion, and thought together, demonstrating that one does not act by reason alone, but rather thinking with and through the body. Bloom's body is not simply his interface between a self-contained subject and the world; rather there is communication between, and co-constitution with the world. Bloom *thinks* with his body. Indeed as Seigworth and Greg point out, "affect and cognition are never fully separable – if for no other reason than that thought is itself a body, embodied" (*ATR* 2-3). Joyce renders this shifting neuroaffective embodiment in language, making nonconscious decisions visible to the reader. Bloom's physiological signals – cold veins, gasps, beating eyes - are forms of somatic markers that influence his decision making and subsequent actions. As neuroaffect scientist Antonio Damasio posits, decisions are made far too quickly for the rational computation of risk/benefits in each scenario, therefore something else must assist in decision making.[266] He claims that the feeling of negative/positive sensation just prior to reasoning offers a nudge to decision-making.[267] So, in the case of Bloom's half-conscious decision-making about his actions in "Lestrygonians," his marker is positive. He is hungry, and his energy and his mood are depressed, and his mind skirts the issue of Molly's infidelity, yet his memories of her are positive, not accusatory: "Swish and soft flop her stays made on the bed. Always warm from her. Always liked to let herself out. Sitting there after till near two taking out her hairpins. Milly tucked up in beddyhouse. Happy. Happy" (*U* 8.198-200). Bloom considers his home and relationship with

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[265] Paterson, Mark. *The Senses of Touch: Haptics, Affects, and Technologies*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2007, p.2.

[266] Damasio A. R. *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*. G.P. Putnam, 1994. See also, Bechara, Antoine, Hanna Damasio, Antonio R. Damasio; Emotion, Decision Making and the Orbitofrontal Cortex, *Cerebral Cortex*, Volume 10, Issue 3, 1 March 2000, pp. 295–307; Bechara, Antoine and Antonio R. Damasio. "The Somatic Marker Hypothesis: A neural theory of economic decision." Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 52, issue 2, 2005, pp. 336 -372.

[267] Or as Jose M. Munoz succinctly puts it: "Suppose that, prior to the reasoning process, you feel a brief, unpleasant sensation when imagining a negative consequence to a possible decision. You are then experiencing a somatic marker, that is, a bodily sensation that is associated with a scenario imagined by an agent." Muñoz, José M. "Somatic Markers, Rhetoric, and Post-Truth." *Frontiers in Psychology* 8, 2017, p.1273.

his wife in advance of her adultery. It is an affair he has 'decided' to facilitate by removing Milly and himself from the house; these 'markers' indicate a continued attachment and care for Molly. As Bechara and Damasio suggest, and this example demonstrates, "emotions are a major factor in the interaction between environmental conditions and human decision processes" and that "the process of deciding advantageously is not just logical but also emotional" (2005, 368).

The catechistic questions of "Ithaca" represent the idea of the rational self being logically motivated into action – or at least being able to come to a kind of conscious awareness of actions. Bloom's decision to reclaim his warm bed and the body within it is a decision that is not based entirely on reason. Bloom realizes he is entering a bed only recently vacated by another man. He reflects on the fact he is only one in a series. The pseudo-scientific-sounding narrator informs the reader, "advantages were possessed by an occupied, as distinct from an unoccupied bed." Especially a bed filled with a woman, as she warms the heart as well as the body: "the superior quality of human (mature female) to inhuman (hotwaterjar) calefaction" (*U* 17.2037). The connection of touch, warmth, and life outweighs the fear of recriminations. The body, through somatic markers, reconnects Bloom across time into a past emotional self. He thinks via his body: "the necessity for repose, obviating movement: the proximity of an occupied bed, obviating research: the anticipation of warmth (human) tempered with coolness (linen), obviating desire and rendering desirable" (17.2031-33). The language is mock-rational, but the reasoning is emotional, and the anticipation of this intersubjective exchange influences Bloom's decision- in short, I'm going to my warm bed. Unlike Odysseus, Bloom returns a hero of mere domestic proportions, not as one who insists on (or needs to) violently reclaim his territory. Yet in his inaction, in his rest in the bed of marriage and birth, he affirms life. A life of connection and unconscious intimacy.

Lestrygonians/ Sirens - Bloom, & Eating Joy

The "Lestrygonians" episode of *Ulysses* offers two important illustrations for my argument. Firstly, this episode illustrates Joyce's technique of linking body and feeling. Specifically, this episode illustrates the power of the gap to make affect tangible, if not visible. Joyce is able to represent the movement of affect and its registration upon the body, through gaps and almosts, linguistically rendered somatic markers (staccato sentences, one-words, half words, gaps, gasps). Secondly, "Lestrygonians" includes the famous passage of Bloom recalling the joy of his first sexual encounter upon the hill of Howth with Molly. Bloom's experience of joy offers an opportunity to consider memory and imagination as affective, an idea now supported by research into

epigenetics.[268] Plus, Bloom's re-joycing (the joyful experience of reexperiencing joy) brings attention to the importance of touch and taste as senses for experiencing joy.

Affect is most often characterized as a pre-conscious shift of force, a processual shift from one state to another. One that is registered within the body but without consciousness of it. One difficulty for affect studies is how to capture in language the movement of affect, because once it has found language – as both Brennan and Massumi point out – it becomes something else: a feeling or emotion. In Joyce's experimental language, I argue, it is possible to find the traces of affect. His writing becomes the amber in which the vapor-trails of affect can be caught and held, and which lingers upon/within/around the body of the reader. In "Lestrygonians" the dynamic movement of affect can be seen when Bloom's mind (either consciously or unconsciously) swerves away from contemplating Molly's upcoming liaison with Boylan. Bloom repeatedly pulls his mind away from thinking of their meeting, and what the imminent sexual encounter says about his own marriage. I will discuss an example of conscious and unconscious avoidance. In both cases affect lingers like the after-image from a flash: momentarily noticeable but quickly blinked away and ignored.[269]

Readers follow Bloom's flow of consciousness, witness to his interior monologue, as he goes in search of lunch. As he wanders, his associative thoughts calculate when the last full moon was and where he was at that time; this leads him to recall that it was two weeks ago, after a concert with Boylan and Molly. Bloom recalls that as Boylan and Molly were walking together and singing, he noticed an exchange between them via touch, the start of their affair:

Touch. Fingers. Asking. Answer. Yes.

Stop. Stop. If it was it was. Must.

Mr. Bloom, quickbreathing, slowlier walking passed Adam court.

With ha quiet keep quiet relief his eyes took note this is the street here middle of the day of Bob Doran's bottle shoulders[270]

(*U* 8.591-594)

Still witness to his silent thoughts, we see Bloom consciously stop and redirect his flow of thoughts. He retains an element of doubt, perhaps to justify his inaction and also avoid pain: "*If* it was it was.

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[268] See Slavich, George M. and Steven W. Cole. "The Emerging Field of Human Social Genomics." *Clinical Psychological Science.* Vol 1,3, 2013, pp.331-348; Blackman, Lisa. "The New Biologies: Epigenetics, the Microbiome and Immunities. *Body & Society*, 22, 3, 2016, pp. 3-18; Lutterbie, John. "Feeling Beauty, Time, and the Body in Neuroaesthetics." *Poetics Today*, 38, 2, 2017, pp. 295-315.

[269] This haunting of affect, a trace without materiality, could also be conceived as an aural haunting of sound reverberations sensed if not quite heard after the end of a musical refrain.

[270] Gabler edition has "With ha quiet keep quiet relief his eyes" (8. 594) and the version Project Gutenburg version has "With a keep quiet relief his eyes" (n.p.).

Must" (my emphasis). To paraphrase: if it happened, so be it. There is nothing to be done, it is past. But what does 'must' refer to? The solitary imperative is emphatic, but the meaning is elusive. What must Bloom do: must stop thinking of this? Must stop the meeting which he knows is due to occur in three hours' time? The meeting *must* happen and cannot be stopped? It seems the first scenario is the most likely, as his train of thought is redirected. His body asserts dominance, and the narrative ejects us from the interior monologue. The narrative shifts to the third person; we are outside of Bloom's stream of consciousness (not only that but an air of formality is introduced, 'Mr. Bloom') and the reader is only permitted to observe from afar. The reader is left to surmise the distress that this train of thought has created within Bloom; he is "slowlier walking," burdened perhaps under the emotional weight of his thought process. Despite a slower tread, he is 'quickbreathing' emphasizing the affective response that is not accessible to the reader and might also be inaccessible to Bloom. [271]

The passage of affect that is both instigator of and consequence of Bloom's thoughts about Molly's adultery is signaled by the shift in point of view and lack of punctuation. The line reads "With *ha quiet keep quiet* relief his eyes took note this is the street here middle of the day of Bob Doran's bottle shoulders." We are apparently still within third person observation; '*his* eyes' see with relief Bob Doran's shoulders, which allows Bloom's thoughts to be distracted, at which point we return once more to the interior thoughts of Bloom. The reader's lack of access to the feelings and thoughts of Bloom mirror the consciousness of those feelings. In other words, if Bloom was conscious of his feelings we would read them. As Bloom seems unaware of the passage of affect, the narration reflects this in the syntax. Are the eyes communicating directly with the reader without the knowledge of Bloom's consciousness? 'Keep quiet' they tell the reader, as they note Bob, 'don't betray the emotion going on beneath' (windows of the soul that they are). Or, are the eyes obeying Bloom's direction to "Stop" and are thereby 'keeping quiet' – but once again this suggests the body knows more than the mind and must not relay the knowledge back to consciousness that holds it. "With ha" could be a gasp, an interrupting aspiration, but who makes it? The narrative line itself? The narrative seems to be winded, mirroring the quickbreathing of Bloom's body, 'ha' reflecting a quick intake of breath. Inserting punctuation, it would then read "With, *ha quiet keep quiet,* relief his

[271] We find out in Molly's monologue that Bloom's suspicions were correct, it was at this exact moment that Molly and Boylan's sexual affair, discussed via touch, is agreed upon. Molly reflects in Penelope: "that night Boylan gave my hand a great squeeze going along by the Tolka in my hand there steals another I just pressed the back of his like that with my thumb to squeeze back singing the young May moon shes beaming love because he has an idea about him and me hes not such a fool" (*U* 18. 609). Bloom also makes use of a coded, gestural language to communicate secretly when he makes masonic signs. Often this is touching his own hands and body to be read at a distance, as when he stands guard over the prostate body of Stephen: *Silent, thoughtful, alert he stands on guard, his fingers at his lips in the attitude of secret master" (U* 15.497*)* A more direct parallel to the tactile signing of Molly and Boylan, also in the Circe episode, is when Bloom feelingly reads Zoe's caress as a masonic gesture as she lures him over the threshold into Circe's lair: "ZOE: Silent means consent. *(With little parted talons she captures his hand, her forefinger giving to his palm the passtouch of secret monitor, luring him to doom.)* Hot hands cold gizzard" (*U* 15.409)

eyes took note" – but who interrupts the external observation of Bloom's relieved eyes?[272] Who, or what, is telling whom to be quiet and remain so? Could the phrase be an adjective modifying the type of relief that the eyes felt "With *ha-quiet-keep-quiet* relief" his eyes took note? In each case, there are gaps and silences, unknown forces that are being felt by Bloom and not consciously recognized, just as the reader is forced to observe the situation and read it from a distance whilst something occurs within. This invites readers to reflect upon the forces occurring within and around their own body that are beyond their conscious reach.

I quoted the longer passage above not only to demonstrate the movement of Bloom's thought, but also to show that the typography/formatting of the passage itself displays gaps. The spaces between thoughts are not filled with words but are filled with meaning. The indentations emphasize the staccato, unconnected, shifting sense of affect. There is an extended episode of movement between physical discomfort: sensations registered upon the body, conscious feelings of panic, unconscious shifting in pain registering upon Bloom's body, and affect as Bloom dodges into the museum to avoid meeting with Boylan. Here the short sentences and in-set line of the stream of consciousness suggest the in-out laboured breath of Bloom as he is shocked to see Boylan, and then scrambles to the safety of the museum. I will quote at length recreating the indentation of the Gabler edition then discuss afterwards:

Mr Bloom came to Kildare street. First I must. Library.

Straw hat in sunlight. Tan shoes. Turnedup trousers. It is. It is.

His heart quopped softly. To the right. Museum. Goddesses. He swerved to the right.

[…]

The flutter of his breath came forth in short sighs. Quick. Cold statues: quiet there. Safe in a minute.

No. Didn't see me. After two. Just at the gate.

My heart!

His eyes beating looked steadfastly at cream curves of stone. Sir Thomas Deane was the Greek architecture.

Look for something I.

(*U* 8 1167-69,1176-1182)

The wonderfully onomatopoeic "quopped" indicates the quietly flopping, stopping rhythm of a heart in panic and emotional distress. After rushing to gain the sanctuary of the museum to avoid a

[272] The 'ha' could also be 'hat' and 'took note' could also relate to the note from Martha Clifford, the P.O.Box information he keeps secreted in his hat band, thus the two infidelities are linked.

confrontation with his rival, Bloom exclaims "My heart!" which links the physical. Out of breath from rushing he acknowledges the of intense beating of his heart. It also acknowledges the emotional - the shock of seeing his rival and being forced to confront feelings that Bloom has made efforts to avoid.[273] Here too the eyes reveal emotion and are a conduit for soothing it: "His eyes beating looked steadfastly at cream curves of stone" (*U* 8. 1180). His eyes are beating to the quopping of his heart, indicating strain and intensity of emotion moving into his head, the familiar feeling of a banging, beating pulse becoming noticeable behind the eyes. Yet they look "steadfastly," latching onto the calm of the "cream curves of stone" which recall the "cold statues" he is aiming for, and their safety. They also recall the curves of Molly, but without her comforting warmth, which return him to the stress he seeks to escape.[274]

As Seigworth notes, the difficulty of capturing, or representing, affect in language is in part a failure to capture the multiple, simultaneous acts of impact and connection: "Affect articulates connection – as the moment of connection or relation, as the persistence or interruption in connection or relation, as the infinite and potential relatedness of all connection that always exists – and yet affect does not immediately yield to articulation in words" (*ATR* 7). The relation of body-mind-object creates an affective assemblage, exemplified by the way that the sight of his rival impacts Bloom's body, creating cascading relations and reactions, moving him to be affected and seek safety. His gaze upon the stone and architectural comment show a mind and body in disarray but also trying unconsciously to look for something to distract himself: the eye seeing something to latch onto and find quiet relief, "Look for something I" (eye). Bloom's mental distress produces a fight or flight response. As he flees, his mind is in disarray, losing his memory of what he was there for. We know Bloom did intend to come to the museum to satisfy his curiosity as to whether statues have anuses: "Lovely forms of women sculpted Junonian. Immortal lovely. And we stuffing food in one hole and out behind: food, chyle, blood, dung, earth, food: have to feed it like stoking an engine. They have no. Never looked. I'll look today. Keeper won't see. Bend down let something drop. See if she" (*U* 8.928-32). Here we see the connection for Joyce between art and real life which might not be rendered in plastic arts but is certainly developed in *Ulysses*. As Bloom points out, if an artist is dealing with living bodies, even beautiful ones, there is a physiological reality: "we stuffing food in one hole and out behind" (*U* 8. 929) as readers witnessed in the "Calypso" episode. The pause

[273] According to the Linati scheme, the technique of "Lestrygonians" episode is peristaltic, so the in/out setting of portions of the episode typographically reflects that. The heart could also be said to follow a similar motion in terms of contraction and relaxation.

[274] Molly is associated with goddesses through the voluptuous curves and her ability to bring life into the world, moments earlier as he ate his sandwich in Davy Byrnes: "His downcast eyes followed the silent veining of the oaken slab. Beauty: it curves: curves are beauty. Shapely goddesses, Venus, Juno: curves the world admires. Can see them library museum standing in the round hall, naked goddesses. Aids to digestion" (8.919-22)

between 'look for something' and patting down his body is a ruse to excuse his hurrying into the museum "busy looking" (and so he can't look at Boylan). But it is also a tactile reassurance, a stock-take of his items and his senses. It's clear he's not sure what he's looking for. We must fill in the blanks, and the gaps are such that multiple levels of consciousness and memory can fit in. For example, the gap between the thoughts in, "Afternoon she said. I am looking for that. Yes, that. Try all pockets" (*U* 9.1172-1173), suggests he recalls Molly saying the assignation will be at 4 o'clock 'in the afternoon', and so what is the "that" which is associated with the recollection? Perhaps the key he has forgotten which gives him access to his home, from which he is currently exiled? He queries, "Where did I? Ah, yes. Trousers. Potato. Purse. Where?" also suggesting he's thinking of his forgotten key (*U* 9.1174). Recalling that his key is in his other trousers, this leads him to inventory his other important items: talisman/moly, money, but not the key to his home and wife. He continues, "Hurry. Walk quietly. Moment more. My heart" (*U* 9.1175), another reference to the organ of feeling, this time without exclamation, underlining the emotional distress from not having the key to his heart in his pocket. As he gains the safety of the museum he is able to stop and his hand finds something – if not what he was looking for on a conscious level (we can't be sure what that is, though there is evidence that it is his key) - he does find the lemon soap. This associatively brings him to what he is missing, to the thought he has been trying to avoid – Molly: "lotion have to call." In the "Ah soap there I yes. Gate. Safe!" (*U* 9.1192-1193). The "Ah soap" seems more of a surprised exclamation than 'ah I've found what I was looking for.' But even in the moment of near-miss with his rival, Bloom is able to affirm 'yes' – on one level acknowledging Boylan and all he means. On another level, he finds emotional and psychological sanctuary from that meaning.

An all-consuming joy

The associative chain of memory leads to another episode of body-memory and Molly in the seedcake scene. Bloom is thinking through his gut. We can imagine, that recalled at a time other than lunch time, the memory might not have taken on such a gastronomic inflection.[275] Yet what Joyce called the peristaltic episode signals a working through Bloom's ingestion, sensation, processing, gaining sustenance, and finally expulsion helps to process the conscious and unconscious issues that Bloom is facing. Joyce shows us that the body thinks. There is an affective transfer between objects (food/gut). Just as the food helps Bloom feel better, the dynamic process comingles with emotion and memory: "Glowing wine on his palate lingered swallowed. Crushing in the

[275] Modern research shows the strong correspondence between gut and mood, as Elizabeth Wilson states: "Mood is not added onto the gut, secondarily, disrupting its proper function; rather, temper, like digestion, is one of the events to which enteric substrata are naturally (originally) inclined" Wilson, Elizabeth A. "Gut Feminism" *differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies*, Vol 15, issue 3, 2004. See also Wilson, Elizabeth A. *Gut Feminism*. Duke University Press, 2015.

winepress grapes of Burgundy. Sun's heat it is. Seems to a secret touch telling me memory. Touched his sense moistened remembered" (*U* 8. 897-99). Psyche and soma are masticated together, evoking an embodied memory. The affective force of food produces rumination in Bloom. Joyce shows how the entanglement of food, memory, sense, affect, feeling, anxiety, and environment all relate to one another and provoke a haunting of memory and feeling in Bloom's seedcake scene. Confirmed by the shift to free indirect discourse, the narration tells us "Touched his sense moistened remembered" (*U* 8. 899). Here the link between sensations that are points of interception with the world trigger a memory. Yet the phrase also suggests that the sense, the body, retains memory: "his sense remembered" because it was moistened by the wine, emphasizing the fact that memories are not purely cognitive.

The phantom seedcake is only in memory, but it causes physiological responses.[276] Bloom recalls the open-mouthed kiss, with "sticky gumjelly lips" (*U* 8. 909) that tastes good, both then and now. In this moment things not normally associated with consumption are described as food: Molly's "sticky gumjelly lips," the "currants" dropped by the nannygoats (themselves food), Molly's body tasty "hot I tongued her" relishing her flesh and flavor (*U* 8. 915). Described as delicious, sex becomes a non-destructive form of cannibalism that guides the chapter. The exchange is flesh against flesh, food of desire, evoking sexual hunger, the cycle of desire. Flesh and feelings can be consumed, taken within and as the nannygoats' currants suggest, pebbled out again, the cycle of life, desire, affect.

The tenderness and beauty of the scene is joyful; Bloom recalls feeling joy. Joy here is conceived of as a coupling of opposites, the capacity to enjoin both joy and other more mundane things. Joy is created by an exchange that involved flesh and food: "Softly she gave me in my mouth the seedcake warm and chewed. Mawkish pulp her mouth had mumbled sweetsour of her spittle. Joy: I ate it: joy. Young life, her lips that gave me pouting" (*U* 8. 907-909). Bloom receives the seedcake from Molly, chewed and containing the "sweetsour of her spittle." Bloom acknowledges its sweet and sourness, in fact describes it as "mawkish pulp." The word mawkish is important, suggesting a possible queasiness or sickness, something possibly disgusting. The alliteration of the line "*M*awkish pulp her *m*outh had *m*umbled *s*weet*s*our of her *s*pittle" (emphasis mine) is both beautiful, poetic, and yet viscerally evocative, perhaps causing mawkishness in the reader as they

[276] Of course, the seedcake is deeply symbolic as 'seed' links to semen, representing their youthful fertility and their as yet unrealized children which Bloom carries within him, and which he has previously lamented the loss of. Molly offering the cake is reminiscent of mother birds regurgitating food for their young, suggesting Molly's role as Gaia provider of sustenance, but also recalls Joyce's desire (which we see in Bloom) to be overwhelmed and babied by a woman. Molly's seed and agency circulates alongside Bloom's receptivity and 'womanly-man" tendencies which results in his imaginatively giving birth to eight children in the "Circe" episode.

imagine the sticky-spittle-seedcake. Though we know Bloom "hates dirty eaters," we also know he relishes food that many find disgusting. And indeed, he eats her offering, and with it joy – "Joy: I ate it: joy." This line has many valences. Of course, eating the seedcake was joyous, symbolising the sexual and emotional connection between the two young lovers. In this case the colon introduces an emphasis, repeating the fact he ate the seedcake, the repetition indicating his willingness and relish of it. The repetition of joy emphasizes the ecstatic feeling the exchange evoked for Bloom. Yet we could think of the colon as an illustration or explanation of joy, a one-word sentence. To think of "I ate it" as an illustration or explanation, then we understand that he consumed joy: took it inside himself, swallowed it and felt more joy as a consequence. Perhaps it offers a sequence, or even an equivalence: Joy = I ate it = joy. This makes joy consumable, even more material, something outside of the self that is taken within. Of course, the colon has an alimentary connection, it is not just a mark of punctuation but a part of the body that is crucial to digestion. The joy, like the seedcake, circulates through the body. Affectively speaking, a force is encountered, registered, and reencountered by and through others. Or might the colon be considered as a list after joy: I ate it and it gave me more joy. Considered typographically the two mirroring colons could be thought of Bloom on top of Molly, consuming her through his desire, and both finding mutual joy in the exchange. All of these meanings connect and entangle, building the intensity of the memory for the reader, as it builds within Bloom.

The wave of joy continues throughout the recollection of the memory. The mention of joy increases the speed of the staccato sentences, the listing of parts of Molly's body. The memory tumbles out, as excited, panting perhaps, as young Bloom was on Ben Howth: "Wildly I lay on her, kissed her: eyes, her lips, her stretched neck beating, woman's breasts full in her blouse of nun's veiling, fat nipples upright. Hot I tongued her. She kissed me. I was kissed. All yielding she tossed my hair. Kissed, she kissed me" (*U* 8. 914- 916). Bloom is active here, kissing and tonguing; still, there is mutuality and exchange. Having previously kissed her, he feels kissed in return: "She kissed me. I was kissed." The moment of joyful memory triggered by the sunshine wine closes with what seems like a sad, even pathetic, reflection of "Me. And me now" (*U* 8. 917). This abrupt end compresses the comparison – look how much happier I was then and look at me now. A sad reflection on how far the mighty have fallen and how the love between Molly and Bloom has disintegrated; this impasse is supported by the stuckness of the flies on the window pane. "Stuck, the flies buzzed" (*U* 8. 918). The lines can also be read as 'that was me and it is *still* me,' meaning that he still loves Molly as he did when they first met. This is supported by Bloom's continuing concern and constant circulation of thoughts back to his wife. Yes, the flies are stuck, but are they grasped in a death embrace, or sexual union (or both). The stuck flies buzzing recall John Donne's "The Flea,"

but also the dogs going at it which awoke Molly's desire and led to the conception of Rudy as described in "Hades." Of course, that did not end entirely well either, but joy in Joyce always contains both joyful and mawkish pulp.

Joy not Epiphany

The instances of joy that I trace and examine here are not epiphanic. The characters receive no sudden insight; there is no breaking through of reality to reveal the 'whatness' of the object. Epiphany carries with it a connotation of revelation, whatever the character of the sudden emotion that accompanies it. As Morris Beja explains, "something is revealed, there is a feeling of new knowledge gained instantaneously and apparently irrationally."[277] Instead, I have focused on the effort to live day-by-day, the striving to remain embedded and embodied in the ongoingness of life. Nothing new might be known - in fact some things might be repressed further - but the joy is entangled with a will to persist. This effort, the movement from one state to another, is what Spinoza would associate with joy - an attitude that, I suggest, Joyce shares. Elsewhere, in my May Sinclair chapter, I have discussed epiphanic moments of joyful revelation, and I would certainly argue that epiphanies in Joyce can be joyful, for example when Bloom has a vision of Rudy at the close of "Circe." However, I consider a form of joy previously overlooked in Joyce scholarship, and therefore to emphasize the joy incorporated into the "daily bread of experience" as Stephen says in *Portrait*, "into the radiant body of everyday life" (*P* 195).

Finnegans Wake

Short Introduction to *Finnegans Wake*

Written over the course of 17 years, Joyce's *magnum opus* was published in instalments between 1928 and 1937 under the title *Work in Progress.* It was finally published as *Finnegans Wake* in 1939, two years before Joyce's death. The *Wake* is a highly experimental modernist text written at a moment of the twentieth century when aesthetic experimentation sought new modes of representation in order to respond to intense changes and cultural shocks, such as WWI. With little discernible plot, an idiosyncratic style (even by avant-garde standards), and a polyglossic lexicon, the *Wake* earns its reputation as the most difficult novel written in English. Fellow modernist Ezra Pound wrote to Joyce on reading an extract of the *Work in Progress* stating that, "Nothing short of divine vision or a new cure for the clap can possibly be worth all the circumambient peripherization"

[277] Beja, Morris. *Epiphany in the Modern Novel*. University of Washington Press, 1971.

(cited in Ellmann 584). The *Wakes's* rhizomatic trajectories, its difficulty, its refusal of interpretive conclusion, its opaque relationship to language, and its quixotic dynamism are some of the reasons that the *Wake* strongly resonates with affect studies.

Joyce seeks to see and experience things anew. Having written of the day in *Ulysses*, Joyce stated that he wanted "to write this book about the night" and "reconstruct the nocturnal life."[278] John Bishop in *Joyce's Book of the Dark* argues that the *Wake* is not simply a book about a dream, or about what one remembers about being asleep on awakening, but rather a book that "reconstructs the night" (Bishop 26). As Joyce himself stated, "One great part of every human existence is passed in a state which cannot be rendered sensible by the use of wideawake language, cutanddry grammar and goahead plot" (Joyce cited in Ellmann 584-5). The book is, on one level, the story of a publican in Chapelizod (near Dublin), Humphrey Chimpden Earwicker (or Here Comes Everybody), referred to here as H.C.E.. His wife, Anna Livia Plurabelle, referred to as A.L.P., and their three children: the twins Shem and Shaun, and their daughter Issy.[279] Instead of a single plot, *Finnegans Wake* has a number of kernel stories, some of them occurring in hundreds of versions, from a word or two long to several pages. The most ubiquitous is the repetition of the motif of the Fall, figured as the Fall of Man into original sin; the tumble from a ladder by an Irish builder, Tim Finnegan, (whose wake is referred to in the title); and the fall from status of H.C.E. due to the rumor of an unspecified indiscretion in Phoenix Park, Dublin, of him (possibly) spying on two girls peeing. Life, history, character, language are all cyclical - all recycled, all a load of rubbish - all the same with a difference "the seim anew".[280] Dreamlike, and I would suggest perhaps affect-like, the figure of H.C.E., for example, can be Neanderthal man, transformed into the invaders of Ireland, *and* St. Patrick, *and* the Russian General, *and* Parnell – the founder figure –connected, linked, the same with a difference, dynamic, processual. Each iteration of the 'character' exists simultaneously on multiple planes of narrative: polysemantic and poetic. Each figure is multiple. Bodies, minds, beings are protean, constantly shifting and responding to stimuli that it is not possible to fully grasp, not closed or limited, but rather porous, not only one but also many.

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[278] Joyce cited in Bishop, John. *Joyce's Book of the Dark: Finnegans Wake*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993, 4.
[279] Joyce himself said " I might easily have written this story in the traditional manner [...] Every novelist knows the recipe [...] It is not very difficult to follow a simple, chronological scheme which the critics will understand [...] But I, after all, am trying to tell the story of this Chapelizod family in a new way" Joyce, James, cited in McLuhan, Eric. *The Role of Thunder in Finnegans Wake*. University of Toronto Press, 1997, p.13.
[280] Joyce drawing on Giambattista Vico's cyclical theory and use of etymology and mythology to explain events, for a recent discussion of Joyce's use of Vico and Bruno, see Verene, Donald Philip. *James Joyce and the Philosophers at Finnegans Wake*. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2016.

Strength Through Joy

In my initial turn to analysis of *Finnegans Wake*, I want to firstly consider the disturbing appropriation of joy at the turn of the twentieth century. To consider joy in Modernism is to face the problem of Nazi Germany co-opting the word 'joy' and making it 'compulsory' in order to meet fascist and capitalist objectives. *Kraft durch Freude* (*KdF*), or 'strength through joy' was a propagandist slogan that represented Germany's nationalistic drive to maximize the productivity of workers. After the disbanding of the workers' unions by Hitler, the German Labor Front was established to manage discipline, wages, and working hours, as Hitler had declared it necessary to "control not only the working hours but the leisure hours of the individual."[281] Robert Ley was put in charge of the *KdF* and proclaimed that "workers were to gain strength for their work by experiencing joy in their leisure."[282] Sports, hiking, health clubs, day trips, and displays of athletic Aryan bodies were organized for the Führer.[283] Pleasure and leisure couched under the word 'joy,' became compulsory.

Ostensibly a state-operated leisure organization, the German Labor Front was active between 1933-1945, though most activities ended at the start of World War II. *KdF* was established to promote the advantages of National Socialism and to provide worker 'benefits' without significant economic change; the *KdF* program claimed to remove social barriers by making middle-class leisure activities available to the working class. This was mainly achieved through subsidized travel to Germany-friendly countries of lower economic status, which served the dual purpose of providing a break for workers and allowing them to compare Germany favorably with poorer countries. Less ideologically, it also offered a means of boosting the German economy. Offered as a means of apparent social mobility, *KdF* became a mode of placating any dissidence or labor organizing. *Kraft* may be translated as physical energy, potency, or vigor, and *freude* to mean pleasure, fun, or gladness. The scheme was to target individual bodies to increase their vigor through pleasure and rest, in order to make them more productive to a broader, nationalist power. Finding pleasure in work ('Beauty of Labor') and strength for work through 'joy' in their leisure activities was the crux of the Nazi program. Many workers were pragmatic: "If you get it [a holiday] so cheaply, then it's worth raising your arm now and then!" said one Social Democratic agent (cited in Evans, 472).

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[281] Snyder, Louis L. *Encyclopedia of the Third Reich*. Wordsworth, 1998, p 209.
[282] Evans, Richard. *The Third Reich in Power*, 2005, p.466.
[283] A British Pathé news reel of a Strength through Joy parade in Hamburg (1938) can be seen here: https://www.britishpathe.com/video/strength-through-joy. A short preview of a film of the cruise liner "Robert Ley" filmed during a visit by Hitler (1939) can be seen here: https://www.britishpathe.com/video/robert-ley-aka-hitler-aboard-the-robert-ley/query/Strength+Through+Joy . This display entitled "Swinging for Beauty" (1939) looks to be an example of the regimented exercise regimes organized by the *KdF* campaign: https://www.britishpathe.com/video/swinging-for-beauty/query/Strength+Through+Joy

Though the word 'joy' was co-opted, the experience was rarely described as something that felt joyful. Indeed, many were aware of the dangers to individuality and saw the surveillance at the heart of the scheme. As an official at the Labour Front concluded about 'relaxing cruises' in 1940, "[it] does not really bring relaxation if the tourist has to go back at the end to the material oppressiveness of his everyday existence" (cited in Evans 476). Adam Potkay concludes, "joy" did not fare well as a term of phrase in the twentieth century, as it became a "suspect term of phrase" associated with "politics, adverts, and revivalist religion" (221). I argue, however, that to consider modernist authors' relationships to the feeling and phrase 'joy' is in a sense to reclaim it from its commodified and fascist valence, without erasing its history.

Joyce makes explicit reference to the Nazi program of 'Strength through Joy' in *Finnegans Wake*, offering a challenge to the will-to-mastery and productive leisure time dictated by the Nazi regime. Joyce reimagines the external political conflict and will-to-dominate as a familial drama. He introduces the phrase at the opening of book four, at the twilight of the dawn (recalling the Wagner's 'Twilight of the Gods' and the dawning of a new day/regime). There is to be a power shift from H.C.E. to Shaun – the son/sun on the rise - all will begin again, "the seim anew" (*FW* 215. 24). Shaun, the postman, is a blonde "nangel" [an angel] (222. 22), Aryan-like, in his guise as Chuffy he is clean and pure "Unclean you art not. Outcaste thou are not. …You are pure" (237. 21-22,25). Shaun the Post is associated with words that foreshadow the thunderclap that will accompany the next Viconian cycle of history. He is the "hundering blundering dunderfunder of plundersundered manhood" (*FW* 596.3). To *hunder* is to do harm, to injure, or to disparage and belittle. The thundering founder (*dunder* is Dutch for thunder) Shaun will plunder the riches of the house (including their shared incestuous love-object, daughter-sister, Issy) and sunder H.C.E. from power. As H.C.E. dozes, half conscious, Shaun returns "renascenent; fincarnate," (*FW* 596. 4). Renascent, ascendant, resplendent, Finn incarnate (Tim Finnegan and the hero Finn McCool). Book three, chapter three, referred to as "The Starchamber Quiry" depicts "senators four" (474. 31), or the "quartermasters" (477 13). The senators change guise to Matthew Gregory, Marcus Lyons, Lucas Metcalfe Tarpey, and Jonny na Hossaleen, and they interrogate Shaun in his iteration as Yawn.[284] In this same section Joyce connects these religious imperial impulses to fascism and to Shaun/Yawn through the German language. Joyce further satirizes the Nazi yoking of nationalism and racial supremacy to strength and joy, referring to the German language as "Djoytsch" (*FW* 485. 13). Yawn is the socially mobile son of H.C.E., on the rise to take over his father's position. It is telling then,

[284] The "starchamber quiry" refers to the Court of the Star Chamber, a perogative court active between 15th-16th century in England. Made up of judges and privy counsellors to offer supplementary justice to common-law courts, the Star Chamber was able to act on individual complaints or information (like the unclear accusations against H.C.E.), and to give verdict and punishment without jury.

that as Yawn/Shawn as son/sun is gaining strength, so Yawn/Shawn seems to be "sprakin sea Djoytsch" (*FW* 485. 13). He is speaking German as he enjoys his rise to power. Yet he is also speaking "Joyce," and so the dawning sun/son Yawn enables him to slip from *their* attempts at mastery over him. The Masters wonder, "Are we speachin d'anglas landadge or are you sprakin sea Djoytsch?" (*FW* 485. 8, 11-13) ['are we speaking the English language (and therefore on recognizable linguistic *terra firma*) or are we at sea speaking Joyce/German?']. The ambivalent possibilities are simultaneously violent and emancipatory, pointing to the never fully transparent nature of communication, and the possibility for manipulation of minds, feelings, and bodies.

Though H.C.E., only just awakening, does not see Shaun return nor does he know of the imminent transition, he senses it. The feeling of discomfort has him turning in his bed and hearing fateful messages from the radio's weather report: "It was a long, very long, a dark, very dark, an allburt unend, scarce endurable, […] Endee he sendee. Diu! The had goning at gone, the is coming to come. […] Doom is the faste" (*FW* 598. 6- 10,11). After the long, dark night of the soul, the end is coming from the three-in-one of Shem/Shawn/H.C.E. ('sendee' signifying Shem, the sender of the letter, Shawn the deliverer of the letter, and H.C.E. the addressee of the letter). The 'coming to come' recalls the second coming. Doom is coming fast, or nearly here (*fast* is German for nearly). It is within this violent end that H.C.E. awakens to a new day and ponders the need to move "through strength towards joyance" (*FW* 598.25-26).[285] In Spinozan terms, to move towards joy is to increase in capacity, especially in the knowing of self and God. As H.C.E. moves from his dreamstate to being awake, so his night-knowledge of his son's ascendency lingers, but his capacity to know it increases with his awakening conscious mind.

Strength coming from joy, or revitalization from pleasure, is shifted and becomes "*through* strength towards joyance" (my emphasis, 598.25-26). Moving through strength and embracing passivity moves H.C.E. towards joy (we might also hear 'giants' in joyance, an echo of his former glory). [286] The play of meaning in the phrase "through strength" can mean 'because of strength' or if we think of strength as a state, moving through and away from strength to into the state of joy. So that ultimately it is joy and pleasure, and even Joyce (or a Joycean quality of joy) that is the object, rather than power or strength as force. It is not control or mastery that is the focus of the phrase for Joyce, but rather the joy. Vicki Mahaffey juxtaposes Joyce's book of the dark against "the Nazi

[285] The reference to "through strength towards joyance" (*FW* 598.25-26*)* comes in book four, which is the *the* book after the Shaun/Yawn section discussed above. Shawn escapes being mastered in order to master others in his turn. See the Unmastery section.

[286] The suffixes '-ance' and '-ence' mean quality, action, state or process, so to move towards joyance is to move towards the quality or state of joy

celebration of light and strength" (197). Joyce reminds us there is joy within the dark, and that strength has a dark side.

There is danger in joy. Joy is not a good in itself; what you take joy from and who you share joy with matters, Nazi 'joy' in genocide being a case in point. Rather than recreate the holidays and controlled leisure of the *KdF* scheme, publican H.C.E. stages his own resistance. He is in control of his own 'fun' and is lying in bed refusing productivity. Joyce retains the pleasure of rest but refuses the productivity of fascism's coopting of joy by having H.C.E. lingering in bed, drowsing, lacking in physical vigor and delaying his return to the waking, working day. Strength is aligned with force, and force with dominance. H.C.E.'s assertive passivity – neither meeting the challenge of his sons, nor ceding his waning power – is one alternative to forging strength through joy. The starting of H.C.E.'s day is like the start of the universe in a microcosm. His sleeping self is dying and being born again into waking consciousness:

> Mildew, murk, leak and yarn now want the bad that they lied on. And your last words todate in comparative accoustomology are going to tell stretch of a fancy through strength to joyance, adyatants, where he gets up. Allay for allay, a threat for a throat
>
> (*FW* 598. 22-26).

The old Christian religion – the church also being a structure system that demands adherence to its rules and laws - is passing, represented by Mathew, Mark, Luke and John - homophonically linked to 'Mildew, murk, leak and yarn' (see below). It is time for a new start. So that H.C.E.'s listening to the sounds of the morning "comparative accoustomology" as he thinks about arising from sleep (a small death), whilst thirsting for a drink "a threat for a throat," becomes the start of the universe, the god rising again, The universe – in other cosmologies – coming from sound and water. In their "comparative accoustomology" which is comparative cosmology and also "acoustic-cosmology"- the beginning of the universe was with sound rather than the vision of the Bible. If the words at the start of the universe (in compare we hear *campare*, It. – 'to live') are compared, then they will tell a tale ("to tell stretch of a fancy") of fancy, or a lie about the joy of today ("joyance, adyatants" - Skt *adya*: today, now), where he (god and H.C.E.) gets up. "Allay", or Allah, another cosmology, created the universe from water – which is "a treat for the throat." This is not collective joy, nor socially mobile joy of external status, but rather joy accessible to everyone in its everyday smallness – through sleeping, waking, drinking, imagining – in short, living. Like Bloom's pleasure in the morning sounds of Molly's warm body rolling over in bed, the daily universe is made and unmade in the force of life, by daily joys. Though this does little to stop fascism itself, it does envision a different relation and physical orientation to capitalist and nationalist demands. In the community of the drinking punters, having fun at the wake of Tim Finnegan, along with H.C.E.'s refusal to

engage, Joyce offers a collective refusal of the idea of strength and the commodification of pleasure. He replaces it with a collective celebration of life even in death.

Reminder of Affect

It is perhaps useful to offer a brief reminder of my definition of affect. Affect is the capacity to affect and be affected, "considered as an encounter between the affected body and a second, affecting, body."[287] Affects are the transition or movement from one state to another, so that affect is always in process, in relation, linked to change, and is part of an encounter. Not possessed or contained within a sovereign subject, "affects openness is unconfinable in the interiority of the subject" and at the same time "is formative of subjects." [288] Spinoza defined a body by what capacities were connected and changed from experience to experience, so that affect is "a dimension of life" as Massumi puts it (*PA* vii). To live is to be subject to change (from forces without and within), and to increase, or decrease, the capacity to act (either mentally or physically). To read is to have an encounter that entails being affected, and the reader's capacity to act might be increased or decreased by the encounter. Spinoza identifies the state that increases the capacity to act and thereby increases life, as joy, and that which decreases our power to act (whether mentally, physically or emotionally) as sorrow. To read any book is to stage an encounter between multiple "bodies." The concepts within the book, the ideas it evokes, the emotional responses, are all bodies that encounter one another and are changed in that encounter. What is unique to *Finnegans Wake* is that Joyce stages an aesthetic encounter that is so granular and multi-directional that the intensity of the encounter is increased through the multilayered, ever-affected and affecting language. The language can be metaphorical or symbolic (or both), signification can be "loosed" (to borrow Sedgwick's phrase) and meaning proliferates and accumulates. These layers meaning thereby force the reader increase in capacity in order to encompass multiple meanings, and thereby, in Spinozan terms, it is joyful. [289] The capacity to sit with uncertainty, to experience multiple realities at once, and to read affectively, like the text itself, I would call encyclopaedic and the increased capacity that might be considered joyous.

[287] Massumi, Brian. "Introduction." Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. University of Minnesota Press, 198, p. xvi.
[288] Massumi, Brian. *Politics of Affect*. Polity Press, 2015, p x, hereafter referred to intext as *PA*.
[289] Kosofsky Sedgwick, Eve. *Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity.* Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2003, p.3.

Encyclopaedic Capacity

In 1976, Edward Mendelson coined the phrase "encyclopaedic narrative" and made an argument for a distinctive genre of writing of the same name. [290] An encyclopaedic narrative is a long and complex work of fiction that incorporates immense amounts of information, and as a genre shares a broad set of qualities, such as "a full account of a technology or science" (1270), an account of an art form other than fiction (1271), and utilizes a broad range of literary styles, offering *Ulysses* as one example of this style of narrative.[291] It is not my intention to debate the value or applicability of such a definition to *Ulysses*, but to note two things that Mendelson's definition suggests: first, the impulse to immensity in Joyce's work. The sheer mass and matter of the text offers an orientation that is abundant and joyful in its too-muchness, "Tootoo moohootch" (*FW* 485. 35-36). Part of my definition of an encyclopaedic capacity is the scale and size of Joyce's ambition for readerly engagement: the book is 628 pages long and contains the longest words written in English, and seeks to offer a protean version of "universal history" mixing "history and fable in a comic leveling" (Ellmann 544). Joyce sought to include everything. Nothing was beneath notice or pleasure. Clive Hart concurs, suggesting that Joyce attempted to "make it relevant to the world by including all given experience and every possible permutation of experience as well." [292] Readers must be willing to open their minds to discovering varied forms of knowledge across multiple disciplines: world religion, Irish mythology, history, and culture, world literature, over forty languages. As I will discuss later, this kind of breadth (if not equal depth) makes the *Wake* impossible to master. Rather, one must be a "masterbilker" (111.21) - to bilk is to deceive or avoid paying a debt- so that readers must bring what they have, collect what they can and, with a magpie-mind, collect fragments to piece together the meaning that is only ever contingent; meaning that may always be built upon and not complete. One must also build meaning collectively, bringing elements of knowledges together, for to build alone might result, like the Master Builder in a fall.

Second, to use the word "encyclopaedia" is to evoke a reference work, one that offers an "elaborate and exhaustive repertory of information on all the branches of some particular art or department of knowledge; *esp.* one arranged in alphabetical order."[293] Though the volume of material gestures to this meaning, there is an equal impulse with *Finnegans Wake* to *refute* the

[290] Mendelson, Edward. *Modern Language Notes: Comparative Literature*, 91, 6, 1976, pp. 1267 – 1275.
[291] He suggests that encyclopaedic narratives "attempt to render the full range of knowledge and beliefs of a national culture, while identifying the ideological perspectives from which that culture shapes and interprets its knowledge" (1269), and offers Mendelson offers Dante's *Commedia*, Rabelais' five books of *Gargantua* and *Pantagruel*, Cervantes' *Don Quixote*, Goethe's *Faust*, Melville's *Moby-Dick*, Joyce's *Ulysses*, and Pynchon's *Gravity's Rainbow* as exemplary of this genre (1267).
[292] Hart, Clive. "James Joyce's Sentimentality." *James Joyce Quarterly* Vol 41, 1-2, 2004, p27.
[293] "encyclopaedic | encyclopedic, adj." *OED Online*, Oxford University Press, December 2018, www.oed.com/view/Entry/61851. Accessed 14 December 2018.

encyclopaedic and signal the *impossibility* of cataloguing everything.[294] It is the sense of "exhaustive" that I suggest that the *Wake* resists. Joyce resists totalizing impulses and systems of thinking and social structures that would claim which claim mastery or ascendancy over all others (this anti-totalitarian impulse is also apparent in his criticism of strength through joy above). Joyce crafted the *Wake* to resist neat conclusions, or as Tim Cribb explains, "knowing the mind's insatiable appetite for systems of order, Joyce defeats it by surfeit."[295] Rather than collect everything in order to control and colonize the knowledge, I suggest that Joyce's text, via its form and style, creates a *radical openness* to *potentialities* and *multiplicities* of meaning that exceed cataloguing and ordering. This is where affect theory can offer a means of encountering Joyce's writing that recognizes the desire to include all things but also be in excess of the words on the page. The utility of the phrase 'encyclopaedic capacity' then is to gesture to both the Joycean impulse to include, but also its capacity to exceed, so that that the abundance and accumulation of knowledge, facts, thoughts, feelings, and impressions can be enormous, but not final and fixed. In the sections that follow I will explore the notion of capacity and potentiality, so that reading capaciously becomes a means of developing the capacity to engage the text. Then, in closing, I will touch upon the radical openness and uncertainty of unmastering the *Wake*.

Joyce found joy in largess, even making one permutation of his hero, H.C.E., a giant. Nothing was beneath (or in excess of) potential notice or pleasure. There is not only thematic multiplicity, but the breaking of language so that techniques of portmanteau, pun, and onomatopoeia ensure the proliferation of resonances and associations at the word, sight, and sound levels. This multiplicity and the radical openness that it implies are useful for thinking about, and writing about, affect. Nothing is singular or still, each element of language offers the opportunity for playful plurality. Clive Hart argues that Joyce designed the *Wake* to be forever in progress: "[he] made a text with as many loose ends as possible in order to ensure as many connections with as much experience as possible - the work is eternally in progress" (*Structure* 34). Philosopher and affect theorist, Brian Massumi, distinguishes between language that fixes an "established" meaning and a "matching" perception which thus "coagulates" (13) and is thereby fixed. Against this, he posits that any experience has an accompanying 'unique feeling' that "can never be exhausted by linguistic

[294] The opposition of containing all things and the impossibility of containing all things is particularly Joycean. Joyce takes the idea of the coincidence of opposites from the Italian philosopher Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) whose philosophy held that "every power in nature must evoke an opposite in order to realize itself and opposition brings reunion" (Verene 60). Bruno also held that "there is a single origin to everything – everything comes from an origin that is potentially everything …and thus the end of everything is already in the beginning – in the end is the beginning again" (Verene 60). This cycle end-in-beginning and beginning-in-end appealed to Joyce and can be seen in reflected in the *Wake* starting in the middle of the last sentence of the book.

[295] Cribb, Tim. "James Joyce: The Unconscious and the Cognitive Epiphany" *Modernism and the European Unconcious*. Peter Collier & Judy Davies (eds.) St. Martin Press, 1990, p 73.

expression," and that there is language "that can bring that inadequation between language and experience to the fore in a way that can convey the 'too much' of the situation – its charge – in a way that actually fosters new experiences" (13). Humor and poetic expression are two such modes of language (though he does not elaborate on why these forms do that work), only that they can communicate the "singularities of experience" in a specific and open way. I propose that is it the multivalent meanings associated with poetry and humor that permits the expression of the texture of experience. Humor, like poetry, means more than one thing and 'getting' the joke often relies on intuitions other than the rational (explaining a joke will often kill it). As Donald Verene points out, "Joyce makes jokes a way of speaking. Every line in the *Wake* is a joke, a juxtaposition of one meaning on another; no word is allowed to stand alone, to have a literal meaning; every word coincides with another."[296] Verene suggests that "a joke is a joy," linking joy and multiplicity in Joyce as I do, gesturing at the webbed connections between and within words. Laughter also injects intensity into the encounter, interrupting any steady flow of rational meaning, or as Joyce puts it, "he was down with the whooping laugh at the age of the loss of reason" (423.25-26). To encounter language and to attempt to express experience in a way that fosters new experiences, as per Massumi's notion of affective language, necessitates a new form of writing and reading, one to which I posit the *Wake* has one possible response, as the example below will demonstrate.

The style and form of *Finnegans Wake* seem to capture something essential about the potentiality of affect in its language. At the most fundamental levels – sounds, sight of letters, scaling up to whole words, phrases, sentences – everything is placed into unexpected connection. New words are made to create new relationships, to defamiliarize one's mode of thinking, and to estrange our relation to language. For example, Joyce incorporates ten thunderclaps in *Finnegans Wake,* the first 'thunder word' is on the opening page: "bababadalgharaghtakamminarronnkonnbronntonner-ronntuonnthunntrovarrhounawnskawntoohoohoordenenthurnuk!" (3.15-17). The reader is invited into the encounter in multiple ways. Perhaps by sounding the word aloud and understanding the meaning of the letter by the 'thunderous' sound it makes. Perhaps by recognizing a foreign word (or many) for 'thunder' among the seemingly random letters. Perhaps the reader will learn that each 'clap' contains one hundred letters - with the exception of the last, which contains one hundred and one – and thus make a link to the medieval stories of *The Thousand and One Nights.* That allusion might then lead a reader of Irish history to discover that during the same period in Ireland (around 1000AD), there were a lot of medieval manuscripts to support our knowledge of Viking raids leading

[296] Verene, Donald Philip. *James Joyce and the Philosophers at Finnegans Wake*. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2016, p.14.

to Norse settlement in Ireland.[297] The High Kings of Ireland were ousted eventually by Norman invaders and colonizers, and this links back to the multiple and hybrid languages. This is one small example of a *process* of reading the *Wake* affectively. Through metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, homophony, allusion, onomatopoeia, pun and portmanteau, Joyce used the tools that would ensure that any one thing would also mean many other things simultaneously, thus creating a world permeated by correspondences and connections.

The language of *Finnegans Wake* can be seen as a dedicated attempt to render the movement of the mind, the imagination, emotions in a non-waking state. Ordinarily the notion of mind clearly suggests a rational subject to whom the mind belongs. Even in the modernist period, where the fragmentation of mind and the exploration of the unconscious was at the intense beginning in art, the *Wake* broke apart the subject in unique ways. As McCracken articulates, "consciousness in the modernist novel – in the hands of Richardson or Joyce – is never subject:object but rather a being with, an intersubjectivity that exceeds our heads and goes over our heads, so that the subjective is remade through others and returns to us differently."[298] The circulation between text and reader to text returns changed. Words break and make fluid the representational flesh of the characters, as each person is multiple without a strong boundary of individual subjectivity. As Richard Ellmann notes, to Joyce "language is time's expression," and this temporal and spatial collapse of all things into a book of everything expresses "a series of coincidences which are general all over humanity. Words move into words, people into people, incidents into incidents like the ambiguities of a pun, or a dream. We walk through darkness on familiar roads" (551). Joyce scholar Kimberly Devlin points out that "in the *Wake* language is exposed as an irrevocably self-alienating medium" (*Wandering and Return* 67), and that in dream self-image is reiteratively reconstructed: "Self-image returns in dream in altered and destabilized forms: it becomes a text that is constantly being rewritten, a "traumscrapt" (*FW* 623) revised under the pressures of desire and anxiety" (*Wandering and Return* 66). By extension, the very language of the text undermines the notion of a stable 'self' that is able to be represented in language that is itself 'stable.' People and things become one, but they also become many, as discussed above.

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[297] The reader is faced with an unknown word and the task of sounding one hundred letters - reading it aloud is almost inevitable. Joyce's giant portmanteau, an amalgam of foreign words for thunder and onomatopoeic sounds, invites the reader to make the language come to life by voicing it. Some of the languages that the word contains include: French *tonnerre*, Italian *tuono*, Irish *tórnach*, Japanese *kaminari*, Hindustani *karak*, Greek *brontaô*, Swedish *aska*, Portuguese *trovão*, Danish *tordenen*. Invaluable to this list was McHugh, Roland. *Annotations to Finnegans Wake*. Third Edition. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006, and also Google translate.

[298] McCracken, Scott. "Dorothy Richardson and Stream of Consciousness." Stream of Consciousness Centenary Conference, May Sinclair Society, 26th-28th July 2018, Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, UK. Conference Presentation.

Seigworth and Gregg claim that "the real powers of affect" are in its potential to affect the *capacity* of a body: "a body's capacity to affect and be affected" (2, italics original). Capacities, as Ben Anderson proposes, are "always collectively formed" and "because capacities are dependent on other bodies, they can never exhaustively be given in advance."[299] Affective experience, he claims, "consists of bodily capacities to affect and to be affected that emerge and develop in concert" (9). Furthermore, the technological advances available to readers – hyperlinks within the digital text, websites dedicated to cataloguing allusions, digital concordances, online translation services, and the use of social media to exchange interpretative possibilities – is taking the relational beyond the human and into the animacies of the virtual. In order to have real change, not the rearrangement of the same conceptual furniture, one must – according to Massumi – become realigned with a "logic of relation" (70), a "being *of* the middle" (70), and embrace "the unfounded and unmediated in-between of becoming" (71).[300] Even collectively we do not master the text. We join it. We bring it alive and contribute to the animation of a 'more than human', more than textual life. To encounter the *Wake*, and to engage with it in order to pursue an intellectual openness is to increase the readers' capacity to read 'otherwise.'

Reading Capaciously

To engage with *Finnegans Wake* is to stage an affective encounter in two senses. First, being open to the *Wake* is a means of "thinking through affect" as Massumi calls it. This is an experimental mode of encounter that does not represent affect or reductively attempt to produce a definition of it. Rather it is "enacted" (*PA* vii). To read the *Wake* is to encounter a force that affects and is affected. The opacity of the language and lack of traditional novelistic scaffolding, such as plot and character development, insists on radical connections and interactions with the text that change the reader's method of reading and interpretive capacity. The polyvalent language does not permit a fixed form of knowledge production or meaning-making. Rather than language that "codifies" and that offers a referent that everyone can agree upon, Joyce's "traumscrapt" [transcript, traumatic script, *traum* is dream German - dreams script] (623 36), fractures and multiplies references, so that no unit of meaning (phrases, words, phonemes) stands singularly, and as such in the seemingly inexhaustible potentiality of meaning, *Finnegans Wake* is an especially affective text. Such a text demands a singular, as in particular and unusual, approach to reading. Scholars such as John Lurz and Finn Fordham have pointed out how the *Wake* frustrates and defies conventional reading, and

[299] Anderson, Ben. *Encountering Affect: Capacities, Apparatuses, Conditions*. Ashgate Publications, 2014, p 9-10.
[300] Massumi, Brian. *Parables of the Virtual Movement, Affect, Sensation*. Duke Univ. Press, 2002.

so requires alternative literary approaches, such as material, genetic, or expository, and scholars such as John Bishop have suggested that a form of ignorance is the best means of accessing the *Wake*.[301] Each of these approaches has value and methodological overlap; however, scholars have tended not to foreground feeling, or what I will call 'reading affectively' as a hermeneutic approach to the *Wake*.[302]

Finnegans Wake is a work of literature that immerses and absorbs readers, yet slips and dances away from intellectual certainty, neat conclusions, and the lofty generalizations of the reasoning, and reasonable, scholar. The text demands repeated significant encounters with it, taunting and teasing the reader with its density. I prefer the notion of *un*-sense for the *Wake*'s sense, which invokes notions of undoing, undermining, unravelling, and the unconscious. It is not that there is no-sense, rather meaning is co-created with the reader, and always contingent. Joyce decouples significance from meaning, daring scholars – with their close readings and hermeneutics of suspicion - to try and *know* the text in multiple ways. One might usefully consider the difference between *savoir* and *connaître* to differentiate a form of knowledge that reduces knowing to the accumulation of fact, and one that opens it to multiple forms of connection. S*avoir* is to acquire and work towards intellectual wisdom or learning. It is a sense of expertise, whereas *connaissance* carries a corporeal and relational connotation, to be acquainted with someone or something, to experience a place or thing. Joyce emphasizes *connaissance*, as it encompasses learning and expertise, but also a somatic and sensual sensing. The singular complexity of the text leaves well-practiced hermeneutic modes redundant. In order to engage with the *Wake* fully – and affectively - readers must pay attention to body of the reader as well as the body of the text.

Textual bodies come to be defined beyond the flesh, rather "bodies are defined not by an outer skin-envelope or other surface boundary but by their potential to reciprocate or co-participate in the passage of affect" (*ATR* 2). By this definition the body of the text is a co-participant that is able to affect and be affected. This is therefore to recognize that "sovereign consciousness—including reason—is an effect of a matrix of moving lines of force, travelling through us and leaving power in their wake"[303] The reader must cultivate a kind of synaesthesia, experiencing the text whilst

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[301] Lurz, John. "Literal Darkness: *Finnegans Wake* and the Limits of Print." *James Joyce Quarterly*. Vol 50, 3, 2013, pp 675-691. Fordham, Finn. *Lots of Fun at Finnegans Wake: Unravelling Universals*. Oxford University Press, 2007. Bishop, John. *Joyce's Book of the Dark: Finnegans Wake*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993.

[302] For informative approaches to reading and teaching *Finnegans Wake* see also Devlin, Kimberly J. "Attempting to Teach *Finnegans Wake*: Reading Strategies and Interpretive Arguments for Newcomers." *Joyce Studies Annual*, 2009, pp. 159-187; Norris, Margot, "Teaching *Finnegans Wake*. Between Domestication and Deconstruction," *James Joyce Quarterly,* Vol 39, issue 1, 2001, pp. 113-21; Saint-Amour, "Late Joyce and His Legacies: Teaching *Finnegans Wake* and its After-tale" *James Joyce Quarterly,* Vol 39, issue 1, 2001, pp. 123-34.

[303] Schaefer, Donovan O. "It's Not What You Think: Affect Theory and Power Take the Stage." Duke University Press Author Blog. Duke University Press, Feb 15 2016, [accessed 2nd December 2018], n.p.

mobilising all senses, and give credence to any impression that occurs.[304] Readers must use their "mind's ear, temptive lissomer" (*FW* 477.18). *Finnegans Wake* breaks conventions of language, in order to break habits of reading and feeling. When drawing on multiple languages, for example, Joyce often emphasizes sonority and rhythm over meaning, thus mixing sound, sight and sense. If readers read aloud, "In the name of Annah the Allmaziful, the Everliving, the Bringer of Plurabilities, haloed be her eve, her singtime sung, her rill be run, unhemmed as it is uneven!" (*FW* 104, 1-3), then it is possible to *hear* in the phrase "haloed be her eve, her singtime sung," a parody of the Lord's prayer. The rhythm of the language plucks at familiarities or passing similarities to make associative connection. The aural play on 'plurabilities' constructs A.L.P. as the bringer of possibilities, of many pluralities. This might make us think of children (who are mentioned later in the passage as rainbow colors). But equally we might hear 'Pleura' which are serous membranes, whose two layers enclose a potential space (A.L.P. the bringer of space, more room / womb/ children therefore more potential. Or readers might see "Plurabelle" reveals "belle" and links it to beautiful, or flowers (which A.L.P.'s daughter is also associated with), or the musical instrument striking at a religious ritual or church bells. In fact, Joyce suggests we develop "an earsighted view" (*FW* 143. 9-10), that moves objects from the distance of vision to be 'nearsighted' and come closer, in order to incorporate touch, intuition, and memory, association - permitting a fluidity of responses that refuses the traditional primacy of vision to reading. The prayer is transformed from the male/white Catholic godhead into an embodied woman with her most sexual parts celebrated, made divine: "Haloed be her eve." Unhemmed – ahem! – we might feel the throaty physical reaction that indicates judgement or discomfort - she is, that "naughty Livvy trinkettoes" – sloppy with her hem down, hinting at her less than pure status. But in unhemmed we also hear 'Un*hymn*ed' unsung - such women are unsung, and A.L.P. – like Molly Bloom in *Ulysses* is more spoken about than speaking, and in this passage gossiped about for her sensual sexuality, and queer watery flow. The perceiving bodies of readers encounters the text, which moves them -often through a sense of "almosts" not quite knowing but venturing, not quite understanding but willing to make associative leaps and folds, in order to co-create an unmastering unsense – that may or may not get tidied, ordered, and interpreted into orderly academic speech.

[304] A kind of synaesthesia is necessary, a cross-connection of the senses was an important element of art of the modernist period, where artists purposely attempted to blend and muddle the senses, like hearing colours, tasting words, or feeling images. Polina Dimova defines synaesthesia as "the confusion or conflation of sensory modalities, where one sense is experienced or described in terms of another" as in Charles Baudelaire's simile "perfumes sweet as oboes, green as prairies." Dimova, Polina. "Synaesthesia." The Routledge Encyclopedia of Modernism. Taylor and Francis, 2016. Available at: https://www.rem.routledge.com/articles/synaesthesia. doi:10.4324/9781135000356-REM1011-1 [Accessed 5 Sep. 2018].

To read affectively is to pay attention to scales and speeds, to attend to different scales in a way that provokes different intensities of attention. The viscosity of the language produces what Deleuze and Guattari might call "comparative works of flow" or "phenomena of relative slowness" and the contrary phenomenon of "acceleration and rupture."[305] The opacity of the language offers only an uneasy grasp on understanding. The text becomes a more demanding interlocutor as the ebb and flow of the perceived clarity accelerates or/and slows. The difficulty invites readers to slow down and linger over phrases, individual words, single letters, or phonemes. But it equally invites the reader to skim, and if reading aloud, to speak rhythmically without taking in each unit of meaning – aurally speeding over large tracts of text, gaining an impression, sometimes strong, sometime faint, but lingering over a trace and nearly-grasped sense or sensation. In *Finnegans Wake* language lingers through the body and in the memory, never quite dissipating, but often we cannot recall or bring it to order either. It offers what Valery calls "poetic language," which unlike prose and utilitarian language, lingers.[306] One knows utilitarian language has been understood, Valery suggests, "by the remarkable fact that my speech no longer exists: it has been completely replaced by its *meaning*" (italics original 64). Poetry on the other hand, Valery asserts "does not die for having lived; it is expressly designed to be born again from its ashes and to become endlessly what it has just been" (64). The language of the *Wake* refuses to be easily transformed into meaning, and confronts the reader with feelings, sensations, affects first, with ruptures of meaning bursting through. Meaning and argumentation are to be constructed later via deliberate thought and the diligent application of attention. Sensory meaning is primary and 'decoding' secondary. It seems particularly affective that the *Wake* stimulates attention in such a way that it is what instinctively 'sticks' to the mind-body assemblage that is prioritized before the rational mind can rally meaning.

The Letter episode, book 1 chapter 5, offers an example of Joyce's conception of literature and how to read with a capacious sense of embodiment. The theme of the letter runs throughout the novel. In this episode it is A.L.P.'s "untitled mamafesta" (104.5) [manifesto] written "by a Woman of the World who only can Tell Naked Truths about a Dear Man and all his Conspirators" (107.3-4). Like all things in the *Wake*, the letter is one thing - A.L.P's defense of H.C.E. - but also many other things. The letter is a "proteiform graph" or protean writing [from *graphicus*, Latin for writing] (107.9).[307] Reading is always in flux, dependent on context, identity, and perspective. Joyce uses

[305] Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. University of Minnesota Press, 1987, p.3-4).
[306] Valery, Paul. "Poetry and Abstract Thought" The American Poetry Review, Mar/April 2007 36 2, extracted from *Paul Valery The Art of Poetry* trans Denise Folliot, Princeton University Press 1958.
[307] The letter in the context of the book is A.L.P's epistle, her "mamafesta" that A.L.P dictates to her son, Shem the Penman who writes it for her, and which is then delivered by her other son, Shaun the Post. It states her defense of vague but nefarious accusations made against her husband (and their father) H.C.E. However, like all Wakean objects, the letter

Biddy the Hen as a means of discussing the fact that the identity of the reader impacts readerly perspective. Like the Book of Kells, stolen and discovered under a sod of earth, the letter was found "on that fatal midden" (110.19), later "changed into an orangery" (110. 27) by an "original hen" (110.16), known as "Belinda of the Dorans" (111.5). As she scratches up the letter her physical force impresses upon the text, "partly obliterated the negative to start with" and she fully encounters the text, making her mark. She touches, tastes, sees, smells the letter – engaging fully with it – and giving primacy to the sensorial process of discovery rather than meaning. This trans-species reading experience offers "sound sense" Joyce suggests– good sense and sense from auditory understanding rather than visual – "For her socioscientific sense is sound as a bell, sir" (112. 11-12). Colleen Jaurretche in her analysis of the letter's visual primacy offers a valuable insight: "[o]ur original hen invokes the epistemological crux of I.5 and the book: all language is filtered through perception, always subject to the senses" and "in the world of the *Wake* there is no mental process that is free of the sensory and tangible world."[308] One must adopt multiple perspectives, hold things "palpably nearer your pecker" while also taking a broader view, as "the farther back we manage to wiggle" then we might "see as much as the hen saw" (111. 30-36 – 112.1-2). Jaurretche argues that "the letter becomes a statement about alternative forms of literacy that do not depend on high learning, or even logical meaning, but rather…work to make us see" (79); not only see, I suggest, but experience (feel) the text fully. Like Biddy, see, hear, touch, look closely, look widely, take pleasure, take pause, assemble with others and reassemble again.

To read affectively is to shift focus to the *process* of reading and the importance of doing that collectively. The language of the *Wake* has multiplicity at its core, each new resonant reading reaching for potential relations across the text. Again, the letter bears witness to the collectivity central to writing and reading: "closer inspection of the bordereau would reveal a multiplicity of personalities inflicted on the documents" (107. 23-24). This pertains to the stains, scratches, and bodily residues that have marked the parchment, but also metaphorically speaking, all aspects of life – ancestral, biological, literary, historical, political, geographic - that had led to the (unknown) writer, penning the letter. Language literally lingers, meaning that the letter is old and fragmentary, leaving traces of times and relations past and bringing them into the present. This offers an analogy for the living reader coming to the letters of the *Wake*, and as I will discuss below, the 'dead' letter becomes once again vivified by the reading body. The force of the letter affects and is affected. The

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is also Joyce's version of the Book of Kells, an ancient illuminated manuscript; it is also a letter from an emigrated family member in America, sending seasons greetings and family gossip; it is also a letter describing the Boston Tea Party (1773). The letter and its delivery and content is a repeating motif throughout the *Wake*.

[308] Jaurretche, Colleen. "Joyce's Common Reader: A Primer for Sensory Consciousness in I.5." *Joyce's Allmaziful Plurabilities*. Kimberly, Devlin J. and Christine Smedly (ed). Florida: University Press of Florida 2015, p. 82.

letter is changed (affected) by its environmental context: "it has acquired accretions of terracious matter whilst loitering in the past" (114.28-29). Though it bears the marks of bodies, the letter is not owned, or closed, by any *one* person. It is it 'signed' with a "teatimstained terminal" that is "a cosy little brown study all to oneself" (114. 29-30), a stain, as worthy of note as a signature, as "a true friend is known much more easily, and better into the bargain, by his personal touch, habits of full or undress, movements, response to appeals for charity than by his footwear, say" (115.8-11). One must get to know, *connaître,* the *Wake* as a "true friend" – linger, sense, build relationships, in order to read affectively and effectively.

Like the letter, if it is discovered and read, then *Finnegans Wake* is a living text, in the sense that the complexity of the language continues to offer jumping off points for new flights of investigation and connection, so that new text-reader bodies are created. Eighty years on from its publication date, some associations, such as the references to popular songs or commodity items, might diminish in their power to be immediately recognizable and thus begin associative relations. Others, like Biblical references, are more immediately accessible; but the opacity and uncertainty create an openness that permits new interactions. The associations might be anachronistic for the original publication, but the relational circulation between text and reader offers an evolving access to the text. Readers, for example, might find contemporary allusions and associations to the text, links that follow forces from the body of the text, into the body of the reader. To insist that associative links into the text be limited to the years that Joyce was alive and writing is a convention of (reasonable) current scholarly literary standards.[309] In *Parables of the Virtual*, Brian Massumi states that "change is emergent relation, the becoming sensible in empirical conditions of mixture, of a modulation of potential. Post-emergence, there is capture and containment."[310] As meaning emerges, there is the possibility of becoming anything. Nothing is closed. This could describe reading with an open curiosity, in dialogue with multiple readers and contributors (whether reading group, seminar, classroom, or pub chat), rather than the "capture and containment" of writing, of concluding, and of 'mastering' the text. My argument is focused on the *process* of being in relation to the words on the page and psychically and somatically *experiencing* that relationship. The *Wake* offers playful provocations that create new relational circuits into and out of the text. To the common reader, the contemporary associations offer a living text and active relationship to it. This fresh cycle

[309]This is not to say that all associations or interpretations are equally valuable, arguable, or supported within the text – they are not, but as teachers as well as scholars, it is imperative that we find new modes of access and engagement to older and more difficult texts. To allow "circumcentric megacycles" of thinking isn't the same as 'anything goes'. To use cognitive connections as a means of bridging time and ideas in this particular text is a means of offering a more capacious thinking process can be (or not) corralled into more logical and reasonable coherence for the academy.
[310] Massumi, Brian. *Parables of the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation*. Duke University Press, 2002, p. 77.

of associations finds support in the Viconian cycles that form a motif in the *Wake*. As civilizations fall and histories fade, new histories arise adding to the midden of accumulated knowledges, "the orangeflavoured mudmound" of history (*FW* 111.34), keeping its affective forces dynamic.

This is what we might call an agential association, meaning to give the power to act, to "set in motion, drive forward" to be active and affected. This is also to be agential in the sense of being adjacent, making connections to and with material and non-material things, permitting things that are near though not necessarily overlapping to connect us to new associations and thinking. To read affectively is pay attention to these agential associations and the *Wake's* ability to accrete force-relations forms its capaciousness and its joy. Joy, for Spinoza, is the increased capacity to act, feel, perceive and refers to the intensity of the encounter. To live is to change, and to immerse oneself in the intensity of the *Wake* is, potentially, a means of "experiencing the eventfulness and uniqueness of every situation" (13). As Joyce writes in the letter, to do this is to be open to the multiple interpretative possibilities, and this is akin to "commanding movement," but rather "it's about navigating movement. It's about being immersed in an experience that is already under way" (13). It is about interpretative ongoingness, the movement from one insight to another that might link associatively, or thematically, or through linking of images or sounds to another element.

Renowned *Wake* scholar Clive Hart sensed something of this relationship and is critical of it, calling this dynamic 'sentimental': "Perhaps the most serious single criticism that one can make of *Finnegans Wake* is that it relies too much on the reader's response to things to which it points, rather than to things which it creates. […] Emotion may be attributed where it is either not warranted or not directly evoked" (2004, 34). Yet if we take this pointing seriously, as part of the project of the *Wake*, then the circulation of affective forces between the text and reader becomes integral to the reading process, not in excess of, i.e. sentimental. The accusation of sentimentality is itself a highly gendered one, 'too much' often being code for the irrational, the embodied, the emotional, all of which is conflated with the womanly.[311] As I have argued, part of the challenge that the *Wake* makes to readers is to encompass modes of understanding that reach beyond the rational and to incorporate them into their experience of the text. Emotion and affect are motivational systems that push readers to continue on this difficult engagement. This is something that the book itself reflects upon – both the intellectual puzzle but more clearly in the readerly frustration: "who is hallhagal wrote the durn thing anyhow?" – who in all hell wrote the darn/damn/bad [*durnoi*, Russian for bad] thing anyhow? (107. 36-108. 01) An encyclopaedic text requires its reader to have an encyclopaedic capacity:

[311] For more on sentiment and modernism see Clark, Suzanne. *Sentimental Modernism: Women Writers and the Revolution of the Word*. Indiana University Press, 1991.

collective, contingent, agentially associative – all these orientations offer an important means of reading the *Wake* affectively.

In distinction from Hart, I suggest that readers coming together to share theories, insights, feelings, and observations can form an important means of relationing to the *Wake.* As it is impossible for any *one* individual to have complete and absolute knowledge of the *Wake*, so the book encourages a transindividual mode of inquiry that encourages the circulation of affect. The *Wake* offers a difficult and capacious pleasure. Joyce, at the level of syntax, breaks open words and decouples signifier and signified, challenging hermeneutic norms in order to create a joyful freedom to not-know. *Finnegans Wake* thus offers an intertextuality that reaches beyond the boundaries of the page, allowing readers to break paradigms of reading, and creates the possibility for a form of democratic cultural activity and meaning-making. This collectivity is an important part of the *Wake*'s skepticism of enlightenment values and refusal of mastery, as I will discuss in the following section.[312] In fact, Joyce had a vision of *Finnegans Wake* as a radically democratic novel. He produced a book about a state common to us all, sleep, that contained all history, all time, and all things, so that it could be read by everyone. As Clive Hart explains, "He saw potential readers in waitresses and pot-boys and was genuinely distressed when people showed no appreciation of his work" (2004, 34). Multiple readers must pool knowledge and make multiple returns to the text (re*joy*cing), all of which forces the individual reader to forgo a claim to mastery. This reminds us that reading is never really a solitary act, we are always haunted by the ghosts of words and the voices of other readers. Seigworth and Gregg call this form of relation "a rhythm, a fold, …or a shape [that] comes to mark the passages of intensities …in body-to-body /world-body mutual imbrication" and in "always more-than-human collectivity" (*ATR* 13). The *Wake* offers a complicated, capacious pleasure. The plane/place of experiential reading invites an attunement with something greater than the individual, something akin to affect, that might "fall under the ban of our infrarational senses" (19.36). In this circuitry of words entering the ears and sense of readers, to be returned again to the text, time and again in order to partake in the modulating intensity of co-creation – the co-creation of a reading experience. This is part of building an encyclopaedic capacity.

[312] It is not that one cannot read *Finnegans Wake* alone and gather great expertise in the book – many scholars have – but the book itself resists being mastered and fixed by meaning. In addition, at least, readers are usually reading McHugh's annotations and googling words or phrases, so that the network of relations expands out beyond the individual. To reach out beyond the text for clarification and confirmation might be standard reading practice, but the *Wake's* form necessitates that reaching out more than most texts.

Unmastering Affect

In the *Wake* Joyce resists systems of thinking and social structures that would claim mastery over the individual (also apparent in his criticism of strength through joy above). The *Wake* is fascinated with mastery and what I call *unmastery.* In the creative and capacious system of thinking, the *Wake* refuses to lead the individual to answers (to master) but demands the reader cultivate incredible skills and patience (self-mastery) at the same time as incorporating forms of knowledge that disrupt rational modes of comprehension (unmastery).[313] Unmastery, I suggest is an idea that can be developed from an affective reading of Joyce's work, which allows us to consider how his work undoes, unthinks, unravels key ideas that pertain to mastery. Mastery is linked to certainty, dominance, authority, single-mindedness, a sovereign subject, and the institutions that support those qualities, e.g. school, home, religion, work, literary canons. Unmastery asks readers to unthink typical, often exhausted, ways of thinking and reading (as I discussed in the 'Reading Affectively' section). Indeed, reading the *Wake* brings into question the value we place on certain knowledge systems over others, for example logic over the irrationality of laughter. As Vicki Mahaffey articulates, *Finnegans Wake* "registers deep suspicion of the values of enlightenment."[314] *Finnegans Wake* confronts readerly commonplaces and techniques and demands the capacity to hold multiple things in rhizomatic simultaneity. Tim Cribb calls Joyce's study of the mind in his novels a stand against "the arrogance of reason," and argues that part of what differentiates him from systematic psychoanalysts is that "his sense of the sheer diversity and hence unpredictability of the unacknowledged forces at play in the mind's operations is only matched by the keenness of his sense of the insistence with which the mind will nonetheless be operating" (71). Julietta Singh considers the dehumanizing potential of mastery and insists that scholars must "become exiled from subjectivities founded on and through mastery" because of the "continued liberal enchantment" of intellectual discourse "with a subject that remains 'transparent' and unmarked by various categories of difference." [315]All characters are marked and dark in the opacity of the *Wake*, and Singh gestures at the ethical possibility within a refutation of mastery.

Unmastery is simultaneously what *Finnegans Wake* teaches, demands, and makes possible. It is linked to the encyclopaedic immensity of the book, to forms of knowledge, and the capacities that

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[313] This does not imply a sovereignty of the rational subject over all aspects of life, the *Wake* itself demonstrates how little control one has of their own internal lives and forces.

[314] Mahaffey, Vicki. *Modernist Literature: Challenging Fictions*, Blackwell, 2007, p. 197.

[315] Since completing this chapter, Julietta Singh has published a book on mastery, focusing on postcolonial literature and theory and offering "dehumanism" as a means of tracing mastery as a lingering colonial politics in the work of postcolonial theory. She draws on posthumanism and new materialism to offer a concept of dehumanism as a mode of engagement that recognizes mastery and seeks to do critical work other than it. Though my chapter was completed before her work was published and brought to my attention, I found useful parallels in our concerns regarding mastery. See Singh, Julietta. *Unthinking Mastery: Dehumanism and Decolonial Entanglements*. Duke University Press, 2018, p 4.

it asks its readers to cultivate. If we define knowledge as recognizing something, or being acquainted or familiar with something, then the faculty of understanding remains open and mobile. This is the faculty of understanding and the state of knowledge to which I would argue the *Wake* aspires. Yet to know is also to apprehend "fact or truth with the mind; clear and certain perception," and "the fact or state of having a correct idea or understanding of something; the possession of information about something."[316] To *know* the *truth*, to be in *possession* of the *facts* that are *correct*, is to close any other interpretative possibilities. It is to take ownership of that area of knowledge and to refuse to connect to other potentialities. This is a form of mastery that limits the play of language and meanings, and this I argue, is what the *Wake* critiques and resists.

Some critics lament this inability to own or master the text. In an interview, Fritz Senn rather wistfully laments that "*Finnegans Wake* cannot be dominated, controlled, domesticated, in spite of our efforts" and confesses this is why he "gave up" as a *Wake* scholar – though not as an avid reader.[317] This ambivalence is what I would call the affective texture of unmastery and is part of the pleasure of it: the recognition of the impossibility of mastery, whilst simultaneously being drawn by to engagement with the text. To engage with the *Wake* is to be uncertain (to read affectively is to embrace this state). Joyce suggested that this uncertainty, or doubt, can offer a means of bringing people into relationship. Asked what was greater as a power to hold people together- faith or doubt – Joyce's response was clear, "doubt is the thing. Life is suspended in doubt like the world in the void. You might find some sense of this in *Exiles*" (Joyce quoted in Ellmann, 557).[318] To be uncertain is to leave open possibilities and to tempt a reader to "Finnagain" (5. 10) [sin again, end again, return again] because in this recursive text, to end (*fin*, French for end) is to begin again. The letter, synecdoche for the text as a whole, makes such a teasing invitation to the reader: "You is feeling like you was lost in the bush, boy?" the speaker mocks - you feel like you are lost, and "You says: It is a

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[316] "knowledge, n." *OED Online*, Oxford University Press, June 2018, www.oed.com/view/Entry/104170. Accessed 3 September 2018.

[317] I came across this delightfully despairing confession from internationally respected Joycean and literary scholar Fritz Senn:

> I started out full of enthusiasm at the age of about 25 and invested a great deal of time, at one time really trying to resolve its minute obscurities into tentative meaning, and often this brought good returns, and experiences. But more often not. After many years I simply gave up *Finnegans Wake* as a "scholar", in semantic despair; my, and perhaps our, ignorance is so overwhelming that I cannot, in all honesty, pose as an expert (and the experts don't help). This does not exclude occasional probes and references in what I have written. All Joycean ways lead to FW. But I cannot imagine writing a book about something that I so fundamentally and in many details fail to grasp. So often in our weekly reading, I find that after 40 years or so of endeavour, I have no clue what a passage or a sentence does. Disheartening.

As well as disheartening, this unmastery could be freeing, open to possibilities, and radically democratic. Fritz Senn interview. hcehamada. *Understanding Finnegans Wake*. Available at: http://hcehamada.blogspot.com/2007_07_06_archive.html. Accessed 7th Aug 2018.

[318] The striving for certainty is a form of jealousy, a will to master and possess. Tim Cribb sees this theme playing out in Joyce's play, *Exiles*, claiming that Richard's ruling passion is "his desire for certainty of knowledge" (72).

puling sample jungle of woods" (112. 3-4) or a pure and simple jumble of words. Indeed, like Biddy the Hen that found the letter you "have the poultriest notions what the farest he all means" (112.5-6), you haven't the paltriest of notions what he means. Rather than offer an answer, the response is a less than sympathetic admonishment to sit with uncertainty and enjoy the ride: "Gee up, girly!" (112.6).

Instead of trying master it by placing our lenses and theories on it in order to deaden it into meaning, instead, what if we used what Joyce calls, our "mind's ear, temptive lissomer" (477.18) and stay with the discomfort of not-knowing, so we might comprehend something feelingly? Because as the *Wake* warns, "Thus the unfacts, did we possess them, are too imprecisely few to warrant our certitude." (*FW* 57.15-16). To become a "temptive lissomer" takes skill and practice; one must recursively encounter the text: read it aloud, see differently breaking open phrases and words, read associatively, look up endless references, translate multiple languages, refer to secondary sources. To encounter the *Wake* is to build a relationship with it, slowly and over time. Unmastery does not imply a lack of discipline or lack of effort; instead it refuses ownership over knowledge production, and it embraces uncertainty. Thus, being unmastered by the *Wake* is part of the process of reading the book affectively, capaciously, and, in our increased capacities, joyfully.

CHAPTER FIVE

"Little lusts and lucidities": Queer Expressions and Joy in Mina Loy

"There is no Life or Death / Only activity…There is no Space or Time / Only intensity" Mina Loy
"Being alive is a queer coincidence" Mina Loy

This chapter offers the most peculiar consideration of joy so far, peculiar taken to mean both idiosyncratic and queer. Loy is vigilantly anti-sentimental, rarely emotional, does not tend to evoke the senses – though she focuses defiantly and unblinkingly on the body – and her work is strongly focused on language. Given this characterization, one might ask, in what way does Loy's work fit within the scope of modernist joy? Part of my rationale for including Loy is the many ways in which she *does not* fit neatly into the parameters drawn so far. In fact, I see Loy as offering a kind of hyphenated extension to the writers previously discussed and other modernist writers' joys. To Sinclair, for example, Loy offers a provocative parallel in that both writers focus on modernist women's psychosexual experiences, consider love and relationships as problematic for creative women, and explore the role of sexuality in the lives of creative geniuses. Yet their conclusions and joys are almost diametrically opposite. Whereas Sinclair's feminism focuses on the emotional and economic freedom of the female "genius" – achieved, in part, through the sublimation of sexual desires - Loy embraces sexuality to find freedom from gendered consciousness that can repress genius. Loy's relationship with feminism, for example, illuminates a radical sexual position that few women artists articulated in such bold terms, and her work produces a node from which joy of sex and female desire might be traced back to/from. In her candid approach to sex, her non-normative performance of gender, and her often critical stance to heteronormativity especially structures of marriage that prop it up, we can productively consider Mina Loy queer. Loy's work is orthogonal to many of the modernist avant-garde groups - Futurism, Dada, Surrealism - and is able to shed a queer light upon them. Her modernist refusal of normative structures, especially for women, I argue, forms an integral part of her queerness, and her work offers an oblique perspective on modernist affect and joy. The predominantly male and certainly masculine avant-gardes actively repudiate emotion as feminine; they perform a certain 'permitted' set of affects, such as mania and ecstasy, and reject the rest as sentimental. Engaging with Loy allows me to consider an example of a form of avant-garde aesthetics, and how the refusal of joy can still be a relation to joy. In analyzing Loy's intellectual, sardonic, and forthright poetry that often engages these anti-femme interlocutors directly, it is

possible to trace the queer, cerebral, antagonistic force of joy in Mina Loy's poetry, concluding that Loy's relation to joy is affective, energetic, and queer.[319]

In *Feeling Backwards*, Heather Love warns against an idealizing impulse when forging queer cross-historical relations with the past: "by including queer figures from the past in a positive genealogy of gay identity, we make good on their suffering, transforming their shame into pride after the fact."[320]In recuperating joy as an affective presence of the past, even if a phantasmatic one, that has tendrils into the present, the impulse to create a celebratory recovery project is strong. These figures and affects have been missing from the narrative for so long, it is tempting to reinsert them, permitting them a moment to shine untethered to the negative. Yet, as my concept of hyphenated joy asserts, the relation to the positive is never not linked to the negative. As Love's genealogy points out, a queer history in particular is always founded on "suffering, stigma, and violence" (1). So, though considering queer joy does perform a recovery project of sorts – adding to the scholarship that is bringing queer women writers back to prominence - Loy is also a figure that permits me to consider mixed, hyphenated feelings. In considering Mina Loy's work, her fraught and ambivalent emotional presentation allows me to consider joy queerly. I will do so by considering Loy's cerebral sexual poetics and her queer relation to feminism and feminist feeling.

Biography of Mina Loy

As Mina Loy is a less familiar figure of Modernist literature, and since her "Anglo-Mongrel" status (as she called it), plays a significant role in the making of Loy as a Modernist 'personality' I will offer some short biographical context.[321] Mina Gertrude Lowy was born in London on December 27, 1882 to a middle-class English family.[322] She showed a talent for painting and at the age of seventeen went to Munich to study with Angelo Jank before moving to Paris to study further. Strikingly beautiful, elegant, and talented, in Paris she shortened her name to Mina Loy. She met and married English painter Stephen Haweis in 1903.[323] Both painted in the Decadent style and Loy

[319] Given the relative difficulty of accessing Loy's poetry and her continued non-canonical status all poems referred to in his chapter can be found in the Appendix, they are listed in order of discussion within the chapter.
[320] Love, Heather. *Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History*. Harvard University Press, 2007, p. 32.
[321] Currently out of print, Mina Loy called her long, narrative, autobiographical poem "Anglo-Mongrels and the Rose." Parts of the poem appeared in *Lunar Baedeker* (1923) and *The Little Review* 9.4 (Autumn/Winter 1923-24). It appeared in full in 1925 published by Three Mountains Press as part of the Contact Collection of Contemporary Writers.
[322] I am indebted to the following works for biographical information on Loy, see Burke, Carolyn. *Becoming Modern: The Life of Mina Loy*. University of California Press, 1996 – hereafter referred to in text as *BM*; Conover Roger L. "Introduction" and "Notes." Loy, Mina. *The Lost Lunar Baedeker,* Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1996; Kouidis, Virginia M. *Mina Loy: American Modernist Poet,* Louisiana State University Press, 1980.
[323]Haweis and Loy married on December 31, 1903 and had three children: Ada Janet (1904-1905), Joella Synara (1907-2004), and Giles (1909-1923). Loy would later have a child with her second husband Arthur Cravan, Jemima Fabienne (1919-1997).

enjoyed some success as she was elected to the *Salon d'Automne*. The Haweises left Paris and lived in Florence from 1907-1916. During this time Loy met Mabel Dodge and became part of her circle, which included Carl Van Vechten and Gertrude Stein. Loy also knew the Futurists by 1913.[324] During her time in Florence, Loy's poetry began to be published, her marriage ended and she began divorce proceedings from Stephen Haweis (who had left the family and would finally settle in the Caribbean), she also had affairs with both F.T. Marinetti and Giovanni Papini (widely credited to be the Joannes figure from "Songs to Joannes").

Leaving her children in Florence, Loy travelled to New York in 1916, where she would join the intellectual salon of the Arensburgs, regularly rubbing shoulders with the likes of William Carlos Williams, Marcel Duchamp, Man Ray, Beatrice Webb, and Djuna Barnes. Loy's poetry appeared in the little magazines, predominantly in *Others* (1915-1919).[325] In order to make ends meet and to express herself creatively she also wrote plays, acted at the Provincetown Theatre, sold designs, made her own clothes, and cut a beautiful and sophisticated figure in the avant-garde art scene. In New York she met Dadaist and 'poet'-boxer, Arthur Cravan, whom she described on first meeting as a "unique phenomenon." He had impressed her as a "biological mystic" who "traced his poetic sensibility to his power to 'think' with any part of his body" (Loy cited in Kouidis, 10). They married in Mexico City in January 1918 and despite poverty and near starvation, Loy's recollection of their time was of "pure bliss."[326] The couple renovated a small boat, planning for Cravan to sail it to Buenos Aires where it was said to be cheap to live, and for the pregnant Loy to join him there. In October 1918, Cravan took the boat out for its maiden voyage as Mina waved to him from the pier, he disappeared out of sight never to be seen again (*BM* 264). Loy took the passenger boat to Buenos Aires in the hopes of finding him. His unresolved disappearance was to haunt Loy, and her poetry, for the rest of her life.[327]

After brief stints in England and Florence, she settled in Paris in the 1920s (until 1936) with her young daughters.[328] She designed and sold lampshades after been set up in a Paris shop by Peggy

[324]In early 1914 Loy wrote to Mabel Dodge stating, "I am in the throes of conversion to Futurism – but I shall never convince myself – There is no hope in any system that '*combat le mal avec le mal*'…and that is really Marinetti's philosophy" (Kouidis 8)

[325]The Arensburgs held nightly gatherings in New York for the fashionable expatriates and avant-garde artists, and Loy was a nightly guest. Their salon was known for "scintillating talk and racy innuendo" (*BM* 213). For more on the Arensburg salon see Davidson, Abraham A. "The Arensburg Circle." *Early American Modernist Painting*. Harper & Row, 1981.

[326]Recalling her marriage to Cravan, she advised her daughters that in relations between men and women, what mattered was lovemaking, everything else would follow from that (*BM* 393).

[327]See Loy's "Widow's Jazz" (1927).

[328] Stephen Haweis had passed through Florence when Mina was in America and taken Giles back to the Caribbean with him. She never saw Giles again as he died two years later.

Guggenheim. Once again, she was at the heart of an expatriate art scene, mixing with the likes of Paul Valery, Djuna Barnes, Gertrude Stein, Colette, Robert McAlmon, James Joyce, Sylvia Beach, Natalie Barney and Constantin Brancusi among others. In 1923, Robert McAlmon published her collection, *Lunar Baedecker* [sic] to great shock and some critical celebration.[329] In 1936 she returned to New York, and because of her financial circumstances lived near the Bowery. By the 1940s partly due to poverty, partly due to an obsession with the past, Loy had become highly reclusive and "lost in her own mythology."[330] Though she wrote poetry she preferred to make art from found objects from around her Bowery home in New York. Though the Surrealists and other avant-gardists also found themselves in New York, Loy remained reclusive, seemingly "embarrassed by her age, appearance, and reduced social status" (*BM* 399). She created art and had a successful solo exhibition late in life.[331] Her reduced circumstances led to some of her more powerful later poems that focus on the homeless and "bums" of the Bowery, for example, "Hot Cross Bum" (1942), an honest but compassionate vision of the destitute of Bowery. Loy finally joined her daughters in Aspen, Colorado in 1954 and died in there in 1966.

Modern Queerness

Peculiar, strange, eccentric; also of questionable character or dubious: "queer" at the turn of the 20th century described intimidating difference.[332] An individual's refusal of, or inability to, adhere to social norms marked them as 'queer' – a euphemism that could encompass many forms of difference, from wittiness to madness. Whether meant endearingly or derogatorily, "queer" earned a link to the eccentric – off center, and therefore suspicious, dubious, shady. At the historical moment for homosexuality, when queer still meant "odd," the word also came to signify sexual and gender deviance. As Benjamin Kahan points out, "the queerness of queer modernism has as much to do

[329] Biographers generally agree that it was Robert McAlmon who was responsible for the misspelling of Baedecker [Baedeker] in Loy's first book of poetry; I hereafter give the corrected spelling in discussion unless quoting directly.
[330] This is Loy's son-in-law, Hans Fraenkel's, description of Loy, who lived with him at this time, cited in *BM*, p. 402.
[331] Loy eventually had a solo exhibition of her artwork in New York in 1959 after she had moved from the Bowery to Aspen.
[332] In the 1919 publication of *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English*, queer contains the following entries: "Strange, odd, eccentric; of questionable character, shady, suspect; out of sorts, giddy, faint, (esp. *feel* q.); (slang) drunk*; in Q. street* (slang), in a difficulty, in debt or trouble or disrepute; hence queerish a., queerly adv., queerness n. (Vb) spoil, put out of order, (esp. *q. the pitch for one*, spoil his change beforehand by secret dealings); make feel q. [perh.f.G *quer* crosswise]. Queer also appeared in the entries for weird; strange; rum; omnium gatherum – a queer mixture, a miscellaneous assemblage of persons or things; odd; funny; fish – person of a specified kind (cool, loose, queer, &c.); euphemism – substitution of mild or vague expression for harsh or blunt one…as 'queer' is a e. for 'mad'.; droll; customer, awkward, &c., c.; comical; codger; card." Fowler, H. W., James Augustus Henry Murray, and F. G. Fowler. *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English.* 7th impression, The Clarendon Press, 1919, p.681. Available from Hathi Trust Digital Library, https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/006150592/Home Accessed 1st March 2019.

with gender and sex as sexuality."[333] He continues, stating " [that] queerness adheres in particular gender styles as much as or more than in sexual acts is crucial to our understanding of queer modernism" (355). Loy, with her unquestionable beauty, irresistible personality, unique fashion, and scintillating conversation was every inch the Modern Woman.[334] At the same time, she wrote with unblinking frankness about female sexual desire and emotionally unsatisfying sexual encounters, was highly critical of marriage and the power structures of heterosexuality, and posited radical solutions to sexual double standards.[335]She was acerbic, contradictory, outspoken, and passionate. She shocked and offended readers of her writing, and her early literary experiments sought to revolutionize not only the themes of poetry in making the psychosexual experience of women central, but also in its sound and form. Loy was considered disturbingly deviant, weird, odd, and often perceived as of dubious character, if not also outright dangerous to morality. By these measures, Mina Loy is decidedly queer. Though the etymology of queer is unclear, most dictionaries suggesting that it stems from German *quer* to mean "oblique or off-center" emphasizing the hidden and marginal status of queer subjects. Interestingly, a Scottish and Irish English colloquial variant, *quare*, intensifies concepts positively, meaning very or extremely. Loy's intense focus and insistence on female sexual desire and pleasure, plus her elliptical, aphoristic, unpunctuated style, makes her both oblique, off-center, and *quare* queer.

Queerness is not only based on sexual identity. [336] Mary E. Galvin also identifies Loy as queer, placing her within the context of Adrienne Rich's "continuum of lesbian experience." [337] Galvin points out that by placing her in such a context, "we may come to a clearer understanding of both her politics and her poetics of disruption" (51). Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick in her seminal text

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[333] Kahan, Benjamin. "Queer Modernism." *A Handbook of Modernism Studies*, edited by Jean-Michel Rabate, John Wiley & Sons, 2013, p.355.

[334] It was John McAlmon who described Loy as "too beautiful for description," and Harriet Monroe that observed: "I may never have fallen very hard for this lady's poetry, but her personality is irresistible" (cited in *BM* 336). The *Evening Sun* ran a feature to find and describe the "modern woman" and the reporter selected Mina Loy as the quintessential representation of this figure. The article stated that "some people think the women are the cause of artistic modernism, whatever that is," see "Do You Strive to Capture the Symbols of Your Reactions? If Not You Are Quite Old Fashioned," New York *Evening Sun*, February 13, 1917.

[335] Another decidedly queer and heterosexual female figure who embodied the performativity and rebellion of Dada is Elsa Baroness von Freytag-Loringhoven. Her outrageous, performative personality makes her an even more eccentric figure than Mina Loy, see Jones, Amelia. *Irrational Modernism: A Neurasthenic History of New York Dada,* MIT Press, 2004 and Gammel, Irene. *Baroness Elsa: Gender, Dada, and Everyday Modernity – A Cultural Biography,* MIT Press, 2002.

[336] Though Loy did not identify as a lesbian, she was part of 'queer' community of avant-garde Parisian gay women, and good friends with Djuna Barnes, Natalie Barney and Gertrude Stein. Loy features in Djuna Barnes's *Ladies Almanack* (1927-28) written about Natalie Barney's circle which included Mina Loy. Barney as Lady Evangeline leads a cast of women through adventures. Loy appears as Patience Scalpel whose wit "was as cutting in its Derision as a surgical instrument" and who despite some teasing vacillation "gentelmaned only" (*BM* 360-364). Barnes, Djuna. *Ladies Almanack.* Martino Fine Books, 2016.

[337] Galvin, Mary E. *Queer Poetics: Five Modernist Women Writers*. Greenwood Press, 1999, p.51. See also Rich, Adrienne. "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence." *Signs*, 5 (4) 1980, pp. 631-660.

Epistemology of the Closet asserts that the queerness of the analytical and epistemic act might not focus on the genitals or identity, but rather: "the resistance to treating homo/hetero-sexual categorization…as a transparently empirical fact about a person."[338] She goes on to say that without ignoring desire, " the variety of sexual practices, along with their diverse meanings for individual lives, can be done better justice in a context where the impoverished abstractions that claim to define sexuality can be treated as not authorative" (xvi). Just as the proliferation, exploration, and specificity of sexual and sexual-relational experiences multiplied in the modernist moment, so Loy's consistent attacks on heterosexuality interrupt the "conceptual incoherence" of sexual categories (Sedgwick, xvii). Both Heather Love and Benjamin Kahan claim that the historical moment of modernism might reasonably be considered "queer" in broader terms than same-sex desire. Kahan underscores "the tremendous upheaval and reorganization of sexual categories and the sexual grammars which compose the language of modernism in all its queerness" (348). He defines queer modernism as "the sexually transgressive and gender deviant energies that help fuel modernism's desire to thwart normative aesthetics, knowledges, geographies, and temporalities" (348). Gabrielle McIntire also finds modernism unique in the play of discourses: "[w]e might say that modernist fiction and poetry represents the first body of literature to play consistently with the proliferation of discourses that Foucault proposes occurred from the seventeenth century onward.[339] Heather Love points out "the pervasiveness of nonnormative desires in the making of the modern" (744). She also finds a parallel between modernism and queer studies' critique of stable notions of identity. Perhaps what makes queerness and modernism such a good fit, she posits, "is that the indeterminacy of queer seems to match the indeterminacy, expansiveness, and drift of the literary particularly the experimental, oblique version most closely associated with modernist textual production" (745). Loy's dissident frankness and repeated critique of the masculine avant-garde of which she was part, offers a useful means of exploring a queer feminist critique of modernist aesthetics as it developed in the early 20th century.

Lunar Baedeker [340]

Mina Loy's poetry is phosphorescent: it sheds light without warmth or heat. Even at the culmination of her candid sexual expression her lusts are "lunar" – silver, satirical signals. Loy's "Lunar Baedeker," the title poem of her first book of poetry published in 1923, can serve as a guide

[338] Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. *Epistemology of the Closet*. 2nd Edition, University of California Press, 2008, p. xvi.
[339] McIntire, Gabrielle. "Psychology and Sexuality." *A Companion to Modernist Poetry*, edited by David E. Chinitz and Gail McDonald, John Wiley & Sons, 2014, p. 134. See also Foucault, Michel. *History of Sexuality I-IV*. Vintage Reissue, 1990.
[340] All of Loy's poems, unless otherwise stated, are taken from *The Lost Lunar Baedeker*, edited by Roger L. Conover, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1996, hereafter referred to in-text as *LLB*.

to introduce the key themes and concerns of this chapter and offer a route to understand the mood and emotion of Loy's poetry. Moments of delirious rapture, ecstatic whirling, erotic euphoria are expressed and obscured by archaic and austere diction. She yokes the mythic and the mundane, bringing them together to inflate and deflate, to celebrate and deride, both the human and the divine by turns. Myths and heavenly bodies are rendered alongside romantic earthly encounters, and everyday encounters are made strange and given mythic significance through the simultaneity of the natural and mythic imagery.

Loy queers traditional imagery, in this case the moon, which is typically associated with women's bodies (menstrual rhythms) and virginal goddesses:

A silver Lucifer
serves
cocaine in cornucopia

To some somnambulists
of adolescent thighs
draped
in satirical draperies

Peris in livery
prepare
Lethe
for posthumous parvenues

Delirious Avenues
lit
with the chandelier souls
of infusoria
from Pharoah's tombstones

lead
to mercurial doomsdays
Odious oasis
in furrowed phosphorous---

the eye-white sky-light
white-light district
of lunar lusts
(l.1-23)

Through "silver Lucifer" she associates the moon with a male, rebellious, intellectual independence. Lucifer, meaning "light bringer," emphasizes the playful devilry of her imagery. The moon as light-source reveals the actions of modernity as filled with nocturnal, sinful pleasures. That "fossil virgin of the skies" (l.50), is given new meaning for modernity, as she shines a metallicized light ("silver")

fueled by a pharmacological frenzy ("cocaine in cornucopia") on youthful sexual attractions and whirlwind amatory experiences. Sexual encounters can be a route to alternative forms of knowledge, Loy suggests, by linking Lucifer – who is linked to phosphorous in his light (knowledge) bringing role - and phosphorous is the morning star, Venus. The night-light casts "white-light" on unconscious forces and affective motivations rather than the sun light of rationality.[341]The Baedeker thus offers a map to the unconscious of the modernist mindscape.

The sublunary somnambulists are young, their thighs draped but resplendent and suggestive. They are linked to the abundance and plenty of the cornucopia, smooth-skin suggested by the sibilant "s's" that circulate around them. Yet the drapery that teasingly envelops their thighs is "satirical." Their stimulus is not only the moon, but cocaine, which links the man-made to the natural, undermining it. Their movements are automatic and jittery since they are both sleepwalking and fueled by the stimulant of cocaine. A new, modern set of associations are thereby linked to the moon, and the old sense of being moon-struck and in love is old, passé, a fossilized relic of a past era. The new generation no longer needs to wish upon this cold star to find love and sexual frenzy; the new age prefers "Stellectric signs" (l.24) – a portmanteau that implies electric and stellar, thereby replacing the stars in the night-sky with the electric lights of an urban cityscape.[342] These "Stellectric signs" - signs as signals or written instructions - sound like headlines that advertise the "stars" of Broadway: ""Wing shows on Starway" / "Zodiac carrousel" " (l.25-26). The carrousel no longer a romantic tournament of knights or a sacred circuit of the constellations across the night sky, but rather "arousal" and "carousing" and the modern wheel of fortune an astrology chart to predict love that is considered like fairground play, a merry-go-round.[343] Thus Loy maps out her investments: youth, beauty, pleasure, intuition, modernity as stimulant. The short, clipped stanzas move the poem along mimicking the exhilaration of speed – a key pleasure of modernity.[344]

Loy evokes the modernist impulse to destroy the old and herald the new when she invokes cyclones.

Cyclones
of ecstatic dust

[341] Joyce also argues in *Finnegans Wake* that there are forms of knowledge can be disovered in the dark that could never be discovered in the light.
[342] In urban settings the light pollution from electric lighting can prevent a viewer from seeing stars, once aga in offering a modern alternative to the traditional imagery of the night sky.
[343] Conover writes of a famous episode in the Loy mythology when Marcel Duchamp and Mina Loy attended the costumed ball, the Pagan Romp in Greenwich Village (May 25, 1917). When the ball was over Duchamp, Loy and two other companions went for eggs and wine, collapsing together in Duchamp's bed "where the *menagé á cinq* spent a chaste night" (xi).
[344] For more on modernism's obsession with the joy of speed see Duffy, Enda. *The Speed Handbook: Velocity, Pleasure, Modernism.* Duke University Press, 2009.

and ashes whirl
crusaders
from hallucinatory citadels
of shattered glass
into evacuate craters
(l.27-33).

'Cyclone' recalls The Vorticists, blasting humanity and old associations into dust, ecstatically shattering old hallucinations.[345] The whirlwind of modernity associated with fresh inspiration – here figured as a cyclone, a term also evocative of the pistons and pumps of the machines of Futurism – blasts away old romances of moralistic conversions. The crusaders are thrown from their imaginary security fortresses "hallucinatory citadels" (l.31) down into empty hollows "evacuate craters" (l.33). The cyclones of "ecstatic dust /and ashes" that precipitate the fall from importance of old ways subverts the Gods/God through their humanity – people being associated ashes and dust from the Christian funerary rite "ashes to ashes, dust to dust." Yet these modern heathens are ecstatic ` – meaning both outside of the norm, beside oneself, and rapturously enthusiastic. They are moved to action by speed and destructive inspiration. In contrast to the dynamism of the cyclone, the moon is associated with art that seeks to be accepted into museums and the artistic establishment: "'Immortality'/ mildews …/in the museums of the moon" (l.44-46). In the light of Futurism's call for art to "destroy museums, libraries, academies of any sort," the moon represents all that is old, fusty, including living forever (or living by a pious set of rules in order to get into heaven – that "odious oasis" (l.19).[346]

The speaker couches her closing address to the moon ironically by using "scare quotes." This sets her modern approach apart from old associations, while also acknowledging their continuing power.[347] The moon is described as:

"Nocturnal cyclops"
"Crystal concubine"
(l.47-48).

Though powerful and celebratory sounding, the moon is nonetheless called a one-eyed giant of the sky – the Cyclops associated with stupidity and barbarity in the Homer version of *Ulysses*. The cyclops suggests single or tunnel vision, lacking depth-perception due to the single eye but also lacking depth because she is transparent. This unsensual celestial concubine can be compared to the dark-eyed mistress of the previous stanza who has an impenetrable gaze and active judgement:

[345] See Lewis, Wyndham et al. "Blast Manifesto I." *Blast*, 1, 1914, pp.11-29.
[346] Marinetti, F.T. "The Foundation and Manifesto of Futurism" (1909). *100 Artists' Manifestos from the Futurists to the Stuckists*, edited by Alex Danchev, Penguin Books, 2011, p.5.
[347] Compared to the dark-eyed mistress of the previous stanza the moon is crystalline - precious but non-tactile and thus a chaste concubine.

Onyx-eyed Odalisques
and ornithologists
observe
the flight
of Eros obsolete
(l.39-43).

Loy's Modern Woman is evoked here as the "onyx-eyed Odalisques" – the eye is still single, but the perspective multiple due to the plurality of women. By using the word "Odalisque" Loy evokes Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres's *Grande Odalisque,* a painting that shifted the perception of the classical nude, in part by forcing the viewer to meet the impassive gaze of the naked woman.[348] Loy's concubine has an assessing gaze that is intelligent and difficult to read, unlike the crystal clarity of the moon's look. Along with scholars of birds ("ornithologists") the modern women observe the old god of sexual attraction, Eros/Cupid (the winged God of Love) and declare him obsolete.[349] Eros – and his "crystal concubine" - is no longer necessary, as the modern woman is in charge of her own sexual encounters, even if the power dynamic of sexual encounter (she is a concubine) continues to be unequal. Loy's Baedeker, map to the modern unconscious, thus guides the reader around both a rapturous and a ruptured terrain.

Loy's joy is queer. She arranges beautiful looking words in pleasant sounding clusters for aesthetic pleasure. Loy's unfamiliar vocabulary and alliterative emphasis estranges words so that they become objects in themselves, diction is selected with an artists' eye for their shape and texture as well as their sound. Modern poetry, she claims, should communicate "the sound of an idea" rather than its sense (*LLB* 157). The power of her "sound idea" stems from Loy's use of alliteration and assonance. The slither of sibilance in the opening stanzas offers a 'sshh' of sleep and also a slippery texture of draped thighs, suggestive of silk or satin. The sibilant "s's" connect with the assonance of the "c' sounds in "Lu*c*ifer", "adoles*c*ent" suggesting that the young sleepwalkers moved to action are the ones to bring the light. The "s" weaves its way towards the introduction of

[348] By using the term 'odalisque' Loy, an artist trained in Paris, must have been aware that she would evoke the famous painting *Grande Odalisque* (1814, Louvre Paris) by Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres (1780-1867). At the time of its painting it was an iconoclastic nude painted in the Romantic mode. It drew fierce criticism when it was first shown (the Salon 1819) because of the elongation and sinuous line of the female body that bore little resemblance to anatomical reality. Ingres's painting also became famous for the woman's direct, penetrating, yet impassive gaze towards the viewer. The sexually attractive concubine is resplendent and challenges the observer to acknowledge the erotic nature of their gaze, yet she refuses to betray an easily interpreted emotion and is thereby emotionally unavailable, even as she is (seemingly) sexually available.

[349] The modern female lover, depicted as the odalisque, looks upon love and desire and delivers a damning critique ("obsolete"). Loy juxtaposes the assessing gaze of the modern concubine to the Greek myth. In Greek mythology, Eros is married to Psyche (who represents the soul), who is punished for looking and curiosity – she is forbidden to look upon the face of her secret, night-time lover Eros. However, the placement of "obsolete" might also indicate that the odalisques and ornithologists are obsolete; the lack of love and desire in the modern world (Eros) means that their observations are now obsolete.

the plosive "p" that propels the poem in a different direction – from earthly thighs to mythical spirits: "**P**eri*s* in livery / **p**re**p**are / Lethe / for **p**o*s*thumous **p**arvenu*s*" (l.8-11). The stanzas read as discreet, crystalline fragments, one stacked upon the other and constructing a scene or mood, deprioritizing logical connection in favor of the "lunar" unconscious connections.[350] Her unexpected combinations of words in a non-narrative context inserts a rhythmic gap between mouth-feel, aural impact and any connotative meanings, thus queering the sound and sense of her poetry. Loy's poetry expresses joy through the force and intensity of her words. Her phosphorescent force is transformative; it moves and changes the meaning of words, lending fresh associations to tired language and imagery.

Throughout "Lunar Baedeker," and the rest of Loy's poetry, intense positive feelings that are orthogonal to joy are scattered throughout her work: rapture, bliss, ecstasy, sublimity. There is little of the humane joy of Joyce, or the celibate, restrained spirituality of Sinclair. Yeats is a precursor in his sublime linking of rage and despair-fueled joy, but he is often moved to masculinized postures of embodied and empowered defiance. Loy's defiance rarely reads as forceful, rather as detached, but her empowerment is through her unblinking vision and her voicing of a cruel reality, treated candidly but also with irony and humor. Loy stands in her cold queerness as both a reflection of a familiar modernism – impersonal, detached, cerebral - and yet separate from it in its queerness, as I will discuss.

Sexuality and the Feminist Context

To continue my discussion of Loy in light of her queer critique of attitudes and institutions upholding sexual and gender norms, I will look at her attitude towards sexual expression and place it in the context of contemporaneous feminism. Loy's work emerged from and into an Anglo-American and European ferment of feminism. At the turn of the century the "sex wars" were raging. The "question" of women: their nature, their roles, and their place in society was a continuous point of contention.[351] Women in the West, especially the UK and America, were agitating for rights and reform to all aspects of life. Feminisms were multiple and varied.[352] Suffragettes continued to struggle for women's equality, focusing on the vote. At the turn of century, various local women's

[350] Yvor Winters suggested the that the *Lunar Baedeker* was a litany of images "frozen into epigrams" (Winters cited in *BM* 323).
[351] See Browne, Stella F.W. "The 'Women's Question' *The Communist*, March 11 1922, for a contemporaneous take on the ongoing debate.
[352] The use of the term "feminism" emerged in the 1910's; prior to that people spoke of "women's rights," The Cause or Women's Suffrage. I use the term feminism in this chapter as an umbrella term to capture the many aspects of women's equality that were of concern at the turn of the 20th century.

suffrage societies came together to form the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies (NUWSS), led by Millicent Fawcett. However, Emmeline Pankhurst, impatient of gradualist tactics of the NUWSS, established the more militant Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU) that included law-breaking and hunger strikes as part of their strategy.[353] Though the advent of WWI meant the suffrage movement reduced their activities, the role of women in the war effort intensified the conversations and urgency of the question of women's place in society.[354] Cristanne Miller offers this useful summation: "active women's movements throughout Europe, the British Isles and the United States brought women's legal rights and social positioning to political consciousness, and the study of sexuality fueled the new fields of psychology and sociology, as well as being a favorite topic of the popular press."[355] Miller asserts that "radical changes of gender expectation and sexual definition" transformed lives, and influenced aesthetics as much as technology, the metropolis, and war (82).[356]

The struggle for women's equality was not a one issue movement. Women were at the forefront of revolutionary reform in all aspects of life, including morality and shifting social and sexual roles. As historian Sheila Rowbotham notes, women challenged the status quo broadly speaking:

> gender divisions, sexual attitudes, family arrangements, ways of doing housework and mothering, existing forms of consumption and paid working conditions. They proposed new approaches to the body, alternative kinds of clothing and food; they turned their attention to how space was used in cities, to the time needed for leisure, to the purposes of work.[357]

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[353] The NUWSS under Millicent Fawcett argued for the vote for middle-class property-owning women and were generally referred to as suffragists. The WSPU, which included working class women, employed more direct methods, under the leadership of Emmeline Pankhurst, and they were referred to as suffragettes. The suffragette's motto was "deeds not words." In 1907, the WSPU split into two and the Women's Freedom League was formed. Though these groups disagreed on tactics they worked towards the same goal and often worked together.

[354] There was an active Anti-Suffrage League that maintained the separate spheres philosophy. Supporters argued that women were mistresses of the domestic and social sphere and men the public and political. Violet Markham is representative of this position. Addressing a large audience at an anti-suffrage rally at the Albert Hall in 1912, Markham stated that " We believe that men and women are different – not similar – beings, with talents that are complementary, not identical, and that they therefore ought to have different shares in the management of the State, that they severally compose. We do not depreciate by one jot or tittle women's work and mission. We are concerned to find proper channels of expression for that work. We seek a fruitful diversity of political function, not a stultifying uniformity." Markham cited in Bush, Julia. "British Women's Anti-Suffragism and the Forward Policy, 1908-14." *Women's History Review*, 11 (3), 2002, pp. 431.

[355] Miller, Cristianne, "Gender, Sexuality, and the Modernist Poem." *The Cambridge Companion to Modernist Poetry*, edited by Alex Davis and Lee M. Jenkins, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 68.

[356] For a history of sexuality in the United States see D'Emilio, Gerald and Estelle Freedman. *Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in America*, Harper & Row, 1988.

[357] Rowbotham, Sheila. *Dreamers of a New Day: Women Who Invented the Twentieth Century*. Verso, 2011, p.3.

The "radical" generation of the Modern Women included Greenwich Village radicals like Mabel Dodge and Emma Goldman who "sought in sexual liberation the key to future social revolution," and felt that sexual freedom was central to redefining a more equitable world.[358] As Nancy Cott points out, sex radicals "embedded their critique of gender hierarchy in a critique of the social system."[359] Despite marrying twice, Loy was vocally critical of marriage as an institution that legitimized women as an merely the negation, or correlative, of men. She dramatized her critiques in one of her most effective satirical poems, "The Effectual Marriage, or The Insipid Narrative of Gina and Miovanni" (1915).[360]

In "Gina and Miovanni" Loy depicts a "typical" marriage of two people who "eat their suppers in peace" (l.53). They achieve this marital bliss because the one never intrudes upon the separate domain nor the thoughts of the other. Loy satirizes this quietism that masquerades as peace:

> what their peace consisted
> We cannot say
> Only that he was magnificently man
> She insignificantly a woman who understood
> (l.54-57).

Gina, the woman "who understood," and who therefore keeps the peace with her performance as maid and muse, becomes a mirror for her husband, basing her sense-of-self on his needs: "incipience a correlative / an instigation of the reaction of man" (l.24-25). They live in separate spheres, Miovanni, the writer, in his library "Outside space and time" (l.45), and Gina silently watching "From among *his* pots and pans / Where he so kindly kept her" (l.14-15, emphasis mine). Gina is magnanimously "kept" like a pet, in her place; even in her domestic sphere, her tools are not her own. She is owned, like the pots and pans, by Miovanni, and regarded by him with as much interest.

Loy explores the necessity for double-consciousness, almost self-delusion, for a "effectual" marriage. As his wife, Gina is devoted to Miovanni, even to the detriment to her own well-being and personal development:

> While Miovanni thought alone in the dark
> Gina supposed that peeping she might see
> A round light shining where his mind was

[358] Buhle, Mary Jo cited in cited in Trimberger, Ellen Kay, "The New Woman and the New Sexuality: Conflict and Contradiction in the Writings and Lives of Mabel Dodge and Neith Boyce." *1915: The Cultural Moment,* edited by Adele Heller & Lois Rudnick, Rutgers University Press, 1991, p.75.
[359] Cott, Nancy cited in Trimberger, Ellen Kay, ibid, p.71.
[360] Gina and Miovanni are the barely disguised names of Mina (Loy) and Giovanni (Papini) who were lovers. Though Loy is critical and mocking of Papini, she is also scathing about her role in perpetuating her own self-erasure for the sake of love.

She never opened the door
Fearing that this might blind her
Or even
That she should see Nothing at all
So while he thought
She hung out of the window
Watching for falling stars
And when a star fell
She wished that still
Miovanni would love her tomorrow
(l.68-80)

Gina attempts to enact a feminine ideal that is adoring and subservient. She knows that she must believe in the genius of her husband – the shining light of his intellect – and leave it undisturbed. However, the poem also hints at the fact that she fears "she should see Nothing at all," which teasingly suggests her husband's lack rather than her lack of perspicacity. However, as merely his correlative, there is danger in seeing nothing, as it would not simply negate her husband's genius, but also her own being. To be thought of (and feel like) the counterpart of the man of genius is one thing, to be the silent "incipience" of merely a "man" is to lower the status of the woman to almost a nullity. Gina recognizes that her adoration might rest on an empty foundation, so she wishes upon a star, hoping to be comforted by love at least. Gina is loved by Miovanni, but due to a passive disregard rather than an active acknowledgement: "And as Miovanni / Never gave any heed to the matter / He did" (l.81-83). Loy reinforces the danger of such a form of love for women, for without any real purpose beyond Miovanni, Gina has no inner or outer world of her own: "Gina's world would have been at an end / Gina with no axis to revolve on / Must have dwindled to a full stop (l. 99-101). As in "Lunar Baedecker," Loy mocks the myth of "happy ever after"; romantic love and happy marriage is made possible because of a benign indifference.

Though married women might wish to transcend this type of marriage, Loy suggests that they must do so willfully and self-consciously. Gina occasionally "wrote a poem on the milk bill" (l.109); this simple line reveals the desire of Gina to transcend her domestic sphere through art. Yet, as May Sinclair also repeatedly explored in her writing, Loy shows how women's art is valued (especially married women) – it must be secondary to domestic duties and is devalued as scrap. Gina has no time, no space, no materials to create. The poem offers a sarcastic, sharp, and funny

depiction of a marriage, but Loy underscores the serious consequences of marriage for women when the poem closes with this sardonic aside:

> (This narrative halted when I learned that the
> house which inspired it was the home of a mad
> woman.
> (l.123-125).

Gina is "mad" for her self-erasure, her self-delusion, and her attempts to write in this state. Loy, through her poetry, joined her voice to the chorus of women who critiqued the institutions that negatively impacted the emotional and sexual lives of women.

When she arrived in New York in 1916, Loy's status as a divorcee – or an escapee from the mad house of an effectual marriage – as well as a European avant-garde artist situated her as a "radical" of gender politics. She became an integral figure within Mabel Dodge's intellectual salon. Dodge brought a queer community of people together to discuss and intervene in the greatest questions of the day; sex was often the topic of conversation.[361] Dodge included many artists in these gatherings believing that "changes in the means of expression would go hand in hand with changes in form of social organization," and that "radicalism in all domains sprang from the same impulse."[362] Loy supported changes that would make pragmatic social difference to women, such as changes in attitudes to marriage, divorce, and women working, as each of these things had impacted her own life. But she was mainly "sympathetic to greater sexual honesty," in order to secure a radical shift in consciousness, "which she saw as a prerequisite for psychic and social liberation" (Burke "New Poetry" 41).

In the artistic sphere, Loy signaled her interest in increasing sexual frankness in her visceral and sexual vocabulary. Her poems often included references to virgins, prostitutes, mothers, "seismic orgasms", "infructuous impulses," sexual delight or bliss, spermatozoa, kissing, saliva – to name a few examples. Her poetry involved sexual shocks in order to create psychic shocks that might therefore shift attitudes. In the political sphere, activists dealing specifically with sex issues, such as Margaret Sanger in the US and Marie Stopes in the UK, were staunchly advocating for

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[361] Attitudes to all aspects of everyday life were in flux. In 1924 Freda Kirchwey, editor of *The Nation*, tried to capture "the changing morality of America" through a collection of essays entitled *Our Changing Morality: A Symposium*. The subject of sex, she explains "has been treated in this generation with a strange, rather panic-stricken lack of balance. Obscenity hawks its old wares at one end of the road and dogmatic piety shouts warnings at the other – while between is chaos" (v). In *Our Changing Morality: A Symposium* she claims the men and women in her volume "saunter up to the edge" of chaos "and see what moral disorder looks like" (vii), so that they might hold the "fragments of conduct up in the sun and air to find what they are really made of" (vi). Kirchwey, Freda (ed). *Our Changing Morality: A Symposium*. Albert & Charles Boni, 1924.

[362] Burke, Carolyn. "The New Poetry and the New Woman: Mina Loy." *Coming to Light: American Women Poets in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Diane Wood Middlebrook and Marilyn Yalom, University of Michigan Press, 1985, p.39.

women's access to contraception and planned pregnancies.[363] Feminists such as Stella Browne (UK) were also vocal and visible in their petitioning for abortion law reform. Browne held the (then heretical) view that each woman had an "absolute right to decide whether or not she will bear a child or children," regardless of class, age, or marital status.[364] Some sex feminists advocated partially or wholly in line with eugenicist impulses (Stopes). Others, like Browne, identified as "a Socialist and 'extreme' Left-Wing Feminist," arguing that a meaningful birth control regime was integral to the reduction of poverty and better living and working conditions (Hall 21). Many contraception advocates were also advocating for frank sexual knowledge for both men and women, and were therefore at least were seen as, advocates for women's pleasure and equal sexual enjoyment.[365] The pleasure of women and their sexual drive was a radical part of the modernist debate.

Mabel Dodge saw Margaret Sanger as preaching a new gospel: "of not only sex knowledge in regard to conception, but sex knowledge about copulation and its intrinsic importance." Dodge saw Sanger as "an ardent propagandist for the joys of the flesh" (Dodge cited in Burke "New Poetry" 40). Stella Browne, for example, also entered into a public debate in the letters section of *The Freewoman* about the question of women's pleasure and the dangers of abstinence.[366] Watson, her interlocutor, argued that abstinence had no repercussions on her health and that sexual needs had never interfered with her rational mind nor wellbeing. Browne acknowledges the bravery it took for Ms. Watson to write frankly about sexual issues, but also suggests that "there is surely a middle path between total abstinence and excess; the abuse of a natural pleasure does not make it entirely injurious and to be deprecated" (270). Loy was aware of debates like these and expressed her opinions in her writing. Burke places Loy in the context of these feminist forces: "like Dodge, Loy

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[363]For more detailed information on the history of feminism in America see Cott, Nancy. *The Grounding of Modern Feminism*, Yale University Press, 1987.

[364] Hall, Lesley A. *The Life and Times of Stella Browne: Feminist and Free Spirit*, I.B. Tauris, 2011, p1.

[365]A counter-narrative to sexual liberation can be found in the Social Purity Movement that began in the 19th century and sought to abolish prostitution and other "immoral" (according to Christian morality standards) sexual practices. Social Purity was a euphemism for sexual chastity and was rooted in moral reform movements of the late 19th century but still held some influence on debates surrounding birth control and eugenics in the early 20th century. A later development of this group was the Social Hygiene Movement. They were primarily concerned with the threat to public health due to syphilis and gonorrhea. In 1913, for example, at the Fourth International Congress on School Hygiene in Buffalo, attendees addressed the "sex problem" and the problems of prostitution and venereal diseases. Several organizations joined together to form the American Social Hygiene Association in order to create a "simple and effective educational campaign" to address the public health crisis, see Farrand, Livingston. "The Social Hygiene Movement." *American Journal of Public Health*. Vol 3 (11), November 1913. Though proponents claimed science as the basis for their antivenereal disease movement, many still promoted sexually conservative ideas based on idealized notions of marriage and motherhood, see Simmons, Christina. *Making Marriage Modern: Women's Sexuality from the Progressive Era to World War II*. Oxford University Press, 2009.

[366] Though the discussion was published over multiple subsequent issues, Browne's opening repost is a useful document in its clear articulation of the "middle way" for sexual tolerance, see "The Chastity of Continence" (19th Feb 1912), *The Freewoman,* Vol 12, issue 1, 22nd Feb 1912.

called for freedom of "sex expression"; like Sanger, she wrote of female sexuality as the woman's own prerogative; and like Goldman, she questioned the sway of the inner tyrants that caused even emancipated women to accept the conventions of romantic love and patriarchal marriage" (Burke 1985 43). Loy was particularly opposed to the "cult of virginity" and explores her attitude to it is a means of illustrating her queer, sex-positive position. [367]

Told from the perspective of one of the virgins, "Virgin Plus Curtains Minus Dots" (1914) critiques heteropatriarchal hypocrisy towards sex and economic inequality. Unmarried women waste away, virginial, hidden behind curtains and bolted – protected – by "Somebody who was never /a virgin" (l.44-45). The speaker identifies herself as part of the group, as "we" walk and pass time, bored, looking into the mirror. The women who look out beyond curtains are made to be passive observers upon life – a life that is measured by the men who stride passed their windows. These women have been sold the lie that "Love is a god / White with soft wings" (l.31-32), the spacing represents a breathless gasp of desire, hinting at the hoped-for future of their imagined honeymoons – a sensual possibility, which is "a secret well kept" (l.39). There is pathos in the situations of these fluttery virgins, because they have desires and hopes, daring to whisper to themselves of " 'Transparent nightdresses made all of lace' " (l.23). Their situation is pathetic because they have no need of protection nor lace nightdresses because part of the "secret" of marriage is that it is a business transaction, and these women have no dowries – the "dots" of the title.

Though one of the virgins, the speaker has a clearer vision than the others, unfiltered by curtains or hope, for she is able to see that "Virgins may squeak / 'My dear I should faint'" but that "we" are "Wasting our giggles / For we have no dots" (l.24-25, 28-29). The speaker describes the sad state of society's double standards, replacing Cupid with capitalism - "buying a purchaser" (l. 35). Yet also refusing women a life (sexual and social) if their family has no money:

We have been taught
Love is a god
White with soft wings
Nobody shouts
Virgins for sale
Yet where are our coins
For buying a purchaser
Love is a god
Marriage expensive

[367] Amelia Jones makes a brief reference to a "virginity cult" in the culture in her discussions of Dada. For more on the Dadaist attitudes to women, see Jones, Amelia. *Irrational Modernism: A Neurasthenic History of New York Dada*. MIT Press, 2004, p 289n81.

A secret well kept
Makes the noise of the world
Nature's arms spread wide
Making room for us
Room for all of us
Somebody who was never
a virgin
Has bolted the door
Put curtains at our windows
See the men pass
They are going somewhere
(l.30-49).

Though there is "room for us all" in nature and despite the fact that women's flesh, behind the curtains "Throbs to the night" (l.55), men - with freedom of space and sex - have locked women away. Men are doubly culpable because it is men that earn the money to buy other men as husbands. Ironically, at the poem's close, it is the men that barricade themselves behind locked doors, fearful of women's powerful desires: "Against virgins who / Might scratch" (l.62-63). Echoing the complaints of the suffragettes, Loy places the blame for women's ignorance of economic and sexual realities on a society – ran by and for men – that claims to "protect" women from life. She satirizes those men whose hypocritical actions perpetuate the structures that justify the need for women's protection.

Feminism and Futurism

Seeking to "wake up" the consciousness of others to her radical sex and gender politics Loy reappropriated the form and force of the Futurists.[368] This is especially clear in Loy's "Feminist Manifesto" (1914).[369] Here Loy advocates for women's right to have sexual desires and fulfil them, but to do so women must sacrifice " 'virtue' " (*LBB* 154). Loy argues that the emphasis on "physical purity" makes it "too easy" for women, "rendering her lethargic in the acquisition of intrinsic merits of character, by which she could obtain a concrete value" (*LBB* 154). A man's value, by contrast, is

[368] In a letter (1915) to Carl Van Vechten Loy credited Marinetti with "waking her up," and teaching her to draw on her "vitality," Loy cited in Scott, *Gender of Modernism*, p 232. Though Loy credited Marinetti with "waking her up" to the powerful link between art and life when she met him and the Futurists between 1907-1916. Loy also met Gertrude Stein at that time, and she read Stein's work in manuscript form. Loy's writing on and defense of Stein's work also offers an insight into her own writing, this connection deserves deeper discussion than I am able to give it here.

[369] The "Feminist Manifesto" was not published in Loy's lifetime but was sent in its initial form to Mabel Dodge Luhan. I take my version from Conover's *LLB* (1996), all emphasis and typographical idiosyncrasies are Loy's own unless otherwise stated. In the notes Conover refers to a subsequent letter from Loy to Mabel Dodge, she wrote: "By the way – the fragment of Feminist tirade I sent you – flat? I find the destruction of virginity – so daring don't you think – had been suggested by some other woman years ago – see Havelock Ellis" (216). Conover speculates that Loy's "Feminist Manifesto" was partly written in response to Valentine de Saint-Point's "Manifesto of the Futurist Woman" (1912) and her "Futurist Manifesto of Lust" (1913), which Conover summarizes as announcing "the birth of a strong and instinctive superwoman and affirmed the rights of female sexual desire" (217) .Saint-Point's manifestos, as discussed below, are more firmly in line with classic Futurism, and Loy's work differs in its inclusion of feelings, spirituality, and non-violent radical revolution.

"assessed entirely according to his use or interest to the community" (*LBB* 155). Women's value rests on chance, the chance of marrying well: "her success or insuccess in maneuvering a man into taking the life-long responsibility for her" (*LBB* 155). Being allowed no other means of earning money or taking care of themselves leaves women the choice between:

> **Parasitism, & Prostitution – or Negation** (*LBB* 154).[370]

Loy's solution is provocative and extreme: "the unconditional surgical destruction of virginity through-out the female population at puberty" (*LBB* 155). Though the emerging generic conventions of the manifesto demanded polemic stances, Loy did believe that lasting change came from a shift in consciousness rather than voting rights. She scoffs at incrementalism, asking:

> Professional & commercial careers are opening up for you --
> **Is that all you want?**

Loy is a proponent of change at a more fundamental, ontological level than "economic legislation, vice-crusades & uniform education." To pay attention, Loy claims, to legislation only, is to gloss over "**Reality**" (*LBB* 153).[371] For Loy a fundamental change in consciousness is necessary to create new relations between men and women. A means of communicating this necessity and precipitating this change was through the shock of the visual. Marinetti called it a "typographical revolution" in his "Destruction of Syntax" manifesto (1913).[372] Marinetti claimed it was necessary to destroy syntax through the "suppression of the qualifying adjective," and to make use of the infinitive verb form. He advocated for multicolored variety and different typefaces. Against ornament, he insisted typographical impact should be brutally hurled in the face of the reader. Clearly influenced by this manifesto, Loy typographically emphasizes the necessity for a "Wrench," a "devastating psychological upheaval," and an "Absolute Demolition" for meaningful change to occur (*LBB* 153).

Women artists, like Loy, sought social change through aesthetic expression, believing that art could effectively change attitudes. Burke points out that for many female modernists "political,

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[370] I have tried to recreate the typographical emphasis and spacing of Loy's original manifesto, as such, short quotations are sometimes given in block quote form.

[371] "Reality" also carries the sense that in "reality" the progress that had been made did not amount to much for the everyday experiences of women. Anthropologist and feminist Elsie Clews Parson's makes this very point, despite writing after the 1920 ratification of the 19th amendment to the American constitution for women's voting rights, nothing much changed. Parson's writes in "Changes in Sex Relations" (1924), that "the lessening of the verbal taboo gives a sense of greater change in relationships than there is; in fact women had no greater freedom in sex in reality" (*Changing Morality* 41).

[372] Marinetti, F. T. "Destruction of Syntax – Imagination without Strings – Words-in-Freedom." https://www.unknown.nu/futurism/destruction.html . n.p. Accessed 21st March 2019.

artistic, and sexual experimentation spring from the same impulse" ("New Poetry" 43). Men and women are enemies, Loy claims, because they are both "at the mercy of the advantage that each can take of the other's sexual dependence" and the only point where the interests of sexes merge "is the sexual embrace" (*LBB* 154). To destroy the illusion that sex is impure, Loy concedes, will take "indomitable will, irreducible courage, & abundant health the outcome of sound nerves—" (*LBB* 156). Concerned with finding new ways to express the direct experiences of life, particularly women's experiences that were taboo, Loy stood vocally and visually against continued Victorian gender politics. Though Loy's "Feminist Manifesto" remained unpublished in her lifetime, Loy's manifesto was a polemical version of the statements that she consistently made in poetic form.

The feelings that Futurism typically claimed for itself were pride, frenzy, fervor, mania - "a furious gust of madness tore us out of ourselves" - defiance, and lust. [373] In the foundational manifesto, Marinetti dramatizes the birth of Futurism; the male Futurists race "Like young lions" that are "vital and throbbing" (3), they are reborn not from women but from machines. In being parthenogenetically created from cars and the fecund ditch that they violently crash into, they are distancing themselves from the weakness of the (female) flesh: "Our hearts feel no weariness, for they feed on fire, on hatred, and on speed!" (8). They fling their "challenge to the stars" and triumphantly declare the death of the old, claiming that Futurism is the birth of the new. Their poetry will be filled with "courage, boldness and rebellion" (4). Their actions struggle toward glory, speed, movement, destruction, war (4). Famously Marinetti stated, "we wish to glorify war – the sole cleanser of the world – militarism, patriotism, the destructive act of the libertarian, beautiful ideas worth dying for and scorn for women" (5). Phallic, machinic, assertive, intense, violent – Futurist joy is the penetration that kills the heart and vivifies it: "my heart being pierced by the red-hot sword of joy" (4). The virile, masculine Futurist was created, not born.[374]

Loy's first publication, for instance, entitled "Aphorisms on Futurism" (1914), used many of the techniques and much of the tone of the Futurist manifesto.[375] She utilized short declarative statements, used white space and capitalization, used second-person address to call an audience into

[373] Marinetti, F.T. "The Foundation and Manifesto of Futurism" (1909). *100 Artists' Manifestos from the Futurists to the Stuckists*, edited by Alex Danchev, Penguin Books, 2011.
[374] Futurist Painters also declared: "all subjects previously used must be swept aside in order to express our whirling life of steel, of pride, of fever and of speed." In what might be called a proto-affective declaration Boccioni states that "movement and light destroy the materiality of bodies." Boccioni, Umberto et al. "Futurist Painting: Technical Manifesto" (1910), p.17.
[375] The "Aphorisms on Futurism" was Loy's first publication and was first published in Alfred Steiglitz's *Camera Work* 45 (January 1914). After breaking with Futurism, she revised the words future/Futurism to modern/Modernism (Conover 215).

being, and cultivated a bombastic tone. As Alex Danchev explains, "to manifesto is to perform."[376] Loy's performance claimed to explain Futurism to its readers, but the content only partially toed the Futurist line. A small number of the aphorisms focused on velocity, speed, activity, and the destruction of the past – all of which are typical of the focus and mood of Futurism. For example, "THE Futurist must leap from affirmative to affirmative, ignoring intermittent negations—must spring from stepping-stone to stone of creative exploration; without slipping back into the turbid stream of accepted facts" (*LBB* 150). However, Loy also includes ideas that seem antithetical to the self-proclaimed Futurist project; namely, Loy includes love and care: "LOVE of others is the appreciation of one's self" (*LBB* 150). She also suggests that beauty is integral to the small and ugly rather than the grand: "LOVE the hideous in order to find the sublime core of it" (*LBB* 149). Even at her most dedicated to Futurism, Loy challenges the dominant regime, queering the feelings of Futurism.

Incorporated into Loy's vision of the future is feeling. This contrasts sharply with Valentine de Saint-Point and her "Manifesto for Futurist Woman" (1912). The women worthy of being part of Futurism should be, according to Saint-Point, "Furies, Amazons, Semiramis, Joans of Arc" who "fight more ferociously than males."[377] Futurist women are "lovers who arouse" and "destroyers who break down the weakest" (31). Loy, instead, calls for "egotism be so gigantic that you comprise mankind in your self-sympathy" (*LBB* 150). Loy's call is to radical love, community, and self-shattering intimacy rather than physical violence and hierarchy. Loy acknowledges joy explicitly, making it a necessary feeling for the future, when people will be "tremendous," expanding to their fullest capacity:

> MISERY is in the disintegration of Joy;
> Intellect, of Intuition;
> Acceptance, of Inspiration.
> (*LBB* 150).

Feelings of joy, intuition, inspiration are made central to the creative consciousness, and something that must be protected. She calls into being an equality through a democratic appeal for everyone (potentially) to expand their consciousness: "the smallest person, potentially, is as great as the Universe" (*LBB* 150). This diverges strongly from de Saint-Point's Futurist party-line. True to modernism more broadly, de Saint-Point states, "I have renounced Sentimentalism as a weakness,"

[376] Danchev, Alex (ed). "Introduction." *100 Artists' Manifestos from the Futurists to the Stuckists*, Penguin Books, 2011. All manifestoes are taken from this collection unless otherwise stated.
[377] Ibid, p.31. Valentine de Saint-Point was an avant-garde artist and muse turned dancer, writer, and activist. She was part of Futurism for a while but left because of their misogyny. As well as "Manifesto for Futurist Woman," she also wrote a "Manifesto of Lust" (1913).

and that "*Lust is a strength*, because it destroys the weak" and excites men to domination ("Futurist Women" 33). Futurists claimed virile masculinity as their core force of connection and relation. de Saint-Point claims Futurism and the categories of masculinity and femininity are not determined by sex. However, all weakness and lack of virility is coded female or feminine, and this attitude represents the typical Futurist view of women. Emotion generally is repudiated, but "soft" and "feminine" feelings of care, love, and joy especially are rejected in Marinetti's "scorn for women" ("Futurist Women" 30). As opposed to the "virility" of the Futurist woman, Loy offered the "vitality" of the Modern woman.

It was Futurism's masculinity, sexuality, and energy that initially attracted Loy to the Futurists, and eventually led her to reject them for their misogyny, posturing, and glorification of war. Marinetti modeled for Loy how art and life might be connected: "Living art draws its life from the surrounding environment" (11). Though not often explicitly stated, Futurist misogyny can be identified in the emotions they reject, emotions associated with care-giving and close relationships are rejected as too feminine and thereby weak. As the birth of Futurism clearly illustrates, the body of women and any associated power of maternity is rejected.[378] Fundamental to Loy's divergence from the Futurists was their scorn for women and ambivalence towards impassioned feeling, both of which became central to her aesthetic and her philosophy of psychic development. For Loy, as I demonstrate, one must be emotionally alive to *all* forms of feeling to be moved towards psychic and aesthetic revolution.

Psycho-Democracy

Loy expounded upon her theories for revolutionary consciousness and social and cultural change in a published pamphlet entitled "Psycho-Democracy: A movement to focus human reason on THE CONSCIOUS DIRECTION OF EVOLUTION."[379] Written in 1918, it is both an explicit critique of WWI and Futurism's glorification of war, and a commentary on the subsequent loss of spiritual hope. Loy offers an alternative manifesto for the evolution of individuals and society rather than revolution and the cataclysm of war. Her aim is to "establish a new social system" for the utilization of the "forces of human nature" (19). Loy offers a "Democracy of The Spirit," governed by creative imagination - "Fraternity of Intuition, and Intellect and Mother wit" - as a replacement for "the cataclysmic factor in social evolution WAR" (14). She presents "intellectual heroism as a popular ideal in place of physical heroism" (19). Loy contradicts and queers the Futurist philosophy

[378] Ahmed, citing Spelman and Jagger, points out that feminist scholars have shown that the subordination of emotions also works to "subordinate the feminine and the body"; Ahmed, Sara. *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*. Routledge, 2004, p.3.
[379]Loy, Mina. "Psycho-Democracy." *The Little Review*, Autumn 1921, p.14, emphasis original.

by incorporating care, intuition, maternity, and psycho-social development into her manifesto. She advocates for life-orientated generation rather than death and destruction. Loy focuses on individual development of intellectual and spiritual understanding (which is joyful in a Spinozan sense), she emphasizes the place of the creative mind in the production of this (joyful) knowledge. [380]

The Psycho-democrat, she claims, is "Man, Woman, or Child of good sense and with imagination, having a normal love of Life and a sympathetic indifference to their neighbours obligations" (15). Since people create institutions, she explains, they reflect the needs, ideas, and psychology of the people that make them. Thus, institutions have a tendency to "outlast the psychological conditions from which they arose" (16). Rather than be thought of as structures that need protection, outmoded institutions should be reimagined and replaced in the knowledge that they will also outlast their use. Institutions created today, Loy suggests, "will cause future generations to roar with laughter" (16). Thus, she emphasizes the process of change that necessitates the replacement of systems that no longer serve the society – outmoded ideas regarding sexual and gender expression being a case in point. Loy lists the ideas that future generations will not only laugh at but also condemn. For example, the "criminal lunacy" of war:

> that it is considered either normal or necessary for millions of men and women to wear out their organisms with no reward but the maintenance of those organisms, imperfectly functioning, and that this social condition should be safeguarded and preserved by the blowing up of other millions of human organisms will appear as the nightmare of a criminal lunatic (16).

This desire for war, she suggests, is part of the problematic militarism that is aroused by a poetics of the spectacle, a poetics created by the symbols of flag and uniform, and the rhythms created by band and parade. This millenarianism "sustains the *belligerent masculine* social ideal" (18), a Futurist mentality. This is balanced in her manifesto by the inclusion of "Intuition and Mother Wit" (14). She calls upon "the thinker, the scientist, the philosopher, the writer, the artist, the mechanic, the worker, to join intelligent forces in a concerted effort to evolve and establish a new social symbolism, a new social rhythm, a new social snobism" (18). Loy makes an appeal to creative thinkers to find an alternative to militarism.

Loy's call to people to join together in collectively reimagining social structures, in a Spinozan sense, creates joy. According to philosophers Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd, part of

[380] Loy was clearly influenced by the work of Henri Bergson and I would like to explore his impact upon her work in future research.

Spinoza's definition of imagination is "an awareness of the body as it is impinged upon by other bodies."[381] Loy considers this relationality in terms of the collective consciousness: "social institutions as structural forms in collective consciousness which are subject to the same evolutional transformation as is collective consciousness" (16). This means that thinking and imagining is always collective. To call people together to reimagine social bodies is to increase understanding, both individual and collective. This change means an increase in joy. In a section of "Psycho-Democracy" that strongly evokes Spinoza, Loy connects the individual with the collective and universal, the psychic with the social:

> *The Aim of Society is the Perfection of Self*
>
> Man's desire is for Self.
> His desire is commensurate with possibility.
> The earth offers super-abundance for All.
> Human imagination is illimitable.
> Psycho-Democracy advocates the fulfilment of all Desire.
> "Self" is the covered entrance to Infinity.
>
> (18)

This will-to-knowledge, self-transformation, education and self-awareness as integral to perfection – strongly recalls Spinoza's *conatus*. Loy emphasizes that the *democratic* evolution over time is important since, by 1918, Futurism was starting to show its fascist leanings as a means of change.

Loy incorporates a queer critique into her psycho-democratic proposal. She argues that the repression of desires and non-normative impulses has contributed to a "Cosmic Neurosis, whose major symptom is Fear" (16). Emotions move us to action and are felt by the individual but, as I have previously discussed, they do not originate with the individual, rather they have a life before and after us. Loy's "cosmic neurosis" gestures to the physical and psychological outcomes of collective suspicion and fear of difference. Integral to this illness is "inhibitive social and religious precepts that ordain that man must suffer," and repress his "fundamental desires" (16). Against this she juxtaposes a psycho-democratic alternative that she had previously touched upon in her earlier poem sequence "Songs to Joannes" (1915). The unblinking, open, feeling work of Loy – that might be criticized as "feminine" or "sentimental" by masculinist heteronormative positions that she will critique –aims at greater power, greater capacity to act and imagine, and this is joy in its affective form. Loy proposes radical intimacy, through sex, as a way of allying fear. She calls it "the impact of luminous bodies, knocking sparks off one another in chaos" (16). Sexual union becomes a site of creative thinking and the means for sparking new life (literally in the case of conception). A new

[381] James, Susan, Genevieve Lloyd and Moira Gatens (interview). "The Power of Spinoza: Feminist Conjunctions." *Hypatia*, 15, 2, 2000, p. 48.

mutuality between humans is necessary to create new social structures. Ironically, it was not her manifestos for which she kept her most biting tone, rather it is in her poetry and in particular love poetry. In "Songs to Joannes" she offers both the spiritual hope and vision of "Psycho-Democracy" and the "Wrench" that unmasks the lie of centuries of love songs.

Failure of Intimacy, Success of Sex

"Songs to Joannes" is a song cycle of thirty-four poems that first appeared under the title "Love Songs" in the inaugural issue of *Others* (July 1915).[382] Insistently sexual and persistently focused on the female speaker's experience, "Songs to Joannes" offers a reflection on the potential for success but ultimate failure of, the Psycho-Democratic ideal of intimacy. The sequence unfolds the process of a love affair begun, consummated, developed, but ended. It is a modernist elegy for the end of traditional lyric love songs. The sequence documents bursts of experiences that come together to give the impression of a love affair. As is typical of Loy, the sequence is not a progressive narrative, rather, Loy presents moments of consciousness, shifting from present moments – with direct address to the lover, to fantasies of what "might have been," and also memories of past events. Each song reveals a facet of an affair that had potential for a queer non-normative intimacy, but it failed.

In perhaps what is Loy's best-known line in her best-known poem, "Pig Cupid," the herald of love and lust, roots in "erotic garbage" to create self-deluding fantasies of fairytale happiness:

I

Spawn of Fantasies
Silting the appraisable
Pig Cupid his rosy snout
Rooting erotic garbage
"Once upon a time"
Pulls a weed white and star-topped
Among wild oats sewn in mucous-membrane

I would an eye in a Bengal light
Eternity in a sky-rocket
Constellations in an ocean
Whose rivers run no fresher
Than a trickle of saliva

These are suspect places

[382] The complete sequence appeared in *Others* in April 1917. Conover takes the 1917 version as the copy-text.

I must live in my lantern
Trimming subliminal flicker
Virginal to the bellows
Of Experience
Coloured glass
(l. 1-18)

From the opening stanza Loy demystifies love and exposes the lie from "Virgins Plus Curtains Minus Dots," that "Love is a god / White with soft wings" (l.31-32). She reveals the god of Love to be a rosy pig, sniffing and appraising the bodies of women – flesh that Loy linked to weeds in "Virgin Plus Curtains Minus Dots": "Fleshes like weeds" (l.49) – Pig Cupid sorting them by their monetary value. Cupid is not only created from the source - "spawn" - of fantasies but roots around in those garbage fairytales for a "happily ever after" that will keep women blinded and tranquil. Having been previously taken in by the sight of fireworks ("Bengal light") and the reflected beauty of stars, both images of untouchable and remote lights, the speaker offers a different vision.[383] Shifting register to a clinical vocabulary, she speaks of "mucous-membranes" and "trickle[s] of saliva" in "suspect places." She vows to live in a light that is more earthy and reliable. She tends the light of the mind by trimming the intellectual wick, "subliminal flicker," hoping to become impenetrable to the winds and "bellows" of experience. Eric Selinger calls this a "a modernist dismantling of the old codes of romance."[384] Maeera Shreiber makes the point that, "as a modernist Loy inherits a radical distrust of the notion of the lyrical subject, one of the conventions of amorous discourse."[385] Loy reinforces link between the romantic and the erotic through Cupid, but undermines the traditional love song by emphasizing the messiness and abject aspects of love. [386]

Historian Nancy Cott describes the importance of sexual expression for feminism of the early twentieth century: "Feminists assigned more liberatory meaning and value to passionate heterosexual attachment than did any women's rights advocates before them. Seeing sexual desire as healthy and joyful, they assumed that free women could meet men as equals on the terrain of sexual expression just as on the terrain of political representation or professional expertise."[387] Developing

[383] Bengal lights are a kind of firework that give off a strong blue light, and they are often used for signaling.
[384] Selinger, Eric Murphey. "Love in the Time of Melancholia." *Mina Loy: Woman and Poet*, edited by Maeera Shreiber & Keith Tuma, The National Poetry Foundation, 1998, p. 21. Essays taken from *Mina Loy: Woman and Poet* will hereafter be referred to in-text by author name and *W&P.*
[385] Shreiber, Maeera. " 'Love is a Lyric / Of Bodies': The Negative Aesthetics of Mina Loy's Love Songs to Joannes." *W&P*, p. 87.
[386] In her article "Seismic Orgasm" Rachel Blau DuPlessis calculates that forty percent of the poem centers on sexual acts or mention sex. Blau DuPlessis, Rachel. " 'Seismic Orgasm': Sexual Intercourse and Narrative Meaning in Mina Loy." *W&P*, p. 57.
[387] Cott, Nancy cited in Trimberger, Ellen Kay. "The New Woman and the New Sexuality: Conflict and Contradiction in the Writings and Lives of Mabel Dodge and Neith Boyce." *1915: The Cultural Moment*, edited by Adele Heller and Lois Rudnick, Rutgers University Press, 1991, p.105.

this idea, the sexual pleasures in "Songs to Joannes" are shared.The speaker articulates her own pleasures and displeasures across the trajectory of the relationship. Loy confronts the social taboos around sexuality and particularly female sexuality. Song twenty-five demonstrates one way she achieves this:

Shedding our petty pruderies
From slit eyes
We sidle up
To Nature
— — — that irate pornographist
(l. 292 -296).

Eyes closed in sexual pleasure, reflecting a "seismic orgasm" (l.367) that catches them sensuously sneaking up to a Nature that is wildly procreative. Expressing their natural sexual desires, they shed their pruderies and enjoy sex; eyes that close in sexual pleasure or post-coital sleep, once opened, see the world as entirely different:

When we lifted

Our eye-lids on Love
A cosmos
Of coloured voices
And laughing honey
(l.90-94).

Love transfigures the senses. The universe expands into a cosmos and, synaesthetically, the world is transformed into a place of sweetened tactile sounds. The voices that break on the "confines of passion" (l.110) splinter and are colored. This recalls the "coloured glass" at the close of the first song; the phrase is set apart in song one and is mysterious, perhaps a memory of shared sexual intimacy that comes unbidden to the speaker's mind. Unlike the tired typist and after her encounter with "the young man carbuncular" from "The Waste Land," whose post-coital thought is: " 'Well now that's done: and I'm glad it's over, '" the speaker of "Song to Joannes" recalls their delight in one another:

Voices break on the confines of passion
Desire Suspicion Man Woman
Solve in the humid carnage

Flesh from flesh
Draws the inseparable delight
Kissing at gasps to catch it
(l.110-115).

The incalculable mathematics of a relationship is briefly "solved" in the equation of humid, human flesh. Momentarily made "inseparable" through "delight," their gasping kisses seek to take in the moment. As Loy made clear in her "Feminist Manifesto," it is merely outmoded societal conventions that make sex taboo: "there is nothing impure in sex –except in the mental attitude to it" (*LBB* 156). The shift in mental attitude, Loy stakes, "will constitute an incalculable & wider social regeneration than it is possible for our generation to imagine."[388] The unequivocal confrontation of the reader with the bodies within the poem, when first published, caused more gasps of shock than delight. However, as I will discuss in further detail below, artists within Loy's circle believed that it was possible to "transform sexual relations by transforming language."[389] This transformation was not only focused on the pleasures of the flesh but also its failed pleasures.

The "Songs" powerfully express the loss of love and a yearning for what "might have been." The speaker lays the blame for the failure of the affair squarely at the door of Joannes. She cites two reasons that he is to blame: a failure to be open to intimacy and a failure to produce something other than sex – namely a child or a deeper psychosexual union. In song thirteen for example, the speaker invites her lover to share in a deep, spiritual-sexual union that would involve a true understanding of one another. This potential mutuality during sexual embrace also contains the potential to create something new:

> Where two or three are welded together
> They shall become god
> – – – – – – –
> Oh that's right
> Keep away from me Please give me a push
> Don't let me understand you Don't realize me
> Or we might tumble together
> Depersonalized
> Identical
> Into the terrific Nirvana
> Me you — you — me
>
> (l.146-156)

Loy reimagines love as an intellectual, emotional, and spiritual knowing that enables a true union of equals. Sexual union is a means of to achieve emotional union, but it also results in the "depersonalized" destruction of the self. She offers him this "Nirvana" – a "realization" of a reality that means a loss of individuality. However, the destruction of identity, a liberation of soul from

[388] It is interesting to note that despite being underlined, the statement that there is nothing impure in sex - which comes as the final statement in the manifesto - is not made bold nor given in a large font size; does this suggest a tentativeness – or perhaps a continuing grappling with the problem.
[389] Peppis, Paul. *Sciences of Modernism: Ethnography, Sexology, and Psychology*. Cambridge University Press, 2014, p.569.

body, making a "me you" is rejected for a hyphenated "you' and "me" – individuated but connected. In her reading of the "Songs" Rachel Blau DuPlessis suggests that, "the pleasures and dangers of merging boundaries are in unresolvable circulation in the poem."[390] Refusing such a creative dissolution, the speaker desires an embodied creativity in the form of a child.

The speaker is acerbic in her ire. Aligning her lover with "Pig Cupid" and, in a reversal of the typically gendered gaze, she objectifies his body for its reproductive use. He is reduced to "the skin-sack / In which a wanton duality" is packed with "All the completions of my infructuous impulses" (l.19-22). Despite his god-like creative potential, Joannes refuses to be "welded together" by the creation of a third. Despite the liberatory possibilities of "free love," the difficulties of incompatibility remain. The speaker laments:

> The procreative truth of Me
> Petered out
> In pestilent
> Tear drops
> Little lusts and lucidities
> (l.265-269).

Little lusts bring lucid realizations. The speaker acknowledges that their union was merely lust; not the creative potential of a meeting of bodyminds or in creative conception. In song three, the speaker mourns what "might" have happened. They *might* have come together in a mockery of a typical marriage, and therefore created an alternative to, the "laughable" outmoded Christian union:

> We might have coupled
> In the bed-ridden monopoly of a moment
> Or broken flesh with one another
> At the profane communion table
> Where wine is spill'd on promiscuous lips
>
> We might have given birth to a butterfly
> With the daily-news
> Printed in blood on its wings
> (l. 31-38)

Had Joannes – generally agreed upon as Giovanni Papini, Loy's real lover - "broken flesh," rather than been satisfied with "little lusts and lucidities," he would have created the entirely new being the Futurists envisioned. A new creature, Loy claims, made of air and marked with the press of modernity - a new blood covenant for a new era. Paul Peppis describes the song sequence as an

[390]Blau DuPlessis, Rachel. " 'Seismic Orgasm': Sexual Intercourse and Narrative Meaning in Mina Loy." *W&P,* p. 61.

"anti-blason," and points out that "biological incompatibility" becomes a source of pathos in the poem (179).[391]

Loy's poetry explores sex and explodes the taboos constructed around it, depicting unconventional sexualities directly. Her poetry focusses on woman's experience and their relation to others: as lover, as wife, as mother, and as artistic equal. Loy strove to see things clearly and to express them distinctly. Her friend, William Carlos Williams, commented on the quality of her "directness," saying, "She sees and she sees everything that goes on about her, directly" (Williams cited in *W&P* 555). Virginia Kouidis emphasizes the role of clarity for Loy; she comments on Loy's "continuing struggle for clear vision" that "dominates the spiritual autobiography contained in Loy's poetry" (23). Harriet Monroe, contemporary of Loy and editor of *Poetry,* articulated her discomfort at the direct, fragmented, vivid, and undisguised emotion of Loy's poetry. Monroe wrote that she felt a "desperation" in both Loy's poetry and personality, someone burdened by too much experience and world-weary. Monroe felt that Loy's poetry showed "a modern temperament" that revealed the "ravages of the spirit" (Monroe cited in Burke 336). This meant that to Monroe, Loy's poetry "lacked magic," but she also conceded that Loy's desperation was like the "shadowed under-side of the saint's ecstatic sensuality" (ibid 336).[392] What Monroe found desperate and unmagical, later critics and revivalists of Loy's work found radical and liberatory. Kenneth Rexroth captures something about Loy's work by saying, "her copulators stay copulated," and "Mina Loy, in her best known work, dipped her pen in the glands of Bartholin and wrote."[393]

A New Sexual Grammar

Emotions are *expressed* in Loy, meaning pressed out painfully, elicited by the pain and disappointed-joy of potential unions into a collage-like impression. This is an expression that

[391] As some Loy scholars have pointed out (Burke, Kouidis), in Loy's approach to maternity there is a strain of conservatism. On the one hand, in her "Feminist Manifesto," she argues that "Every woman has a right to maternity" whatever her marital status. On the other, there is an implied assumption for the responsibility of maternity: "Every woman of superior intelligence should realize her race-responsibility by producing children in adequate proportion to the unfit or degenerate members of her sex." These eugenicist and classist overtones were not uncommon among sex radicals. Marie Stopes for example, was strongly influenced by eugenics and part of her work for contraception was to curb the surplus of children from the lower classes. The issue was widely and hotly debated. Ellen Key, a well-known Swedish feminist and writer of *Love and Marriage* (1911), for example, was critical of women who put work over motherhood. "Motherhood," she wrote, "was a more important means of exercising creativity than writing a novel or producing a work of art" (Key cited in Trimberger 108).

[392] Burke points out that both Harriet Monroe and Edwin Muir found an element of spirituality in Loy, what Monroe called "the underside" and Muir called mysticism (337). Muir called Loy "a mystic of a very peculiar kind, a negative mystic, the chief fruit of whose mysticism is an acridly intimate awareness of the flesh" though he added, "she seems 'perplexed' by the senses" (337).

[393] Rexroth, Kenneth cited in *BM* 403. Bartholin glands are very small round glands located at either side of the opening of the vagina, they provide lubrication during sexual intercourse, Rexroth, Kenneth. "Les Lauriers Sont Coupés." *Circle*, 1.4, 1944, p.69.

impresses upon the bodymind of the reader from the body of Loy's poetry. "Songs to Joannes" offers what Benjamin Kahan calls a "new sexual grammar" (356). Loy's sexual grammar aims to incorporate the abject into the traditional love lyric, and therefore expand its scope. One of the ways Loy does this is by utilizing vocabulary from juxtaposing discourses, and selecting vivid and shocking terminology from them. She draws freely on anatomy, giving clinical names to body parts without euphemism, for example, "mucous-membrane" (l.7), "trickle of saliva" (l.12), "the skin-sack / in which a wanton duality/Packed" with "spermatozoa" (l. 19-20, 95). This is set against religious and mythical imagery: "Pig Cupid" (l.3), "bird-like abortions / With human throats / And Wisdom's eyes" (42-44). Older registers, like myth, are juxtaposed with new psychological ideas: "Or are you/ Only the other half/ Of an ego's necessity" (l.121-123), "inviolate egos" (l.145). Loy also uses active and surprising verbs: "Spawn" (l.1), "Licking the Arno," and adjectives: "a white towel / Wipes the cymophanous sweat" (l.328-330). Seeking to express the modern psychosocial experience of the female avant-garde artist, Loy created her own sexual grammar to challenge the conventions and constraints of normative thinking.

In letters to Julien Levy in the 1930s Loy underscores the importance of language to her poetics, claiming that, "I am intensely aiming at pure language" (*LLB* 173). She goes on to say that she had a "subconscious obsession that [she] was being dishonest if [she] ever used a combination of words that had been used before…I was trying to make a foreign language – Because English had already been used by *some* other people" (*LLB* 173). She also had "a fear of the inner censor condemning me if I ever used the word that *is* in use" (*LLB* 173). This explains her polyglot and archaic vocabulary. In fact, Loy argues in her essay "Modern Poetry," that it was inevitable that her poetry would emerge from America because "latterly a thousand languages have been born" (*LLB* 159). Since America had a thousand versions of English, with the "grammatical structure and voice-inflection of many races," she argued that it held the possibility of a rebirth of the English language for poetry. America's "composite language is a very living language" (*LLB* 159), Loy states, and that to be heard in the cacophony of the American melting-pot necessitates fresh phrases, new ways of saying old things. She singles out E.E. Cummings as one of the few successful modern poets because he "keeps that rich compassion that poets have for common things," as well creates as a "new metric relationship" (*LLB* 160). Loy contrasts his compassion with the "entirely anti-human…fear of sentimentality of other less successful poets. There is an interesting relationship between Loy's characterization of modern poetry as distinctly individual and the marble-like impenetrability of some of her poetry. Each modern poet, she suggests, has a highly recognizable signature: "It will be found that one can recognize each of the modern poets' work by the gait of their mentality" (*LLB*

158-159). The rhythm of verse reflects a signature movement of their body. Loy suggest that "the formation of their verses is determined by the spontaneous tempo of their response to life" (*LLB* 158-59). In contrast to the impersonality proposed by Eliot, Loy argues that the "secret" to modern poetry is understanding that it stems from the life and mind of the poet: "it is the direct response of the poet's mind to the modern world of varieties in which he finds himself" (*LLB* 158).

Joyce's *Ulysses*

Loy underscores her commitment to the importance of fresh language and evolving consciousness, in her poem for Joyce's *Ulysses.* Not only did Loy socialize with Joyce in Paris in the 1920's, but she read and admired his work. She found commonality in their rejection of normative values, their honesty about bodies and sexuality, and their love of language.[394] Her tribute to Joyce, her poem, "Joyce's Ulysses" (1923), is a paean to the artist who dared to give flesh words and words flesh, in order to recreate language and art.

Opening with the normalcy that both Joyce and Loy reject and suffer blows from, "The Normal Monster / sings in the Green Sahara" making "Celtic noises /in these lyrical hells" (l.1-2,5-6). A Green Sahara is a hot, barren area that is hostile to life, and so Loy figures Ireland not as the Emerald Isle, but as a cultural desert. The rumbling Celtic complaints, from church and the "normal" moral majority, seek to censor and silence Joyce's "Olympian prose" – his words creating an alternative pantheon recalling the Greek Gods.[395] Rather than the gentle spring wind of Zephryus, Greek God of the west wind, Joyce is heralded by a hurricane – destructor of the old to recreate the new:

> Hurricanes
> of reasoned musics
> reap the uncensored earth
>
> The loquent consciousness
> of living things
> pours in torrential languages
> (l.7-12).

Yet the violent winds, Loy argues, also bring "reasoned musics" in "torrential languages." In contrast to the bareness of the "Green Sahara," this torrent brings life. The earth is "uncensored" – unlike *Ulysses* - contrasting nature to art, but also hinting at the reality of human sexual nature as

[394] Loy knew Joyce in Paris in 1923, she was part of "the Crowd" that congregated at Shakespeare and Company, and so sometimes moved in his social circle. Loy also contributed to an interview of Joyce with Djuna Barnes that was to be published in *Vanity Fair*, with Loy creating sketches of him as they all spoke.
[395] In a letter, Loy referred to him as the "God of Paris" after the publication of *Ulysses*, but also "the most gentle of geniuses" (*BM* 311).

reasonable and unstoppable. These violent winds of artistic inspiration also shift the "consciousness / of living things" making them speak. Loy defends the speaking consciousness expressed in *Ulysses*, for it gives voice to "living things" – the reality of the subconscious.

Joyce's "Olympian prose" is not only life-giving and regenerative, it visits hell onto the "sadistic mother" England. Sharing a distain for England, Loy incites Joyce "With Ireland's wings," to "flap pandemoniums" - abodes of demons and hell – of satire, aimed at "the imperial Rose" (l. 21-22, 25):

> With Ireland's wings
> flap pandemoniums
> of Olympian prose
>
> and satirize
> the imperial Rose
> of Gaelic perfumes
> —England
> the sadistic mother
> embraces Erin —
> (l.21-29)

The embrace of Mother England will engulf and destroy Erin. Loy's placement of the preposition "of" in her instruction to "satirize/ the imperial Rose / of Gaelic perfumes," seems to imply that Joyce's satire might remove the contributing scent of Ireland, making the English rose less attractive. Loy's choice of grand, archaic diction not only raises Joyce – so often accused of peddling filth and obscenity – up to Olympic and Empyrean heights, but also demonstrates Loy's love of language. Like Joyce, she was polylingual, and she described herself as thinking in a "a subconscious muddle of foreign languages" (Conover 173). She therefore establishes a connection between her desire for a new foreign "Anglo-Mongrel" language and Joyce building a new Tower of Babel, from which he will "reject-recreate."[396] The poem closes:

> A gravid day
> spawns
> guttural gargoyles
> upon the Tower of Babel
>
> Empyrean emporium
> where the
> rejector-recreator

[396] Loy wrote a long autobiographical poem entitled "Anglo-Mongrels and the Rose" (1923-25), now out of print. The first two installments of "Anglo-Mongrels and the Rose" were published in the *Little Review* (1923) and the third in Robert McAlmon *Contact Collection of Contemporary Verse* (1925). See Perloff, Marjorie. "English as a 'Second' Language: Mina Loy's 'Anglo-Mongrels and the Rose.'" *Jacket*, vol 5, 1998. Available at http://jacketmagazine.com/05/mina-anglo.html, accessed 6 June 2019.

Joyce
flashes the giant reflector
on the sub rosa – – –
(l. 52-61).

Joyce, a master manipulator of language, embellishes the Tower of Babel with gargoyles, adorning it with crafted ugliness made from the pregnant meaning of a "gravid" June day. Gargoyles, who combine angelic protection, demonic repulsion, and practicality (siphoning water away from the roof and walls) aid in the rejection-recreation of Joyce's "turrace of Babbel" as he calls it in *Finnegans Wake*.[397] Joyce's difficult texts - polylingual and polyvalent -:makes comprehension troublesome, and his status as an English-speaking Irishman undercuts the notion of a society united by a language – revealing the violent means union is achieved. Joyce's contribution to language is, Loy seems to suggest, both a resurrection and recreation - appropriate for the "Phoenix /of Irish fires" (l. 18-19). She alludes to the creation of the world, making Joyce the God-Creator: "The word made flesh" (l.33). This recalls Genesis I: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God," and John 1:14: "And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us." She implies that, by her creation of an art about Joyce's art, she too might be considered a God-creator.[398] Unlike the Christian Trinity – including Jesus - Joyce's word-flesh is corporeal, human, fallible, and *sexual*. Loy, wittily, calls Bloom - Joyce's Christ-figure - the "Don Juan / of Judea" who is "upon a pilgrimage / to the Libido" (l. 38-41). From his Martello-Babel tower Joyce reflects Irish art from his cracked looking glass onto the "sub rosa" – she who is under the Rose, i.e. Ireland - but also that which is done in secret, the sexual life of humanity.

Though Loy and Joyce share an outspoken engagement with bodily matters, Loy's approach is significantly different to that of Joyce and not simply because of the difference between prose and poetry. Unlike the fleshy, visceral, tactile, human bodies of Joyce, Loy's bodies are anatomical not sensuous. The feel of Loy's bodies is sculptural – solid but slippery, visible but cold to the touch, anatomical not sensorial. Whereas Bloom wonders if Venuses have anuses and plans to find out, Loy's Venuses are ruined, fragmented, their broken parts on display, and their innards exposed so that no one thinks to look for their orifices because the tragedy of flesh is so exposed.

Queer Joy

Loy is in some ways a "typical" modernist – cerebral, difficult, anti-sentimental, unemotional, irreverent, shocking, and engaged in the problems of her day. But she is also atypical

[397] Joyce, James. *Finnegans Wake*. 7th edition. New York: The Viking Press, 1957, p.199.31.
[398] See Loy's "Apology for Genius" (1922), where she also links herself to the genius coterie of modernists: "Ostracized as we are with God" (*LBB* 77-78).

and non-normative in her outspoken insistence to see sex, pleasure, and life clearly. In her candid articulation of sex, her non-normative performance of gender, her often critical stance to heteronormativity and the structure of marriage that props it up, and her pleasure in the abject and rejected, Mina Loy is queer. Loy's joy in sex and new sexual grammar offers a radical intervention into the Modernist art scene. Pleasure can be radical when your pleasure is considered dangerous or deviant. As Sara Ahmed points out the publicness of pleasure can become an act of aggression. She states that "pleasure involves not only the capacity to enter into, or inhabit with ease, social space, but also functions as a form of entitlement and belonging. Spaces are claimed through enjoyment, an enjoyment that is returned by being witnessed by others" (*CPE* 165). Loy's very public performance of her complicated, queer pleasures is illustrated by "Songs to Joannes." Loy's advocates especially for women's pleasure, stating that, "Nature has endowed the complete woman with a faculty for expressing herself through all her functions – there are **no restrictions**" ("Feminist Manifesto" 154). Loy sought to remove these psychic and emotional restrictions through her writing. Part of the joy of Loy's poetry is in its honest depiction of female desire and sexual intercourse, and part of Loy's queerness is the amalgamation of descriptions of explicit encounters. Simultaneously difficult, her meaning opaque and undetermined, but also indeterminate, direct and fresh, her vocabulary and style create a poetics that queers modernism.[399] Loy, and others in the sexual avant-garde, were, in part, calling into being a future aesthetic and sexual freedom that did not currently exist. As José Muñoz posits in *Cruising Utopia*, "Queerness is a structuring and educated mode of desiring that allows us to see and feel beyond the quagmire of the present."[400] Aesthetic production is often the mode in which the kernel of possible queer futures begins to flourish, allowing for new and better pleasures: "we must dream and enact new and better pleasures, other ways of being in the world, and ultimately new worlds" (Muñoz 1). As in Loy's "Psycho Democracy," it is through new words, new aesthetics, and new queer experiences that new structures of feeling can emerge. Despite her reputation for sardonic irony, there is a sense of euphoria in Loy's work - euphoria understood in the sense of "bearing well" and "the power to endure," if not easily then consistently – which links her work to persistence. Loy's pleasures are euphoric in their dysphoria quite often, taking and finding pleasure and creating beauty in that which brings unease as well as joy.

[399] William Carlos Williams felt that Loy's hallmark directness was what frightened people who read her poetry (*BM* 432).
[400] Muñoz, José Esteban. *Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity*. NYU Press, 2009, p.1.

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APPENDIX A: MINA LOY'S POEMS

Lunar Baedeker

A silver Lucifer
serves
cocaine in cornucopia

To some somnambulists
of adolescent thighs
draped
in satirical draperies

Peris in livery
prepare
Lethe
for posthumous parvenues

Delirious Avenues
lit
with the chandelier souls
of infusoria
from Pharoah's tombstones

lead
to mercurial doomsdays
Odious oasis
in furrowed phosphorous — — —

the eye-white sky-light
white-light district
of lunar lusts

— — — Stellectric signs
“Wing shows on Starway”
“Zodiac carrousel”

Cyclones
of ecstatic dust
and ashes whirl
crusaders
from hallucinatory citadels
of shattered glass
into evacuate craters

A flock of dreams
browse on Necropolis

From the shores
of oval oceans
in the oxidized Orient

Onyx-eyed Odalisques
and ornithologists
observe
the flight
of Eros obsolete

And “Immortality”
mildews…
in the museums of the moon

“Nocturnal cyclops”
“Crystal concubine”
— — — — — — —
Pocked with personification
the fossil virgin of the skies

waxes and wanes — — — —

The Effectual Marriage

or

The Insipid Narrative

of

GINA AND MIOVANNI

The door was an absurd thing
Yet it was passable
They quotidienly passed through it
It was this shape

Gina and Miovanni who they were God knows
They knew it was important to them
This being of who they were
They were themselves
Corporeally transcendentally consecutively
conjunctively and they were quite complete

In the evening they looked out of their two windows
Miovanni out of his library window
Gina from the kitchen window
From among his pots and pans
Where he so kindly kept her
Where she so wisely busied herself
Pots and Pans she cooked in them
All sorts of sialagogues
Some say that happy women are immaterial

So here we might dispense with her
Gina being a female
But she was more than that
Being an incipience a correlative
an instigation of the reaction of man
From the palpable to the transcendent

Mollescent irritant of his fantasy
Gina had her use Being useful
contentedly conscious
She flowered in Empyrean
From which no well-mated woman ever returns

Sundays a warm light in the parlor
From the gritty road on the white wall
anybody could see it
Shimmered a composite effigy
Madonna crinolined a man
hidden beneath her hoop
Ho for the blue and red of her
The silent eyelids of her
The shiny smile of her

Ding dong said the bell
Miovanni Gina called
Would it be fitting for you to tell
the time for supper
Pooh said Miovanni I am
Outside time and space

Patience said Gina is an attribute
And she learned at any hour to offer
The dish appropriately delectable

What had Miovanni made of his ego
In his library
What had Gina wondered among the pots and pans
One never asked the other
So they the wise ones eat their suppers in peace

Of what their peace consisted

We cannot say
Only that he was magnificently man
She insignificantly a woman who understood
Understanding what is that
To Each his entity to others
their idiosyncrasies to the free expansion
to the annexed their liberty
To man his work
To woman her love
Succulent meals and an occasional caress
So be it
It so seldom is

While Miovanni thought alone in the dark
Gina supposed that peeping she might see
A round light shining where his mind was
She never opened the door
Fearing that this might blind her
Or even
That she should see Nothing at all
So while he thought
She hung out of the window
Watching for falling stars
And when a star fell
She wished that still
Miovanni would love her tomorrow
And as Miovanni
Never gave any heed to the matter
He did

Gina was a woman
Who wanted everything
To be everything in woman
Everything everyway at once

Diurnally variegate
Miovanni always knew her
She was Gina
Gina who lent monogamy
With her fluctuant aspirations
A changeant consistency
Unexpected intangibilities
Miovanni remained
Monumentally the same
The same Miovanni
If he had become anything else
Gina's world would have been at an end
Gina with no axis to revolve on
Must have dwindled to a full stop.

In the mornings she dropped
Cool crystals
Through devotional fingers
Saccharine for his cup
And marketed
With a Basket
Trimmed with a red flannel flower
When she was lazy
She wrote a poem on the milk bill
The first strophe Good morning
The second Good night
Something not too difficult to
Learn by heart

The scrubbed smell of the white-wood table
Greasy cleanliness of the chopper board
The coloured vegetables
Intuited quality of flour
Crickly sparks of straw-fanned charcoal

Ranged themselves among her audacious happinesses
Pet simplicities of her Universe
Where circles were only round
Having no vices.

(This narrative halted when I learned that the house which inspired it was the home of a mad woman.

— Forte dei Marmi)

Virgins Plus Curtains Minus Dots

Latin Borghese

Houses hold virgins
The door's on the chain

'Plumb streets with hearts'
'Bore curtains with eyes'

Virgins without dots
Stare beyond probability

See the men pass
Their hats are not ours
We take a walk
They are going somewhere
And they may look everywhere
Men's eyes look into things
Our eyes look out

A great deal of ourselves
We offer to the mirror
Something less to the confessional
The rest to Time
There is so much Time
Everything is full of it
Such a long time
Virgins may whisper
'Transparent nightdresses made all of lace'
Virgins may squeak
'My dear I should faint'
Flutter . . . . . flutter . . . . flutter . . . .

. . . . ‘And then the man —'
Wasting our giggles
For we have no dots

We have been taught
Love is a god
White with soft wings
Nobody shouts
Virgins for sale
Yet where are our coins
For buying a purchaser
Love is a god
Marriage expensive
A secret well kept
Makes the noise of the world
Nature's arms spread wide
Making room for us
Room for all of us
Somebody who was never
a virgin
Has bolted the door
Put curtains at our windows
See the men pass
They are going somewhere

Fleshes like weeds
Sprout in the light
So much flesh in the world
Wanders at will

Some behind curtains
Throbs to the night
Bait to the stars
Spread it with gold

And you carry it home
Against your shirt front
To . . . . . a shaded light
With the door locked
Against virgins who
Might scratch.

Feminist Manifesto

The feminist movement as at present instituted is

Inadequate

Women if you want to realize yourselves-you are on the eve of a devastating psychological upheaval-all your pet illusions must be unmasked—the lies of centuries have got to go—are you prepared for the Wrench—? There is no half-measure—NO scratching on the surface of the rubbish heap of tradition, will bring about Reform, the only method is

Absolute Demolition

Cease to place your confidence in economic legislation, vice-crusades & uniform education-you are glossing over

Reality.

Professional & commercial careers are opening up for you—

Is that all you want ?

And if you honestly desire to find your level without prejudice—be Brave & deny at the outset—that pathetic clap-trap war cry Woman is the equal of man—

for

She is NOT!

The man who lives a life in which his activities conform to a social code which is protectorate of the feminine element—is no longer masculine

The women who adapt themselves to a theoretical valuation of their sex as a relative impersonality, are not yet Feminine

Leave off looking to men to find out what you are not —seek within yourselves to find out what you are

As conditions are at present constituted—you have the choice between Parasitism, & Prostitution—or Negation

Men & women are enemies, with the enmity of the exploited for the parasite, the parasite for the exploited—at present they are at the mercy of the advantage that each can take of the others sexual dependence—. The only point at which the interests of the sexes merge—is the sexual embrace.

The first illusion it is to your interest to demolish is the division of women into two classes the mistress, & the mother every well-balanced & developed woman knows that is not true, Nature has endowed the complete woman with a faculty for expressing herself through all her

functions—there are no restrictions on the woman who is so incompletely evolved as to be un-self-conscious in sex, will prove a restrictive influence on the temperamental expansion of the next generation; the woman who is a poor mistress will be an incompetent mother—an inferior mentality—& will enjoy an inadequate apprehension of Life.

To obtain results you must make sacrifices & the first & greatest sacrifice you have to make is of your "virtue"
The fictitious value of a woman as identified with her physical purity—is too easy a stand-by rendering her lethargic in the acquisition of intrinsic merits of character by which she could obtain a concrete value—therefore, the first self-enforced law for the female sex, as a protection against the man made bogey of virtue—which is the principal instrument of her subjection, would be the unconditional surgical destruction of virginity through-out the female population at puberty—.

The value of man is assessed entirely according to his use or interest to the community, the value of woman depends entirely on chance, her success or insuccess in maneouvering a man into taking the life-long responsibility of her—
The advantages of marriage are too ridiculously ample—

compared to all other trades—for under modern conditions a woman can accept preposterously luxurious support from a man (with-out the return of an sort—even offspring)—as a thank offering for her virginity
The woman who has not succeeded in striking that advantageous bargain—is prohibited from any but surreptitious re-action to Life-stimuli—& entirely debarred maternity.
Every woman has a right to maternity—
Every woman of superior intelligence should realize her race-responsibility, in producing children in adequate proportion to the unfit or degenerate members of her sex—

Each child of a superior woman should be the result of a definite period of psychic development in her life—& and not necessarily of a possible irksome & outworn continuance of an alliance—spontaneously adapted for vital creation in the beginning but not necessarily harmoniously balanced as the parties to it—follow their individual lines of personal evolution—
For the harmony of race, each individual should be the expression of an easy & ample interpenetration of the male & female temperaments—free of stress
Woman must become more responsible for the child than man—
Woman must destroy in themselves, the desire to be loved—

The feeling that it is a personal insult when a man transfers his attention from her to another woman
The desire for comfortable protection instead of an intelligent curiosity & courage in meeting & resisting the pressure of life
sex or so called love must be reduced to its initial element, honour, grief, sentimentality, pride and & consequently jealousy must be detached from it.
Woman for her happiness must retain her deceptive fragility of appearance, combined with indomitable will, irreducible courage, & abundant health the outcome of sound nerves—
Another great illusion is that woman must use all her introspective and clear-sightedness & unbiassed bravery to destroy—for the sake of her self respect is the impurity of sex
the realization in defiance of superstition that there is nothing impure in sex—except in the mental attitude to it—will constitute an incalculable & wider social regeneration than it is possible for our generation to imagine.

Aphorisms on Futurism

DIE in the Past
Live in the Future.

THE velocity of velocities arrives in starting.

IN pressing the material to derive its essence, matter becomes deformed.

AND form hurtling against itself is thrown beyond the synopsis of vision.

THE straight line and the circle are the parents of design, form the basis of art; there is no limit to their coherent variability.

LOVE the hideous in order to find the sublime core of it.

OPEN your arms to the dilapidated; rehabilitate them.

YOU prefer to observe the past on which your eyes are already opened.

BUT the Future is only dark from outside.
Leap into it—and it EXPLODES with *Light*.

FORGET that you live in houses, that you may live in yourself—

FOR the smallest people live in the greatest houses.

BUT the smallest person, potentially, is as great as the Universe.

WHAT can you know of expansion, who limit yourselves to compromise?

HITHERTO the great man has achieved greatness by keeping the people small.

BUT in the Future, by inspiring the people to expand to their fullest capacity, the great man proportionately must be tremendous—a God.

LOVE of others is the appreciation of oneself.

MAY your egotism be so gigantic that you comprise mankind in your self-sympathy.

THE Future is limitless—the past a trail of insidious reactions.

LIFE is only limited by our prejudices. Destroy them, and you cease to be at the mercy of yourself.

TIME is the dispersion of intensiveness.

THE Futurist can live a thousand years in one poem.

HE can compress every aesthetic principle in one line.

THE mind is a magician bound by assimilations; let him loose and the smallest idea conceived in freedom will suffice to negate the wisdom of all forefathers.

LOOKING on the past you arrive at "Yes," but before you can act upon it you have already arrived at "No."

THE Futurist must leap from affirmative to affirmative, ignoring intermittent negations—must spring from stepping-stone to stone of creative exploration; without slipping back into the turbid stream of accepted facts.

THERE are no excrescences on the absolute, to which man may pin his faith.

TODAY is the crisis in consciousness.

CONSCIOUSNESS cannot spontaneously accept or reject new forms, as offered by creative genius; it is the new form, for however great a period of time it may remain a mere irritant—that molds consciousness to the necessary amplitude for holding it.

CONSCIOUSNESS has no climax.

LET the Universe flow into your consciousness, there is no limit to its capacity, nothing that it shall not re-create.

UNSCREW your capability of absorption and grasp the elements of Life—*Whole.*

MISERY is in the disintegration of Joy;
Intellect, of Intuition;
Acceptance, of Inspiration.

CEASE to build up your personality with the ejections of irrelevant minds.

NOT to be a cipher in your ambient,
But to color your ambient with your preferences.

NOT to accept experience at its face value.

BUT to readjust activity to the peculiarity of your own will.

THESE are the primary tentatives towards independence.

MAN is a slave only to his own mental lethargy.

YOU cannot restrict the mind's capacity.

THEREFORE you stand not only in abject servitude to your perceptive consciousness—

BUT also to the mechanical re-actions of the subconsciousness, that rubbish heap of race-tradition—

AND believing yourself to be free—your least conception is colored by the pigment of retrograde superstitions.

HERE are the fallow-lands of mental spatiality that Futurism will clear—

MAKING place for whatever you are brave enough, beautiful enough to draw out of the realized self.

TO your blushing we shout the obscenities, we scream the blasphemies, that you, being weak, whisper alone in the dark.

THEY are empty except of your shame.

AND so these sounds shall dissolve back to their innate senselessness.

THUS shall evolve the language of the Future.

THROUGH derision of Humanity as it appears—

TO arrive at respect for man as he shall be—

ACCEPT the tremendous truth of Futurism
Leaving all those

—Knick-knacks. —

Songs to Joannes (1917)

I

Spawn of Fantasies
Silting the appraisable
Pig Cupid his rosy snout
Rooting erotic garbage
"Once upon a time"
Pulls a weed white and star-topped
Among wild oats sewn in mucous-membrane

I would an eye in a bengal light
Eternity in a sky-rocket
Constellations in an ocean
Whose rivers run no fresher
Than a trickle of saliva

These are suspect places

I must live in my lantern
Trimming subliminal flicker
Virginal to the bellows
Of Experience
Coloured glass

II

The skin-sack
In which a wanton duality
Packed
All the completions of my infructuous impulses
Something the shape of a man
To the casual vulgarity of the merely observant
More of a clock-work mechanism
Running down against time
To which I am not paced

My finger-tips are numb from fretting your hair
A God's door-mat
On the threshold of your mind

III

We might have coupled
In the bed-ridden monopoly of a moment
Or broken flesh with one another
At the profane communion table
Where wine is spill'd on promiscuous lips

We might have given birth to a butterfly
With the daily-news
Printed in blood on its wings

IV

Once in a mezzanino
The starry ceiling
Vaulted an unimaginable family
Bird-like abortions
With human throats
A n d Wisdom's eyes
Who wore lamp-shade red dresses
And woolen hair

One bore a baby
In a padded porte-enfant
Tied with a sarsanet ribbon
To her goose's wings

But for the abominable shadows
I would have lived
Among their fearful furniture
To teach them to tell me their secrets

Before I guessed
—Sweeping the brood clean out

V

Midnight empties the street
Of all but us
Three
I am undecided which way back
To the left a boy
—One wing has been washed in the rain
The other will never be clean any more—
Pulling door-bells to remind
Those that are snug
To the right a halœd ascetic
Threading houses
Probes wounds for souls
—The poor can't wash in hot water—
And I dont know which turning to take
Since you got home to yourself—first

VI

I know the Wire-Puller intimately
And if it were not for the people
On whom you keep one eye
You could look straight at me
And Time would be set back

VII

My pair of feet
Smack the flag-stones
That are something left over from your walking
The wind stuffs the scum of the white street
Into my lungs and my nostrils
Exhilarated birds

Prolonging flight into the night
Never reaching — — — — — — —

VIII

I am the jealous store-house of the candle-ends
That lit your adolescent learning
— — — — — — — — — —
Behind God's eyes
There might
Be other lights

IX

When we lifted
Our eye-lids on Love
A cosmos
Of coloured voices
And laughing honey

And spermatazoa
At the core of Nothing
In the milk of the Moon

X

Shuttle-cock and battle-door
A little pink-love
And feathers are strewn

XI

Dear one at your mercy
Our Universe
Is only
A colorless onion
You derobe
Sheath by sheath

Remaining
A disheartening odour
About your nervy hands

XII

Voices break on the confines of passion
Desire Suspicion Man Woman
Solve in the humid carnage

Flesh from flesh
Draws the inseparable delight
Kissing at gasps to catch it

Is it true
That I have set you apart
Inviolate in an utter crystallization
Of all the jolting of the crowd
Taught me willingly to live to share

Or are you
Only the other half
Of an ego's necessity
Scourging pride with compassion
To the shallow sound of dissonance
And boom of escaping breath

XIII

Come to me There is something
I have got to tell you and I can't tell
Something taking shape
Something that has a new name
A new dimension
A new use
A new illusion

It is ambient And it is in your eyes
Something shiny Something only for you
Something that I must not see

It is in my ears Something very resonant
Something that you must not hear
Something only for me
Let us be very jealous
Very suspicious
Very conservative
Very cruel
Or we might make an end of the jostling of aspirations
Disorb inviolate egos

Where two or three are welded together
They shall become god
— — — — — — —
Oh that's right
Keep away from me Please give me a push
Don't let me understand you Don't realise me
Or we might tumble together
Depersonalized
Identical
Into the terrific Nirvana
Me you — you — me

XIV
Today
Everlasting passing apparent imperceptible
To you
I bring the nascent virginity of
—Myself for the moment
No love or the other thing
Only the impact of lighted bodies

Knocking sparks off each other
In chaos

XV

Seldom Trying for Love
Fantasy dealt them out as gods
Two or three men looked only human

But you alone
Superhuman apparently
I had to be caught in the weak eddy
Of your drivelling humanity
To love you most

XVI

We might have lived together
In the lights of the Arno
Or gone apple stealing under the sea
Or played
Hide and seek in love and cob-webs
And a lullaby on a tin-pan

And talked till there were no more tongues
To talk with
And never have known any better

XVII

I don't care
Where the legs of the legs of the furniture are walking to
Or what is hidden in the shadows they stride
Or what would look at me
If the shutters were not shut

Red a warm colour on the battle-field
Heavy on my knees as a counterpane
Count counter
I counted the fringe of the towel
Till two tassels clinging together
Le t the square room fall away
From a round vacuum
Dilating with my breath

XVIII

Out of the severing
Of hill from hill
The interim
Of star from star
The nascent
Static
Of night

XIX

Nothing so conserving
As cool cleaving
Note of the Q H U
Clear carving
Breath-giving
Pollen smelling
Space

White telling
Of slaking
Drinkable
Through fingers
Running water
Grass haulms
Grow to

Leading astray
Of fireflies
Ærial quadrille
Bouncing
Off one another
Again conjoining
In recaptured pulses
Of light

You too
Had something
At that time
Of a green-lit glow-worm
— — — — — — —
Yet slowly drenched
To raylessness
In rain

XX

Let Joy go solace-winged
To flutter whom she may concern

XXI

I store up nights against you
Heavy with shut-flower's nightmares
— — — — — — — — — —
Stack noons
Curled to the solitaire
Core of the
Sun

XXII

Green things grow
Salads

For the cerebral
Forager's revival
Upon bossed bellies
Of mountains
Rolling in the sun
And flowered flummery
Breaks
To my silly shœs

In ways without you
I go
Gracelessly
As things go

XXIII

Laughter in solution
Stars in a stare
Irredeemable pledges
Of pubescent consummations
Rot
To the recurrent moon
Bleach
To the pure white
Wickedness of pain

XXIV

The procreative truth of Me
Petered out
In pestilent
Tear drops
Little lusts and lucidities
And prayerful lies
Muddled with the heinous acerbity Of your street-corner smile

XXV

Licking the Arno
The little rosy
Tongue of Dawn
Interferes with our eyelashes
— — — — — — — —
We twiddle to it
Round and round
Faster
And turn into machines

Till the sun
Subsides in shining
Melts some of us
Into abysmal pigeon-holes
Passion has bored
In warmth

Some few of us
Grow to the level of cool plains
Cutting our foot-hold
With steel eyes

XXVI

Shedding our petty pruderies
From slit eyes

We sidle up
To Nature
— — — that irate pornographist

XXVII

Nucleus Nothing
Inconceivable concept

Insentient repose
The hands of races
Drop off from
Immodifiable plastic

The contents
Of our ephemeral conjunction
In aloofness from Much
Flowed to approachment of— — — —
NOTHING
There was a man and a woman
In the way
While the Irresolvable
Rubbed with our daily deaths
Impossible eyes

XXVIII

The steps go up for ever
And they are white
And the first step is the last white
Forever
Coloured conclusions
Smelt to synthetic
Whiteness
Of my
Emergence
And I am burnt quite white
In the climacteric
Withdrawal of your sun
And wills and words all white
Suffuse
Illimitable monotone

White where there is nothing to see
But a white towel
Wipes the cymophonous sweat
—Mist rise of living—
From your
Etiolate body
And the white dawn
Of your New Day

Shuts down on me
Unthinkable that white over there
— — — Is smoke from your house

XXIX

Evolution fall foul of
Sexual equality
Prettily miscalculate
Similitude

Unnatural selection
Breed such sons and daughters
As shall jibber at each other
Uninterpretable cryptonyms
Under the moon

Give them some way of braying brassily
For caressive calling
Or to homophonous hiccoughs
Transpose the laugh
Let them suppose that tears
Are snowdrops or molasses
Or anything
Than human insufficiencies
Begging dorsal vertebræ

Let meeting be the turning
To the antipodean
And Form a blurr
Anything
Than seduce them
To the one
As simple satisfaction
For the other

Let them clash together
From their incognitœs
In seismic orgasm

For far further
Differentiation
Rather than watch
Own-self distortion
Wince in the alien ego

XXX
In some
Prenatal plagiarism
Fœtal buffoons
Caught tricks
— — — — —

From archetypal pantomime
Stringing emotions
Looped aloft
— — — —

For the blind eyes
That Nature knows us with

And the most of Nature is green
— — — — — — — — — —

What guaranty
For the proto-form
We fumble
Our souvenir ethics to

XXXI
Crucifixion
Of a busy-body
Longing to interfere so
With the intimacies
Of your insolent isolation

Crucifixion
Of an illegal ego's
Eclosion
On your equilibrium
Caryatid of an idea

Crucifixion
Wracked arms
Index extremities
In vacuum
To the unbroken fall

XXXII
The moon is cold
Joannes
Where the Mediterranean — — — — —

XXXIII
The prig of passion — — — —

To your professorial paucity

Proto-plasm was raving mad
Evolving us — — —

XXXIV

Love — — — the preeminent literateur

Joyce's Ulysses

The Normal Monster
sings in the Green Sahara

The voice and offal
of the image of God

make Celtic noises
in these lyrical hells

Hurricanes
of reasoned musics
reap the uncensored earth

The loquent consciousness
of living things
pours in torrential languages

The elderly colloquists
the Spirit and the Flesh
are out of tongue — — —

The Spirit
is impaled upon the phallus

Phoenix
of Irish fires
lighten the Occident

with Ireland's wings
flap pandemoniums
of Olympian prose

and satinize
the imperial Rose
of Gaelic perfumes
— England
the sadistic mother
embraces Erin—

Master
of meteoric idiom
present

The word made flesh
and feeding upon itself
with erudite fangs
The sanguine
introspection of the womb

Don Juan
of Judea
upon a pilgrimage
to the Libido

The Press — — —
purring
its lullabies to sanity

Christ capitalized
scourging
incontrite usurers of destiny
—in hole and corner temples

And hang
The soul's advertisements
outside the ecclesiast's Zoo

A gravid day
spawns
gutteral gargoyles
upon the Tower of Babel

Empyrean emporium
where the
rejector-recreator
        Joyce
flashes the giant reflector
on the sub rosa — — —